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S E C R E T GENEVA 000199 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/28 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP MEETING, 
FEBRUARY 17, 2010 
 
REF: 10 GENEVA 195 (SFO-GVA-VIII-055); MOSCOW 000225 (SFO-MOS-007) 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-059. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 17, 2010 
 
           Time:  3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M. 
 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
------- 
 
SUMMARY 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶3.  (S) At the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meeting 
co-chaired by Dr. Warner and Col Ilin on Wednesday, February 17, 
the sides discussed Part Six to the Annex on Inspection Activities. 
Although the parties largely agreed to retain many pre-inspection 
restrictions (PIRs) as they were in START, the Russian side 
rejected any notion of recalling road mobile launchers located in 
non-contiguous portions of a base at the time pre-inspection 
restrictions went into effect. More importantly, the Russian side 
gave its first indication that it was in favor of not counting 
non-nuclear objects on front sections under the warhead central 
limits if they were located on a front section that is declared to 
be an ICBM equipped with nuclear-armed reentry vehicles (RVs).  End 
summary. 
 
 
 
 
 
¶4.  (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: Pre-Inspection Restrictions for Type-1 
Inspections; Differing Problem Sets; and Non-Nuclear Objects on 
Front Sections. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
PRE-INSPECTION RESTRICTIONS FOR TYPE-1 INSPECTIONS 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
 
 
¶5.  (S) Warner opened the discussion by initiating a line-by-line 
review of the U.S. proposal for Section I to Part Six to the Annex 
on Inspection Activities, which outlines the PIRs imposed on a 
particular operational base after site declaration for a Type-1 
inspection has occurred.  Ilin immediately voiced concern about how 
long PIRs lasted, and appeared confused about how these PIRs 
applied to the entire base while the inspection team was traveling 
to the base and before the designation of an item for warhead 
inspection, and then how the PIRs collapse to just the designated 
 
 
item of inspection.  Ilin insisted that wording be added to the 
text to ensure that PIRs only applied to deployed systems during a 
Type-1 inspection.  Warner pointed out that this was redundant, but 
that the United States would accept this addition because it did 
not change the procedures or outcomes in any way. Ilin then 
proceeded to clear several brackets in the U.S. proposal, but 
brackets around any references to "basing areas" remained. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (S) Ilin voiced concern that there should be specific 
references to SSGNs in each portion of Part Six of the Annex, 
beginning with the discussion in Section I of PIRs. While Warner 
reminded Ilin that these were already covered in full detail in the 
Second Agreed Statement, Ilin insisted it would probably be 
necessary to add the acronym SSGN to every passage that referred to 
an SSBN.  Warner accepted, and said the United States would propose 
new language on this subject. 
 
 
 
¶7.   (S) The remainder of the discussion on the subject of PIRs for 
Type-1 inspections consisted of familiarizing Ilin with how such 
PIRs were applied on the ground during START, along with the 
rationale for such PIRs.  Warner explained that during PIRs a heavy 
bomber or SSBN could move within the boundaries of the site while 
the inspection team was traveling to the base but once the 
inspection team arrived, movement of items of inspection was no 
longer allowed since the items must now be annotated on the site 
diagram and be subject to inspection at that location. 
 
 
 
----------------------- 
 
DIFFERING PROBLEM SETS 
 
----------------------- 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S) Considerable time was spent discussing the issue of 
non-contiguous areas of a designated base, and how such areas 
impacted the conduct of a Type-1 inspection.  Warner explained to 
Ilin that items of inspection temporarily located between two 
non-contiguous portions of a site should be part of the 
pre-inspection briefing, as these items should be considered as 
candidates for inspection just as anything located within defined 
boundaries on a site diagram.  Ilin disagreed, noting any item of 
inspection located between non-contiguous parts of a site should 
not be part of an inspection.  He viewed any item in transit 
between two non-contiguous areas of a site as being 
non-inspectable, much as an SSBN at sea cannot be inspected. 
Warner ended this discussion by pointing out that under Ilin's 
construct, road mobile launchers could conceivably always be absent 
and therefore not inspectable. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (S) Col Petrov provided a short description of procedures for 
preparing a front section for a warhead inspection.  Warner 
explained the various options employed in the past, to include 
viewing in a silo launcher, viewing in a vehicle, viewing near a 
silo launcher, and viewing in a specially allocated site.  Petrov 
 
 
concurred that the Russians shared this conceptual vision, but 
requested some nuanced wording substituting "outside the launcher" 
for "in close proximity."  Warner accepted this language as a 
conforming change. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
 OBJECTS DECLARED NOT TO BE NUCLEAR ON FRONT SECTIONS 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
 
 
¶10.  (S) Ilin requested that Warner jump ahead to paragraph 13 of 
Part Six to the Annex in order to allow the sides to think about a 
new proposal overnight.  Ilin broached the subject of additional 
objects declared not be nuclear on the front sections of some ICBMs 
and SLBMs.  He described three possibilities the Russians saw as 
combinations of objects one may find on a front section: 1) 
nuclear-armed RVs and objects declared not to be equipped with 
nuclear warheads, 2) non-nuclear-armed RVs and objects declared not 
to be nuclear, and 3) nuclear-armed RVs, non-nuclear-armed RVs, and 
other objects declared not to be nuclear.  Col Zaitsev explained 
that the inspection team could detect what was not nuclear using 
radiation detection equipment (RDE), so there was a means to 
determine what should be "counted" and what should not be counted 
under the current counting rules.  He stated that ballast and other 
objects should not be counted so long as they were on a front 
section that contained at least one RV with a nuclear warhead. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (S) Warner countered that all non-nuclear-armed RVs counted 
the same as nuclear-armed RVs under the current counting rules for 
START Follow-on.  He asked the Russian side to clarify their intent 
with regard to differentiating between non-nuclear-armed RVs and 
other objects declared not to be nuclear.  Zaitsev explained that 
in the instance of a front section with nuclear-armed RVs and 
objects declared not to be nuclear, the nuclear-armed RVs would 
count against the central limit, but the other objects would not. 
In the instance of a front section consisting of non-nuclear-armed 
RVs and other objects declared not to be nuclear, both the 
non-nuclear-armed RVs and other objects declared not to be nuclear 
would count against the central limit, as there was no means of 
differentiating between them.  In the instance of a front section 
which contained nuclear-armed RVs, non-nuclear-armed RVs, and other 
objects declared not to be nuclear, only the nuclear-armed RVs 
would count against the central limits.  Warner noted that the last 
scenario was complex since there was no way of determining 
nuclear-armed from non-nuclear-armed RVs and neither side had 
allowed the use of RDE on nuclear warheads under START nor were 
they likely to do so under START Follow-on.  Warner ended the 
meeting by expressing interest in hearing about the Russian concept 
in more detail.  Ilin said he would provide proposed language soon. 
 
 
 
¶12.  (U) Documents provided: 
 
 
 
- United States: 
 
 
-- Section I, Part Six to the Annex on Inspections, dated February 
17, 2010. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Dr. Warner 
 
Mr. Albertson 
 
Mr. Brown 
 
Mr. Buttrick 
 
Maj Johnson 
 
LTC Litterini (RO) 
 
Mr. McConnell 
 
Ms. Pura 
 
Ms. Purcell 
 
Mr. Rust 
 
Mr. Smith 
 
Ms. Gesse (Int) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
Col Ilin 
 
Col Petrov 
 
Ms. Vodopolova 
 
Mr. S. Shevchenko 
 
Col Zaitsev 
 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 
 
 
 
¶14.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
KING