VZCZCXYZ0005
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0229/01 0591718
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 281718Z FEB 10
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0625
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0373
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0443
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0447
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0443

S E C R E T GENEVA 000229 
 
SIPDIS 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) JOINT DRAFT TREATY TEXT, FEBRUARY 27, 2010 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-099. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) The text at paragraph 3 is the joint draft text of the 
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian 
Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms dated February 27, 2010. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (S) Begin text: 
 
 
 
SFO-VIII 
 
Joint Draft Text 
 
February 27, 2010 
 
 
 
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION ON MEASURES FOR THE FURTHER REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF 
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS 
 
 
 
The United States of America and the Russian Federation, 
hereinafter referred to as the Parties, 
 
 
 
Believing that global challenges and threats require new approaches 
to interaction across the whole range of their strategic relations, 
 
 
 
Working therefore to forge a new strategic relationship based on 
mutual trust, openness, predictability, and cooperation, 
 
 
 
Desiring to bring their respective nuclear postures into alignment 
with this new relationship, and endeavoring to reduce further the 
role and importance of nuclear weapons, 
 
 
 
Committed to the fulfillment of their obligations under Article VI 
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 
1, 1968, and to the achievement of the historic goal of freeing 
humanity from the nuclear threat, 
 
 
 
Expressing strong support for on-going global efforts in 
non-proliferation, 
 
 
 
Seeking to preserve continuity in, and provide new impetus to, the 
step-by-step process of reducing and limiting nuclear arms while 
maintaining the safety and security of their nuclear arsenals, and 
 
with a view to expanding this process in the future, including to a 
multilateral approach, 
 
 
 
Guided by the principle of indivisible security and convinced that 
measures for the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive 
arms and the other obligations set forth in this Treaty will 
enhance predictability and stability, and thus the security of both 
Parties, 
 
 
 
Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between 
strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms and that this 
interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear 
arms are reduced, 
 
 
 
Mindful of the impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs on 
strategic stability, 
 
 
 
Taking into account the positive effect on the world situation of 
the significant, verifiable reduction in nuclear arsenals at the 
turn of the 21st century, 
 
 
 
Desiring to create a mechanism for verifying compliance with the 
obligations under this Treaty, adapted, simplified, and made less 
costly in comparison to the Treaty Between the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 
1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty, 
 
 
 
Recognizing that the START Treaty has been implemented by the 
Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian 
Federation, Ukraine, and the United States of America, and that the 
reduction levels envisaged by the START Treaty were achieved, 
 
 
 
Deeply appreciating the contribution of the Republic of Belarus, 
the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to nuclear disarmament and 
to strengthening international peace and security as 
non-nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, 
 
 
 
Welcoming the implementation of the Treaty Between the United 
States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive 
Reductions of May 24, 2002, 
 
 
 
Have agreed as follows: 
 
Article I 
 
 
 
¶1.  Each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms 
in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and shall carry 
out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty and its 
Protocol. 
 
 
 
¶2.  Definitions of terms used in this Treaty and its Protocol are 
provided in Part One of the Protocol. 
 
 
 
Article II 
 
 
 
¶1.  Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, 
SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM 
warheads, and heavy bomber nuclear armaments, so that seven years 
after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate 
numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of this Treaty, 
do not exceed: 
 
 
 
    (a)  700, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed 
heavy bombers; 
 
 
 
    (b)  1550, for warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed 
SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers; 
 
 
 
    (c)  800, for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, 
deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed 
heavy bombers. 
 
 
 
¶2.  Each Party shall have the right to determine for itself the 
composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms. 
 
 
 
Article III 
 
 
 
¶1.  For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit 
provided for in subparagraph 1(a) of Article II of this Treaty: 
 
 
 
    (a)  Each deployed ICBM shall be counted as one. 
 
 
 
    (b)  Each deployed SLBM shall be counted as one. 
 
(c)  Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one. 
 
 
 
¶2.  For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit 
provided for in subparagraph 1(b) of Article II of this Treaty: 
 
 
 
    (a)  For ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of warheads shall be the 
number of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs and on 
deployed SLBMs. 
 
