VZCZCXRO0991
OO RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHPB
DE RUEHHI #0027/01 0420705
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 110705Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0866
INFO ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 0471
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 000027 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
FOR EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/11 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEAN MARR MOPS CH RS VM
SUBJECT: DAS MARCIEL DISCUSSES REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE WITH GVN 
OFFICIALS 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Virginia Palmer, CDA; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: Vietnam continues to push for a U.S. Presidential 
visit in 2010 and, less forcefully, for the United States to join 
the East Asia Summit (EAS).  In separate conversations with EAP DAS 
Marciel, Vietnam's Senior Official for ASEAN and the influential 
Vice President of Vietnam's Diplomatic Academy (DAV) welcomed the 
United States' "return" to the region, but warned that U.S. 
engagement was insufficient to balance China's growing clout.  The 
DAV's Dang Dinh Quy was blunt, warning that senior CPV officials 
were turning to Russia as a counter to China; Assistant FM Pham 
Quang Vinh was more circumspect, though he too stressed that Hu 
Jintao and Dimitri Medvedev had already committed to coming to 
Hanoi this Fall.  Speaking of ASEAN more generally, AFM Vinh said 
that Vietnam was focused primarily on efforts to build an ASEAN 
Community by 2015 but was also looking to strengthen ASEAN's 
external relations; he cited disaster-relief coordination within 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a good way to build confidence. 
Vinh affirmed that member countries backed an "ADMM +" mechanism, 
though important details remained unresolved.  Vinh acknowledged 
that U.S. flexibility on Burma would be difficult to sustain absent 
a substantive dialogue with the opposition that went beyond the 
mere staging of an election.  DAS Marciel assured his Vietnamese 
counterparts that the President supported a second U.S.-ASEAN 
summit but said that a late October visit to Hanoi was unlikely. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
Push for a POTUS visit, EAS 
 
--------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶2.  (C) In separate meetings with EAP DAS Scot Marciel February 5, 
Vietnam's Senior Official for ASEAN, AFM Pham Quang Vinh, and the 
Vice President of the MFA-affiliated Diplomatic Academy, Dang Dinh 
Quy, reiterated Vietnam's invitation for the President to visit 
Hanoi at the end of October to participate in ASEAN and ARF-related 
meetings.  Quy struck a dramatic note, arguing that while the U.S. 
"return" in the region was welcome, Vietnam's leaders viewed it as 
insufficient to counter China's growing influence and were looking 
to Russia to provide countervailing pressure -- a "dangerous trend" 
in Quy's mind but one that reflected the "psychology" of several 
key Politburo members.  As an example of growing Russian influence, 
Russia and Vietnam are close to concluding a deal for Russia to 
build Vietnam's first commercial nuclear power plant, according to 
recent press reports and National Assembly member Vu Xuan Hong. 
Only more substantive engagement and perhaps a Presidential visit 
would serve to dispel the perception that the United States was not 
truly committed to the region, Quy insisted.  AFM Vinh was less 
alarmist, but he too emphasized that a Presidential visit to Hanoi 
would be "extremely important" for ASEAN, reiterating that ASEAN's 
foreign ministers had reached a "consensus" that Vietnam should 
host the second U.S.-ASEAN Summit in Hanoi.  Vinh also noted that 
the Chinese and Russian Presidents had already committed to coming 
to Vietnam.  (Comment: In his current "track one and a half" 
position, Quy -- a savvy diplomat known for blunt talk -- is 
frequently employed to articulate positions that, while resonant 
with GVN policy, are too sensitive for the MFA to own officially. 
This was Quy's role as the co-leader of Vietnam's delegation to the 
last two U.S.-Vietnam policy planning discussions.  Not 
coincidentally, a prominent Russian-educated member of Vietnam's 
National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee, Vu Xuan Hong, 
delivered a similar message on Russia to DAS Marciel during an 
informal lunch hosted by the Ambassador the same day.  End 
comment.) 
 
 
 
¶3.  (C) Quy and Vinh also urged the United States to participate 
directly in the East Asia Summit.  Quy argued that a U.S. presence 
in the EAS would bolster Vietnam's ability to maintain an 
independent foreign policy, a guiding principle for Vietnamese 
diplomacy that Quy said was jeopardized by China's increasing might 
and the resulting impulse to lean to Russia.  (Note: MFA DG for the 
Americas, Nguyen Ba Hung told DAS Marciel earlier in the day that 
PM Dung had endorsed an Indonesia proposal that the United States 
play a central role in the EAS.  Septel.  End note.)  AFM Vinh was 
again more guarded, saying that while it favored U.S. participation 
in EAS, Vietnam would have to consult with other member states. 
Vinh declined to characterize China's views but said that there was 
a consensus within EAS that the summit should be "inclusive," with 
 
HANOI 00000027  002 OF 003 
 
 
both Russia and the United States viewed as eventual participants. 
Vinh said that with the U.S. decision to sign the Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation, there were no more "technical" obstacles to U.S. 
involvement in the EAS.  DAS Marciel cautioned that while the 
United States was "interested" in the EAS, at this stage it was 
still seeking other countries' views, especially on how the EAS 
would fit with other pieces of the regional architecture, APEC most 
particularly.  Vinh sought to be reassuring, arguing that EAS and 
APEC were complementary not competing: while APEC's main brief 
remained economic security and trade, EAS was a "high-level policy 
forum" better suited for "strategic questions." 
 
