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S E C R E T GENEVA 000187 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/27 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP, 
FEBRUARY 12, 2010 -- CORRECTED COPY 
 
REF: MOSCOW 000225 (SFO-MOS-007); 10 GENEVA 153 (SFO0GVA-VII-034) 
10 GENEVA 175 (SFO-GVA-VIII-175 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-043. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 12, 2010 
 
           Time:  3:30 P.M. - 6:10 P.M. 
 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
------- 
 
SUMMARY 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶3.  (S) At the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meeting on 
February 12 chaired by Dr. Warner and Col Ilin, the sides discussed 
an unofficial U.S. delegation proposal regarding a new approach to 
batching and the inspection of eliminated solid-fueled missile 
motor cases and mobile ICBM launchers.  The sides also discussed 
unique identifiers (UIDs), conduct of Type-2 inspections at 
operational bases, and a new Russian-proposed Joint Draft Text 
(JDT) for Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (S) The Russian-proposed JDT introduced inspection of ICBM 
silos converted to launch missile defense interceptors and added a 
provision to restrict the purpose of Type-2 inspections at 
conversion or elimination (CorE) facilities to only the 
confirmation of the results of eliminations.  It also included a 
provision to allow inspectors to read UIDs, but only on eliminated 
ICBMs and SLBMs at CorE facilities during an inspection. End 
Summary. 
 
 
 
¶5.  (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY:  U.S. Unofficial Proposal; 
Russian-proposed JDT; Inspecting ICBM Silos Converted to Launch 
Missile Defense Interceptors; Conduct of Type-2 Inspections at 
Type-1 Facilities; Concepts for Batching; and Unique Identifiers. 
 
 
 
---------------------------------------- 
 
U.S. UNOFFICIAL PROPOSAL FOR SECTION VII 
 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶6.  (S) Ilin handed over a Russian-proposed draft JDT for Section 
VII of Part Five of the Protocol, but suggested the group work on 
the U.S. text first.  Warner noted the United States did not have 
an official proposal, as the text could not be cleared by 
Washington because of the recent weather-related closures.  He also 
highlighted the fact that Washington was virtually unaware that the 
delegations in Geneva had much different understandings of the 
agreements on solid-fueled missile and mobile ICBM launcher 
elimination reached during the Mullen-Makarov meetings in Moscow in 
January (Ref A), but that the U.S. delegation was actively seeking 
guidance on these issues.  Warner recommended the working group 
explore each others' proposals for common ground and potential 
compromises. 
 
 
¶7.  (S) After giving the Russian side a copy of an unofficial 
U.S.-proposed Section VII, Warner again outlined the broader U.S. 
view of Type-2 inspections for all conversion or elimination 
activities discussed in the IPWG meeting on February 10, (Ref B), 
as well as the basic structure for a revised batching and 
inspection concept for the inspection of eliminated solid-fueled 
rocket motor cases at Votkinsk and mobile ICBM launchers at 
Piban'shur. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S) Warner noted that U.S. proposals sought to address all 
conversion or elimination activity within the Type-2 inspection 
regime.  While the primary focus of discussions had been on 
elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile ICBM 
launchers, both sides also needed to look at procedures for Type-2 
inspections of eliminated silo launchers, as well as conversions of 
SLBM launchers, and conversion of heavy bombers (HB) from nuclear 
to non-nuclear armaments.  Warner recommended withholding 
discussion of the controversial issue of the conversion of 
individual SLBM launchers aboard SSBNs for another meeting. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (S) For inspections of eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs, 
Warner explained the new, unofficial U.S. proposal under which the 
United States would only inspect the Votkinsk CorE facility twice 
per year, but could choose either to inspect the semi-annual 25 
percent batches of burned-out motor cases accumulated by the 
Russians, or inspect the facility, including the eliminated items 
on display, during periods not associated with the two 
accumulations.  If the United States chose to inspect outside one 
of the accumulation windows, he emphasized that inspection teams 
must be able to inspect all items subject to inspection within the 
boundaries of the inspectable area and not just the eliminated 
missiles or mobile ICBM launchers.  Ilin disagreed on the scope of 
the inspection, insisting that the eliminated items were the only 
inspectable items at these CorE facilities.  (Begin comment: Col 
Petrov was overheard telling Ilin that everything within the 
boundaries of such facilities was inspectable under START, but this 
seemed to make no difference to Ilin.  End comment.) 
 
