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S E C R E T GENEVA 000179 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/27 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: MOU WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 16, 2010 
-- CORRECTED COPY 
 
REF: 10 GENEVA 159 (SFO-GVA-VIII-052) 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-056. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 16, 2010 
 
                Time:  3:30 p.m. - 5:15 p.m. 
 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
------- 
 
SUMMARY 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶3.  (S) During the Memorandum of Understanding Working Group 
(MOUWG) meeting, Mr. Trout and Gen Orlov addressed outstanding 
issues in Section I, General Provisions, and agreed on the title of 
Part Two.  Trout reiterated the U.S. concept for non-deployed heavy 
bombers, while Orlov clarified the view of the Russian Federation. 
Mr. Lobner and Mr. Pischulov clarified some conceptual issues with 
regard to the use of UIDs on heavy bombers.  Trout explained the 
U.S.-proposal for revising the definition for non-deployed 
launchers of missiles, stating that soft-site launchers would not 
be included and would not appear in the Database.  Trout noted the 
need to solve the Leninsk Test Range issue.  End summary. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY:  Clearing Up the Title and Section I; 
Non-Deployed Heavy Bombers; Soft-Site Launchers; and Version Versus 
Variant, Again. 
 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
CLEARING UP THE TITLE AND SECTION I 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5.   (S) Trout asked for Orlov's view of the discussion from that 
morning's meeting on Article VIII (Reftel).  Orlov reiterated his 
view that the title of Part Two needed to be agreed upon before any 
progress could be made in Article VIII.  Trout and Orlov agreed 
that the title of Part Two would be "Database for Strategic 
Offensive Arms," noting that the Russian translation for "database" 
would no longer be "initial data (iskhodnye dannye)," but rather 
"database (baza dannykh)." 
 
 
 
¶6.   (S) Pischulov read the new Russian-proposal for paragraph 1 of 
Section I, which deleted the reference to the word "database." 
Trout agreed with the change. 
 
 
¶7.   (S) Moving to paragraph 2 of Section I, Trout and Orlov agreed 
that the language should reflect both new Russian-proposed language 
as well as some original U.S.-proposed language. Both agreed to 
provide text the following day. 
 
 
 
¶8.   (S) Continuing to paragraph 6, Pischulov proposed some minor 
changes that improved readability.  Trout agreed with most changes, 
but deferred discussion with respect to the word "locations" to the 
conforming group.  Orlov agreed with this decision. 
 
 
 
¶9.   (S) Pischulov brought up the U.S. bracketed text in various 
paragraphs in Section I that contained signposts to other parts of 
the Treaty, Protocol, and in some cases, Annexes.  Trout argued 
that these were valuable phrases that would aid someone who was 
unfamiliar with the Treaty to better understand where to go in the 
Treaty, Protocol or Annexes to find the requirements and 
obligations related to the text of that paragraph.  Orlov asked 
Trout if it was a principled position that these signposts remain 
in the text.  Trout stated he believed they were very useful and 
that they should be retained.  The references remained bracketed. 
 
 
 
-------------------------- 
 
NON-DEPLOYED HEAVY BOMBERS 
 
-------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶10.  (S) Turning to Section II, Orlov asked if the U.S. intended to 
delete the bracketed phrase "equipped for nuclear armaments" after 
the word "non-deployed heavy bombers."  Trout stated this phrase 
would remain until the definition of a non-deployed heavy bomber 
had been agreed.  Orlov took the opportunity to ask for Trout's 
view on a definition for non-deployed heavy bomber, referencing Mr. 
Taylor's comments in that morning's Article VIII meeting (Reftel). 
LT Lobner answered that the U.S. concept was exactly what Taylor 
had explained, reiterating that a non-deployed heavy bomber was a 
test heavy bomber or a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments 
at a certain facility.  Lobner added that discussion was ongoing 
about what those facilities should be, but the main point was that 
the bomber in question was still a heavy bomber equipped for 
nuclear armaments. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (S) Orlov said non-deployed heavy bombers could only be 
equipped for nuclear armaments, or a test heavy bomber.  He asked 
what limits the B-1Bs converted to non-nuclear status would be 
subject to, referencing the deployed 700 strategic delivery vehicle 
limit or the deployed and non-deployed 800 launcher limit.  Trout 
responded that they would not fall under either limit.  He added 
that the proposed Agreed Statement on converted B-1Bs addressed 
these issues.  Trout asked if Orlov thought the United States would 
count the non-nuclear B-1B heavy bombers under any of the three 
 
 
central limits of the Treaty.  Orlov responded in the affirmative. 
Orlov further explained that he expected all converted B-1Bs to 
count under the three limits until the last B-1B was converted, at 
which point the B-1B would disappear from the Treaty. 
 