 
 
    (b)  One nuclear warhead shall be counted for each deployed 
heavy bomber. 
 
 
 
¶3.  For purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit provided 
for in subparagraph 1(c) of Article II of this Treaty: 
 
 
 
    (a)  Each deployed launcher of ICBMs shall be counted as one. 
 
 
 
    (b)  Each non-deployed launcher of ICBMs shall be counted as 
one. 
 
 
 
    (c)  Each deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be counted as one. 
 
 
 
    (d)  Each non-deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be counted as 
one. 
 
 
 
    (e)  Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one. 
 
 
 
    (f)  Each non-deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one. 
 
 
 
¶4.  For the purposes of this Treaty, including counting ICBMs and 
SLBMs: 
 
 
 
    (a)  For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and 
transported in stages, the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a 
particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that 
type. 
 
(b)  For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and 
transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters, an 
assembled missile of a particular type shall be considered to be an 
ICBM or SLBM of that type. 
 
 
 
    (c)  For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and 
transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, an assembled 
missile of a particular type, in its launch canister, shall be 
considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type. 
 
 
 
    (d)  Each launch canister shall be considered to contain an 
ICBM or SLBM from the time it first leaves a facility at which an 
ICBM or SLBM is installed in it, until an ICBM or SLBM has been 
launched from it, or until an ICBM or SLBM has been removed from it 
for elimination.  A launch canister shall not be considered to 
contain an ICBM or SLBM if it contains a training model of a 
missile or has been placed on static display.  Launch canisters for 
ICBMs or SLBMs of a particular type shall be distinguishable from 
launch canisters for ICBMs or SLBMs of a different type. 
 
 
 
¶5.  Newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall begin to be 
subject to this Treaty as follows: 
 
 
 
    (a)  an ICBM, when it first leaves a production facility; 
 
 
 
    (b)  a mobile launcher of ICBMs, when it first leaves a 
production facility; 
 
 
 
    (c)  a silo launcher of ICBMs, when the silo door is first 
installed and closed; 
 
 
 
    (d)  an SLBM, when it first leaves a production facility; 
 
 
 
    (e)  an SLBM launcher, when the submarine on which that 
launcher is installed is first launched; 
 
 
 
    (f)  a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, when its 
airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in 
which components of such a heavy bomber are assembled to produce 
complete airframes; or when its airframe is first brought out of 
the shop, plant, or building in which existing bomber airframes are 
converted to such heavy bomber airframes. 
 
 
 
¶6.  ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers 
shall cease to be subject to this Treaty in accordance with Parts 
 
Three and Four of the Protocol to this Treaty.  ICBMs or SLBMs of 
an existing type shall cease to be subject to this Treaty if all 
ICBM or SLBM launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of that type have been 
eliminated or converted in accordance with Part Three of the 
Protocol to this Treaty. 
 
 
 
¶7.  For the purposes of this Treaty: 
 
 
 
    (a)  A ballistic missile of a type developed and tested solely 
to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the 
Earth shall not be considered to be a ballistic missile to which 
the provisions of this Treaty apply. 
 
 
 
    (b)  Within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear 
armaments shall be distinguishable from a heavy bomber equipped for 
non-nuclear armaments. 
 
 
 
    (c)  Heavy bombers of the same type shall cease to be subject 
to this Treaty ((or to the limitations thereof))2 when the last 
heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments of that type is 
eliminated or converted((, as appropriate,))2 to a heavy bomber 
equipped for non-nuclear armaments in accordance with Part Three of 
the Protocol to this Treaty. 
 
 
 
¶8.  As of the date of signature of this Treaty: 
 
 
 
    (a)  Existing types of ICBMs are: 
 
 
 
        (i)  for the United States of America, the Minuteman II, 
Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper; 
 
 
 
        (ii)  for the Russian Federation, the RS-12M, RS-12M2, 
RS-18, RS-20, and RS-24. 
 
 
 
    (b)  Existing types of SLBMs are: 
 
 
 
        (i)  for the Russian Federation, the RSM-50, RSM-52, 
RSM-54, and RSM-56; 
 
 
 
        (ii)  for the United States of America, the Trident II. 
 
