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S E C R E T GENEVA 000233 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: (SFO-GVA-VIII): (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORK MEETING, 
FEBRUARY 26, 2010 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-091. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date: February 26, 2010 
 
Time: 10:00 A.M. - 12:15 P.M. 
 
    Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
------- 
 
SUMMARY 
 
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¶3.  (S) At the final meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working 
Group (IPWG) for Negotiating Session VIII, on February 26, Dr. 
Warner and Col Ilin continued discussion on the U.S.-proposed draft 
of Section VII of Part Five to the Protocol on the issue of Type-2 
conversion or elimination inspections.  The Russian side continued 
to assert that only converted or eliminated items would be subject 
to inspection at Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Facilities.  The 
U.S. side maintained that such a purpose is one part of a broader 
Type-2 inspection right.  The sides also had an extensive 
discussion on the importance of notifications that would be 
necessary to support the inspection activity of the accumulated 
solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs that had 
completed the process of elimination.  End summary. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY:  Overall Assessment of the Session; 
Batching and Natural Accumulations - Continued; and 
Misunderstanding on Notifications. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE SESSION 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (S) Warner stated that the goal for the meeting should be to 
seek a common understanding on the approach toward conversion or 
elimination inspections associated with Type-2 inspections as 
provided for in Section VII of Part Five to the Protocol.  Ilin 
agreed and said the most important result of the session had been 
the work associated with Section VII.  He said that within that 
Section, there were more unresolved issues than resolved issues. 
All remaining issues were highly technical and substantive in 
nature.  He said that if both sides remained flexible, the issues 
could be resolved quickly.  He noted that the snow in Washington 
and the "Roshomon effect" (Begin comment:  This reference concerns 
the propensity of several persons involved in a situation to 
remember it differently.  "Roshomon" was a Japanese movie in which 
this effect was depicted.  End comment.) from the differing 
interpretations of the two sides regarding results of the January 
Mullen-Makarov meeting in Moscow contributed to the delay in 
completing this important Section.  Ilin added that he was looking 
forward to the upcoming break, as it would give both sides the 
opportunity to return with fresh ideas.  Warner shared Ilin's view, 
especially his point regarding the "Roshomon effect" contributing 
to the slow start of Session VIII. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
 
BATCHING AND NATURAL Accumulations - CONTINUED 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
 
 
¶6.  (S) Turning to paragraph 5 of Section VII, Warner said that the 
U.S. delegation had modified this paragraph by using the 
Russian-proposed draft as the basis for the approach that described 
the inspection of eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs using 
inspections that involved both accumulated and non-accumulated lots 
of eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs, solid-fueled SLBMs, and mobile 
ICBM launchers.  Warner said that paragraph 6 was basically a 
cut-and-paste of paragraph 5 and used the same procedures for 
elimination inspections of eliminated mobile ICBM launchers.  He 
said that the U.S.-proposed changes were more structural than 
substantive.  Ilin agreed to work from the U.S.-proposed text. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (S) Warner explained that there were four subparagraphs to 
paragraph 5.  The first subparagraph summarized the two inspection 
opportunities that a Party would have to confirm the results of 
elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs following receipt of 
notification regarding: (a) burned-out missile motor casings of 
missiles that are accumulated; and b) motor casings of missiles not 
associated with accumulation.  While the chapeau in subparagraph 5 
and subparagraph 1(a) were agreed, there was significant discussion 
on how to craft subparagraph 1(b) on the provision associated with 
inspection of eliminated missiles that would not be part of an 
accumulation.  Ilin bracketed subparagraph 1(b) until a common 
understanding could be reached regarding the wording of the 
inspections outside the accumulation period.  Both sides agreed to 
study this matter and bring proposals to the next session. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S) Regarding the subparagraph associated with the details of 
confirming the results of elimination for missiles that have been 
accumulated, the following text was fully agreed: 
 
 
 
Begin text: 
 
 
 
For solid-fueled ICBMs and solid-fueled SLBMs scheduled for 
elimination during a calendar year, each Party shall conduct two 
accumulations of eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and solid-fueled 
SLBMs at a conversion or elimination facility in such a manner that 
no less than 50 percent of the total number of missiles scheduled 
for elimination during that calendar year would be made available 
for inspection of the result of elimination. Each such accumulation 
shall contain approximately 25 percent of the total number of 
solid-fueled ICBMs and solid-fueled SLBMs scheduled for elimination 
during that calendar year. 
 
 
 
End text. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (S) In regards to the subparagraph that sets forth the 
provision for confirming the results of the elimination process for 
missiles outside the period of inspection associated with the 
accumulation of missiles, while the substance of the sub paragraph 
was basically agreed, Ilin explained that he was uncomfortable with 
describing how many missiles would be in a "portion" of the 
remainder of the year's annual output of eliminated missiles.  He 
suggested the sides study the current bracketed text during the 
break. 
 
 
Begin text: 
 
 
 
Type-2 inspections to confirm the results of elimination at the 
conversion or elimination facility for ICBMs or SLBMs will also be 
conducted outside the period of inspection associated with the 
accumulations of solid-fueled ICBMs or solid-fueled SLBMs. ((During 
such inspections, the inspecting Party shall have the opportunity 
to inspect a portion of the remainder of the annual output of 
eliminated missiles present at the conversion or elimination 
facility and subject to inspection in accordance with Part Three of 
this Protocol.))1 
 
 
 
¶10.  (S) Finally, regarding the subparagraph on the provision of 
notification for the 30-day period of time during which inspections 
may be conducted, Ilin asked whether the notifications specified in 
the subparagraph applied to both inspection opportunities for the 
semi-annual accumulation of eliminated missiles, as well as to the 
smaller increments of eliminated missiles made available for 
inspection during the periods outside of the accumulations.  Warner 
replied that the paragraph applied to both inspection 
opportunities. 
 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
MISUNDERSTANDING ON NOTIFICATIONS 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶11.  (S) Following the discussion of the subparagraph on 
notifications, Ilin and Warner began an intensive discussion 
regarding the provision of notification for missiles during the 
batching process and the 60-day period when eliminated missiles 
would be displayed in the open for potential observation by 
National Technical Means (NTM).  Warner argued that in the 
notification that announced the completion of the elimination 
process for a missile, it was essential to specify whether that 
missile would be part of the accumulation process.  It was 
important that Russia provide notification of the beginning of an 
accumulation of missiles that had been eliminated so that the 
United States did not inadvertently disrupt the batching process, 
thereby losing the opportunity to inspect that particular 
accumulation or batch.  Warner said the United States would be 
reacting to notifications provided by the inspected Party opening a 
30-day inspection window regardless of whether such items were part 
of a planned batch, or the result of incremental output without 
batching.  Ilin apparently failed to understand the logic of this 
proposal, saying that there was no need to specify whether such 
eliminated missiles were part of an accumulation. The sides agreed 
to return to this matter in the next negotiating session. 
 
 
 
¶12.  (U) Documents provided:  None. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Dr. Warner 
 
 
Mr. Albertson 
 
Mr. Brown 
 
Mr. Buttrick (RO) 
 
Maj Johnson 
 
Mr. Rust 
 
Mr. Smith 
 
Mr. Taylor 
 
Mr. Sobchenko (Int) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
Col Ilin 
 
Mr. Izrazov 
 
Ms. Vodopolova 
 
Col Zaitsev 
 
Ms. Polyntseva (Int) 
 
 
 
¶14.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
KING