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FM USMISSION GENEVA
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S E C R E T GENEVA 000223 
 
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DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) NOTIFICATIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING, 
FEBRUARY 24, 2010 
 
REF: 10 GENEVA 185 (SFO-GVA-VIII-073) 
10 GENEVA 191 (SFO-GVA-VIII-075) 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-082. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 24, 2010 
 
           Time:  3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M. 
 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
------- 
 
SUMMARY 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶3.  (S) At the Notifications Working Group meeting chaired by Mr. 
Siemon and Col Ryzhkov, the sides continued discussion of the 
U.S-proposed Joint Draft Text of Part Four to the Protocol to the 
Treaty - Notifications (REF A).  The U.S. side clarified 
U.S.-proposed changes for which the Russian side provided counter 
proposals.  End summary. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY:  Section III:  Notifications Concerning 
the Movement of Strategic Offensive Arms; Section IV: Notifications 
Concerning ((Flight Test))1 ((Launches))2 of ICBMS or SLBMs; 
Section V:  Notifications Concerning Conversion or Elimination; and 
Section VI:  Notifications Concerning Inspections and Exhibitions. 
 
 
 
---------------------------------------- 
 
Section III:  Notifications Concerning 
 
the Movement of Strategic Offensive Arms 
 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (S) Ryzhkov recommended the sides defer discussion of Section 
I:  General Provisions and Section II:  Notifications Concerning 
the Database, since he would provide Russian-proposed text the next 
day.  Siemon agreed and moved to discussion of Section III: 
Notifications Concerning the Movement of Strategic Offensive Arms. 
He indicated that the brackets remaining in Section III were tied 
to time periods for specific events.  Siemon believed the 
Russian-bracketed "five days" in paragraph 1 for the notification 
of the completion of transit was consistent with the notification 
for an update to the database.  Ryzhkov stated that was correct; 
however, there was more involved.  The Russian side proposed a 
five-day time period because experience under START demonstrated 
that a 48-hour time period was difficult for Russian Nuclear Risk 
Reduction Center (NRRC) personnel to meet, since data required for 
the message routinely arrived late from repair and production 
 
 
facilities.  It was also a matter of convenience since it was 
problematic for NRRC personnel to disseminate notifications on 
weekends and holidays.  These could easily be transmitted on a 
Monday if a longer time period was selected.  The sides agreed to 
leave the text bracketed.  There were no brackets in paragraph 2 
relating to the movement of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs from a 
production facility.  Siemon recommended the sides defer discussion 
of paragraphs 3 and 4 on heavy bomber visits since discussion of 
the definitions of deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers had not 
been completed in the Definitions Working Group. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (S) Ryzhkov took the opportunity to discuss the Russian concept 
of "basing" versus "locating" as it related to the definition of a 
deployed and non-deployed heavy bomber.  The Russian side believed 
that "basing" indicated the permanent stationing of a heavy bomber 
at a base.  The deployed heavy bomber was not required to be 
physically present at the base.  It could be temporarily located at 
other facilities, for example a production or repair facility, and 
still be deployed.  The deployed heavy bomber remained based at its 
home air base when it went to either of these facilities and then 
returned to its home base.  A non-deployed heavy bomber was a heavy 
bomber that had a permanent presence at a production or repair 
facility.  Siemon noted that members of the Ad Hoc Group planned to 
discuss this issue at their meeting the following day, and 
suggested, the sides defer further discussion.  Ryzhkov agreed and 
the text remained bracketed. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (S) Siemon stated that the U.S. side could accept the 
Russian-proposed 48-hour time period in paragraph 5 relating to the 
notification of the beginning of a major strategic exercise if the 
Russian side could accept a 48-hour time period for the 
notification of the completion of a major strategic exercise in 
paragraph 6.  Ryzhkov accepted the U.S.-proposed 48-hour time 
period in paragraph 5 but could not accept it in paragraph 6.  The 
sides had a discussion of the no less than 14 day advance 
notification for the beginning of a major strategic exercise 
required under the Agreement Between the Government of the United 
States of America and The Government of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major 
Strategic Exercises, dated September 23, 1989.  Siemon noted that 
with the obligations under the Agreement and the obligations that 
would exist under the new treaty, the sides would be providing two, 
similar notifications for the beginning of each major strategic 
exercise.  Ryzhkov agreed and noted that he had addressed this 
issue at the NRRC-to-NRRC consultations five years earlier.  He 
remarked that his U.S. colleagues suggested that the sides retain 
the START notification and its time period; therefore, two 
notifications were required.  Ryzhkov offered that the sides' 
lawyers might be able to resolve the issue.  Mr. Dean clarified 
that the 1989 Agreement only required notification at the beginning 
of one major strategic exercise per year and the new treaty would 
require notification of the beginning and completion of all major 
strategic exercises.  Responding to a question from Ryzhkov, Dean 
said it was not necessary to address the 1989 Agreement in the new 
treaty.  The text remained bracketed in paragraphs 5 and 6. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
Section Iv:  Notifications Concerning ((Flight Test))1 
 
