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S E C R E T GENEVA 000193 
 
SIPDIS 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/27 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP 
MEETING, FEBRUARY 26, 2010 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-090. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 26, 2010 
 
                Time:  10:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M. 
 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
------- 
 
SUMMARY 
 
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¶3.  (S) During a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group 
meeting held at the Russian Mission on February 26, the sides 
discussed Part Four to the Annex on Inspection Activities, 
specifically, the Russian-proposed procedures for notification and 
agreement on changes to site diagrams.  At the end of the meeting, 
there was a one-on-one meeting between Gen Orlov and Mr. Trout to 
discuss treaty provisions related to mobile missiles.  End summary. 
 
 
¶4.  (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY:  Will These Weekend Meetings Solve 
Anything?; Changing Site Diagrams; Perceived Contradictions; A 
Thinner Main Operations Directorate; and Presidential No to Unique 
Mobile Treaty Provisions. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------- 
 
WILL THESE WEEKEND MEETINGS SOLVE ANYTHING? 
 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (S) General Orlov asked about Mr. Trout's vision for future 
meetings.  Trout proposed meetings take place immediately upon the 
return of the two delegations from the planned break.  He was 
optimistic about the pending meeting of U/S Tauscher and Amb 
Antonov, saying that he hoped they could reach resolution on some 
of the larger issues.  Orlov indicated he was unaware of the 
content of the discussion between the Presidents which had occurred 
two days prior, and that he hoped U/S Tauscher had the requisite 
authority to make definitive proposals.  Trout assured Orlov that 
Tauscher had such authority and was bringing new guidance from 
Washington. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (S) Orlov expressed skepticism that anything productive could 
come from these meetings, recalling that the Presidents discussed 
such issues earlier in the week.  Trout reiterated that U/S 
Tauscher flew to Geneva with new guidance to help negotiate the 
offense-defense relationship. 
 
 
---------------------- 
 
CHANGING SITE DIAGRAMS 
 
---------------------- 
 
 
 
¶7.  (S) Orlov presented a Russian proposal for paragraphs 3-5 of 
Part Four to the Annex on Inspections and asked Col Petrov to 
explain the proposal and its underlying logic.  Petrov said he had 
discussed his proposed procedures with the Russian officers and 
lawyers working on the Notifications Protocol and said he thought 
his proposal would be synchronous with the way the Notifications 
Working Group was thinking about the matter. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S) In the Russian-proposed paragraph 3, Petrov proposed a 
special format for notification of the declaration of a new 
facility.  He acknowledged that for 15 years under START, 48-hour 
notice for the declaration of a new facility and the exchange of 
the site diagram proved a successful procedure.  However, said 
Petrov, a 72-hour timeframe was more practical for transmitting 
this notification and site diagram, given the extra time involved 
in transmitting the information through diplomatic channels. 
Petrov emphasized that diplomatic channels were a proven and 
practical means of transmitting this information, rather than 
waiting for the next meeting of the Bilateral Consultative 
Commission (BCC). 
 
 
 
¶9.  (S) For paragraph 4, Petrov proposed procedures for site 
diagram boundary changes which would not result in the exclusion of 
any part of the inspection site or coastlines and waters diagram, 
and for site diagram changes that entailed the addition or deletion 
of buildings depicted on a site diagram.  For changes in the 
boundaries which preserve or increase the total bounded area, the 
change would occur on the date indicated in the notification and 
the new site diagram would be passed through diplomatic channels 
within 72 hours of the notification. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (S) For the addition or deletion of buildings which are 
intended for use by items of inspection with no boundary change, a 
revised site diagram would be presented to the inspection team 
chief during pre-inspection procedures and would become part of the 
official inspection report. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (S) In the Russian-proposed paragraph 5, Petrov laid out two 
different procedures for boundary changes that entailed a decrease 
in any part of the inspection site.  One scenario would involve a 
structure which is intended for items of inspection that is 
destroyed or dismantled.  In this case, the inspected Party would 
provide a notification through diplomatic channels within 72 hours 
of the change.  The change in the boundary of the inspection site 
would become effective on the date of transmission of the 
notification.  The second scenario would involve a structure that 
 
 
was depicted on an existing site diagram that was no longer 
intended for an item of inspection.  In this case, the proposed 
change to the site diagram would be referred to the BCC for 
discussion between the Parties.  If the Parties agreed upon the 
change, the new site diagram would be effective as of the date of 
transmission of the notification required by Part Four of the 
Protocol.  This proposal did not specifically deal with boundary 
reductions that did not involve structures. 
 
 
 
¶12.  (S) Trout stated the United States looked forward to reviewing 
the proposal. 
 
 
 
------------------------ 
 
PERCEIVED CONTRADICTIONS 
 
------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶13.  (S) Lobner and Col Pischulov turned to a few bracketed 
passages in Part Two of the Protocol that resulted from the 
conforming process.  Lobner asked whether the Russian side had 
reconsidered the bracketed text in Section IV that listed unique 
identifiers (UIDs) for non-deployed SLBMs at a submarine base. 
Pischulov stated he now understood the U.S. concept behind this 
proposal, specifically, that the United States stored non-deployed 
SLBMs at the submarine base that were not located on the submarine. 
Based on that understanding, Russia dropped its brackets. 
 
