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C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 000045 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/17 
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV PHUM GG RS
SUBJECT: GENEVA DISCUSSIONS ON GEORGIA: ROUND IX 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Peter F. Mulrean, Counselor, State, RMA; REASON: 
1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The de facto authorities in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia continued to clamor for "bilateral" non-use of force 
agreements with Georgia.  The Georgians continued to insist Russia 
be part of such agreements and to link them with international 
security arrangements.  While the Abkhazia IPRM continued to 
function, the South Ossetians linked resumption of their IPRM to 
new information from the Georgians about missing persons.  The 
Russians, accusing the Georgians of remilitarization, stood behind 
the South Ossetians, but privately undertook to try and resuscitate 
the IPRM.  In an aside with the U.S., the Russians rejected any 
increased international presence in the breakaway regions, but did 
not reject possibly creating a bigger role for the IPRMs.  The 
second working group was unable to make progress on water or gas 
projects, but agreed to meet one day before the next round of 
Geneva Discussions (planned for March 30) for an experts' 
presentation on IDP-related issues. END SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
------------------ 
 
NON-USE-OF-FORCE 
 
------------------ 
 
 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The South Ossetians and Abkhaz continued to insist they 
faced an ongoing threat from Georgia and therefore needed 
"bilateral" non-use-of-force (NUF) agreements with Tbilisi. 
Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Giga Bokeria countered that such 
an agreement makes no sense without further elucidation of 
international security arrangements, which neither the de facto 
authorities nor the Russians were willing to consider.  Bokeria 
also noted that Georgia continued to face a threat from Russia, 
which has passed a law authorizing the government to take measures 
to protect Russian citizens overseas.  EU Co-Chair Pierre Morel 
stressed that non-use of force means nothing without meaningful 
implementing measures, noting that the Tagliavini report also 
called for an increased international presence. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (SBU) EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Kaidanow echoed Morel's 
sentiments, and pointed out that the Co-Chairs' proposal on 
"interim steps," which contained a modest enhancement of the 
international presence on the ground, would be a good beginning. 
DAS Kaidanow also noted that the August 12 cease-fire signed by 
Russian President Medvedev and Georgian President Saakashvili had 
included NUF, and urged the Russians to comply with the other five 
elements of the cease-fire agreement. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The Russians rejected the co-chairs' approach, with 
Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Karasin stating categorically that 
Russia cannot accept an increased international presence.  He 
threatened that any insistence on such a presence could "disrupt 
the Geneva process."  Morel reacted strongly to Karasin's position, 
pointing out that the working assumption of the discussions at 
Geneva VI, VII and VIII has been to combine the idea of a NUF 
agreement with international security arrangements.  He objected 
that Russia's sudden rejection of this connection threatened to 
undermine all the work that has been done over the last three 
rounds.  With a show of emotion, Morel said the co-chairs would not 
allow themselves to become "quiet managers of the status quo." 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C) In a private conversation with DAS Kaidanow, Karasin 
claimed that "his lawyers" would never agree to an international 
presence in Georgia outside the already agreed Incident Prevention 
and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs).  Kaidanow encouraged him to 
explore further with Morel the possibility of enhancing the IPRMs 
to accommodate a more robust international role and mandate, a 
suggestion that he claimed to be willing to consider.  She made the 
same suggestion to Morel, who had expressed reluctance earlier to 
expand the role of the IPRMs at the possible "expense" of the 
Geneva-based dialogue. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The Russians did acknowledge that Georgia has status 
issues with the territories that will preclude signing an agreement 
with the de facto authorities.  As an alternative to a formal 
 
treaty, Karasin suggested that all three consider making unilateral 
declarations to the United Nations on non-use-of-force.  The 
Georgians said they might consider the proposal if Russia would be 
part of the arrangement. 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
INCIDENT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE MECHANISMS 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Although all participants agreed the Abkhazia IPRM had 
continued to work reasonably well, the South Ossetians continued to 
argue that they would not restart their IPRM (suspended since 
October 2009) without first getting more information from the 
Georgians on the residual issue of the three missing persons that 
they have been concerned with for some time.  Morel suggested a way 
forward by separating out the missing persons issue and addressing 
it through the International Red Cross and Crescent (ICRC), as well 
as through ongoing discussion with Council of Europe representative 
Thomas Hammarberg.  The South Ossetians were willing to accept 
these additional efforts to work on the missing persons cases, but 
steadfastly refused to return to the IPRM until the cases were 
resolved. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Morel also tried to address the South Ossetians' concerns 
about the procedural elements of the IPRM.  He proposed a new 
arrangement for setting the agenda and moderating the meetings, 
which he called the "Fourth Variant," based on the South Ossetians' 
own ideas.  He then suggested that those parties who participate in 
the South Ossetia IPRM hold a side meeting to discuss this 
proposal.  The South Ossetians and Russians refused to attend the 
side meeting, so the Georgians, EUMM and OSCE were unable to take 
any action on the proposal. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (C)  DAS Kaidanow privately (and pointedly) noted to Karasin on 
the margins that the resumption of the South Ossetian IPRM was the 
sina qua non for any further discussion on "non-use-of-force" or 
other security arrangements.  Karasin undertook to try and 
encourage the South Ossetians to moderate their view. 
 
