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Viewing cable 10GENEVA237, SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) AGREED STATEMENTS MEETING, FEBRUARY 26,
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
10GENEVA237 | 2010-02-28 17:32 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | SECRET | Mission Geneva |
VZCZCXYZ0005
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHGV #0237/01 0591732
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O R 281732Z FEB 10
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0655
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0403
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0473
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0477
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0473
S E C R E T GENEVA 000237
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
CIA FOR WINPAC
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) AGREED STATEMENTS MEETING, FEBRUARY 26,
2010
REF: 10 GENEVA 169 (SFO-GVA-VIII-071)
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-094.
¶2. (U) Meeting Date: February 26, 2010
Time: 12:00 P.M. - 12:30 P.M.
Place: U.S. Mission, Geneva
-------
SUMMARY
-------
¶3. (S) Mr. Elliott met with Col Ilin to discuss the status of the
agreed statements and to ensure agreement and understanding on the
first four negotiated statements. Three statements (B-1B
conversion, SSGN conversion, joint basing) were ready for
conforming while a fourth (Davis-Monthan) was very close. An
intense discussion followed on the Russian side's proposed agreed
statement on the use of telemetric information to enhance missile
defense. End summary.
¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Fourth Agreed Statement: Heavy Bombers
at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (AFB); Conforming?; First Agreed
Statement: Conversion of B-1B; and Eighth Agreed Statement: Use
of Telemetric Information.
---------------------------------------------
FOURTH AGREED STATEMENT: HEAVY BOMBERS BASED
AT DAVIS-MONTHAN AIR FORCE BASE (AFB)
---------------------------------------------
¶5. (S) Elliot discussed the agreed statement on Deployed Heavy
Bombers located at Davis-Monthan AFB. Taking into account the
comments provided by ADM (Ret) Kuznetsov during the last
meeting(Reftel), the U.S. side provided a revised copy of the
agreed statement deleting the last sentence which stated, "Such
heavy bombers shall be considered deployed heavy bombers until such
time as they are converted into heavy bombers equipped for
non-nuclear armaments or are eliminated." Elliott explained that
the U.S. side removed this sentence because the details of when a
heavy bomber which is converted or eliminated leaves accountability
were covered very clearly in Part III of the protocol. He said
repeating the concept in the last sentence of the agreed statement
was redundant. He also stated that the purpose of the agreed
statement was to address the treaty inconsistency of basing
deployed heavy bombers at the conversion or elimination facility.
¶6. (S) Ilin responded by asking whether the United States would
count heavy bombers based at Davis-Monthan as deployed or
non-deployed. Elliot responded that they would be counted as
deployed. Ilin stated the Russian side saw the last sentence of
the agreed statement as clarifying that point and without the
sentence, there would be an ambiguity as to how the heavy bombers
should be counted. Elliott proposed modifying the last sentence.
He proposed the following sentence, "Each such heavy bomber shall
be considered a deployed heavy bomber until such time as it is
converted or eliminated in accordance with Part III of this
Protocol." Elliott said he would provide a new version of the
agreed statement later that day.
------------
CONFORMING?
------------
¶7. (S) Elliott stated he was surprised to learn the Russian Side
was not ready to conform the second and third agreed statements
when both sides had agreed on the text and to send them to
conforming during the previous meeting (Reftel). Ilin responded
that he did not have enough time to speak with his delegation prior
to yesterday afternoon's conforming meeting but had discussed the
statements with his delegation last evening and was ready to send
the first, second, and third statements (B-1B conversion, SSGN
conversion, joint basing) to conforming.
-------------------------------------------
FIRST AGREED STATEMENT: CONVERSION OF B-1B
-------------------------------------------
¶8. (S) Elliott agreed all three statements could go to conforming
but he wanted to clarify that brackets still remained in
subparagraph 1(a) of the first agreed statement (conversion of
B-1B) regarding the purpose of the exhibition. Ilin stated that in
his version the U.S. side had agreed to the Russian language and
there, therefore, were no brackets in subparagraph 1(a). Elliott
showed Ilin the documents the U.S. side had provided and explained
the U.S position that the purpose of the exhibition was to
demonstrate the distinguishing features of a heavy bomber equipped
for nuclear armaments as compared to heavy bomber equipped for
non-nuclear armaments and not to confirm the conversion process as
the Russian side suggested. Elliott proposed adding the U.S.
wording in brackets to help the Russian side better understand the
U.S. position and added he would provide a new version of the
agreed statement to the Russian delegation later that day. Elliott
stated that beyond the bracket in subparagraph 1(a) there was
complete agreement on the rest of the document and that it should
go to conforming. Ilin agreed to send the statement to conforming.
