VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0231/01 0591720
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 281720Z FEB 10
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0639
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0387
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0457
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0461
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0457

S E C R E T GENEVA 000231 
 
SIPDIS 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXPQTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 
25, 2010 
 
REF: 10 GENEVA 145 (SFO-GVA-VIII-072) 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-088. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 25, 2010 
 
           Time:  4:30 P.M. - 6:10 P.M. 
 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
------- 
 
SUMMARY 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶3.  (S) At the Telemetry Working Group meeting co-chaired by Mr. 
Siemon and General Poznikhir, the Russian side provided comments on 
the U.S.-proposed draft text ((Annex to the))1 Protocol ((Part 
Seven))2 - Telemetric Information, dated February 24, 2010. The 
Russian side offered a generally negative review of paragraphs 1 
through 4 of Section I:  General Provisions.  For the most part, 
the Russian side emphasized the differences in the positions of the 
sides and a lack of understanding of the U.S. approach.  End 
summary. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (U) Subject Summary:  General Comments; and Section I:  General 
Provisions. 
 
 
 
---------------- 
 
general comments 
 
---------------- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (S) Siemon had provided the U.S.-proposed draft text ((Annex to 
the))1 Protocol ((Part Seven))2 - Telemetric Information, dated 
February 24, 2010, to the Russian side the day before.  The meeting 
focused on the Russian delegation's reaction to this draft text. 
 
 
 
Begin text: 
 
 
 
                                  SFO-VIII 
 
                                  Proposal of the U.S. Side 
 
                                  February 24, 2010 
 
 
((Annex to the))1 Protocol ((Part Seven))2 - Telemetric Information 
 
 
 
Section 1.  General Provisions 
 
 
 
¶1.  The Parties shall exchange telemetric information on an equal 
number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, but on no more than five 
launches of ICBMs and SLBMs per calendar year. 
 
(COMMENT:  This text parallels paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 
U.S.-proposed protocol text.) 
 
 
 
¶2.  The launches of ICBMs or SLBMs, on which telemetric information 
is provided, shall be determined by the conducting Party ((in 
consultation with the monitoring Party.  At the annual BCC exchange 
review meeting, the Parties shall discuss selection of launches on 
which telemetric information would be exchanged to ensure that 
parity is maintained))1. 
 
 
 
¶3.  Telemetric information shall be exchanged on ((five))1 ((the))2 
launches of ICBMs and SLBMs conducted ((in the previous calendar 
year))2 ((unless one of the Parties launches fewer than five ICBMs 
and SLBMs in that year))1. The number of launches of ICBMs and 
SLBMs, about which telemetric information is exchanged, shall be 
((discussed))1 ((agreed upon))2 at the first ((annual))2 session of 
the BCC of ((each))1 ((the current))2 year. 
 
 
 
¶4.  Each Party shall provide telemetric information to the other 
Party via diplomatic channels no later than ((__))1((30))2 days 
after a decision ((to exchange telemetry on a flight test))1 
((regarding this issue))2 has been made((by the BCC))2. 
 
 
 
¶5.  The conditions and guideline for the exchange of telemetric 
information on the launches of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be considered 
within the framework of the BCC. 
 
(COMMENT:  This text parallels paragraph 3 of the U.S.-proposed 
protocol text.) 
 
 
 
((The Bilateral Consultative Commission shall meet within 65 days 
after entry into force of the Treaty to discuss exchange of 
telemetric information on flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs planned 
for that year. Thereafter, the Bilateral Consultative Commission 
shall meet within the first 65 days of each calendar year to 
discuss exchange of telemetric information on flight tests of ICBMs 
and SLBMs planned for that year, and to review the conditions and 
methods of further telemetric information exchange on flight tests 
of ICBMs and SLBMs.))1  In the event that one of the Parties raises 
a question concerning the need to change the ((conditions and 
methods of the exchange))1((quaQity and amount))2 of telemetric 
information ((transferred))2, the exchange of telemetric 
 
 
information shall be ((continued))1 ((suspended))2 until the 
Parties reach an agreement on the given change. 
 
