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S E C R E T GENEVA 000249 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 
26, 2010 
 
REF: 10 GENEVA 231 (SFO-GVA-VIII-088) 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-093. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 26, 2010 
 
           Time:  10:00 P.M. - 12:00 P.M. 
 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
------- 
 
SUMMARY 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶3.  (S) At the Telemetry Working Group meeting chaired by Mr. 
Siemon and General Poznikhir, the sides continued discussion of the 
U.S.-proposed Draft Text ((Annex to the))1 Protocol ((Part Seven))2 
- Telemetric Information, dated February 24, 2010 (Reftel).  The 
tone of the Russian side was more positive than at the previous 
meeting; however, three major issues divided the sides.  The sides 
had a constructive review of the document that clarified the 
other's position.  End summary. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY:  Section I:  General Provisions; Section 
II:  Access to Telemetric Information; and Section III: Guidance 
for the Exchange of Telemetric Information. 
 
 
 
------------------------------ 
 
Section I:  General Provisions 
 
------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶5.  (S) Poznikhir provided Russian-proposed text for paragraphs 1 
through 3 of Section I:  General Provisions, which, he said, 
reflected the discussions held the previous day (Reftel).  (Begin 
comment.  The three new paragraphs presented by the Russian side 
contained no new text but was rather a combination and 
re-arrangement of previously presented Russian text and did not 
incorporate any text provided by the U.S. side.  End comment).  Mr. 
Siemon indicated that he would provide an official U.S. translation 
later that day. 
 
 
 
Begin text: 
 
 
 
U.S. Official Translation 
 
February 26, 2010 
 
 
SFO-VIII 
 
CONFIDENTIAL 
 
Releasable to the U.S. side 
 
Document of the Russian side 
 
 
 
February 26, 2010 
 
 
 
Part Seven - Telemetric Information 
 
 
 
     Section I. General Provisions 
 
     ¶1.  The Parties shall exchange telemetric information on an 
equal number of ICBM and SLBM launches, but on no more than five 
ICBM and SLBM launches per calendar year. 
 
     Telemetric information shall be exchanged on ICBM and SLBM 
launches that have been conducted in the previous calendar year. 
 
     ¶2.  The launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, on which telemetric 
information is provided, shall be determined by the conducting 
Party. 
 
     At the first annual session of the BCC, the Parties shall 
discuss the issue of selection of ICBM and SLBM launches, conducted 
in the previous year, on which telemetric information will be 
exchanged in the current year, and shall come to a mutual decision 
regarding the number of such launches. 
 
     ¶3.  Each Party shall provide telemetric information to the 
other Party via diplomatic channels no later than ((  )) days after 
the decision, mentioned in paragraph 2 of this Section, has been 
made. 
 
 
 
End text. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (S) Mr. Dean reminded Poznikhir that the sides had not resolved 
the issue of "launch" versus "flight test" and indicated that the 
text should show both terms in brackets.  Poznikhir acknowledged 
the difference and noted that some of the Russian launches were for 
peaceful purposes.  Regarding paragraph 5 which addresses the 
conditions and guidelines for the exchange of telemetric 
information on the launches of ICBMs and SLBMs in the Bilateral 
Consultative Commission (BCC), Siemon noted the U.S. side had two 
fundamental disagreements with the Russian text.  The first was 
that the receiving Party had no role in the selection of the flight 
tests on which telemetry would be exchanged.  The second was the 
idea that the exchange of telemetry could be suspended if the 
issues were not resolved in the BCC.  Poznikhir clarified the 
Russian position.  Telemetry would be exchanged on launches from 
the previous calendar year.  The Russian side would not provide a 
 