 
 
--------------- 
 
MISSING PERSONS 
 
--------------- 
 
 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The Georgians relayed privately that the ICRC had 
convened a meeting among the South Ossetians, Georgians, and 
Russians under their auspices in Geneva January 27 to discuss 
forming a commission to look at the missing persons issue, 
including the three individuals of concern to the South Ossetians. 
Everyone reportedly concurred this would be a good idea, but there 
was no real agreement on venue.  South Ossetia objected to Ergneti, 
on the administrative boundary line, and suggested Geneva.  ICRC 
said this made little sense, especially since meetings often need 
to take place on short notice.  The Georgians expressed the fear 
that the South Ossetians might object to IPRM meetings in Ergneti 
in the future, though this was not immediately apparent.  [Note: 
The ICRC subsequently informed us that all parties have now agreed 
to meet periodically in Geneva.  End note.] 
 
 
 
¶11.  (SBU) During the discussions, Morel expressed the hope that 
the involvement of the ICRC and the Council of Europe in the 
investigation of individual cases would not only help make progress 
on those cases, but allow the South Ossetians to return to the 
IPRM.  Representative of the South Ossetian "president" Boris 
Chochiyev replied in the negative, saying that he had little hope 
that these additional efforts would make much difference.  He also 
noted that South Ossetia had concerns about cases dating to before 
the war, seeming to imply that resolution of the cases under 
 
discussion might not be enough, but he did not go into detail. 
 
 
 
----------------------------- 
 
REMILITARIZATION ACCUSATIONS 
 
----------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶12.  (SBU) European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) Chief of 
Mission Hansjoerg Haber gave a detailed assessment of developments 
on the ground.  Countering Russian General Kulakhmetov's explicit 
allegations of Georgian troop movements and redeployments aimed at 
threatening the two separatist regions, Haber noted that the 
Georgians are living up to their unilateral transparency 
commitments under MOUs with the Ministries of Defense and Internal 
Affairs, and that EUMM's own assessment is that Georgian 
deployments are of a fundamentally defensive nature.  He also noted 
that it is Russia that has not complied with its cease-fire 
commitments, in particular in the regions of the Upper Kodori 
Valley, Perevi and the Akhalgori Valley.  Haber also listed a 
number of hotspots along the administrative boundaries of both 
regions on which the EUMM keeps a careful eye. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (C) Haber later related privately that, in a side conversation 
with Karasin and Kulakhmetov, the Russians requested a copy of 
Haber's presentation.  Haber got the impression that Karasin did 
not have a very clear picture of the situation on the ground, and 
that in general the MFA did not get regular information from the 
Russian agencies (the military and the FSB) with primary presence 
in the regions. 
 
 
 
----------------------------- 
 
GEORGIAN ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY 
 
----------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶14.  (SBU) The Russians acknowledged receipt of the engagement 
strategy, which the Georgians had passed to them on the margins of 
the session, but did not comment extensively on its contents. 
Karasin was careful not to reject it out of hand, but was 
disparaging about Georgians' intentions in drafting such a 
document.  Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Bokeria noted that 
Geneva was not the proper forum to discuss the strategy, and 
stressed that its goal was to reach out to the people in the 
regions in a non-politicized way. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------------- 
 
WORKING GROUP TWO STILL STALLED, INFORMATIONAL MEETINGS TO BEGIN 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------------- 
 
 
 
¶15.  (SBU) The second group focused its morning session on one 
paragraph of the "Agreed Undertakings" draft circulated by the 
Co-Chairs, but were unable to make any progress.  The South 
Ossetians reintroduced concepts that had been debated and rejected 
in previous rounds, with the Russians playing a more openly 
unhelpful role.  The tone of conversation became more negative and 
personal than in previous rounds. 
 
 
 
¶16.  (SBU) The OSCE remained cautiously hopeful that gas might be 
secured for Aklhalgori.  While Georgia appeared to be cooperative, 
the South Ossetians insisted they would only consider the 
possibility of discussing proposed water projects to feed 
irrigation systems in undisputed Georgia after Georgia turns on the 
gas.  In a discussion of potential action items, the U.S. suggested 
the Co-Chairs hold informational meetings with experts to explain 
how issues related to the return of internally displaced persons 
 
(databases, go-and-see visits, etc) had been addressed in other 
situations.  All parties agreed that such a meeting will take place 
in a half-day session before the next round of the Geneva 
Discussions March 30. 
 
 
 
¶17.  (C) COMMENT.  This was the least productive round in recent 
memory, with regression on both the NUF agreement/international 
security arrangements (Russia's categorical rejection of the 
latter) and the IPRM (South Ossetia's refusal to participate), and 
no progress on Working Group II's Agreed Undertakings.  Many 
participants expressly questioned the continued utility of Geneva. 
The South Ossetian reference to detention cases from before the 
August 2008 war, which have not been raised before, raises the 
specter that, even if we resolve one of their concerns, they will 
always find another.  Russia's outright rejection of international 
security arrangements, which have been a key part of the co-chairs' 
efforts to cobble together a compromise, also raises questions 
about their commitment to finding a workable and durable way 
forward.  Unless we can, in the runup to March 30, somehow lay the 
groundwork for a more productive session -- at the very least get 
the South Ossetians to return to the IPRM -- the process is in 
jeopardy. 
GRIFFITHS