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S E C R E T GENEVA 000239 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETING, 
FEBRUARY 19, 2010 
 
REF: 10 GENEVA 227 (SFO-GVA-VIII-062) 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-069. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 19, 2010 
 
                Time:  3:30 P.M. - 18:10 P.M. 
 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
------- 
 
SUMMARY 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶3.  (S) At the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meeting on 
February 19, chaired by Dr. Warner and Colonel Ilin, the sides 
discussed the U.S.-proposed Annex on Inspection Activities, Part 
Six, related to procedures for conducting Type-1 inspections.  The 
sides reviewed the proposed text line-by-line, accepted several 
paragraphs and agreed to re-write others.  End summary. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY:  Homework First; U.S.-Proposed Part Six of 
the Annex, Continued. 
 
 
 
-------------- 
 
homework first 
 
-------------- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (S) Warner stated the U.S. delegation was expecting to receive 
guidance from Washington concerning a possible compromise solution 
regarding the conduct of Type-2 conversion or elimination 
inspections.  Once that guidance was received, the Working Group 
could return to the review of Section VII of Part Five of the 
Protocol and finish the drafting of a Joint Draft Text (JDT) that 
would incorporate the changes.  Ilin stated the Russian side was 
planning on returning to Moscow on February 27, and that it might 
be impossible to finish work on both Section VII and Part Six of 
the Annex  prior to their departure.  Warner recommended that the 
sides continue with Part Six of the Annex where the working group 
left off at the last meeting (Reftel).  Ilin said he was ready to 
work on Part Six of the Annex and he understood that the Annex was 
important to the U.S. side. 
 
 
 
¶6. (S) Ilin stated he had two homework items from the last meeting 
that he wanted to review.  The first was a re-drafted paragraph 
proposed by the Russian side combining paragraphs 3 and 4 of 
Section II of Part Six of the Annex.  The merged paragraph would 
cover movement of both road mobile launchers and submarines during 
the nuclear warhead portion of a Type-1 inspection.  The paragraphs 
were similar so one paragraph would be sufficient.  Ilin read the 
draft aloud and Warner agreed that it seemed correct. 
 
 
 
Begin text. 
 
 
((3. At the discretion of the inspected Side, a designated deployed 
mobile launcher of ICBMs or a submarine on which designated a 
deployed launcher of SLBMs is located, may proceed to a specially 
allocated site, where the viewing of the front section of such 
ICBMs or SLBMs will be conducted, or where the front section will 
be separated from an ICBM or SLBM.  The inspection team shall have 
the right to maintain uninterrupted visual contact, while in 
transit, with such deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs or with such 
submarine, which shall proceed to a specially allocated site, while 
surfaced.))2 
 
 
 
End text. 
 
 
 
¶7. (S) Ilin stated that the paragraph did not include mention of 
the SSGNs; Warner explained it was because SSGNs could be viewed at 
the pier without having to move them to the explosive handling 
wharf.  Warner stated that regardless of that fact, the Second 
Agreed Statement on SSGNs was still in draft and the sides should 
assess the content of that document before deciding whether to make 
any mention of SSGNs in the Annex.  In addition, further procedures 
for inspecting the SSGNs might have to wait until after the 
exhibition following entry-into-force of the Treaty and be worked 
out in the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC), because the 
United States had not determined what they might be yet.  Warner 
stated that final agreement with Russia's combined paragraph 3 and 
4 would come following the U.S. delegation's review of the official 
translation. 
 
 
 
¶8. (S)  Concerning his second point, Ilin stated that following a 
review of subparagraph 2(f) of Section II of Part Six of the Annex, 
the Russian side had agreed with the draft text, as presented by 
the United States, with the exception that Russia did not agree to 
permit the inspection of vehicles. (Note: Subparagraph 2(f) deals 
with the inspecting Party's right to inspect vehicles, containers 
or objects that enter or leave the vicinity of the ICBM or SLBM 
launcher during the preparation of the front section while the 
launcher door is open. End note.)  Ilin emphasized that inspectors 
had the opportunity to view, and could inspect, any containers or 
objects during front section preparation, and therefore, vehicles 
would not be subject to inspection.  Warner noted the contradiction 
that any containers or objects leaving the area probably would be 
in or on a vehicle, but stated the U.S. Delegation would discuss 
this point further and get back to the Russian delegation.  Ilin 
commented that vehicles were always prepositioned at the site and 
it did not matter what they might contain, since inspectors could 
observe the entire front section removal process. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
U.S.-proposed Part Six OF the Annex, continued 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
 
 
¶9.  (S) Ilin explained that the Russian side would prefer to remove 
the statements of purpose for each individual step in the 
paragraphs detailing the rights granted to inspectors during the 
preparation of a missile front section for viewing.  The purpose 
for each step was the same in that inspectors were ensuring that no 
additional front sections or RVs were present.  Restating the 
purpose in each paragraph was redundant.  The ultimate purpose of 
the steps was to get to the point of inspecting the warheads. 
Warner agreed and proposed stating the overall purpose in a 
paragraph at the beginning of Section II so that the purpose did 
not have to be repeated for each individual step. 
 
 
¶10.  (S) Warner continued to paragraph 6, where agreement was 
reached to remove one sentence which concerned a partial front 
section separation step relevant only to a type of missile retired 
during START (the SS-24). 
 
