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S E C R E T GENEVA 000247 
 
SIPDIS 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
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NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP 
MEETING, FEBRUARY 25, 2010 
 
REF: 10 GENEVA 245 (SFO-GVA-VIII-086) 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-086. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 25, 2010 
 
                Time:  3:30 P.M. - 6:15 P.M. 
 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
 
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¶3.  (S) During a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group 
meeting held at the Russian Mission on February 25, the two sides 
discussed Part Four to the Annex on Inspection Activities, 
specifically, the provisions and requirements for site diagrams and 
references to Part Two of the Protocol.  End summary. 
 
¶4.  (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY:  The First Data Exchange; Problematic Data 
Categories; The Chicken or the Egg; and Brass Tacks. 
 
 
 
----------------------- 
 
THE FIRST DATA EXCHANGE 
 
----------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (S) The meeting began with Gen Orlov briefly discussing two 
issues with Part Two that had been raised recently in his 
delegation.  The first issue concerned an apparent textual problem 
regarding the release of geographic coordinates, and the second 
issue concerned how the initial data exchange would occur. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (S) Regarding the first issue, Col Pischulov pointed out that 
45 days after signature of the treaty, the Parties would exchange 
site diagrams that included geographic coordinates, as required by 
paragraph 3 of Section I of Part Two of the Protocol.  However, in 
paragraph 2, the text specifically stated that geographic 
coordinates would not be exchanged in the initial exchange of data. 
 
 
 
 
¶7.  (S) Orlov offered two solutions.  The first solution would be 
to change the text in paragraph 2 to modify subparagraph (a) by 
specifying that geographic coordinates for silo launchers would not 
be provided, thus allowing the Parties to exchange geographic 
coordinates for facilities.  The second solution, which he said was 
his personal preference, was to change the requirements of 
 
 
paragraph 3 by changing the timeline for the exchange of site 
diagrams from the currently-agreed 45 days after signature to 45 
days after entry into force (EIF). 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S) Trout stated immediately that the first option was much 
more reasonable than the second option.  He also noted that should 
Russia formally change their position on the date of exchange for 
site diagrams to after EIF, this would represent a significant 
walking back from the agreed position.  Trout suggested another 
solution would be to include all geographic coordinates in the 
initial exchange since the data will be the same data that was 
already exchanged during START.  This was possible because neither 
Party had built new silos and the exchange would be secret, since 
neither Party could make such information public.  He suggested 
that the words "geographic coordinates" could be expunged from Part 
Two of the Protocol, so that no circular references would have to 
be made. 
 
 
 
¶9.   (S) Orlov appeared to be struggling to understand, and again 
suggested that site diagrams be exchanged 45 days after EIF.  Trout 
said this would be a bad idea, and reminded Orlov that in the Fall, 
both Parties had agreed to exchange site diagrams at signature. 
Orlov envisioned a situation in which the U.S. Senate ratified the 
treaty, but the Federation Council did not.  In this possible 
scenario, site diagrams would have been exchanged for a treaty 
which would never enter into force.  When questioned by Trout, 
Orlov stated that none of this discussion was official, but rather 
his own opinion about what should be exchanged and when. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (S) Trout reiterated that the timeline for the site diagram 
exchange was agreed, but that the U.S. side would examine the 
Russian side's concern with the provisions in paragraph 2 and how 
they would affect the requirement to exchange site diagrams in 
paragraph 3. 
 
 
 
¶11.   (S) Turning to the second issue regarding the method of 
exchange of the initial exchange of data, Col Petrov asked Trout 
how he envisioned the first data exchange occurring, specifically 
asking if a new notification should be introduced.  Trout explained 
that the answer to that question depended on the requirements 
written into the text for provisional application of the treaty. 
If certain notifications were provisionally applied, then Petrov's 
solution could work.  Another solution, Trout suggested, was that 
the text in paragraph 2 be modified to specifically state how the 
exchange would take place, such as via diplomatic channels.  Both 
sides agreed to look harder at this issue and think of a good 
solution. 
 
