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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/27 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) DEFINITIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING, 
FEBRUARY 23, 2010 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-075. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 23, 2010 
 
           Time:  4:00 P.M. - 5:15 P.M. 
 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
------- 
 
SUMMARY 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶3.  (S) At the Definitions Working Group meeting co-chaired by Mr. 
Siemon and ADM (Ret) Kuznetsov on February 23, the sides discussed 
Russian-proposed language for treaty Article IV, paragraph 8, that 
revised the locational restriction for non-deployed heavy bombers. 
The sides also agreed on the following terms:  "nuclear armaments," 
"heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments," "heavy bomber 
equipped for non-nuclear armaments," "non-deployed launcher of 
ICBMs," "non-deployed launcher of SLBMs," "rocket motor case," 
"solid rocket motor," "solid-fueled ICBM," and "solid-fueled SLBM." 
The sides briefly noted five other terms that remained for 
discussion in the near future.  End summary. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY:  Article IV Regarding Non-Deployed Heavy 
Bombers; and Terms and Definitions Discussed. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
ARTICLE IV REGARDING NON-DEPLOYED HEAVY BOMBERS 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (S) Kuznetsov handed over a copy of a paper that had been 
provided by the Russian delegation during an Expanded Ad Hoc 
meeting earlier that day, with a proposal for Article IV, paragraph 
8, on locational restrictions for non-deployed heavy bombers. 
 
 
 
Begin text: 
 
 
 
¶8.  Non-deployed heavy bombers shall be based only at heavy bomber 
flight test centers and shall be located only at repair or 
production facilities for heavy bombers. 
 
 
 
End text. 
 
 
¶6.  (S) Kuznetsov explained that the proposal built on direction 
from the Russian Head of Delegation and on the definition for 
non-deployed heavy bomber that had been nearly agreed in the 
Definitions Working Group.  He also noted that some slight changes 
to the previous version of this text had been made at Moscow's 
direction.  He drew the attention of the U.S. delegation to the 
concept that the non-deployed heavy bombers were "located" at 
repair facilities, not "based" there.  They would, Kuznetsov said, 
remain attributed to the airbase from which they had come. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (S) Kuznetsov pointed out that it was not important when the 
bomber switched from one category of the database to another since 
there would be a notification to that effect.  He clarified that a 
movement notification would be provided when the heavy bomber went 
to the repair facility; the notification would include a comment 
indicating the change in its deployed status. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S) Siemon remarked that the U.S. delegation had initially 
considered using the term "located" for the restriction, but had 
decided that "based" was more accurate.  Siemon concurred ON the 
provision of a notification for the movement of the heavy bomber to 
or from the repair facility.  But, Siemon continued, using the 
criteria of where the heavy bomber was "based" provided a clearer 
picture of what would be going on with the bombers.  He illustrated 
his point, saying that if there was a bomber that left Minot for a 
repair facility, the inventory of heavy bombers at Minot would go 
down by one and the inventory at the repair facility would go up by 
one.  Doing so would reflect that the heavy bomber was "based" at 
the repair facility.  "Based" was more permanent than "located." 
Moreover, for the U.S. side, heavy bombers would be in repair for a 
long time.  Kuznetsov added that the period of repair was longer 
for Russian heavy bombers than for U.S. bombers. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (S) Kuznetsov continued that each air base had a unit of heavy 
bombers; a heavy bomber went from the production facility to its 
airbase, where it would be attributed for some dozen years 
although, he acknowledged, whole units sometimes moved to other 
airbases.  Some regular repair or maintenance could be conducted at 
the air base; however, heavy bombers would sometimes go to the 
repair facility for longer term repair that could last a year. 
During that period, it would remain attributed to its home air base 
and would be only provisionally at the repair facility.  Russia 
wanted to be able to remove that heavy bomber from accountability 
under the deployed delivery vehicle and warhead limits.  It would 
also not be subject to inspection, he asserted, because it would be 
non-deployed.  After the end of the maintenance period, the heavy 
bomber would return to its home air base.  Maybe in the U.S. 
system, Kuznetsov observed, the heavy bomber would go to a 
different air base than the one at which it had started. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (S) Kuznetsov stated that the repair and production facilities 
would, of course, be listed in the database.  If some heavy bombers 
were at those facilities, the database would reflect them as being 
there.  When the repair was completed, the heavy bombers would go 
 
 
back and appropriate notifications would be provided. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (S) Siemon asked whether the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
data for the air base would be reduced when the heavy bomber went 
to the repair facility, or would the heavy bomber stay listed in 
the database as being based at the air base?  Kuznetsov said the 
bomber would go to the repair facility.  Mr. Dean cautioned about 
changing the deployed status of a bomber every time it moved to 
another facility.  Kuznetsov reiterated that when the repair was 
done, the bomber would go back to the air base and not be 
permanently at the repair facility. 
 
