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Viewing cable 10GENEVA195, SFO-GVA-VIII): (U) Inspection Protocol Working Group

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10GENEVA195 2010-02-27 17:52 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Mission Geneva
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0195/01 0581752
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 271752Z FEB 10
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0533
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0336
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0406
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0410
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0406
S E C R E T GENEVA 000195 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/27 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: (SFO-GVA-VIII): (U) Inspection Protocol Working Group 
Meeting, February 16, 2010 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-055 
 
 
 
2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 16, 2010 
 
           Time:  3:30 P.M. - 17:15 P.M. 
 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
------- 
 
SUMMARY 
 
------- 
 
 
 
3.  (S) At the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meeting, 
chaired by Dr. Warner and Colonel Ilin, the sides discussed the 
U.S.-proposed Annex on Inspection Activities, Part Six, related to 
the procedures for conducting Type-1 inspections.  The sides agreed 
to review the proposed text line-by-line; accepted several 
paragraphs and agreed to re-write others for clarity. End summary. 
 
 
 
4.  (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY:  U.S.-proposed Annex on Inspection 
Activities; Focusing on Part Six. 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
U.S.-Proposed Annex on Inspection Activities 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
5.  (S) Warner stated the priority of the Inspection Protocol 
Working Group (IPWG,) in order to complete selected parts of the 
Annex on Inspection Activities prior to signature of the START 
Follow-on Treaty, needed to be Part Six, related to the procedures 
for the conduct of Type-1 inspections, and Part Seven, related to 
the procedures for the conduct of both Type-1 and Type-2 
inQctions.  Part Four, procedures for the submission of site 
diagrams, was also a priority but the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) Working Group, led by Mr. Trout and General Orlov, would be 
responsible for drafting that part. 
 
 
 
6. (S) Warner proposed to begin discussion of Part Six by focusing 
on pre-inspection restrictions and the conduct of warhead 
inspections.  He noted the Annex on Inspection Activities was an 
important "handbook of agreed procedures" to be used by inspectors. 
While many of the procedures in the Annex would be the same as 
those used in START, it was important for this working group to 
verify the validity of the procedures, he said.  Ilin concurred, 
stating the priority should be placed on setting forth the 
procedures for Type-1 and Type-2 inspections.  Warner clarified 
that Part Seven dealt largely with Type-2 inspections, but some 
portions would apply to Type-1 inspections as well because it had 
been agreed to inspect both deployed and non-deployed items during 
Type-1 inspections.  In order to ensure clarity, Ilin proposed 
referencing in Part Six the provisions from Part Seven that were 
applicable to Type-1 inspections.  Warner agreed. 
 
 
 
--------------------- 
 
 
focusing on part six 
 
--------------------- 
 
 
 
7.  (S) Ilin explained that current provisions in Part Six did not 
contain procedures for inspecting structures that do not contain 
mobile launchers of ICBMs and recommended those procedures be 
added.  Warner agreed to add them if they were missing.  Ilin 
stated that Part Six did not describe the actions of the inspecting 
party if a non-declared item of inspection was discovered.  Warner 
countered that it was clear in the Protocol, but agreed to review 
the matter.  Ilin pointed out that Part Six did not include 
guidance if objects other than warheads were discovered on an 
inspected missile and recommended wording from START be included 
with consideration being given to the presence of both nuclear and 
non-nuclear warheads.  Warner reminded Ilin that both nuclear-armed 
and conventionally-armed warheads would be counted against the 1550 
aggregate limit on warheads.  Ilin continued that new provisions 
for the inspection on SSGNs during Type-1 inspections had also not 
been included.  Warner stated the Second Agreed Statement on the 
SSGNs was adequate to cover this situation since it outlined the 
principle of using an empty tube inspection to inspect the 
converted launchers.  In any case, Warner noted, such an inspection 
would be a Type-1 rather then a Type-2 inspection.  Ilin replied 
that the Agreed Statement did not specify the order of inspection 
and reiterated the need for detailed instructions somewhere in the 
Annex since this Annex provided guidance for execution of the 
inspections. 
 
 
 
8.  (S) In paragraph 1, the sides agreed to change paragraph 
1(a)(i) to the active voice and remove the words "launch 
canisters."  Ilin requested the phrase "closed vehicles" be placed 
in brackets and the last portion of the paragraph be rewritten to 
specify that covered objects large enough to contain items of 
inspection should not be removed from the inspection site.  Warner 
agreed to the rewriting of the paragraph.  Paragraph 1(a)(ii) was 
agreed and changed to read: "Heavy bombers shall not leave the 
inspection site." 
 
 
 
9.  (S) Ilin asked if the pre-inspection restrictions imposed by 
paragraph 1(b) were in place prior to the declaration of the 
launcher.  Warner explained it was a two step process.  First, the 
restrictions were put in place on the whole base until completion 
of the pre-inspection procedures which included the declaration of 
the launchers or bombers for Type-1 inspection.  Following 
designation of the launcher or bombers for inspection, certain 
pre-inspection restrictions on the remainder of the base would no 
longer be in effect, but the pre-inspection restrictions on the 
selected launchers or bombers would remain in effect until the 
inspecting party arrived at the location of the designated 
launchers or bombers.  Both parties agreed to revise paragraph 1(b) 
to better specify which pre-inspection restrictions were applicable 
during each period of the inspection to eliminate confusion on the 
matter. 
 
 
 
10.  (S) Ilin questioned whether the pre-inspection restrictions 
(PIR) were applicable to SSGNs located at SSBN bases and Warner 
reiterated that SSGN pre-inspection restrictions were covered in 
the Second Agreed Statement.  Ilin disagreed and requested a 
reference in the Annex to the Second Agreed Statement on SSGNs. 
Warner agreed to review the matter.  Ilin demonstrated his 
unfamiliarity with START inspection procedural concepts, raising 
questions on test heavy bombers and "water trucks" which are 
captured under PIRs.  With reference to test heavy bombers, Ilin 
questioned why test heavy bombers would be permitted to leave 
during PIRs.  Warner explained that these were not inspectable, but 
Ilin countered that because the inspecting party had no way of 
 
 
distinguishing a test bomber from a normal heavy bomber, the test 
heavy bomber should be required to remain at the base.  Warner 
agreed. 
 
 
 
11. (S) Ilin commented that it was not reasonable that a water 
truck which was large enough to contain an item of inspection would 
get captured under PIRs.  He implied that it should be apparent to 
an inspector that a missile could not be hidden in the back of a 
water truck, and that the idea of having to inspect a water truck 
undermined altogether the basis of trust in the treaty. 
 
 
 
12.  (U) Documents provided: 
 
 
 
-  United States 
 
 
 
-- U.S.-proposed text for Part Six of the Annex to Part V of the 
Protocol, dated February 15, 2010 
 
 
 
13.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Dr. Warner 
 
Mr. Ahlm (RO) 
 
Mr. Albertson 
 
Mr. Buttrick 
 
MAJ Johnson 
 
LTC Litterini(RO) 
 
Mr. McConnell 
 
Ms. Purcell 
 
Mr. Rust 
 
Mr. Smith 
 
Ms. Gesse (Int) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
Col Ilin 
 
Col Petrov 
 
Mr. Shevchenko 
 
Ms. Vodopolova 
 
Col Zaitsev 
 
Ms. Shustiva (Int) 
 
 
14.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
KING