 
 
--------------------------- 
 
PROBLEMATIC DATA CATEGORIES 
 
--------------------------- 
 
 
¶12.  (S) Trout moved onto the category of ICBM Loading Facilities 
in Part Two, Section III.  Orlov admitted to Trout that he was 
confounded by the handling of some categories of data required in 
Part Two of the Protocol, including ICBM Loading Facilities.  He 
noted that Russia had none, neither did the United States.  Trout 
said he failed to understand why this category was included, and 
that if neither party was going to have such facilities, the 
category should be deleted.  Orlov commented on the possibility 
that such a facility could exist sometime during the life of the 
treaty.  Therefore, it seemed there should be a category to 
accommodate it. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (S) Turning to Section V, Trout sought to clarify a 
conversation of earlier that day regarding "based" versus "located" 
with reference to heavy bombers.  Orlov stated that in his opinion, 
where a bomber was "located" was all that mattered for treaty 
purposes.  He asked Trout whether the data for a non-deployed heavy 
bomber should be included in the data for a repair facility where 
it was located, or in the data for its assigned base for counting 
purposes. 
 
 
 
¶14.  (S) Trout stated that the definitions of deployed heavy 
bomber, non-deployed heavy bomber, and test heavy bomber had all 
been agreed between the sides that very morning.  Trout then read 
the agreed definitions to Orlov and explained the significance of 
"located" versus "based."  Trout convinced Orlov that "based" was 
an important treaty provision, and that each heavy bomber or test 
heavy bomber had a dual nature in regard to its actual location and 
its home base.  Orlov again voiced his dissatisfaction at some of 
the definitions and understandings the sides had reached, saying 
these made no sense to him. 
 
 
 
---------------------- 
 
THE CHICKEN OR THE EGG 
 
---------------------- 
 
 
 
¶15.   (S) For the second consecutive day, the sides discussed the 
nuanced nature of Part Two of the Protocol.  Trout stated that as 
Part Two was the Categories for the Database Pertaining to 
Strategic Offensive Arms, it had no data.  Therefore, it could not 
be used as a reference within the treaty to identify where the data 
exchanged was located.  Orlov complained that the United States 
requested Part Two of the Protocol first be called "the Database," 
then called "Categories of Data for the Database," but either way, 
he agreed in concept that Part Two could not be used as a reference 
elsewhere in the treaty if the reference was to "data listed in". 
Petrov also acknowledged this issue, and stated that the Russian 
legal team was working on it.  He recommended that the sides leave 
references to Part Two in brackets until a logical solution could 
be agreed.  Trout agreed to allow the lawyers to conform the 
reference in a manner that suited both Parties. 
 
 
----------- 
 
BRASS TACKS 
 
----------- 
 
 
 
¶16.  (S) Orlov then asked Trout if he would continue leading the 
MOU Working Group until the entire "third tier" was completed. 
(Begin comment:  Annexes are often referred to as the third tier. 
End comment.)  Trout said he would be in Geneva leading the working 
group at least until the treaty was signed.  Orlov pressed Trout 
about his plans after treaty signature.  Trout stated those plans 
had not yet been developed. 
 
 
 
¶17.  Orlov then deferred to Petrov to work with Trout and LT 
Lobner, clearing several brackets in paragraphs 2(c) through 2 (j). 
While some brackets remained, Trout promised to examine these 
issues with his staff and respond quickly in order to clear as many 
brackets prior to the break as possible. 
 
 
 
¶18.  (S) The major bracketed issue remaining after the discussion 
was the Russian side's proposal to exclude language that stated 
that all structures would be depicted within the inspection site 
that "are intended for, and are large enough to be used for, items 
declared at that facility shall be shown within the boundary of 
that facility, except those structures the entrances of which are 
not large enough to permit passage of such items."  Both sides 
acknowledged the bracketed text and noted a significant conceptual 
difference; however, the sides deferred discussion of the topic to 
another meeting. 
 
 
 
¶19.  (S) The salient issues remaining for discussion included 
codifying language to describe which buildings must be depicted on 
site diagrams, mechanisms and processes for making changes to site 
diagrams, and the role of the Bilateral Consultative Commission 
(BCC) in the approval of changed site diagrams. 
 
 
 
¶20.  (U) Documents provided:  None. 
 
 
 
¶21.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Mr. Trout 
 
LTC Litterini (RO) 
 
LT  Lobner 
 
 
Mr. French(Int) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
Gen Orlov 
 
Col Petrov 
 
Col Pischulov 
 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 
 
 
 
¶22.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
KING