(c)  Existing types of heavy bombers are: 
 
 
 
        (i)  for the United States of America, the B-52G, B-52H, 
B-1B, and B-2A; 
 
 
 
        (ii)  for the Russian Federation, the Tu-95MS and Tu-160. 
 
 
 
    (d)  Existing types of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers are: 
 
 
 
        (i)  for the Russian Federation, ICBM launchers RS-12M, 
RS-12M2, RS-18, RS-20, RS-24; SLBM launchers RSM-50, RSM-52, 
RSM-54, and RSM-56; 
 
 
 
        (ii)  for the United States of America, ICBM launchers 
Minuteman II, Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper; the SLBM launchers 
Trident II. 
 
 
 
Article IV 
 
 
 
¶1.  Each Party shall locate: 
 
 
 
    (a)  deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases; 
 
 
 
    (b)  deployed launchers of SLBMs only on ballistic missile 
submarines. 
 
 
 
¶2.  Each Party shall base deployed heavy bombers only at air bases. 
 
 
 
¶3.  Each Party shall locate: 
 
 
 
    (a)  non-deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases, 
production facilities, ICBM loading facilities, repair facilities, 
storage facilities, conversion or elimination facilities, training 
facilities, test ranges, and space launch facilities.  Mobile 
launchers of prototype ICBMs shall not be located at maintenance 
facilities of ICBM bases; 
 
 
 
    (b)  non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs only at ICBM 
bases, submarine bases, ICBM or SLBM loading facilities, 
 
((maintenance facilities of ICBM bases,))1 repair facilities for 
ICBMs or SLBMs, storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, conversion 
or elimination facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, training facilities, 
test ranges, space launch facilities, and production facilities. 
Prototype ICBMs and prototype SLBMs, however, shall not be located 
at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases or at submarine bases. 
 
 
 
¶4.  Non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs as well as 
non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may be in transit.  Each 
Party shall limit the duration of each transit between facilities 
to no more than 30 days. 
 
 
 
¶5.  Test launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located only at test 
ranges. 
 
 
 
¶6.  Training launchers may be located only at ICBM bases, training 
facilities, and test ranges.  The number of silo training launchers 
located at each ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs shall not 
exceed one for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base. 
 
 
 
¶7.  Each Party shall limit the number of test heavy bombers to no 
more than ten. 
 
 
 
¶8.  Each Party shall base test heavy bombers only at heavy bomber 
flight test centers.  Non-deployed heavy bombers other than test 
heavy bombers shall be located only at repair facilities or 
production facilities for heavy bombers. 
 
 
 
¶9.  Each Party shall not carry out at an air base joint basing of 
heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers 
equipped for non-nuclear armaments, unless otherwise agreed by the 
Parties. 
 
 
 
¶10.  Strategic offensive arms shall not be located at eliminated 
facilities except during their movement through such facilities and 
during visits of heavy bombers at such facilities. 
 
 
 
¶11.  Strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty shall not be 
based outside the national territory of each Party.  The 
obligations provided for in this paragraph shall not affect the 
Parties' rights in accordance with generally recognized principles 
and rules of international law relating to the passage of 
submarines or flights of aircraft, or relating to visits of 
submarines to ports of third States.  Heavy bombers may be 
temporarily located outside the national territory, notification of 
which shall be provided in accordance with Part Four of the 
Protocol to this Treaty. 
 
Article V 
 
 
 
¶1.  Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and 
replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out. 
 
 
 
¶2.  When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive 
arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the 
question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the 
Bilateral Consultative Commission. 
 
 
 
((3.  Each Party undertakes not to convert and not to use ICBM 
launchers and SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense 
interceptors therein.  Each Party further undertakes not to convert 
and not to use launchers of missile defense interceptors for 
placement of ICBMs and SLBMs therein.  This provision shall not 
apply to ICBM launchers that were converted prior to signature of 
this Treaty for placement of missile defense interceptors 
therein.))3 
 
 
 
Article VI 
 
 
 
¶1.  Conversion, elimination, or other means of removal from 
accountability of strategic offensive arms and facilities shall be 
carried out in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this 
Treaty. 
 