 
 
¶11.  (S) Ilin asked Warner to explain his proposal to add in 
subparagraph 7(c) the requirement for inspectors to view the upper 
missile airframe edge in the launcher following front section 
separation.  Petrov added that during START it was nearly 
impossible to view the upper edge of a Minuteman III in a silo 
because of the payload transporter (PT) van sitting over the top of 
the silo.  Petrov suggested that additional text could be added to 
require the in-country escort to provide a drawing prior to the one 
minute viewing to explain what the inspectors would see.  This 
would help inspectors by giving them an idea of what they were 
looking for prior to viewing.  Warner agreed to put the requirement 
in U.S. brackets and return to the subject at a later date 
following internal discussion within the U.S. working group and the 
Russian delegation's own internal discussion.  Warner added that, 
if the Russian side would draft text to incorporate the diagram 
requirement, the concept could be discussed later. 
 
 
 
¶12.  (S) Ilin questioned subparagraph 10(a) concerning the right to 
inspect the specially allocated site (SAS) where a front section is 
prepared for viewing; a location that is some distance from the 
launcher or fixed structure where the missile designated for 
inspection is located.  Ilin asked what the text's reference to a 
"portion of the site" actually meant.  Warner explained that it 
meant an interior area or room within the SAS used for the 
preparation of the front section of the missile.  It was agreed to 
change "portion of a site" to "portion of a room".  Warner 
suggested that the term "enclosed space" could be used instead of 
"room." 
 
 
 
¶13.  (S) Ilin  asked how inspectors could secure the SAS.  Warner 
replied  this could be done either by sealing the entrances with 
tamper-evident seals or positioning inspectors at each entry point 
to verify no re-entry vehicles were removed from the site.  Ilin 
inquired why it was at the discretion of the inspecting Party 
whether to seal the doors or post observers and not at the 
discretion of the inspected Party.  Ilin suggested it should be an 
agreed decision between both parties whether to seal or post 
observers at the SAS.  Warner disagreed and stated that the 
decision on whether to seal or observe exits to/from the SAS is the 
right of the inspecting Party.  Ilin bracketed the U.S. text and 
offered alternative Russian-proposed text that the decision to seal 
the SAS would be based "upon agreement of the in-country escort." 
 
 
 
¶14.  (S) Ilin raised the question why there was no time limit set 
for the inspection and the sealing of the SAS.  Warner countered 
that each case was different and allowing the inspection team chief 
to decide the issue would be the best course of action.  If the 
Russians had specific ideas they should present their proposal in 
writing.  Ilin requested that the United States insert, as Russia's 
proposal, a time limit of ten minutes for viewing the SAS.  Warner 
made clear that the United States had no interest in such a time 
limit. 
 
 
 
¶15. (S) Ilin backtracked to paragraph 9.  He suggested that where 
the paragraph stated that the viewing of the front section could 
take place within a vehicle, the vehicle should be referred to as a 
"special" vehicle.  Warner agreed to the suggestion, acknowledging 
 
 
that the United States always used a special vehicle for viewing a 
front section.  Petrov said Russia might do so too. 
 
 
 
¶16. (S) Returning to subparagraph 10(b) concerning the SAS, Ilin 
inquired why there was no distance specified from which inspectors 
would observe the SAS during the preparation process.  Warner 
stated that it was common practice for inspectors to remain just 
outside of the SAS while front section preparation was taking 
place.  Warner asked Ilin what he suggested for a distance.  Ilin 
said not so far that binoculars would be required; perhaps 500m. 
Warner countered that any distance separating inspectors from the 
front section measured in hundreds of meters was far too great. 
Ilin said setting a distance requirement was necessary in cases 
where the SAS was not inside a building.  Warner commented that, at 
least in the U.S. case, a structure or vehicle was always placed 
over the launcher, thereby obstructing the inspectors' view.  Ilin 
said the front section preparation of a mobile system might be 
outdoors, and it would not be possible to prepare the front section 
for viewing outside the view of the inspectors unless there was a 
distance requirement. 
 
 
 
¶17. (S) Warner reminded Ilin that past Russian practice was to 
bring SS-25 mobile launchers into the maintenance facility, where 
inspectors would be placed so they could not see the preparation of 
the front section, but could see that nothing was brought to or 
removed from the area by positioning inspectors to the left and 
right aft portion of the launcher.  Petrov asked whether the 
inspectors could remain outside the structure.  Warner replied that 
if inspectors remained outside during the front section 
preparation, they would have to inspect the boxes on the sides of 
the mobile launcher upon their return, in order to ensure RVs had 
not been hidden in spaces on the launcher that were large enough to 
contain an RV.  Petrov argued that the mobile launcher was not 
subject to inspection, and the boxes on it had other purposes. 
Moreover, he said silos had a great deal of extra space, but Russia 
did not believe RVs could be hidden in silo spaces.  Warner asked 
the Russian side to provide their suggestion in draft text 
regarding the positioning of inspectors during the preparation of 
the front section. 
 
 
 
¶18. (U) Documents provided: 
 
 
 
- Russia: 
 
 
 
-- Proposal for paragraph 3 of Section II of Part Six of Annex on 
Inspection Activities, dated February 19, 2010. 
 
 
 
¶19.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Dr. Warner 
 
Mr. Albertson 
 
Mr. Buttrick 
 
Maj Johnson 
 
 
LTC Litterini (RO) 
 
Mr. McConnell 
 
Ms. Purcell 
 
Mr. Rust 
 
Mr. Smith 
 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
Col Ilin 
 
Col Petrov 
 
Ms. Vodopolova 
 
Col Zaitsev 
 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 
 
 
 
¶20.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
KING