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S E C R E T GENEVA 000181 
 
SIPDIS 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/27 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP 
MEETING, FEBRUARY 11, 2010 -- CORRECTED COPY 
 
REF: 10 GENEVA 175 (SFO-GVA-VIII-038) 
10 GENEVA 165 (SFO-GVA-VIII-029); 10 GENEVA 177 (SFO-GVA-VIII-177) 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-040. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 11, 2010 
 
                Time:  3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M. 
 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
------- 
 
SUMMARY 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶3.  (S) During the Memorandum of Understanding Working Group 
(MOUWG) meeting on February 11, Mr. Trout and General Orlov 
discussed issues addressed earlier in the day at the Expanded Ad 
Hoc meeting (Ref A) concerning conversion and elimination of 
individual SLBM launchers, conversion of heavy bombers, and 
transfer of Trident II SLBMs to the United Kingdom.  With respect 
to issues in Part Two of the Protocol, Section I was reviewed and 
some brackets were resolved.  However, during the discussion it 
became clear there was significant misunderstanding regarding use 
of the word "database."  The U.S. side delivered Part Four of the 
Annex on Inspection Activities dealing with site diagrams and had a 
quick discussion on the U.S. approach.  End summary. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (S) Subject Summary:  Follow Up on Conversion of Individual 
SLBM Launchers; Converted Heavy Bombers; UK Trident Missiles; 
Non-Deployed Heavy Bombers; Part Two Issues; and Site Diagrams. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
FOLLOW UP ON CONVERSION OF INDIVIDUAL SLBM LAUNCHERS 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (S) Orlov made a few points regarding the Expanded Ad Hoc 
meeting earlier in the day (Ref A).  He mused that while he 
understood the military benefits of having multi-mission capable 
submarines that could launch both SLBMs and cruise missiles the 
requirements of the treaty would severely restrict the operations 
of these submarines.  Trout pointed out that the U.S. decision to 
convert single launchers on SSBNs had to do with political reality. 
He compared it to the decision of the United States not to develop 
mobile ICBM systems in the early 1990s, and pointed out that 
political willpower, based on the desires of the people, often 
carries the most weight when making major decisions in the United 
 
 
States.  He stated there was a large coalition of Senators that did 
not want to see any ICBM bases closed.  Mr. Colby added there was a 
desire by the U.S. Government not to make too severe a cut in any 
one leg of the nuclear triad.  Trout argued that it was reasonable 
for the United States to look for the most inexpensive, convenient 
way to lower their number of deployed and non-deployed launchers, 
and conversion of single SSBN tubes accomplished exactly that. 
Additionally, he continued, the number of SSBNs would not likely 
change due to operational requirements and the U.S. view that a 
survivable submarine force is stabilizing. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (S) Orlov stated the Russian Federation faced similar military 
and political problems and concerns, although with regard to the 
military, this applied more to the Air Force. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (S) Trout added the concept of "detubing," or rendering 
individual SLBM launchers on SSBNs incapable of launching an SLBM, 
was not new and was presented as a concept during  preliminary 
discussions concerning START-III as a way to reach the low delivery 
vehicle limits.  Trout said the U.S. Government was not sure what 
the tubes would be converted to, but in his opinion it seemed 
unlikely they would be converted into cruise missile launchers. 
 
 
 
----------------------- 
 
CONVERTED HEAVY BOMBERS 
 
----------------------- 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S) Orlov stated the United States was unlikely to ever prove 
satisfactorily to him the conversion process of the B-1B produced a 
bomber incapable of carrying nuclear armaments.  Nuclear heavy 
bombers are designed from the beginning to carry nuclear armaments, 
he said.  The electronics and unique equipment needed for the 
nuclear mission are intrinsic to that class of bomber. 
Consequently, the argument the United States had made for several 
years only addressed the "capping" of the connectors at the 
location where they attach to the nuclear armament; all the 
internal connections and equipment still remain.  Orlov added that 
he often wondered how the Russian Federation would try to present 
its case for a converted heavy bomber should it decide to pursue 
that capability.  He often wondered if the Russian Federation would 
have any more success in convincing the U.S. side than the U.S. 
side had with its arguments.  This, despite years of discussion in 
the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), he 
commented. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (S) Trout pointed out it was difficult for the other side to 
fully understand a foreign technical system.  Trout noted that one 
of the provisions in the agreed statement on B-1Bs included a 
continuation of periodic viewing of B-1Bs to instill confidence 
that the U.S. side was not circumventing treaty requirements. 
 
 
------------------- 
 
UK TRIDENT MISSILES 
 
------------------- 
 
 
 
