Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 10HANOI168, Treasury Visit to Hanoi: Macroeconomic Uncertainty, Tax

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #10HANOI168.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10HANOI168 2010-02-10 09:25 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Hanoi
VZCZCXRO0323
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHHI #0168/01 0410926
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 100925Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0855
INFO ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 0460
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 HANOI 000168 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON ETRD EFIN EINV EINT VM ASEAN
SUBJECT: Treasury Visit to Hanoi: Macroeconomic Uncertainty, Tax 
Treaty Negotiations and Chiang Mai Progress 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  During Treasury Financial Attach???? Seth 
Bleiweis' 
January 21-22 trip to Hanoi, Vietnamese economic officials 
acknowledged the recent policy shift towards fiscal and monetary 
tightening that began in November 2009, focusing on the control of 
inflation which has now risen for five consecutive months.  There 
was also acknowledgement that the political pressures of the coming 
2011 Communist Party Congress may make it hard for policymakers to 
chart the steady monetary policy course necessary to successfully 
control inflation.  Treasury's interlocutors suggested that 
Vietnam's ongoing balance of payments problems are not yet 
critical, but that economic officials do not have a clear policy 
approach to resolve Vietnam's persistent macroeconomic imbalances. 
Discussing possible double tax treaty negotiations, the General 
Department of Taxation made a critical concession, asserting that 
tax sparing would not be a part of any discussions on a double tax 
treaty.  The Ministry of Finance (MOF) also stated the Government 
of Vietnam's (GVN) objective for full signing of the Chiang Mai 
Initiative for bilateral swap arrangements by the end of March 
2010.  End summary. 
 
 
 
A Clear Macroeconomic Shift, But an Uncertain Course 
 
 
 
2. (SBU) The GVN will be focused on stabilization of the macro 
economy in 2010, said Vice Chairman Vu Viet Ngoan of the National 
Assembly (NA) Economic Committee.  Ngoan stated that the NA spent a 
lot of time reaching this consensus in October 2009 - when the GVN 
began shifting from growth-focused macroeconomic policies to those 
focused on controlling inflation - asserting that the NA was the 
first to raise the need for stabilizing the economy.  "Stability 
provides the foundation for meeting Vietnam's growth target," said 
Ngoan.  However, the coming 2011 Communist Party Congress will 
really challenge the GVN's ability to chart a steady monetary 
course, according to International Monetary Fund (IMF) Regional 
Representative Benedict Bingham.  This concern regarding policy 
consistency was echoed by Vice Chairman Ha Huy Tuan of the National 
Financial Supervisory Commission (NFSC), who raised his worry 
regarding the tension between Vietnam's growth and inflation 
targets, stating that the GVN "wants the country to have 
significant achievement before the party congress."  Tuan suggested 
that the implementation of economic policy will be a challenge and 
that policy could "come back to the old times, with the government 
intervening." 
 
 
 
Rising Inflation the Chief Economic Risk 
 
 
 
3. (SBU) Inflation is now broadly recognized as the chief risk to 
Vietnam's economy.  The State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) acknowledged 
that the fiscal and monetary loosening of 2009 may cause inflation 
in 2010.  The SBV stated that inflation risks have risen lately, 
along with the rising global economy.  January inflation was 7.6 
percent year-on-year, the highest in nine months and a sign that 
double digit inflation is likely in 2010.  NA Vice Chairman Ngoan 
also said he expects increased price pressures in 2010, due in part 
to global recovery, as well as to wage increases and credit growth 
of almost 40%.  Ngoan said the GVN will have to tighten monetary 
and fiscal policy and "lessen the rate of loosening."  He suggested 
that keeping inflation within 7 percent will be difficult and that 
"8 percent CPI growth rate will be acceptable."  NFSC Vice Chairman 
Tuan also said inflation is the "number one" focus, with the budget 
deficit coming second.  However, the GVN wants both growth and 
price stability.  As a result, he is concerned the GVN may 
undertake month-by-month management of the inflation-growth 
balance, tightening and loosening monetary and fiscal policy in 
response to monthly inflation numbers.  Vice President Nguyen Dinh 
Cung of the Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM) - the 
think tank for the Ministry of Planning and Investment - stated 
that his analysis shows that inflation in Vietnam is closely linked 
with credit growth, with about a six-month lag, and that CIEM, 
therefore, expects inflation to pick up around April or May 2010. 
 
