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S E C R E T GENEVA 000235 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETING, 
FEBRUARY 24, 2010 
 
REF: MOSCOW 000225 (SFO-MOS-007) 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-076. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 23, 2010 
 
                Time:  3:30 P.M. - 5:30 P.M. 
 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
------- 
 
SUMMARY 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶3.  (S) At the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meeting on 
February 23, chaired by Dr. Warner and Col Ilin, the sides 
continued the discussion of the U.S.-proposed Section VII of Part 
Five to the Protocol related to Type-2 inspections.  It was very 
clear that the sides were still far apart on the concept for Type-2 
inspections at Conversion or Elimination (CorE) facilities.  The 
Russian side held to its position that at (CorE) facilities only 
converted or eliminated items would be subject to inspection 
whereas the U.S. view was that a Type-2 inspection at such 
facilities must also include the right to confirm the accuracy of 
data about systems declared to be located at such a facility.  The 
Russian side also made it clear that the now expired START site 
diagram for the Votkinsk Elimination Facility would be reduced and 
only the open viewing area where eliminated items are placed for 
National Technical Means (NTM) viewing would be included and made 
subject to inspection, thus negating the ability to inspect 
non-deployed missiles being prepared for elimination in the large 
building that used to be included on the site diagram. End Summary. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY:  Reviewing the Bidding; Type-2 Inspections 
are Still not Just About CorE; Confusion over Type-2 Inspections 
for Conversion; Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Interceptors not Part 
of Type-2 Inspections; and Still Far Apart on Full Type-2 
Inspections. 
 
 
 
--------------------- 
 
REVIEWING THE BIDDING 
 
--------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (S) Warner began the meeting by reminding Ilin that Section VII 
of Part Five to the Protocol dealt with all Type-2 inspections and 
CorE inspections were a subset of Type-2 inspections.  As a result, 
the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text contained elements for both 
confirming the accuracy of declared technical characteristics and 
data specified for facilities on the numbers and types of items of 
inspection as well as confirming that items had been converted or 
eliminated in accordance with the provisions of Part Three of the 
Protocol.  He also noted that CorE inspections would count against 
the annual quota for Type-2 inspections. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (S) Ilin acknowledged that CorE inspections would be Type-2 
inspections and count against the quota.  He noted that the Russian 
side had reviewed the U.S.-proposed text and pointed out that there 
 
 
was a need to include various elements from the agreed statement 
related to the conversion of B-1 heavy bombers to a conventional 
role as well as the agreed statement on SSGNs.  He also emphasized 
the need to include text related to the conversion of silo 
launchers into launchers of anti-missile defense systems or 
interceptors and pointed out that the U.S.-proposed text did not 
fully take into account the Russian proposal. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
Type-2 inspections are still not just about core 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
 
 
¶7.  (S) Warner began a discussion of the first paragraph of the 
text.  The first part of the paragraph was related to the locations 
where Type-2 inspections could be conducted as well the purpose of 
such inspections which is to confirm the declared data in Part Two 
of the Protocol.  The U.S.-proposed text added the additional right 
to confirm that items had been converted or eliminated if such 
items were present at a facility.  He explained that this 
additional text was necessary to complete the picture for a full 
Type-2 inspection at any appropriate facility. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S) Ilin stated that the additional text was not needed and 
that the Russian-proposed text included the idea that inspectors 
could confirm the elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs, as 
well as mobile ICBM launchers.  Warner acknowledged that was true 
but the text needed to be expanded to include the conversion of 
heavy bombers as stated in the U.S. approach.  Ilin opined that if 
that was the case, text from the agreed statement on the conversion 
of B-1 heavy bombers should be included.  Warner explained that the 
concept of B-1 heavy bomber conversion was captured in paragraph 2 
(a) of the U.S.-proposed text which dealt with inspections of 
formerly declared facilities which was where such inspections would 
be conducted but that the paragraph would need to be expanded to 
include the "right to conduct inspections at eliminated air bases 
to confirm that designated converted B-1 heavy bombers were 
incapable of employing nuclear armaments as stated in the First 
Agreed Statement." 
 