 
((Launches))2 of ICBMS or SLBMs 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S) Siemon noted that he and Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov had discussed 
the term "launch" in the Definitions Working Group the previous day 
(Ref B).  Ryzhkov was aware of these discussions and said the 
Russian side preferred "launch" versus "flight test" since "launch" 
included both flight tests and launches to place an object into 
space; whereas "flight test" excluded space launches. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (S) Siemon noted the definition also was tied to the Telemetry 
Protocol in which the U.S. side believed telemetry should be 
exchanged on both flights tests and launches to deliver objects 
into space.  The sides agreed to leave the text bracketed. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
Section V:  Notifications 
 
Concerning Conversion or Elimination 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶10.  (S) Ryzhkov believed the U.S.-bracketed word "planned" in 
subparagraph 1(a) relating to advance notification of the intent to 
initiate a conversion or elimination could be deleted since it was 
self evident that when a side "intended to initiate" a conversion 
or elimination it "planned to initiate" the conversion or 
elimination.  Siemon agreed to delete "planned."  Ryzhkov believed 
that U.S.-bracketed subparagraph 1(d) that referenced a 
notification concerning the inspection of batched items was not 
needed if the sides included remarks on batching in the 
notification required by subparagraph 1(c) that required a 
notification after the completion of conversion or elimination. 
Siemon agreed and subparagraph 1(d) was deleted.  The sides removed 
all brackets in paragraph 2 which resulted in agreement of all text 
in Section V.  The agreed Section is as follows: 
 
 
 
Begin text: 
 
 
 
Section V.  Notifications Concerning Conversion or Elimination 
 
 
 
¶1.  For conversion or elimination of ICBMs or SLBMs, launch 
canisters for ICBMs and SLBMs, ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers, 
heavy bombers, and facilities: 
 
 
 
(a) Notification, no less than 30 days in advance of the initiation 
 
 
of conversion or elimination, of intent to conduct a conversion or 
elimination 
 
 
 
(b) Notification, no later than five days after the initiation of a 
conversion or elimination. 
 
 
 
(c) Notification, no later than five days after the completion of 
conversion or elimination procedures. 
 
 
 
¶2.  Notification, no later than 20 days after each calendar year, 
of the number and types of strategic offensive arms scheduled for 
conversion or elimination during the year. 
 
 
 
End text. 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Section VI:  Notifications 
 
Concerning inspections and exhibitions 
 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶11.  (S) Siemon remarked that the sides agreed on text in 
paragraphs 1 through 6.  Bracketed language in paragraph 7 that 
referenced objection to individuals on the initial and amended list 
of inspectors and aircrew members was fundamentally the same. 
Ryzhkov agreed and believed the sides' lawyers could resolve any 
differences in the language. 
 
 
 
¶12.  (S) Ryzhkov accepted U.S.-bracketed text in paragraph 8 and 
the agreed paragraph was as follows: 
 
 
 
Begin text: 
 
 
 
¶8.  Notification containing the agreed list of inspectors and 
aircrew members shall be provided in conjunction with the six-month 
database update of Part Two of this Protocol. 
 