 
 
¶12.  (S) Lobner and Trout clarified that the Agreed Statement was 
clear on this matter, and that it was the U.S. position that as 
each B-1B was converted, it would only be counted as a "heavy 
bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments" and would not be subject 
to any of the three central limits. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (S) Orlov made a quick presentation as to how it was 
impossible to prove the B-1B conversion process, referencing the 
unique design characteristics that go into a nuclear capable 
bomber. 
 
 
 
¶14.  (S) Pischulov asked if the United States would provide UIDs 
for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments until such 
time when the last B-1B was converted.  Trout responded that the 
U.S. would provide UIDs for all heavy bombers, and consequently 
UIDs for B-1Bs would be provided until the last B-1B was converted. 
 
 
 
 
------------------- 
 
SOFT-SITE LAUNCHERS 
 
------------------- 
 
 
 
¶15.  (S) With regard to space launch facilities, Pischulov asked if 
the United States intended to declare soft-site launchers in the 
Database.  Trout replied that the United States would not provide 
such information.  Orlov asked why the United States had introduced 
the term in the Definitions Working Group.  Trout said the 
soft-site launcher definition had to be established before it could 
be excluded from the definition for non-deployed launcher of ICBMs 
and SLBMs.  Pischulov asked if the United States was saying that 
soft-site launchers would not be counted as non-deployed launchers. 
Trout stated that this was correct.  Pischulov said this was not 
the Russian view. 
 
 
 
----------------------------- 
 
VERSION VERSUS VARIANT, AGAIN 
 
----------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶16.  (S)  In Section VII, ICBM and SLBM Technical Data, Pischulov 
asked about the only bracket in the Section which pertained to use 
of "variant" versus "version."  Trout cited "versions" of the 
 
 
RS-12M launcher as an example of how "version" was used.  In this 
case, he pointed out, two launchers existed that were different due 
to the location of the driver's cab.  In this situation, he 
continued, there were two versions of the RS-12M mobile launcher. 
Trout posed a hypothetical question: if you modified an RS-24 
launcher, what would the modified launcher be called?  Orlov and 
Pischulov did not answer but stated the working group would have to 
return to the issue. 
 
 
 
------- 
 
LENINSK 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶17.  (S) Trout asked if the Russian side had any proposals on how 
to solve the Leninsk Test Range issue.  Trout reiterated statements 
made in several meetings over the past days, pointing out that the 
U.S. had no desire to prohibit or restrict Russia in this matter. 
The goal of the U.S.-proposed Agreed Statement was to suggest one 
way of solving the problem, but by no means was it the only method. 
 
 
 
 
¶18.  (S) Orlov recollected that the main paragraphs in the Agreed 
Statement were about notifications, which he had stated on numerous 
occasions Russia would provide.  Trout noted this was a large part 
of the Agreed Statement, however there were additional issues in 
the text.  Trout added that the Agreed Statement could probably be 
shortened and simplified. 
 
 
 
¶19.  (S) Lobner acknowledged that the United States understood 
Russia's point that the issue could be solved via notifications. 
However, he noted, if the issue was stripped down to the basic 
problem, Russia's solution did not work.  Lobner argued the core 
problem was that Russia intended to locate accountable items at a 
non-declared facility.  He further pointed out that the 
Notifications Protocol was designed based on the premise that 
movements of items would occur between declared facilities.  Unless 
Russia proposed new language to make this work, he continued, 
existing notifications would not solve the problem. 
 
 
 
¶20.  (S) Orlov noted, in a personal gesture to Trout, that this was 
likely to be tied to the UK Trident II issue, but also quietly 
stated he agreed that something was wrong with the Leninsk issue. 
 
 
 
¶21. (S) Trout stated he was disappointed that such a small 
"administrative" issue had expanded into such a "political" issue 
that was stalling the negotiations. 
 
 
 
¶22.  (S) Documents provided:  None. 
 
 
¶23.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Mr. Trout 
 
Mr. Dean 
 
Dr. Fraley 
 
LT  Lobner (RO) 
 
Ms. Gesse (Int) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
Gen. Orlov 
 
Mr. Pischulov 
 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 
 
 
 
¶24.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
KING