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S E C R E T GENEVA 000237 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) AGREED STATEMENTS MEETING, FEBRUARY 26, 
2010 
 
REF: 10 GENEVA 169 (SFO-GVA-VIII-071) 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-094. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 26, 2010 
 
           Time:  12:00 P.M. - 12:30 P.M. 
 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
------- 
 
SUMMARY 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶3.  (S) Mr. Elliott met with Col Ilin to discuss the status of the 
agreed statements and to ensure agreement and understanding on the 
first four negotiated statements.  Three statements (B-1B 
conversion, SSGN conversion, joint basing) were ready for 
conforming while a fourth (Davis-Monthan) was very close.  An 
intense discussion followed on the Russian side's proposed agreed 
statement on the use of telemetric information to enhance missile 
defense.  End summary. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY:  Fourth Agreed Statement:  Heavy Bombers 
at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (AFB); Conforming?; First Agreed 
Statement:  Conversion of B-1B; and Eighth Agreed Statement:  Use 
of Telemetric Information. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
FOURTH AGREED STATEMENT:  HEAVY BOMBERS BASED 
 
AT DAVIS-MONTHAN AIR FORCE BASE (AFB) 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (S) Elliot discussed the agreed statement on Deployed Heavy 
Bombers located at Davis-Monthan AFB.  Taking into account the 
comments provided by ADM (Ret) Kuznetsov during the last 
meeting(Reftel), the U.S. side provided a revised copy of the 
agreed statement deleting the last sentence which stated, "Such 
heavy bombers shall be considered deployed heavy bombers until such 
time as they are converted into heavy bombers equipped for 
non-nuclear armaments or are eliminated."  Elliott explained that 
the U.S. side removed this sentence because the details of when a 
heavy bomber which is converted or eliminated leaves accountability 
were covered very clearly in Part III of the protocol.  He said 
repeating the concept in the last sentence of the agreed statement 
was redundant.  He also stated that the purpose of the agreed 
statement was to address the treaty inconsistency of basing 
deployed heavy bombers at the conversion or elimination facility. 
 
 
¶6.  (S) Ilin responded by asking whether the United States would 
count heavy bombers based at Davis-Monthan as deployed or 
non-deployed.  Elliot responded that they would be counted as 
deployed.  Ilin stated the Russian side saw the last sentence of 
the agreed statement as clarifying that point and without the 
sentence, there would be an ambiguity as to how the heavy bombers 
should be counted.  Elliott proposed modifying the last sentence. 
He proposed the following sentence, "Each such heavy bomber shall 
be considered a deployed heavy bomber until such time as it is 
converted or eliminated in accordance with Part III of this 
Protocol."  Elliott said he would provide a new version of the 
agreed statement later that day. 
 
 
 
------------ 
 
CONFORMING? 
 
------------ 
 
 
 
¶7.  (S) Elliott stated  he was surprised to learn the Russian Side 
was not ready to conform the second and third agreed statements 
when both sides had agreed on the text and to send  them to 
conforming during the previous meeting (Reftel).  Ilin responded 
that he did not have enough time to speak with his delegation prior 
to yesterday afternoon's conforming meeting but had discussed the 
statements with his delegation last evening and was ready to send 
the first, second, and third statements (B-1B conversion, SSGN 
conversion, joint basing) to conforming. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------- 
 
FIRST AGREED STATEMENT:  CONVERSION OF B-1B 
 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S) Elliott agreed all three statements could go to conforming 
but he wanted to clarify that brackets still remained in 
subparagraph 1(a) of the first agreed statement (conversion of 
B-1B) regarding the purpose of the exhibition.  Ilin stated that in 
his version the U.S. side had agreed to the Russian language and 
there, therefore, were no brackets in subparagraph 1(a).  Elliott 
showed Ilin the documents the U.S. side had provided and explained 
the U.S position that the purpose of the exhibition was to 
demonstrate the distinguishing features of a heavy bomber equipped 
for nuclear armaments as compared to heavy bomber equipped for 
non-nuclear armaments and not to confirm the conversion process as 
the Russian side suggested.  Elliott proposed adding the U.S. 
wording in brackets to help the Russian side better understand the 
U.S. position and added he would provide a new version of the 
agreed statement to the Russian delegation later that day.  Elliott 
stated that beyond the bracket in subparagraph 1(a) there was 
complete agreement on the rest of the document and that it should 
go to conforming.  Ilin agreed to send the statement to conforming. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
EIGHTH AGREED STATEMENT:  USE OF TELEMETRIC INFORMATION 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
 