 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
DISCUSSION ON RUSSIAN-PROPOSED JDT 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶10. (S) Discussion moved to the Russian-proposed JDT, which added 
several sub-paragraphs to paragraph 2 of Section VII for specific 
facilities: sub-para (b) to allow Type-2 inspections of eliminated 
silo launchers at ICBM bases and inspections at submarine bases for 
SSBNs converted to SSGNs; sub-para (c) to state the purpose of 
inspections at CorE facilities for solid-fueled missiles or mobile 
ICBM launchers was only to confirm the elimination of these items; 
sub-para (d) for inspection of heavy bombers (HBs) converted to 
non-nuclear armaments at their basing locations; sub-para (e) to 
inspect silo launchers of ICBMs converted to launch missile defense 
interceptors at Vandenberg AFB (VAFB); and an additional clause 
that would exempt from inspection and prohibit access to any other 
facilities at ICBM bases, submarine bases, and CorE facilities when 
conducting Type-2 elimination inspections at these sites. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (S) In response to a question from Warner, Ilin clarified that 
sub-para (b) for inspections of SSGNs dealt strictly with the full 
conversion of an SSBN into an SSGN and would be conducted under two 
situations: to confirm completion of the conversion; and to confirm 
 
 
the cruise missile launchers had not been reconverted.  Warner 
noted that Ilin had discussed this topic during the previous day's 
Expanded Ad Hoc Group meeting (Ref C), and requested that Ilin 
provide his talking points in writing.  Ilin demurred, claiming he 
did not yet have authorization from the Russian Head of Delegation 
(HOD). 
 
 
 
¶12. (S) Warner noted the Russian proposal was that inspection of 
converted HBs would only take place at air bases and asked if 
Russia would inspect HBs at CorE facilities where the conversion 
process actually occurred.  Warner indicated that the United States 
planned to continue to carry out conversions of HBs at 
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (DMAFB), probably through the life of 
the treaty.  Ilin claimed Russia had based its language on HBs on 
U.S. language in a draft agreed statement discussed on February 11 
(Ref D), but the lack of a definition for non-deployed HBs had 
created a problem. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (S) Warner said the individual HBs at DMAFB would remain 
deployed HBs equipped for nuclear armaments until the conversion 
process on each was completed.  As all provisions for inspection of 
converted HBs were contained in paragraph 1 of Section VII, the 
United States had not considered it necessary to include a special 
provision in paragraph 2.  Both sides agreed to consider whether a 
separate provision for inspection of HBs undergoing conversion at 
DMAFB was needed in paragraph 2. 
 
 
 
----------------------------------------- 
 
INSPECTING ICBM SILOS CONVERTED TO LAUNCH 
 
MISSILE DEFENSE INTERCEPTORS 
 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶14.  (S) Ilin raised the issue of inspection of the former ICBM 
silo launchers located at VAFB, which had been converted to launch 
missile defense interceptors (MDI). Citing discussion on 
these(MDI)during the February 11 Expanded Ad Hoc Group meeting (Ref 
C), Ilin proposed that converted silo launchers be subject to 
inspection to ensure against reconversion in the same manner as HBs 
converted to carry non-nuclear armaments. 
 
 
 
¶15.  (S) Warner reminded Ilin that Article V of the draft treaty 
banned conversion of ICBM silo launchers to launch MDI, with the 
exception that the ban did not apply to former ICBM silo launchers 
located at VAFB that had been converted prior to signature of this 
treaty.  Warner stated that this issue was being discussed at the 
HOD level, and might possibly develop into an agreed statement. 
Ilin claimed that the Russian HOD understood that "technical 
elements" for the development of such an agreed statement could be 
discussed in the IPWG.  Warner reemphasized that the sensitivity of 
including missile defense issues in the SFO Treaty was so great 
that this matter required special handling.  He recommended both 
sides note this issue and report to their respective HODs. 
 