 
 
Continuing Balance of Payments and Foreign Exchange Problems 
 
HANOI 00000168  002 OF 004 
 
 
4. (SBU) Vietnam's foreign exchange (forex) reserves likely now 
stand around $15 - $16 billion, according to IMF's Bingham. 
Because Vietnam's forex reserves are too low to effectively defend 
the value of the currency, the success of Vietnam's recent shift in 
monetary policy will be critical to stabilizing the dong, said 
Bingham.  On the upside, he noted that the margin of dong trading 
in the "free" or black market has narrowed to as little as 100 dong 
outside the official band in the interbank market, down from a 
premium of over 1,000 dong.  On the downside, the spread in the 
gold market remains 3 to 4 percent above world gold prices, says 
Bingham.  He said that there are now some signs of people beginning 
to sell foreign exchange to the banks, but the question is "whether 
this is a lull in the storm or a fundamental shift."  The current 
lull may be temporary.  Dollar demand is now off its peak as 
businesses close for the Tet holiday, Tet remittances flow in from 
abroad and SOEs sell forex into the market.  The GVN's recent 
directive instructing SOEs to sell dollars to the banks netted 
about $700 million - $1 billion, according to the SBV. (Note: 
Recent local press reports suggest that increased deposits amount 
to only about $450 million.) 
 
 
 
5. (SBU) Asian Development Bank (ADB) Country Economist Bahodir 
Ganiev stated that Vietnam is still experiencing a persistent 
shortage of forex, while Mr. Cung of CIEM foresees increasing forex 
shortages.  NA Vice Chairman Ngoan, however, suggested that a 
rising global economy and increased foreign direct investment (FDI) 
might resolve Vietnam's current balance of payments problem. 
Deputy Director Nguyen Van Anh of the SBV Foreign Exchange 
Department stated that the GVN is also targeting relieving the 
trade deficit to reduce Vietnam's balance of payments problem.  Anh 
noted the SBV had also recently reduced dollar reserve requirements 
for Vietnamese banks to reduce the pressure on dollar liquidity. 
Anh added that the SBV doesn't see a substantial gap between dollar 
supply and demand and suggested that if the GVN can fully mobilize 
the dollars currently in the banking system there will not be a 
shortage of dollars.  The problem is that "people won't sell 
dollars to banks and dollar borrowing is increasing," said Anh.  He 
expects an improved dollar supply in 2010, aided by the GVN's 
recent successful $1 billion sovereign international bond issuance. 
 
 
 
Possibility of Devaluation and Interest Rate Hikes 
 
 
 
6. (SBU) NA Vice Chairman Ngoan suggested that Vietnam would need 
to maintain forex flexibility in 2010, noting some calls for 
further devaluation to support exports, following on the GVN's 5.4 
percent devaluation of the dong in November 2009.  Ngoan suggested 
that some devaluation would be acceptable, but "strong devaluation" 
is not, suggesting that a "strong devaluation" would create 
pressure on inflation and would increase the dollar debt of VN 
businesses.  Further, Ngoan argued that many of Vietnam's key 
commodity exports - including crude oil, minerals and certain 
agricultural products - are not sensitive to exchange rates because 
they are priced in dollars. 
 
 
 
7. (SBU) Looking forward, IMF's Bingham sees economic malaise more 
likely than monetary panic during the coming year, with continued 
forex rationing and additional administrative measures likely to be 
applied to address continuing forex shortages.  Bingham is not 
convinced of the need for depreciation, suggesting that the dong 
exchange is not fundamentally misaligned -the dong is already 
effectively depreciating against its regional partners because of 
its peg to the depreciating dollar - but the GVN's monetary 
policies are misaligned.  For example, the GVN has recently allowed 
interbank interest rates to fluctuate too broadly; up to 15%, then 
down to 8% on monetary tightening.  Bingham argued that the current 
8% policy base rate is too low and banks can't mobilize capital 
under the current rate cap.  Stating that GVN's monetary policy is 
out of step with the market, he said that there may soon be calls 
for an increase in the policy base rate. 
 