 
¶9.  (S) Ilin asked if the United States had a response to the 
Russian-proposed agreed statement on the use of telemetric 
information.  Elliott responded that Under Secretary Tauscher and 
Ambassador Antonov were discussing this in the context of the 
offense-defense relationship.  He went on to say he did not 
understand the utility of the agreed statement since neither side 
could ever prove that the other side was using telemetric 
information to enhance its missile defense capabilities.  General 
Poznikhir stated that neither side had to prove anything.  The 
sides were simply undertaking the obligation under international 
law not to use telemetric information to enhance missile defenses, 
he said. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (S) Elliott asked why, if the sides did not exchange 
telemetric data from the self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM) 
as was proposed by the Russian side, there was a need for the 
agreed statement, since the data resulting from the SCDM was of 
primary importance for missile defense.  Poznikhir postulated that 
this agreed statement was not tied to the offense-defense 
discussion by the heads of delegation but was rather about the 
amount of data being exchanged.  He could not understand why the 
U.S. side could not make such a statement unless the United States 
did, indeed, plan to use the telemetric information to update 
missile defense.  He continued that Mr. Siemon was unwilling and 
unable to discuss this issue in the Telemetry Working Group. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (S) Dr. Warner answered that U.S. concerns over this proposed 
agreed statement were in part about missile defense, which was 
under negotiation by the heads of delegation, and in part about 
sensitivities the U.S. Senate had about missile defense 
restrictions being included in the treaty, a point which the U.S. 
Delegation had explained many times.  Warner went on to note the 
U.S. side had already agreed to include language on missile defense 
in the treaty and the treaty needed to focus on strategic offensive 
arms. 
 
 
 
¶12.  (S) ADM Kuznetsov stated the Russian side had been opposed to 
the transfer of telemetric information because of the chance that 
the data provided by the Russian Federation could be used for 
testing missile defense.  He was not accusing the United States of 
having used telemetric information to enhance missile defense in 
the past but rather stating the concern that telemetry could be 
used to enhance missile defense in the future.  He emphasized that 
this was particularly a concern given the fact that the Anti 
Ballistic Missile Treaty was no longer in force.  He added that the 
Russian leadership had agreed to exchange telemetry but the link to 
missile defense was still a big worry.  This was why the Russian 
Federation was insisting on this agreed statement so that the 
United States cannot use telemetric data to enhance missile 
defense. 
 
 
¶13.  (S) Kuznetsov continued that the agreed statement did not deal 
with the aspect of missile defense under negotiation by the Heads 
of Delegation but was tied to the amount of data being exchanged 
and the concern about that data being used to enhance missile 
defense, noting that this was particularly the case for the U.S. 
position on telemetry from the SCDM.  He reiterated that telemetry 
is not tied to the larger missile defense issues.  Elliott 
responded it was the last 5 words of this proposed agreed statement 
"modernization of missile defense systems" that would meet very 
strong opposition in the U.S. Senate and that we must not discuss 
missile defense in this treaty.  Warner added that this phrase 
would be seen as a constraint on missile defense which would not 
survive Senate scrutiny.  In response to Warner's comments, 
Kuznetsov stated that if the wording bothered the U.S. side, the 
U.S. side should work on it.  The Russian side, however, would 
insist on keeping the substance of the agreed statement. 
 
 
 
¶14.  (S) Poznikhir stated the Russian side had heard no reason why 
the U.S. side needed SCDM data despite asking multiple times.  The 
U.S. side had also asked for annual launch plans, and Poznikhir 
added that he had asked for the reason for that request as well. 
The reasons he was given - that it was for U.S. political reasons - 
caused him to recall that the Russian legislature was also very 
concerned about how telemetry could undermine Russian national 
security and very well understood that SCDM data can be used to 
update missile defense.  Poznikhir proposed that "we should both 
calm down our respective legislatures."  Warner inquired as to 
whether or not the Russian Federation would exchange telemetric 
information on the SCDM if the U.S. side signed the agreed 
statement.  Poznikhir's immediate response was "no." 
 
 
 
¶15.  (S) Kuznetsov again asked why the U.S. side could not accept 
this agreed statement and said the statement would not limit what 
the United States was doing on missile defense.  A problem would 
arise if the U.S. side used Russian data from the SCDM or other 
parameters to enhance missile defense.  Elliott again asked if the 
U.S. side agreed SCDM data would not be exchanged, did the Russian 
side believe that there was still a need for this agreed statement. 
Ilin immediately responded "yes." 
 
 
 
¶16.  (U) Documents provided:  None 
 
 
 
¶17.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Mr. Elliott 
 
Dr. Warner 
 
Mr. Brown 
 
Lt Col Goodman (RO) 
 
 
Mr. Taylor 
 
Mr. Sobchenko (Int) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
Col Ilin 
 
ADM Kuznetsov 
 
Gen Poznihir 
 
Col Zaitsev 
 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
 
 
¶18.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
KING