 
 
¶16.  (S) When Ilin clarified that the Russian provision in sub-para 
(e) was intended to focus on silos at VAFB and not at ICBM bases; 
Warner reminded him that those launchers were located at the VAFB 
Space Launch Facility, which was not and would not be subject to 
inspection.  Ilin asked why the United States was ready to resolve 
Russian concerns about reconversion of HBs and SLBM launchers, but 
was not willing to discuss the converted silos at VAFB.  Ilin 
 
 
proposed to introduce such inspections of MDI at VAFB into Section 
VII as a Type-2 inspection.  Warner replied that any discussion on 
this topic should be at the Expanded Ad Hoc Group level. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
CONDUCT OF TYPE-2 INSPECTIONS 
 
AT ICBM, SUBMARINE, and AIR BASES 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶17.  (S) Ilin noted both the U.S. and Russian proposals included 
provisions that would exclude other items or portions of facilities 
from access during a Type-2 inspection to confirm an elimination or 
conversion.  Warner stated the United States agreed with a portion 
of this understanding - if an inspection team were at an ICBM base 
to see an eliminated silo or at a submarine base to see a converted 
SLBM launcher, only those items would be inspected.  However, the 
United States had a different view on CorE facilities. 
 
 
 
¶18.  (S) Warner noted both sides had agreed early on to include 
CorE facilities within the list of facilities subject to Type-2 
inspections, and the general rules for these inspections in 
paragraph 1 of Section VII stated that their purpose was to confirm 
the accuracy of declared data specified for such facilities on the 
number and types of non-deployed items.  If a team conducted a 
Type-2 inspection at a CorE facility, it had the right to inspect 
the facility for non-deployed items declared for that facility. 
 
 
 
¶19.  (S) Ilin claimed the purpose for inspection of a CorE facility 
should be to confirm the results of elimination, not to confirm the 
presence of non-deployed items of inspection.  According to Ilin, 
Russia did not store any other non-deployed items at its CorE 
facilities, only eliminated items.  He stated that the only purpose 
for coming to a CorE facility was to confirm the fact of 
elimination, which consisted of three elements:  1) confirm the 
number of items eliminated that was declared in the notification 
and pre-inspection brief; 2) view the eliminated items; and 3) 
record the UIDs for these eliminated items. 
 
 
 
¶20.  (S) Warner countered that there could be some other 
non-deployed items at such facilities which were still in the 
process of elimination, but their elimination was not yet 
completed.  Even if the purpose of the inspection was to confirm 
the results of elimination, a side would still have the opportunity 
to inspect the area within the site diagram to confirm data on 
inspectable items - mobile launchers at Piban'shur or first stages 
of ICBMs and SLBMs at Votkinsk at whatever stage they might be 
within the elimination process.  Warner noted the same would apply 
to HBs undergoing conversion at DMAFB, where such bombers could be 
seen in all stages of the process. 
 
 
 
¶21.  (S) Ilin recognized that views on inspections at CorE 
facilities differed, and claimed to be surprised at this U.S. 
"addition." He requested the United States provide in writing its 
reasons for wanting to verify the numbers of non-deployed missiles 
located at a CorE facility at the time of an inspection. 
 
 
 
¶22.  (S) Warner pointed out this was not an addition; it had been a 
component of jointly-agreed text on the conduct of Type-2 
 
 
inspections from the beginning of the negotiations.  Russia had 
proposed to include CorE inspections under Type-2 long before the 
United States agreed to include the inspection of eliminated items 
as part of a Type-2 inspection during the Mullen-Makarov talks in 
Moscow in January (Ref A).  Warner asked Ilin what the Russian 
delegation had in mind regarding the conduct of Type-2 inspections 
at CorE facilities when it had initially agreed that Type-2 
inspections would be carried out at CorE facilities. 
 
 
 
¶23.  (S) Ilin reiterated Russia's position that the basic purpose 
of inspections at CorE inspections was to confirm the results of 
elimination and claimed that the United States was now seeking to 
broaden access at such sites, which would increase inspection time. 
Warner commented that, at Votkinsk and Piban'shur, inspecting the 
entire site would not be a time-consuming activity and recommended 
the group explore the provisions for batching and inspection of 
eliminated items at these two facilities. 
 