 
 
¶6.  ((The number of flight tests on which telemetric information 
shall be exchanged in the remainder of the year in which the Treaty 
enters into force will be determined on a proportional basis.))1 
Telemetric information shall ((not))2 be exchanged during the 
calendar year in which the Treaty expires ((on a proportional 
basis))1. 
 
 
 
Section II.  Access to telemetric information 
 
 
 
¶1.  The Party conducting launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, on which 
telemetric information is provided, shall not take any measures to 
deny access to ((the telemetry signal))1 ((telemetric 
information))2 broadcast, including ((encryption,))2 jamming, 
encapsulation, and use of directional beaming.  ((If encryption 
methods are used, the means to obtain the decrypted data shall be 
provided to the monitoring Party.))1 
 
 
 
¶2.  In relation to launches of ICBMs and SLBMs on which telemetric 
information is not exchanged, each Party shall have the right to 
use any method of denying access to telemetric information which 
originates on board the missile and is broadcast. The Party 
conducting the launch shall notify the other Party, in accordance 
with Part Four of this Protocol, of the intention to take measures 
to deny access to telemetric information. 
 
 
 
((3.  For each launch for which telemetric information is 
exchanged, no less than 24 hours in advance of any flight test of 
an ICBM or SLBM, including a prototype ICBM or SLBM, the Party 
conducting the flight test shall notify the other Party of all 
frequencies and associated modulation methods to be used to 
broadcast telemetric information during the flight test.))1 
 
 
 
Section III.  Guideline for the exchange of telemetric information 
 
 
 
¶1.  In the exchange of telemetric information, the Parties shall 
provide the recording media containing the recording of telemetric 
information broadcast during the ((flight test))1 ((launch, until 
the propulsion unit of the upper stage of ICBMs or SLBMs ceases to 
function,))2 as well as the interpretive data for the telemetric 
information provided, in accordance with the ((Section of the))1 
Annex on Telemetric Information to this Protocol.  ((The 
interpretive data provided shall be that necessary to permit the 
monitoring Party to extract independently the full representation 
of each data element contained in the telemetric information 
described in Paragraph 2 of this Section, including information to 
decrypt the telemetric information if encrypted.))1 
 
 
¶2.  The Parties shall ((not))2 exchange ((all))1 telemetric 
information ((originating from the stages and self-contained 
dispensing mechanism, if so equipped, irrespective of broadcast or 
recovery method))1 ((broadcast after the propulsion unit of the 
upper stage of ICBMs or SLBMs ceases to function, as well as 
telemetric information that originated in (a) re-entry vehicle(s) 
or in other equipment, installed in the missile as payload))2. 
 
 
 
¶3.  During each launch of ICBMs or SLBMs, the Party conducting the 
launch shall not broadcast telemetric information via a re-entry 
vehicle pertaining to the function of stages ((and self-contained 
dispensing mechanism, if so equipped))1 of ICBMs or SLBMs. 
 
 
 
¶4.  The Party conducting a launch shall independently determine the 
method for recording telemetric information on recording media. 
 
 
 
¶5.  Each Party, in order to make it possible for the other Party to 
play back the recording of the telemetric information provided, 
shall: 
 
 
 
  Qa) use those types of modulation, methods, modes and formats 
for recording, as well as methods for encoding telemetric 
information on recording media that will enable the conversion of 
the telemetric information to the form (format) originated on board 
the missile before broadcast, using telemetry playback equipment 
for which a demonstration has been conducted; 
 
 
 
     b) conduct an initial demonstration ((, unless otherwise 
agreed or previously demonstrated))1 of the applicable recording 
media and telemetry playback equipment to be used, in accordance 
with the ((Section of the))1 Annex on Telemetric Information to 
this Protocol; 
 
 
 
     c) conduct demonstrations of the recording media and (((or)))2 
telemetry playback equipment that are different from those for 
which a demonstration has been previously conducted, in accordance 
with the ((Section of the))1 Annex on Telemetric Information to 
this Protocol; 
 
