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S E C R E T GENEVA 000227 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) Inspection Protocol Working Group Meeting, 
February 18, 2010 
 
REF: 10 GENEVA 199 (SFO-GVA-VIII-059) 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-062. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 18, 2010 
 
           Time:  3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M. 
 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
 
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¶3.  (S) At the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meeting 
chaired by Dr. Warner and Col Ilin, the sides continued work on 
Part Six of the Annex on Inspection Activities (Procedures for 
Type-1 Inspections) including changes needed to Section I 
(Pre-Inspection Procedures) and a paragraph-by-paragraph review of 
Section II (Procedures for Inspection of Warheads Located on 
Deployed ICBMs and SLBMs).  The Russian side proposed text on the 
issue of additional objects contained on the front sections of 
ICBMs and SLBMs that are declared not to be re-entry vehicles (RVs) 
with nuclear or non-nuclear warheads.  End summary. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY:  Wrapping up Homework on Section I; 
Paragraph-by-Paragraph, Blow-By-Blow on Section II; Fifteen Minutes 
Remain; and Time to Talk About RVs and Additional Objects. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
WRAPPING UP HOMEWORK ON SECTION I 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (S) Ilin proposed the sides continue discussion on Part Six of 
the Annex on Inspection Activities that was started in the previous 
meeting (REFTEL).  Ilin explained the Russian position on 
subparagraph 1(f) of Section I and agreed to drop the brackets from 
around the term "basing areas."  He stated, however, that the 
brackets in paragraph 3 of Section I around the term "basing areas" 
would remain.  After Warner agreed to continue through this annex 
point-by-point, Ilin asked if the U.S. side had considered Russia's 
inputs to paragraphs 2, 3, and 5 of Section I. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (S) Warner proposed to delete paragraph 5 of Section I dealing 
with items of inspection located along non-contiguous parts of an 
inspection site connected by roads depicted on site diagrams.  He 
explained that the United States had not been able to develop a 
workable solution regarding non-contiguous parts of an inspection 
site connected by roads.  Zaitsev commented that when an inspection 
team arrived, the in-country escort would brief the location of all 
items of inspection and nothing would depart the inspection site. 
Ilin agreed to the deletion. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (S) Warner offered to make a change to paragraph 6 of Section 
VI of Part Five of the Protocol (Inspection Activities) regarding 
 
 
the issue of providing a reason when items of inspection were 
absent during inspections.  This change would replace the term "the 
inspection site" with the language "the designated ICBM base, 
submarine base, or air base."  Ilin agreed. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
PARAGRAPH-BY-PARAGRAPH, BLOW-BY-BLOW ON SECTION II 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S) Moving on to Section II on Procedures for Inspection of 
Warheads Located on Deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, Warner began by 
reading the U.S.-proposed text paragraph-by-paragraph of this 
Section, with Ilin providing comments or suggestions throughout. 
The term "deployed" and "designated" were added in front of the 
terms ICBM or SLBM throughout the text, where appropriate. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (S) On subparagraph 1(a), referencing the geographic 
coordinates specified for that silo launcher, Ilin proposed to add 
the phrase "in Part II of the Protocol" since the coordinates would 
be listed in the treaty database.  Warner agreed. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (S) On subparagraph 1(b), referencing the observation of the 
silo from no more than 50 meters, Ilin proposed to add the phrase 
"or more than 50 meters if agreed to by both the in-country escort 
and member of the inspecting party."  Warner agreed. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (S) On subparagraph 1(c), referencing the opportunity to 
familiarize inspectors with the vicinity of the ICBM or SLBM 
launcher upon arrival, Ilin queried why this description of the 
orientation process was needed.  Having never himself been on an 
inspection, Ilin asked why there was no time limit associated with 
this process and why an unspecified term like "vicinity" was used. 
Following some discussion on this section, Warner proposed to leave 
this section in brackets, adding that the U.S. side could perhaps 
rework the language to a more palatable rendition. 
 
 
 
¶12.  (S) On subparagraph 1(d), referencing continuous observation 
of the designated launcher, Ilin inquired why the purpose of this 
observation needed to be stated in the paragraph.  He observed that 
identification of the purpose for a particular procedure was 
present in some paragraphs and not in others and that the purpose 
of the steps in the procedures to ensure that no additional RVs 
were present was obvious.  Warner agreed to consider 
standardization of the purpose statement, and the two agreed to 
keep this text in brackets. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (S) On subparagraph 1(e), referencing the provision associated 
with informing the inspection team of the opening of the launcher 
door or hatch, Ilin asked that the text be changed to reflect that 
the time of opening be "determined by" vice "at the discretion of" 
the inspected Party.  Warner agreed. 
 
 
 
¶14.  (S) On subparagraph 1(f), referencing inspection of vehicles 
arriving or leaving the vicinity of the launcher once the launcher 
door or hatch was open; Ilin again queried as to the need for this 
paragraph, as he was told, this had never been an issue during 
START inspections.  He pointed out that the inspectors could see 
 
 
all of the vehicles and would be able to tell if objects were 
placed into any of these vehicles.  Warner replied that this type 
of issue may not have arisen in the past precisely because this 
provision existed; one could not know.  Ilin continued down his own 
line of argument, resulting in the text remaining in brackets. 
 