 
 
--------------------- 
 
CONCEPTS FOR BATCHING 
 
--------------------- 
 
 
 
¶24.  (S) Ilin claimed he could not talk about inspection of 
non-deployed items at CorE facilities, but outlined the two 
situations Russia envisioned for elimination inspections at these 
facilities: Situation 1 under the general rules for a short notice 
Type-2 inspection; Situation 2 after notification by the inspected 
Party of the accumulation of the agreed-upon number of eliminated 
items for that batching period.  Ilin explained that the 
concentration (accumulation or batching) of eliminated items would 
not apply to inspections conducted by the inspecting Party in 
Situation 1. 
 
 
 
¶25.  (S) Warner stated the United States may need a notification of 
the start of the accumulation period so that an inspection team did 
not arrive accidently during the period of accumulation activity. 
The timing for a second notification, opening the window for 
inspection or national technical means (NTM) observation would be 
provided in Part Four of the Protocol. 
 
 
 
¶26.  (S) Smirnov asked Warner to confirm his understanding of the 
U.S. proposal which was that if the United States inspected the 
first batch of 25 percent of eliminated items, then inspected the 
facility at some other time prior to the concentration of the 
second batch, the second concentration period would not be 
required.  Warner replied that this was a correct understanding. 
 
 
 
¶27.  (S) Ilin noted that if that were the case, the United States 
would see less than 50 percent of the items planned for elimination 
in that year.  Warner agreed that if the United States inspected 
during one concentration period and one non-concentration period, 
it would get less than 50 percent and if the United States chose to 
inspect twice, both times during non-concentration periods, the 
United States might see significantly less than 50 percent.  It was 
important for the United States to have the chance to conduct a 
short notice inspection of those items that had not yet been 
concentrated or to see items that the Russians had not chosen to be 
part of a particular batch, but which may or may not be going 
through their NTM display period. 
 
 
------------------ 
 
UNIQUE IDENTIFIERS 
 
------------------ 
 
 
 
¶28.  (S) Ilin asked how the United States envisioned viewing and 
recording of UIDs during inspections at CorE facilities.  Warner 
stated that the broad application of the use of UIDs on strategic 
offensive arms (SOA) was one of the agreements from the 
Mullen-Makarov talks (Ref A), and recording of UIDs was relevant to 
all Type-1 and Type-2 inspections.  Through the use of UIDs in 
notifications and in pre-inspection briefings, the inspecting Party 
could confirm the numbers and UIDs for items at all facilities, to 
include those where non-deployed SOA were located. 
 
 
 
¶29.  (S) Ilin agreed that Admiral Mullen and General Makarov had 
talked about broadly applying UIDs, but, as Ilin recalled, Russian 
agreement to the broad application of UIDs was made in return for 
the United States dropping all remaining demands on mobile 
launchers of ICBMs and their missiles. Now that situation might not 
be as clear. 
 
 
 
¶30.  (S) Warner summarized the results of the day's discussion, 
noting that both sides had good drafts and similar approaches to 
elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile ICBM 
launchers, with one exception - that being the element of 
inspecting non-deployed missiles and mobile ICBM launchers at CorE 
facilities.  When Ilin interjected that this was a new element that 
deviated from the agreements reached during the Mullen-Makarov 
talks, Warner corrected him stating that it may be a new issue to 
Ilin, but not to the two delegations. 
 
 
 
¶31.  (U) Documents provided: 
 
 
 
- United States: 
 
 
 
-- Unofficial Proposal for Section VII of Part Five of the 
Protocol, dated February 12, 2010 
 
 
 
- Russia: 
 
 
 
-- Russian Proposal, Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol, 
dated February 12, 2010 
 
 
 
¶32.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Dr. Warner 
 
Mr. Albertson 
 
 
Mr. Buttrick 
 
MAJ Johnson 
 
LTC Litterini 
 
Mr. McConnell (RO) 
 
Ms. Purcell 
 
Mr. Rust 
 
LT  Sicks 
 
Mr. Smith 
 
Ms. Gesse (Int) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
Col Ilin 
 
Mr. Lyasovskiy 
 
Col Petrov 
 
Mr. G. Shevchenko 
 
Mr. Smirnov 
 
Mr. Venevtsev 
 
Ms. Vodopolova 
 
Col Zaitsev 
 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
 
 
¶33.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
KING