 
 
     d) provide the other Party with the opportunity to acquire the 
telemetry playback equipment and spare parts for such equipment, 
((if requested))1 in accordance with the ((Section of the))1 Annex 
on Telemetric Information to this Protocol; 
 
 
 
     e)  provide timely training in the operation and maintenance 
of the telemetry playback equipment to technical personnel of the 
other Party, ((if requested))1 in accordance with the ((Section of 
the))1 Annex on Telemetric Information to this Protocol; 
 
 
¶6.  If a Party that has received the media containing the recording 
of telemetric information, determines that the media does not 
contain the recording of the telemetric information in the amount 
specified in paragraph 1 of Section III of this Part, or that the 
quality of the telemetric information recorded on the media is 
insufficient to convert it to the form (format) originated on board 
the missile before broadcast, that Party shall provide notification 
in accordance with Part Four of ((the))1 ((this))2 Protocol. No 
later than 30 days after receiving such notification, the Party 
that has provided the media containing the recording of the 
telemetric information, shall provide notification in accordance 
with Part Four of ((the))1 ((this))2 Protocol explaining the 
reasons fQ the incompleteness or insufficient quality of the 
recording of telemetric information, or shall provide via 
diplomatic channels new media containing the recording of 
telemetric information. 
 
 
 
((7.  If a Party that has received the interpretative data for the 
telemetric information provided, determines that such data does not 
meet the requirements set forth in the Annex on Telemetric 
Information to this Protocol, or that the data received is 
insufficient to convert the recorded telemetric information to the 
form (format) originated on board the missile before broadcast, 
that Party shall provide notification in accordance with Part Four 
of this Protocol. No later than 30 days after receiving such 
notification, the Party that has provided the interpretative data 
for the telemetric information shall provide notification in 
accordance with Part Four of this Protocol specifying the procedure 
for using the interpretative data for telemetric information 
previously provided, or shall provide via diplomatic channels the 
revised interpretative data for telemetric information.))2 
 
 
 
End text. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (S) Poznikhir stated the Russian side did not understand why 
the U.S. side had rejected the Russian-proposed Protocol.  The 
Russian-proposed Protocol reflected the concept that obligations 
should be contained in the Protocol and technical details to 
implement the Treaty and Protocol should be contained in the 
Annexes.  The U.S.-proposed Annex repeated language from its 
Protocol that Pozhikhir opined did not make sense, legally or 
logically.  He said the U.S. approach of using brief protocol 
language would not speed up the work. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (S) As he had done in the previous meeting (Reftel), Siemon 
explained that the U.S. approach reflected agreements made by the 
Presidents during the January 27 phone call and the letter 
exchanged by the Presidents.  The U.S. approach reflected Treaty 
and Protocol language that could be agreed rapidly to allow 
signature.  The three paragraphs of the U.S.-proposed ProtQol were 
those agreed during the Admiral Mullen-General Makarov meetings in 
Moscow.  Guidance from Washington directed the delegation to 
provide a simple, direct Protocol based on agreed language, which 
it had done.  The U.S. proposal for the Annex took the Protocols of 
 
 
 
the two sides and merged them into one document that reflected the 
positions of both within brackets.  It was meant to be a work in 
progress; the purpose was to stimulate discussion on similarities 
and differences in positions and to resolve bracketed text. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S) As an example, Siemon noted the U.S.Qroposed title of the 
document that reflected both the Russian intent for a Protocol and 
the U.S. intent for an Annex.  He also noted paragraph 1 and the 
first sentence of paragraph 5 of Section I:  General Provisions, 
where the U.S. side included the Russian-proposed text without 
brackets.  The U.S. side had instead included a comment at the end 
of each to show that they were parallel to the U.S.-proposed 
Protocol and also to indicate that discussion was necessary to 
decide where the two paragraphs should go. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (S) Poznikhir stated that Siemon's explanation still did not 
answer his question of why the U.S. side had chosen this approach 
since the parts of the Protocol that addressed conversion or 
elimination, notifications and inspection activities all used the 
approach that placed obligations in the Protocol and details in the 
Annex.  Poznikhir stated that the Russian side would provide its 
proposal for the Annexes the next day.  If each side would 
accommodate the other's positions an agreement could be reached 
quickly.  He recommended the U.S. side use the Russian-proposed 
Annexes as a starting point for its proposed Annexes. 
 