--------------------------------------------- ----------
EIGHTH AGREED STATEMENT: USE OF TELEMETRIC INFORMATION
--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶9. (S) Ilin asked if the United States had a response to the
Russian-proposed agreed statement on the use of telemetric
information. Elliott responded that Under Secretary Tauscher and
Ambassador Antonov were discussing this in the context of the
offense-defense relationship. He went on to say he did not
understand the utility of the agreed statement since neither side
could ever prove that the other side was using telemetric
information to enhance its missile defense capabilities. General
Poznikhir stated that neither side had to prove anything. The
sides were simply undertaking the obligation under international
law not to use telemetric information to enhance missile defenses,
he said.
¶10. (S) Elliott asked why, if the sides did not exchange
telemetric data from the self-contained dispensing mechanism (SCDM)
as was proposed by the Russian side, there was a need for the
agreed statement, since the data resulting from the SCDM was of
primary importance for missile defense. Poznikhir postulated that
this agreed statement was not tied to the offense-defense
discussion by the heads of delegation but was rather about the
amount of data being exchanged. He could not understand why the
U.S. side could not make such a statement unless the United States
did, indeed, plan to use the telemetric information to update
missile defense. He continued that Mr. Siemon was unwilling and
unable to discuss this issue in the Telemetry Working Group.
¶11. (S) Dr. Warner answered that U.S. concerns over this proposed
agreed statement were in part about missile defense, which was
under negotiation by the heads of delegation, and in part about
sensitivities the U.S. Senate had about missile defense
restrictions being included in the treaty, a point which the U.S.
Delegation had explained many times. Warner went on to note the
U.S. side had already agreed to include language on missile defense
in the treaty and the treaty needed to focus on strategic offensive
arms.
¶12. (S) ADM Kuznetsov stated the Russian side had been opposed to
the transfer of telemetric information because of the chance that
the data provided by the Russian Federation could be used for
testing missile defense. He was not accusing the United States of
having used telemetric information to enhance missile defense in
the past but rather stating the concern that telemetry could be
used to enhance missile defense in the future. He emphasized that
this was particularly a concern given the fact that the Anti
Ballistic Missile Treaty was no longer in force. He added that the
Russian leadership had agreed to exchange telemetry but the link to
missile defense was still a big worry. This was why the Russian
Federation was insisting on this agreed statement so that the
United States cannot use telemetric data to enhance missile
defense.
¶13. (S) Kuznetsov continued that the agreed statement did not deal
with the aspect of missile defense under negotiation by the Heads
of Delegation but was tied to the amount of data being exchanged
and the concern about that data being used to enhance missile
defense, noting that this was particularly the case for the U.S.
position on telemetry from the SCDM. He reiterated that telemetry
is not tied to the larger missile defense issues. Elliott
responded it was the last 5 words of this proposed agreed statement
"modernization of missile defense systems" that would meet very
strong opposition in the U.S. Senate and that we must not discuss
missile defense in this treaty. Warner added that this phrase
would be seen as a constraint on missile defense which would not
survive Senate scrutiny. In response to Warner's comments,
Kuznetsov stated that if the wording bothered the U.S. side, the
U.S. side should work on it. The Russian side, however, would
insist on keeping the substance of the agreed statement.
¶14. (S) Poznikhir stated the Russian side had heard no reason why
the U.S. side needed SCDM data despite asking multiple times. The
U.S. side had also asked for annual launch plans, and Poznikhir
added that he had asked for the reason for that request as well.
The reasons he was given - that it was for U.S. political reasons -
caused him to recall that the Russian legislature was also very
concerned about how telemetry could undermine Russian national
security and very well understood that SCDM data can be used to
update missile defense. Poznikhir proposed that "we should both
calm down our respective legislatures." Warner inquired as to
whether or not the Russian Federation would exchange telemetric
information on the SCDM if the U.S. side signed the agreed
statement. Poznikhir's immediate response was "no."
¶15. (S) Kuznetsov again asked why the U.S. side could not accept
this agreed statement and said the statement would not limit what
the United States was doing on missile defense. A problem would
arise if the U.S. side used Russian data from the SCDM or other
parameters to enhance missile defense. Elliott again asked if the
U.S. side agreed SCDM data would not be exchanged, did the Russian
side believe that there was still a need for this agreed statement.
Ilin immediately responded "yes."
¶16. (U) Documents provided: None
¶17. (U) Participants:
UNITED STATES
Mr. Elliott
Dr. Warner
Mr. Brown
Lt Col Goodman (RO)
Mr. Taylor
Mr. Sobchenko (Int)
RUSSIA
Col Ilin
ADM Kuznetsov
Gen Poznihir
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)
¶18. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
KING