 
 
¶12.  (S) Before ending this part of the meeting, Siemon sought 
clarification that the new Russian proposal did not affect the 
agreed definitions of deployed or non-deployed heavy bomber. 
Kuznetsov provided a paper with slightly revised definitions, 
showing that "test heavy bomber" had not changed, but "deployed 
heavy bomber" and "non-deployed heavy bomber" had changed and 
included "located" instead of "based" at a repair facility.  Siemon 
said the U.S. delegation would respond to the proposal promptly. 
 
 
 
------------------------------- 
 
TERMS AND DEFINITIONS DISCUSSED 
 
------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶13.  (S) Turning back to definitions, Kuznetsov quickly indicated 
that the Russian delegation could agree to drop the reference to 
the range of 600 kilometers for air-to-surface missiles as proposed 
by the U.S. side and the sides agreed to the following definitions: 
 
 
 
Begin text: 
 
 
 
The term "nuclear armaments" means, for heavy bombers, long-range 
nuclear ALCMs, nuclear air-to-surface missiles, or nuclear bombs. 
 
 
 
The term "heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments" means a 
heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, nuclear 
air-to-surface missiles, or nuclear bombs. 
 
 
 
The term "heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments" means a 
heavy bomber that is not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, 
nuclear air-to-surface missiles, or nuclear bombs. 
 
 
 
End text. 
 
 
¶14.  (S) Kuznetsov also announced that, since the sides had agreed 
to the definition of soft-site launcher, the Russian delegation 
could agree to the following terms: 
 
 
 
Begin text: 
 
 
 
The term "non-deployed launcher of ICBMs" means an ICBM test 
launcher, an ICBM training launcher, an ICBM launcher located at a 
space launch facility, or an ICBM launcher, other than a soft-site 
launcher, that does not contain a deployed ICBM. 
 
 
 
The term "non-deployed launcher of SLBMs" means an SLBM launcher, 
other than a soft-site launcher, which is used for testing or 
training, or an SLBM launcher that does not contain a deployed 
SLBM. 
 
 
 
End text. 
 
 
 
¶15.  (S) Kuznetsov also gave Russian concurrence and the sides 
agreed to the following terms: 
 
 
 
Begin text: 
 
 
 
The term "rocket motor case" means the casing of an ICBM or SLBM 
that remains when the propellant is removed. 
 
 
 
The term "solid rocket motor" means that part of the stage that 
consists of the case filled with solid propellant. 
 
 
 
End text. 
 
 
 
¶16.  (S) For the following terms, Kuznetsov stated that the Russian 
side wanted to separate the definition into two terms instead of 
using "or" and the sides agreed to the following: 
 
 
 
Begin text: 
 
 
 
The term "solid-fueled ICBM" means an ICBM for which the stages are 
equipped with solid rocket motors. 
 
 
The term "solid-fueled SLBM" means an SLBM for which the stages are 
equipped with solid rocket motors. 
 
 
 
End text. 
 
 
 
¶17.  (S) Siemon and Kuznetsov jointly reviewed the remaining agenda 
for the Definitions Working Group by running through a few 
remaining terms that would be discussed at a future meeting: 
"submarine base," "relocation," "ICBM base," "basing area," and 
"launch" versus "flight test." 
 
 
 
¶18.  (U) Documents provided: 
 
 
 
- Russia: 
 
 
 
-- Russian proposal for Article III, paragraph 8, dated February 
23, in Russian and unofficial English. 
 
 
 
-- Russian proposal for definitions of deployed heavy bomber, 
non-deployed heavy bomber, and test heavy bomber, dated February 
23, in Russian and unofficial English. 
 
 
 
¶19.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Mr. Siemon 
 
Lt Col Comeau 
 
Mr. Connell 
 
Mr. Dean 
 
Mr. Hanchett 
 
Mr. Taylor 
 
Ms. Zdravecky (RO) 
 
Ms. C. Smith (Int) 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
ADM Kuznetsov 
 
Ms. Fuzhenkova 
 
Mr. Kamenskiy 
 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
 
 
¶20.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
KING