 
 
No Coming Independence for State Bank 
 
 
 
8. (SBU) There now appear to be no short or mid-term prospects for 
 
HANOI 00000168  003 OF 004 
 
 
a more independent Vietnamese central bank.  While Vietnam 
previously had a "roadmap" for an independent central bank, the 
global financial crisis led to its reconsideration and the GVN is 
no longer pursuing plans for SBV independence, according to NFSC 
Vice Chairman Tuan.  The SBV agrees there is no medium term plan 
for SBV independence, despite SBV staff desires to the contrary. 
Further, according to the SBV, given that revisions to the SBV law 
are just now in their final drafts, it will likely be another 3-5 
years before there will be another push for further legislative SBV 
reform.  Echoing NFSC comments, SBV Deputy Director Nguyen Van Anh 
stated the financial crisis has paused moves to further liberalize 
Vietnam's capital markets and that the SBV still faces calls for 
further tightening of currency controls.  Mr. Anh suggested that, 
as the economy grows, market forces will eventually dictate the 
need for further currency flexibility.  But while he sees further 
currency flexibility as likely in the next three to four years, he 
does not anticipate a full currency float. 
 
 
 
General Department of Taxation Agrees to Treasury Precondition 
Regarding Tax Sparing 
 
 
 
9. (SBU) Following on earlier GVN diplomatic notes requesting tax 
treaty negotiations, Bleiweis met with the General Department of 
Taxation (GDT) of the Ministry of Finance to discuss possible 
negotiations for a US-VN treaty on the avoidance of double 
taxation.  During the meeting, GDT Deputy Director General Le Hong 
Hai stated that, while GDT believes the issue of tax sparing should 
not be a precondition to US-VN tax negotiations, in order to 
address the bottleneck in current discussions, "we assert that tax 
sparing will not be a part of discussions on a double tax treaty." 
 
 
 
10. (SBU) DDG Hai expressed her appreciation for US interest in 
possible tax treaty negotiations.  She suggested that, during 
earlier tax treaty discussions in 2007, there may have been a 
misunderstanding about GDT's position on tax sparing.  At that 
time, tax sparing was not raised as a demand, but only as a point 
of discussion in seeking to understand each other's tax policies. 
Bleiweis inquired regarding GDT's record on other key Treasury 
issues of tax information sharing and treaty shopping.  DDG Hai 
opined that these issues should not be points for worry as, based 
on prior US-VN tax discussions in 2007, GDT is not aware of any US 
reservations regarding GDT's positions on either tax information 
sharing or treaty shopping.  Econoff offered to work with GDT to 
clarify any outstanding Treasury questions regarding tax 
information sharing, treaty shopping and quantifying the economic 
benefits of a prospective US-VN tax treaty. 
 
 
 
11. (SBU) In response to US questions regarding information sharing 
and treaty shopping, DDG Hai raised GDT's concern that the US 
seemed to be raising the bar on its preconditions to starting 
negotiations.  She said a tax treaty with the US is a priority for 
GDT and asked whether the US is really interested in starting 
negotiations, expressing her disappointment that GDT's concession 
on tax sparing may not ensure the start of negotiations.  Bleiweis 
clarified that his questions sought to set realistic expectations 
and maximize the possibility of an earlier start to negotiations. 
 
 
 
Chiang Mai Initiative to be Signed by March 2010 
 
 
 
12. (SBU) ASEAN has strengthened its financial cooperation over the 
past year, stated Deputy Director General Nguyen Ba Toan of the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) International Cooperation Department. 
According to MOF, the first stage of this cooperation will be the 
signing of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) to create a network of 
bilateral swap arrangements among the ASEAN+3 countries.  The 
second stage will be the multilateralization of these arrangements. 
MOF noted that Vietnam is currently the co-chair of ASEAN+3 and is 
in favor of multilateralization.  MOF suggested that the CMI would 
not only help countries manage balance of payments crises, but 
would also send a signal of stability during such crises. 
 
HANOI 00000168  004 OF 004 
 
 
13. (SBU) The GVN's objective is for full signing of the CMI by the 
end of March and MOF is confident that all ten countries will sign. 
The ASEAN+3 countries have already completed consultations and 
reached consensus on the CMI, according to MOF.  Vietnam has 
already approved the CMI and only procedural approvals in other 
countries remain outstanding.  The MOF noted that the CMI had not 
yet been drawn upon because it requires an effective monitoring 
regime that is not yet in place.  There is no timeline for 
implementing a CMI monitoring mechanism as the member countries are 
still waiting for final signatures and there will be some gap 
between signing, full implementation and any funds transfers.  MOF 
added that the ASEAN financial ministers are in favor of the G20 
Framework for Balanced Growth, and that the ASEAN financial 
ministers appreciated their meeting with Treasury Secretary 
Geithner on the margins of APEC.  MOF encouraged further dialogue 
with Treasury, suggesting a meeting this year on the margins of 
ASEAN as a possibility. 
Michalak