 
 
¶2.  Notifications related to conversion, elimination, or other 
means of removal from accountability shall be provided in 
accordance with Parts Three and Four of the Protocol to this 
Treaty. 
 
 
 
¶3.  Verification of conversion or elimination in accordance with 
this Treaty shall be carried out by: 
 
 
 
    (a)  national technical means of verification in accordance 
with Article X of this Treaty; and 
 
 
 
    (b)  inspection activities as provided for in Article XI of 
this Treaty. 
 
 
 
Article VII 
 
¶1.  A database pertaining to the obligations under this Treaty 
shall be created in accordance with Parts Two and Four of the 
Protocol to this Treaty.  Categories for this database shall be 
included in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty. 
 
 
 
¶2.  Each Party shall notify the other Party about changes in data 
and shall provide other notifications in a manner provided for in 
Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty. 
 
 
 
¶3.  Each Party shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in 
order to provide and receive notifications unless otherwise 
provided for in this Treaty. 
 
 
 
¶4.  Each Party may provide additional notifications on a voluntary 
basis, in addition to the notifications specified in paragraph 2 of 
this Article, if it deems this necessary to ensure confidence in 
the fulfillment of obligations assumed under this Treaty. 
 
 
 
¶5.  The Parties shall hold consultations within the framework of 
the Bilateral Consultative Commission on releasing to the public 
data and information obtained during the implementation of this 
Treaty.  The Parties shall have the right to release to the public 
such data and information following agreement thereon within the 
framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission.  Each Party 
shall have the right to release to the public data related to their 
respective strategic offensive arms. 
 
 
 
¶6.  Geographic coordinates relating to data provided in Part Two of 
the Protocol to this Treaty, unique identifiers, site diagrams of 
facilities provided by the Parties pursuant to this Treaty, as well 
as coastlines and waters diagrams provided by the Parties pursuant 
to this Treaty shall not be released to the public unless otherwise 
agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Bilateral 
Consultative Commission. 
 
 
 
¶7.  Notwithstanding paragraph 5 of this Article, the aggregate 
number of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy 
bombers; the aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs, 
deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy 
bombers; and the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed ICBM 
launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, as well as 
deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers, may be released to the 
public by the Parties. 
 
 
 
Article VIII 
 
 
 
In those cases in which one of the Parties determines that its 
actions may lead to ambiguous situations, that Party shall take 
measures to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty 
 
and to enhance confidence, openness, and predictability concerning 
the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.  Such 
measures may include, among other things, providing information in 
advance on activities of that Party associated with deployment or 
increased readiness of strategic offensive arms, to preclude the 
possibility of misinterpretation of its actions by the other Party. 
This information shall be provided through diplomatic or other 
channels. 
 
 
 
((Article IX 
 
 
 
By mutual agreement of the Parties, telemetric information on 
((flight tests))1 ((launches))2 of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be 
exchanged on a parity basis.  The Parties shall agree on the amount 
of exchange of such telemetric information.))3 
 
 
 
Article X 
 
 
 
¶1.  For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the 
provisions of this Treaty, each Party undertakes: 
 
 
 
    (a)  to use national technical means of verification at its 
disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized 
principles of international law; 
 
 
 
    (b)  not to interfere with the national technical means of 
verification of the other Party operating in accordance with this 
Article; and 
 
 
 
    (c)  not to use concealment measures that impede verification, 
by national technical means of verification, of compliance with the 
provisions of this Treaty. 
 
 
 
¶2.  The obligation not to use concealment measures includes the 
obligation not to use them at test ranges, including measures that 
result in the concealment of ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, or the 
association between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers during 
testing.  The obligation not to use concealment measures shall not 
apply to cover or concealment practices at ICBM bases or to the use 
of environmental shelters for strategic offensive arms. 
 
 
 
Article XI 
 
 
 
¶1.  For the purpose of confirming the accuracy of declared data on 
strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty and ensuring 
 
verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each 
Party shall have the right to conduct inspection activities in 
accordance with this Article and Part Five of the Protocol to this 
Treaty. 
 