 
 
¶15.  (S) Warner jumped ahead to paragraph 5, referencing a 
prohibition on removal of RVs between designation of the launcher 
for warhead inspection and completion of the viewing of the front 
section.  Warner proposed to rework this text to cover the 
necessary time periods and move this text forward in the section. 
Warner offered that this solution would solve the earlier concerns 
with standardization of purpose statements.  Ilin agreed, although 
he stated that the text should remain in brackets as it may be 
revisited following later discussions on the issues of additional 
objects contained on the front sections of ICBMs and SLBMs that are 
declared not to be RVs with nuclear or non-nuclear warheads. 
 
 
 
¶16.  (S) Returning to subparagraph 1(f), Warner provided examples 
of items - such as the Trident II closure cap, SS-18 upper tube 
extension, and silo-based SS-27 launch canister extension - that 
are removed from the missiles, placed in a vehicle and driven away 
from the inspection site.  If this provision was not retained, 
inspectors could not confirm whether or not RVs were also being 
removed.  Ilin retorted that as all of these items remained on 
site; none of this was an issue for vehicles.  Maj Johnson 
countered by noting that the SS-18 upper tube extension was, in 
fact, taken away by vehicle. 
 
 
 
¶17.  (S) Proceeding to paragraph 4, referencing movement of a 
designated submarine to a specially allocated site, Ilin proposed 
that this language should be combined with that of the mobile 
launchers.  He volunteered that the Russian side would prepare this 
text for the next meeting.  Ilin also asked about SSGNs, and Warner 
said that he would see about the language.  Warner cautioned that 
the SSGN issue may have to wait until later discussion on 
non-deployed launchers. 
 
 
 
¶18.  (S) On paragraph 6, referencing the viewing of the ICBM or 
SLBM front section directly in or on the ICBM or SLBM launcher, 
Ilin asked about whether language on partial separation was still 
needed.  Warner agreed to look into it, stating that it could 
certainly be deleted if it was found to no longer apply. 
Discussion followed on the specifics regarding temporary structures 
and vehicles used during these procedures. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
FIFTEEN MINUTES REMAIN, TIME TO TALK ABOUT 
 
RVS AND ADDITIONAL OBJECTS 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶19.  (S) As in the previous meeting (REFTEL), Ilin noted there was 
fifteen minutes remaining and requested to skip ahead to paragraph 
13 on the issue of additional objects contained on the front 
sections of ICBMs and SLBMs that are declared not to be RVs with 
nuclear or non-nuclear warheads.  Ilin stated that the Russian side 
had prepared two texts on this matter and handed over copies of a 
proposed Agreed Statement on Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Objects as 
well as draft text that would replace the U.S.-proposed text for 
paragraph 13. 
 
 
¶20.  (S) Begin text: 
 
 
 
Proposal of the Russian Side 
 
February 18, 2010 
 
 
 
Agreed Statement: "The Parties agree, that only RVs with nuclear 
warheads that are subject to counting towards the aggregate limit 
under the Treaty, and other objects, that are not RVs with nuclear 
warheads that are not subject to counting towards the aggregate 
limit under the Treaty may be placed on ICBMs or SLBMs at the same 
time." 
 
 
 
Proposal of the Russian Side for Part Six Section II of the Annex 
on Inspection Activities: 
 
 
 
¶13.  "If a member of the in-country escort declares that objects, 
contained in the front section simultaneously with RVS with nuclear 
warheads, are not RVs with nuclear warheads, the inspecting Party 
shall have the right to designate one of these objects for 
inspection.  The inspected Party shall demonstrate to the 
satisfaction of the inspectors that such designated objects are not 
RVs- with nuclear warheads.  Radiation detection equipment, 
provided for in Part Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities to 
this Protocol, may be used, at the discretion of the inspected 
Party, in order to demonstrate to the inspectors, that the object, 
contained in the front section and declared by the in-country 
escort not to be a nuclear warhead, is in fact not a nuclear 
warhead.  The use of radiation detection equipment shall be 
conducted in accordance with Part Five of the Annex on Inspection 
Activities to this Protocol." 
 
 
 
End text. 
 
 
 
¶21. (S) Warner agreed to review these statements and pass them to 
the necessary people. 
 
 
 
¶22.  (S) Warner thanked Ilin for the constructive work on the Annex 
during the last two meetings.  He offered that, given the deadlines 
and the amount of work remaining, the United States was prepared to 
meet every day to get the necessary Protocol and Annex documents 
ready for signature and eventual ratification.  Ilin deferred, 
replying that Ambassador Antonov had given him no orders on the 
need to finish annexes. 
 
 
 
¶23.  (U) Documents provided: 
 
 
 
-   Russia 
 
 
 
-- Proposed Agreed Statement on Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Objects, 
dated February 18, 2010 
 
 
-- Proposal for Part Six Section II Paragraph 13 of the Annex on 
Inspection Activities, dated February 18, 2010 
 
 
 
¶24.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Dr. Warner 
 
Mr. Ahlm 
 
Mr. Albertson (RO) 
 
Mr. Buttrick 
 
Mr. Couch 
 
Maj Johnson 
 
LTC Litterini 
 
Mr. Rust 
 
Mr. Smith 
 
Ms. Gesse (Int) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
Col Ilin 
 
Ms. Vodopolova 
 
Col Zaitsev 
 
Ms. Shustova (Int) 
 
 
 
¶25.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
KING