 
 
Q---------------------------- 
 
Section I:  General Provisions 
 
------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶10.  (S) Poznikhir questioned the use of "parity" in the text of 
paragraph  2.  How did this relate to the term "equal number" in 
paragraph 1?  Siemon said that parity meant more than one thing; it 
reflected on which flights telemetry would be exchanged, as well as 
the kinds of information that would be exchanged.  The Russian side 
had stated several times that its position was that telemetry would 
be exchanged only on launches from the previous calendar year.  The 
conducting Party determined on which launches the telemetry would 
be exchanged and the number exchanged would be discussed in the 
annual reviews conducted in the Bilateral Consultative Commission 
(BCC).  This was the fundamental position of the Russian side and 
it would not accept any other process. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (S) Siemon noted that it was the position of the U.S. side to 
discuss in the BCC launches of the current year on which telemetry 
would be exchanged.  It was the U.S. view that the receiving Party 
had a role in the decision on which launches telemetry would be 
exchanged.  Poznikhir dismissed the U.S. approach because it was 
not possible for the Russian side to discuss future launches.  A 
schedule could change due to force majeure or technical issues.  In 
addition a schedule of this type contained sensitive information 
that the Russian side would not release.  He reemphasized the 
fundamental Russian position that it was the sole right of the 
 
 
conducting Party to determine on which launches telemetry would be 
exchanged. 
 
 
 
¶12.  (S) Poznikhir moved to the discussion of paragraph 3 which he 
believed conflicted with the obligations of both paragraph 1 of 
this document and paragraph 1 of the U.S-proposed Protocol.  The 
U.S.-bracketed text in paragraph 3 obligated the sides to exchange 
telemetric information on five launches of ICBMs and SLBMs 
conducted in theQrevious calendar year unless one of the Parties 
launches fewer than five ICBMs and SLBMs in that year.  The 
obligation appeared to conflict with the obligation in paragraph 1 
in this document and with paragraph 1 of the U.S.-proposed Protocol 
since both used the formulation "no more than 5 launches."  The 
Russian interpretation of "no more than five launches" meant that 
if a Party conducted 8 launches in the previous year the sides 
could decide in the BCC to exchange telemetry on 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 
launches; but no more than 5 launches.  Poznikhir believed the 
U.S.-proposed text in this example did not permit this decision but 
mandated that telemetry be exchanged on 5 launches.  A lengthy 
discussion ensued in which Mr. Dean explained the legal consistency 
between the paragraphs.  This did nothing to convince Poznikhir to 
change his view that the U.S. language was not internally 
consistent. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (S) Regarding paragraph 4 that addressed the provision of 
telemetric information through diplomatic channels, Siemon noted 
the United States included brackets that indicated that the U.S. 
side had not decided the number of days for when the exchange would 
occur after the decision was made to exchange telemetry on a Qight 
test. 
 
 
 
¶14.  (S) Poznikhir recommended the group conclude discussions for 
the day and pick up with paragraph 5 of Section I at the meeting 
the following day.  Looking ahead to these discussions, Siemon 
stated that the U.S. side disagreed with Russian text on the 
suspension of telemetry exchange and on the lack of a role for the 
receiving Party in the decision on which launches telemetry would 
be exchanged. 
 
 
 
¶15.  (U) Documents provided:  None. 
 
 
 
¶16.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Mr. Siemon 
 
Mr. Connell 
 
Mr. Dean 
 
 
Lt Col Goodman 
 
Mr. Hanchett (RO) 
 
Ms. Pura 
 
Dr. Ringenberg 
 
Ms. Smith (Int) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
Gen Poznikhir 
 
Ms. Fuzhenkova 
 
Col Ryzhkov 
 
Mr. Shevchenko 
 
Mr. Smirnov 
 
Mr. Voloskov 
 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 
 
 
 
¶17.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
KING