 
schedule of planned launches for the current year.  One of the 
reasons for this was that these dates could be moved for several 
reasons, including the status of the launch vehicle or the status 
of the mission itself.  Mr. Schevchenko and Poznikhir indicated 
concern over the repercussions of a schedule that was not met. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (S) Poznikhir did not understand what impact provision of a 
planned launch schedule could have on the selection of the launches 
on which telemetry would be exchanged or the exchange itself. 
Siemon noted that there were several places in the Protocol where 
notifications in advance of current year events occurred.  Agreed 
conversion or elimination and notification procedures obligated a 
Party to provide the current year's planned schedule of conversions 
and eliminations.  He understood the Russian concern over schedule 
changes; however, the U.S. side realized that what a side planned 
to do was not always what necessarily happened.  The sides would 
exchange planned launch schedules simply to give the other side 
insight into what was planned for the current year.  The U.S. side 
did not consider this to be sensitive information. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S) Siemon remarked that the exchange of schedules was about 
extending the concept of transparency into the development and 
deployment of a side's strategic forces.  He could not understand 
why the Russian side found it so difficult to provide a schedule of 
planned launches given the idea of the new relationship between the 
United States and Russia.  Poznikhir stated the Protocol contained 
a notification 24 hours in advance of a launch that made sharing of 
the planned schedule unnecessary.  He could not be convinced that 
provision of this schedule would have an impact on implementation 
of telemetry obligations or that it was important for the treaty. 
Poznikhir also noted that Russia had laws that prevented it from 
providing state secrets.  Siemon reminded him that in both the 
United States and Russia, a ratified treaty trumped domestic law. 
Poznikhir suggested the sides leave the text bracketed but assured 
Siemon nonetheless that the text would not be accepted.  He also 
recommended the text on suspension of telemetry exchange remain 
bracketed since it was a fundamental difference in positions and 
could be returned to at a later date.  Before leaving the issue, 
Siemon reminded Poznikhir that the sides had agreed during the 
Admiral Mullen-General Makarov meetings in Moscow that if telemetry 
exchange issues could not be resolved in the BCC, the exchanges 
would continue and both sides clearly understood the agreement. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (S) Dean attempted to clarify Poznikhir's question regarding 
whether paragraph 6 that referenced telemetry exchange in the year 
the treaty entered into force was redundant.  He gave examples that 
supported the positions of each side; however, the text remained 
bracketed.  Poznikhir also noted that under the Russian proposal, 
telemetry could not be exchanged for the last year of the treaty, 
because the discussions regarding the exchange for the year would 
have to take place after the treaty expired. 
 
 
 
---------------------- 
 
Section II:  Access to 
 
Telemetric Information 
 
 
---------------------- 
 
 
 
¶10.  (S) Poznikhir agreed to the U.S. formulation "the telemetry 
signal" in paragraph 1 that addressed measures to deny access to 
information broadcast.  He questioned what the United States meant 
by the text in the last sentence that referenced providing the 
means to obtain decrypted data when a Party encrypted telemetric 
information.  Siemon stated that the text was required for a 
situation in which a side only conducted five flight tests and had 
encrypted the telemetric information on one of the flight tests. 
In this situation if the sides decided to exchange telemetry on 
five launches, the side that encrypted the telemetry would be 
required to provide the information necessary to decrypt the 
encrypted telemetric information.  Siemon noted that this was 
provided as an option, not an obligation.  Poznikhir stated that 
this situation would not happen since the sides would "bank" 
unencrypted launches on which telemetry would be exchanged to 
ensure it had five to exchange.  He asked the U.S. side to think 
about the question of what equipment or codes would need to be 
exchanged.  The text remained bracketed. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (S) Poznikhir stated that the sides agreed on the text in 
paragraph 2 regarding notification of the intent to use measures to 
deny access to the telemetry signal for launches of ICBMs and SLBMs 
on which telemetric information is not exchanged.  Poznikhir asked 
if paragraph 3 that addressed the notification of broadcast 
frequencies and associated modulation methods 24 hours in advance 
of a launch was also required for the launch of a prototype. 
Siemon responded in the affirmative.  Poznikhir said that the text 
referring to prototypes was redundant because the Agreement between 
the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, dated 
May 31, 1988 covered prototypes.  He said that he had no 
fundamental objection to the concept of the paragraph.  It had 
worked under START, but he asked that the text remain in brackets 
for now.  He noted the use of both "launch" and "flight test" in 
the U.S. language. 
 