 
 
¶4.  (C) DAS Marciel assured his counterparts that the President 
valued the U.S.-ASEAN Summit mechanism and was committed to meeting 
again in 2010.  A Presidential visit to Hanoi at the end of October 
was unrealistic, however, given that the President had committed to 
traveling to Seoul and Tokyo to attend the G20 and APEC meetings in 
mid November.  More likely, DAS Marciel noted, was a New York 
summit in connection with UNGA, unless something could be worked 
out in Asia in connection with the G20/APEC trip.  Both Quy and 
Vinh seemed prepared for this response.  While reiterating the 
"need" for a Presidential-level summit, preferably in Hanoi, the 
two said that Vietnam was prepared to be flexible with the timing 
(for both the US-ASEAN Leaders' Meeting and the EAS) though Vinh 
noted China and Russia also had scheduling concerns.  (Vinh also 
reminded DAS Marciel that Vietnam wanted to participate in the 
G20.)  DAS Marciel stressed that as far as the U.S.-ASEAN Summit 
was concerned, it was simply a question of scheduling.  Alluding to 
his more difficult conversation with MPS Vice Minister Nguyen Van 
Huong earlier that day (septel), DAS Marciel told AFM Vinh that 
Vietnam could, however, do more to make itself a more attractive 
site for a bilateral visit. 
 
 
 
Visions for ASEAN, China, South China Sea 
 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C) In each of his meetings, DAS Marciel stressed that the 
United States was committed to becoming an even stronger partner 
with ASEAN, and that our goal was to help ASEAN ensure member 
countries' prosperity, security, and independence.  Emphasizing 
"independence," DAS Marciel added that the United States had no 
designs on ASEAN and believed that no country in the region should 
become too dependent on any one power.  A key piece of this was 
economic, he said, noting that successful economic integration 
would facilitate progress on ASEAN's other two pillars 
(political/security and social/economic).  AFM Vinh concurred, 
arguing that Vietnam held a similar vision for ASEAN.  Vietnam's 
primary focus for its chairmanship would be to support internal 
efforts to build an ASEAN Community by 2015, Vinh said, but added 
that Vietnam would also look to strengthen ASEAN's external 
relations, both through ARF and through the various "ASEAN +" 
mechanisms.  Vinh cited connectivity as a priority, first within 
ASEAN and then with the region as a whole; he also mentioned the 
ASEAN single window as a key step toward establishing a single 
market by 2015.  On ARF, Vinh highlighted discussions on 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as a particularly 
fruitful area of cooperation.  While not specifically  mentioning 
Status of Forces Agreements, Vinh said that he agreed with the U.S. 
assessment that it was not enough to respond to a crisis when it 
occurs; countries must prepare in advance by ironing out the 
procedures for cross-border cooperation, including among member 
countries' militaries.  Vinh said that member countries agreed that 
the ADMM should be expanded, though the precise mechanism remains 
undecided.  (Note: In a conversation last week, reftel, Vinh's 
subordinate, MFA DDG Vu Ho, indicated that there was now informal 
agreement on an "ADMM+8" framework.  End note.) 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Both Vinh and Quy took DAS Maricel's message on 
"independence" as an opportunity to raise Vietnam's concerns about 
China and the South China Sea.  Vinh said that at Davos Prime 
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung had reiterated Vietnam's position that the 
matter should be resolved peacefully and in accord with the 1982 UN 
Law of the Sea.  Vietnam's approach was pragmatic, Vinh emphasized. 
 
HANOI 00000027  003 OF 003 
 
 
Vietnam acknowledged that China preferred to handle the issue with 
individual claimants on a bilateral basis; although Vietnam did not 
share this view, this was not a point that Vietnam argued directly 
with China.  Vinh also conceded that it was difficult to coordinate 
within ASEAN -- not only do some countries not have a stake in the 
territorial dispute, there remain significant disagreements among 
those ASEAN countries that do have claims.  The best approach, Vinh 
said, was to put sovereignty claims aside and to make progress on 
confidence building measures by building on the Declaration of 
Conduct.  This too was difficult, though, because, "like it or 
not," even the most basic confidence-building measures turned back 
to sovereignty issues.  Quy was more alarmist, stressing that 
Vietnam had "big problems" with China.  Along the Tonkin Gulf 
meridian line, for example -- an area supposedly not in dispute -- 
Vietnamese ships engaged in oil exploration faced daily 
intimidation, with Chinese fighter jets flying as low as 200 meters 
and naval vessels approaching within 500 meters. 
 
 
 
Burma 
 
----- 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C) "Burma's generals are hard to love," DAS Marciel told AFM 
Vinh, explaining that U.S. flexibility had so far not been 
reciprocated.  Holding elections in 2010 would not be sufficient, 
if the Burmese elections were not also part of a larger process 
involving a genuine, inclusive dialogue between the generals and 
Aung San Suu Kyi.  Absent such a dialogue, it would be difficult to 
sustain the current U.S. stance, DAS Marciel stressed, adding that 
ASSK was a realist and understood that the generals would not 
simply yield power.  "We know that," Vinh responded without further 
elaboration.  Asked if the Burmese had set a date for elections, 
AFM Vinh backed away from an earlier report that FM Nyan Win had 
mentioned May during January's ASEAN Foreign Ministers retreat in 
Danang. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (U) This cable was cleared by DAS Marciel. 
Palmer