 
 
¶2.  Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at ICBM 
bases, submarine bases, and air bases.  The purpose of such 
inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of declared data on 
the numbers and types of deployed and non-deployed strategic 
offensive arms subject to this Treaty; the number of warheads 
located on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs; and the number of 
nuclear armaments located on deployed heavy bombers.  Such 
inspections shall hereinafter be referred to as Type One 
inspections. 
 
 
 
¶3.  Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at 
facilities identified as facilities subject to inspection in Part 
Two of the Protocol to this Treaty except for the facilities 
specified in paragraph 2 of this Article.  The purpose of such 
inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of declared data on 
the numbers, types, and technical characteristics of non-deployed 
strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty and to confirm that 
strategic offensive arms have been converted or eliminated. 
 
 
 
In addition, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections 
at formerly declared facilities, which are listed in Part Two of 
the Protocol to this Treaty, to confirm that such facilities are 
not being used for purposes inconsistent with this Treaty. 
 
 
 
The inspections provided for in this paragraph shall hereinafter be 
referred to as Type Two inspections. 
 
 
 
¶4.  Each Party shall conduct exhibitions and have the right to 
participate in exhibitions conducted by the other Party.  The 
purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate distinguishing 
features and to confirm technical characteristics of new types, to 
demonstrate the results of conversion of the first item of each 
type of strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty. 
 
 
 
Article XII 
 
 
 
To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of 
this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Bilateral 
Consultative Commission, procedures for the operation of which are 
set forth in Part Six of the Protocol to this Treaty, to: 
 
 
 
    (a)  resolve questions relating to compliance with the 
obligations assumed; 
 
(b)  agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to 
improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty; and 
 
 
 
    (c)  resolve questions related to the applicability of 
provisions of this Treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive arm. 
 
 
 
Article XIII 
 
 
 
To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each 
Party shall not assume any international obligations or 
undertakings that would conflict with its provisions.  The Parties 
undertake not to transfer strategic offensive arms subject to this 
Treaty to third parties.  The Parties shall hold consultations in 
accordance with Article XII of this Treaty in order to resolve any 
ambiguities that may arise in this regard.  This provision shall 
not apply to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in 
the area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of 
signature of this Treaty, between a Party and a third State. 
 
 
 
Article XIV 
 
 
 
¶1.  This Treaty, including its Protocol, which is an integral part 
thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the 
constitutional procedures of each Party.  This Treaty shall enter 
into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of 
ratification. 
 
 
 
¶2.  This Treaty shall remain in force for 10 years unless 
superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and 
limitation of strategic offensive arms.  If either Party raises the 
issue of extension of this Treaty, the Parties shall jointly 
consider the matter.  If the Parties decide to extend this Treaty, 
it will be extended for a period of no more than five years unless 
it is superseded before the expiration of that period by a 
subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic 
offensive arms. 
 
 
 
¶3.  Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have 
the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that 
extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty 
have jeopardized its supreme interests.  It shall give notice of 
its decision to the other Party.  Such notice shall contain a 
statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards 
as having jeopardized its supreme interests.  This Treaty shall 
terminate three months from the date of receipt by the other Party 
of the aforementioned notice, unless the notice specifies a later 
date. 
 
¶4.  As of the date of its entry into force, this Treaty shall 
supersede the Treaty between the United States of America and the 
Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions of May 24, 
2002, which shall terminate as of that date. 
 
 
 
Article XV 
 
 
 
¶1.  Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty.  Agreed 
amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures 
governing entry into force of this Treaty. 
 
 
 
¶2.  If it becomes necessary to make changes in the Protocol to this 
Treaty that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under 
this Treaty, the Parties shall use the Bilateral Consultative 
Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to 
the procedure for making amendments that is set forth in paragraph 
1 of this Article. 
 
 
 
Article XVI 
 
 
 
This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
 
 
 
Done at (location and date), in two originals, each in the English 
and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. 
 
 
 
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 
 
 
 
FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: 
 
 
 
(( ))1 Proposed by the United States 
 
(( ))2 Proposed by the Russian Federation 
 
(( ))3 For Discussion by the Heads of Delegation 
 
 
 
End text. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
KING