 
 
¶9.  (S) Ilin expressed concern about specifically mentioning B-1 
bombers since he understood that the United States was interested 
in converting B-52H heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for 
non-nuclear armaments in the future and when that process began the 
Protocol would have to be changed.  Warner agreed that it might be 
best just to refer to converted heavy bombers in general rather 
than specifying the B-1.  Ilin agreed with Warner in principle 
stating that the Russian-proposed text could be combined to include 
heavy bomber conversion.  As a result of the discussion Ilin 
bracketed CorE facilities in paragraph 1 as U.S.-proposed text to 
clarify the Russian position that the confirmation of declared data 
would not be allowed during CorE Type-2 inspections. Both sides 
agreed to reformulate their versions of the text for future 
discussion. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
CONFUSION OVER TYPE-2 INSPECTIONS FOR CONVERSION 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
 
 
¶10.  (S) Warner moved to paragraph 2(b) of the U.S.-proposed text 
 
 
explaining that this was where the concept of conducting Type-2 
inspections at ICBM bases and submarine bases to confirm the 
elimination of silo launchers of ICBMs and the conversion of SLBM 
launchers was found.  He explained that the U.S. proposal also 
included the idea that at such facilities during this Type-2 
inspection no other items or portions of the facility would be 
subject to inspection. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (S) Ilin incorrectly pointed out that a Type-2 inspection 
should also be used to confirm that a converted SLBM launcher had 
not been reconverted to allow it to launch an SLBM.  Warner 
carefully explained that the Type-2 inspection at a submarine base 
was intended to confirm the initial conversion of the SLBM 
launcher.  If the Russian side thought it was necessary to allow 
for confirmation that the SLBM launchers had not been reconverted 
then that inspection should be added to a Type-1 inspection and 
Section VI of the Protocol would need to be adjusted.  Ilin agreed 
in principle and acknowledged that Section VI would have to be 
adjusted. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
ABM INTERCEPTERS NOT PART OF TYPE-2 INSPECTIONS 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
 
 
¶12.  (S) Warner turned to the Russian-proposed text which 
referenced the inspection of silo launchers at ICBM bases that had 
been converted to launch ABM interceptors.  Beyond the fact that 
the United States strongly disagreed that such silos would be 
subject to inspection, he explained that these silos were not part 
of an ICBM base but were contained within the Vandenberg Space 
Launch Facility (SLF) and the entire facility was not subject to 
any type of inspection.  Ilin asked which of the launchers 
containing ABM interceptors launched objects into space since this 
was the purpose of a SLF.  Warner repeated that the United States 
was strongly opposed to the Russian position on this topic. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
STILL FAR APART ON FULL TYPE-2 INSPECTIONS 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶13.  (S) Warner shifted the focus of the meeting to the Russian 
proposal not to allow the inspection of the entire CorE facility 
during a Type-2 inspection in order to confirm the declared data 
for the facility.  He reemphasized the U.S. approach that a Type-2 
inspection at a CorE facility would serve two purposes.  First, to 
confirm the data provided in Part Two of the Protocol and provided 
during the pre-inspection briefing and second, to confirm the 
conversion or elimination of items if they were present.  Ilin 
referred back to the Mullen-Makarov meetings in Moscow (Reftel) 
stating that it was agreed that the focus of these inspections was 
only to confirm the elimination of items.  Warner reminded him that 
even before the meetings in Moscow the sides had agreed that CorE 
facilities would be subject to full Type-2 inspections and both 
non-deployed items as well as eliminated items would be subject to 
inspection.  In the case of Votkinsk, for example, this would 
include the inspection of both the building where missiles were 
prepared for elimination as well as the open viewing area in front 
of the building. 
 
 
¶14.  (S) Smirnov placed a piece of paper on the table which 
depicted the now expired START site diagram of the Votkinsk CorE 
facility.  It clearly showed that the boundary of the inspection 
site had been reduced and was now drawn around only the open 
viewing area.  He explained that the processing building would be 
declared to be a portion of the Votkinsk Production Facility, which 
is not subject to inspection under START Follow-on. Consequently, 
the site diagram for the facility would be redrawn and would 
contain only the open viewing area where the eliminated missiles 
would be located.  Ilin noted that no non-deployed items would be 
inspected since the missile preparation building would not be 
included on the site diagram.  Both sides recognized that serious 
disagreement still existed on this point. 
 
 
 
 
¶15.  (U) Documents provided:  None 
 
 
 
¶16.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Dr. Warner 
 
Mr. Albertson (RO) 
 
Mr. Brown 
 
Mr. Buttrick 
 
Maj Johnson 
 
Mr. McConnell 
 
Ms. Purcell 
 
Mr. Rust 
 
Mr. Smith 
 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
Col Ilin 
 
Col Izrazov 
 
Mr. S. Shevchenko 
 
Mr. Smirnov 
 
Ms. Vodopolova 
 
Ms. Shustiva (Int) 
 
 
 
¶17.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
KING