 
 
End text. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (S) Ryzhkov believed paragraph 9 which referenced the 
objection of an inspector or aircrew member on the agreed list 
 
 
could be deleted since paragraph 7 covered this situation.  Siemon 
indicated paragraph 9 was needed to remove an individual from the 
agreed list without waiting for the submission of an amended list. 
Siemon agreed to delete paragraph 9 with the understanding that the 
sides could return to it if necessary after the sides' lawyers had 
resolved the text in paragraph 7.  Ryzhkov agreed. 
 
 
 
¶14.  (S) Siemon stated that after discussing the issue of the time 
period for the declaration of the intent to conduct an inspection 
with Dr. Warner, he believed the issue required work in the 
Inspection Protocol Working Group.  Ryzhkov noted that this 
declaration was not as important as the site declaration time since 
the site declaration time drove the beginning of pre-inspection 
procedures and the time to transport inspectors to the declared 
facility.  Ryzhkov repeated his complaint about the logistical 
burden placed on the Russian side by a 16-hour time period.  In 
addition, the manner in which the U.S. side notified its intent to 
conduct an inspection also placed a burden on the Russian side. 
The Russian side consistently received the notification on a 
weekend for a team arriving on a Monday.  This required Ryzhkov, as 
Head of the Russian NRRC, to call in personnel to make logistical 
arrangements for the incoming team.  Siemon believed there was room 
for compromise but the text would remain bracketed until a decision 
was made outside of the Notifications Working Group. 
 
 
 
¶15.  (S) The sides agreed on the Russian-proposed text in paragraph 
11 with the additional change to replace "messages" with 
"notifications" in the last sentence of the text.  The text was as 
follows: 
 
 
 
Begin text: 
 
 
 
Notification, provided by the inspected Party no later than 30 days 
after entry into force of the Treaty of the determination of agreed 
geographic coordinates of reference points, used at the point of 
entry. Subsequently, the inspected Party shall provide 
supplementary notifications on changes to these reference points. 
 
 
 
End text. 
 
 
 
¶16.  (S) No movement was made on paragraph 12 regarding the 
notification of a change to the boundaries of the inspection and 
coastlines and waters diagrams.  The Russian side deleted its 
bracketed text in paragraphs 13 and 14.  The agreed text was as 
follows: 
 
 
 
Begin text: 
 
 
 
¶13. Notification of intent to conduct an exhibition shall be 
 
 
provided no less than 30 days in advance of the planned date of the 
exhibition. 
 
 
 
¶14.  Notification of intention to participate in an exhibition 
shall be provided no less than 72 hours in advance of the planned 
date of the exhibition 
 
 
 
End text. 
 
 
 
¶17.  (S) The sides agreed on the following text in paragraph 15 
which addressed notifications provided by the inspection team 
during inspections: 
 
 
 
Begin text: 
 
 
 
¶15.  Notification provided by the inspection team chief in writing 
to a member of the in-country escort during inspection. 
 
 
 
End text. 
 
 
 
¶18.  (S) Maj Johnson walked Ryzhkov through a time line for 
declaration of a sequential inspection which occurred after the 
return of the inspection team to the point of entry.  Ryzhkov 
stated that this clarified the U.S.-proposed text and he would 
provide Russian-proposed text for the paragraph at a later date. 
 
 
 
¶19.  (U) Documents provided:  None. 
 
 
 
¶20.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Mr. Siemon 
 
Mr. Albertson 
 
Mr. Dean 
 
Mr. Dwyer 
 
Dr. Fraley 
 
Mr. Hanchett(RO) 
 
 
 
Maj Johnson 
 
LTC Litterini 
 
Mr. Stickney 
 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
Col Ryzhkov 
 
Mr. Ivanov 
 
Mr. Smirnov 
 
Mr. Voloskov 
 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
 
 
¶21.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
KING