¶10.  (S) Orlov asked about the U.S. practice of transferring 
Trident II missiles to the United Kingdom (UK) in reference to the 
Russian-proposed agreed statement on the subject.  Trout pointed 
out that most of the provisions contained in the proposed agreed 
statement were already covered by other sections of the treaty.  He 
noted that notifications existed for the transfer and return of 
missiles to and from a third party.  Additionally, he pointed out, 
the Russian Federation will receive unique identifiers for each of 
the missiles transferred to the UK, which was more information than 
was disclosed under START.  Trout acknowledged that the proposal to 
send a notification of a UK flight test was not covered under START 
nor had it been included as part of this treaty but argued that 
this was the flight test of a missile owned by a third country.  He 
said the United States had no legal responsibility for such a 
notification.  Trout said he assumed the UK would send a notice to 
mariners and airmen prior to any flight test. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (S) Orlov complained that Russia did not have an agreement 
with the UK to provide a notification when the UK performed a 
flight test.  Trout responded that perhaps Russia should consider 
establishing an agreement to do just that.  Orlov observed it was a 
political issue.  He noted that he could not answer a simple 
question that was raised by his politicians:  "Wouldn't the United 
States just continue to transfer missiles to the UK and have the UK 
perform flight tests for the United States?"  Trout reiterated his 
point that the United States had no legal method to control a 
Trident II once it had been transferred to the UK.  Orlov said he 
understood the legal position, but unlike the Russian Federation 
selling an anti-tank missile to another country, the United States 
was selling and transferring strategic offensive arms, which was 
another matter entirely. 
 
 
 
-------------------------- 
 
NON-DEPLOYED HEAVY BOMBERS 
 
-------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶12.  (S) Orlov asked whether the U.S. side had finalized its 
position on the status of bombers at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base. 
Trout replied the U.S. delegation was still discussing the issue. 
 
 
 
--------------- 
 
PART TWO ISSUES 
 
--------------- 
 
 
¶13.  (S) Trout delivered the U.S.-proposed joint draft text of 
Section I, General Provisions, that incorporated decisions from the 
previous meeting (Ref B). 
 
 
 
¶14.  (S) In paragraph 1, the sides debated the term "database." 
Mr. Pischulov argued that "database" referred to the categories of 
data, while Trout argued that it referred to this Part of the 
protocol.  With help from the interpreters, both sides attempted to 
understand the rationale behind the other side's position.  The 
interpreters realized that the Russian side was translating the 
word "database" as "initial data," similar to the way it was 
translated in START.  With this realization, both sides noted a 
significant difference in the text.  The U.S. side believed that 
Section I contained provisions that would apply throughout the life 
of the treaty and others that only applied to the initial exchange 
of data.  Both sides agreed to consult with their lawyers and 
members of the Conforming Group. 
 
 
 
¶15.  (S) Pischulov agreed to delete Russian-proposed text in 
paragraph 2, subparagraph (d), leaving the subparagraph 
unbracketed. 
 
 
 
¶16.  (S) Trout informed the Russian side that the United States was 
dropping the bracketed text "warheads on deployed ICBMs" in Section 
III under the basing area for ICBM bases for mobile launchers of 
ICBMs. 
 
 
 
---------------------- 
 
SITE DIAGRAMS, FINALLY 
 
---------------------- 
 
 
 
¶17.  (S) Trout delivered the U.S.-proposed joint draft text for 
Part Four of the Annex on Inspection Activities, Site Diagrams.  He 
noted the Untied States had tried to bracket the text based on 
documents exchanged in November but that it was likely positions 
had changed somewhat since then. 
 
 
 
¶18.  (S) Trout turned to paragraph 2, subparagraph (b)(i) which 
listed the requirement that SSBNs and SSGNs be shown on the 
coastlines and waters diagram.  This related to a discussion on 
SSGN inspections at submarine bases that took place during the 
Agreed Statements meeting (Ref C) earlier in the day.  Trout noted 
the U.S.-proposed text required U.S. SSGNs within five kilometers 
of the center of the coastline of a submarine base be included on 
the coastlines and waters diagram provided to the Russian 
inspection team during a Type-1 inspection. 
 
 
¶19.  (S) Orlov drew several pictures of site diagrams to clarify 
the U.S. position on coastlines and waters diagrams.  LT Lobner 
pointed out that all SSBNs and SSGNs that were located within the 
5-kilometer radius would be shown on the diagram.  When probed 
about submarines being located at different piers, Lobner noted it 
was U.S. practice generally to locate SSBNs and SSGNs at the same 
pier should an SSGN be at a submarine base.  After the third 
drawing, Orlov stated that he believed he understood the U.S. 
position and would attempt to explain it to his colleagues. 
 
 
 
¶20.  (S) Trout called specific attention to paragraph 5 that dealt 
with changes to boundaries of diagrams.  Trout noted that this 
idea, which was from START and which was formerly located in 
Section I, General Provisions, required that there must be 
agreement within the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) in 
order to change a boundary for a diagram.  Orlov brought up the 
point that the BCC would not always agree.  Trout acknowledged the 
point admitting that some changes to diagrams were never approved 
in the JCIC under START, but noted that a majority of changes were 
agreed upon and approved.  Orlov stated he personally understood 
why this provision was important and needed but stated it could be 
more difficult to convince his colleagues. 
 
 
 
¶21.  (S) Trout and Orlov agreed to discuss the issue of the 
translation difference for "database" during the next meeting. 
 
 
 
¶22.  (S) Documents provided: 
 
 
 
- U.S.: 
 
 
 
     -- U.S.-Proposed Joint Draft Text, Part Two, Section I dated 
February 11, 2009; and 
 
 
 
     -- U.S.-Proposed Joint Draft Text, Part Four of the Annex on 
Inspection Activities, Site Diagrams, dated February 11, 2009. 
 
 
 
¶23.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Mr. Trout 
 
Mr. Colby 
 
 
LT Lobner (RO) 
 
Ms. Gesse (Int) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
Gen. Orlov 
 
Mr. Pischulov 
 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 
 
 
 
¶24.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
KING