 
 
------------------------------- 
 
Section III:  Guidance for the 
 
Exchange of Telemetric Exchange 
 
------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶12.  (S) Poznikhir noted paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 contained a 
fundamental difference in the positions of the sides regarding the 
exchange of telemetry from the self-contained dispensing mechanism 
(SCDM).  He repeated the Russian position that SCDM telemetry 
exchange was not necessary since the treaty did not include the 
concept of warhead attribution for ICBMs or SLBMs; and the fact 
that SCDM telemetry would not be exchanged because it could be used 
to enhance missile defense systems.  Poznikhir ask why the U.S. 
side wanted to receive SCDM data. 
 
 
¶13.  (S) Siemon indicated the exchange of SCDM telemetry was one of 
three fundamental differences in the sides' positions.  The other 
two were the role of the receiving Party in the selection of 
launches on which telemetry would be exchanged and the concept for 
the suspension of the exchange of telemetry in cases where issues 
could not be resolved in the BCC.  Poznikhir reminded Siemon that 
the sides were discussing an agreed statement on the use of 
telemetric information for building missile defense systems.  He 
asked the status of the agreed statement.  Siemon noted that the 
agreed statement was being discussed by Assistant Secretary 
Gottemoeller and Ambassador Antonov and in a separate working 
group.  He indicated that Under Secretary Tauscher was in Geneva 
and would discuss the relationship between strategic offensive 
forces and missile defense.  The Telemetry Working Group was not 
the forum for those discussions.  The sides agreed to leave the 
text in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 bracketed. 
 
 
 
¶14.  (S) Poznikhir indicated that there was no disagreement on 
paragraph 4 that addressed the right that a Party conducting a 
launch would independently determine the method for recording 
telemetric information on recording media.  Regarding paragraph 5 
that referenced the playback of the recording of the telemetric 
information, the sides removed brackets containing "if requested" 
in subparagraphs (d) and (e) that addressed acquiring playback 
equipment and the provision of training respectively, but Poznikhir 
suggested using "at the request of the other Party."  The Russian 
side continued to believe that the initial demonstrations of 
playback equipment should include the equipment used in START to 
remove any suspicion that a Party may have modified the equipment 
after the demonstration required by the START Treaty.  Siemon 
believed that Parties should not be obligated to demonstrate the 
equipment a second time; it would be an unnecessary expenditure of 
time, money and effort.  The sides agreed there was no fundamental 
difference in the remaining brackets. 
 
 
 
¶15.  (S) The sides agreed that paragraph 6 regarding the procedures 
to use in the situation where a Party received recording media that 
contained poor quality or insufficient telemetric information was 
similar to START and therefore, there was no disagreement on the 
text. 
 
 
 
¶16. (S) Poznikhir stated that the Russian side had taken the 
concept in paragraph 6 and applied the same concept to interpretive 
data in paragraph 7.  Experience in START and discussions in the 
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission demonstrated the need 
for the text.  The Party conducting a launch should be obligated to 
clarify any question regarding interpretive data that prevented the 
other Party from converting the telemetric information back into 
the format that had existed on the missile before broadcast.  Dr. 
Ringenberg stated that the U.S side was studying the text; however, 
he believed that the right to discuss any issues regarding 
telemetry within the Bilateral Consultative Commission would exist 
in the new treaty as it had existed in START.  The sides agreed to 
continue work on the Protocol/Annex during the intersession so that 
they would be prepared to continue discussions during the next 
session. 
 
 
¶17.  (U) Documents provided: 
 
 
 
- Russia 
 
 
 
 -- Russian-proposed text for paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Section I: 
General Provisions of Part Seven of the Protocol to the Treaty - 
Telemetric Information, dated February 26, 2010. 
 
 
 
¶18.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Mr. Siemon 
 
Mr. Dean 
 
Lt Col Goodman 
 
Mr. Hanchett (RO) 
 
Ms. Pura 
 
Dr. Ringenberg 
 
Ms. Smith (Int) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
Gen Poznikhir 
 
Ms. Fuzhenkova 
 
Mr. Shevchenko 
 
Mr. Voloskov 
 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 
 
 
 
¶19.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
KING