 
 
¶14.  (S) Pischulov moved on to Section VI and asked whether the 
United States would accept the Russian proposal to use "or" instead 
of "and" to describe the category of non-deployed ICBMs/SLBMs at 
space launch facilities.  Lobner explained that using "or" could 
result in a situation where, if both ICBMs and SLBMs were located 
at a space launch facility, a Party could interpret the "or" to 
mean that the Party was only required to declare one or the other, 
but not both.  To avoid this ambiguity, he continued, "and" was the 
correct word to specify the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs. 
Pischulov disagreed because, he said, there are no space launch 
facilities that have both SLBMs and ICBMs.  The text remained 
bracketed. 
 
 
 
¶15.  (S) Pischulov turned to his final question regarding UIDs in 
Section V, asking if the U.S. had accepted the Russian-proposal to 
list UIDs for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. 
Trout explained that since a converted heavy bomber was no longer 
accountable under the treaty, the United States should not provide 
the UID. 
 
 
 
¶16.  (S) Orlov recounted the history of UIDs as he saw it. 
According to him, the United States originally insisted on UIDs. 
Then, he said, General Makarov was under great pressure to concede 
on this issue with Admiral Mullen sitting across from him.  After 
 
 
Makarov finally conceded on this issue, he explained to his nervous 
officers that he would paint the UIDs on heavy bombers in very 
small characters.  Now, said Orlov, he would have to go back to 
Makarov and explain that although the United States forced Russia 
to concede on the UID issue, the United States now refused to place 
UIDs on a type of heavy bomber of an existing type, specifically 
the B-1B.  Trout emphasized that once a heavy bomber had been 
converted there was no need for UIDs because there was no limit on 
the number of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. 
Orlov responded that UIDs on non-nuclear heavy bombers would help 
Russia determine that such heavy bombers had not been re-converted 
to heavy bombers equipped with nuclear armaments. 
 
 
 
¶17.  (S) Trout took the opportunity to attempt to explain the 
difference between "based" and "located" with reference to 
reporting on heavy bombers in the database.  Orlov repeatedly said 
that he did not understand the value in differentiating between 
"located" and "based."  Trout reminded Orlov that the Russian side 
refused to entertain the notion of a heavy bomber being "based" at 
a repair or production facility, and therefore, there was a need to 
differentiate between location and basing. 
 
 
 
¶18.  (S) Both sides used numerous examples to show how the 
numerical values for bombers would change as the bombers moved from 
air bases to certain types of facilities.  Lobner emphasized that 
the numbers changed in one fashion when the bomber's location was 
the only factor taken into account, but could change in an entirely 
different way if the bomber's basing was the only factor taken into 
account.  This duality, he argued, presented a difficult situation 
that needed a solution.  The sides agreed that much work needed to 
be done on this Section.  Trout indicated that the United States 
was working on a revised text for Section V and would hopefully be 
able to present the text at the beginning of the next session. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------- 
 
A THINNER MAIN OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE 
 
------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶19.  (S) Orlov mentioned twice that he was an officer of the Main 
Operations Directorate (Russian acronym:  GOU) of the Russian 
General Staff and that he did not see the logic in many aspects of 
the formulation of this treaty.  LTC Litterini remarked that he had 
worked as an assistant to a Russian general from GOU who worked at 
SHAPE, Belgium.  Litterini asked Orlov to convey his regards to 
Generals Fillipovich and Ponomarenko.  (Begin comment: 
FILLIPOVICH, Alexander Vasilyevich and PONOMARENKO, Andrei 
Makarovich.  End comment.)  Orlov said he knew both officers well, 
but that Ponomarenko had been discharged. 
 
 
 
¶20.  (S) In a side conversation, Pischulov noted that he personally 
was from GOU, and was a graduate of senior service college. 
Litterini commented that the Russian army was going through a 
 
 
dramatic transition, and congratulated Pischulov in having survived 
the drawdown.  Pischulov voiced great uncertainty due to the fact 
that he was here in Geneva while cuts were still occurring in 
Moscow.  He said that he expected to work 13-hour days at GOU 
during the week-long break from negotiations in Geneva.  He also 
noted that during the break at the New Year, GOU officers were 
forced to work 13-hour days from January 2 until they returned to 
Geneva on January 30. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
PRESIDENTIAL NO TO MOBILE PROVISIONS 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶21.  (S) In a one-on-one meeting with Orlov, Trout explained the 
importance for the United States to include in the treaty the right 
to confirm the declared data for deployed mobile launchers at one 
ICBM basing area during a Type-1 inspection, and to have some 
reasonable boundary that Russia would declare for their road mobile 
ICBM bases.  Orlov indicated that as a military man he could 
understand why the United States was requesting these treaty 
provisions.  However, the President of Russia had insisted that 
there be no treaty provisions that uniquely applied to Russia's 
mobile ICBM forces.  Given that Presidential order, no one in the 
Ministry of Defense or the delegation would be willing to sign a 
letter requesting the President change his mind.  He emphasized 
that there was nothing anyone at our level of authority could do to 
change that ruling.  He said it would take discussions between our 
Presidents to change the Russian delegation's instructions.  He 
also noted that the Russian press had started calling the START 
Follow-on treaty "treacherous" to Russian national security.  That 
made everyone even more nervous about recommending anything outside 
Presidential guidance. 
 
 
 
¶22.  (U) Documents provided: 
 
 
 
- Russia: 
 
 
 
    -- Russian-Proposed Joint Draft Text for Paragraphs 3-5, Part 
Four to the Annex on Inspections (Russian-Language Version), dated 
February 26, 2010. 
 
 
 
¶23.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Mr. Trout 
 
 
LTC Litterini (RO) 
 
LT Lobner 
 
Mr. French (Int) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
Gen Orlov 
 
Col Petrov 
 
Col Pischulov 
 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 
 
 
 
¶24.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
KING