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S E C R E T GENEVA 000173 
 
SIPDIS 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
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AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/27 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU) WORKING 
GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 18, 2010 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-063. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 18, 2010 
 
                Time:  3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M. 
 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶3.  (S) During a meeting of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
Working Group (WG), the U.S. and Russian sides exchanged Joint 
Draft Texts (JDT) of Part Two of the Protocol (Database) and 
discussed the Russian proposal for the Annex on Inspection 
Activities (Part Four, Procedures for Site Diagrams).  There was 
general agreement that the sides were fairly close to agreement 
conceptually on Site Diagrams, and the Russian side presented a 
logical restructuring of the document.  The sides discussed the 
need for an agreed procedure for bringing Russian mobile launchers 
of ICBMs into deployed status, the existence of training ICBM silos 
in the new treaty, and requirements for photographs of new missile 
systems.  The Russian side stood firm on its desire for unique 
identifiers (UIDs) for all heavy bombers, and it proposed converted 
B1Bs be listed as heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments in 
Part II of the Protocol until the U.S. exhibition of distinguishing 
features.  End summary. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY:  Lots of Paper Exchanged; Getting into the 
Details; Mostly in Agreement; The Most Painful Part; Questions on 
Other Issues; and Just When We Thought We Were Done. 
 
 
 
----------------------- 
 
LOTS OF PAPER EXCHANGED 
 
----------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (S) Gen Orlov presented the U.S. side with the Russian-proposed 
JDT of Part Two of the Protocol (Database), and noted that most of 
the remaining brackets related to mobile launchers.  He said it was 
up to the U.S. side to remove them.  He also presented the Russian 
proposal for the Annex on Inspection Activities (Part Four, 
Procedures for Site Diagrams).  Mr. Trout presented the Russian 
side with the U.S.-proposed JDT of Part Two of the Protocol 
(Database). 
 
 
 
¶6.  (S) The Russian side had reviewed the U.S. proposal for the 
 
 
text on site diagrams dated February 9, 2010 and Orlov believed 80 
percent of the document could be agreed to at the meeting.  He was 
concerned by a comment made by Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller 
that it took 18 months to agree on the last five percent of issues 
in START, but he noted he was optimistic that the sides could come 
to agreement on any outstanding issues soon. 
 
 
 
------------------------ 
 
GETTING INTO THE DETAILS 
 
------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶7.  (S) Orlov asked Col Petrov to explain the format and content of 
the Russian proposal on site diagrams which the U.S. side had just 
received.  Petrov said that first, the Russian side believed that 
the beginning of the document should indicate what is really being 
asked for, so they reordered the document to have the U.S.-proposed 
paragraph 2 at the beginning (site diagrams...shall be provided). 
Petrov asked why the U.S. proposal required that all facilities 
located within the ICBM base for silo launchers or mobile launchers 
be depicted.  The Russian side objected to the U.S.-proposed text 
in the ICBM base section (defining the boundaries of the ICBM base 
and the requirements for each simplified site diagram of the ICBM 
base that were duplicated elsewhere).  Trout said the U.S. side 
would take these issues under consideration. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S) On the issue of submarine base diagrams, Petrov said that 
the major roads connecting the storage facility for non-deployed 
SLBMs to the coastline should be depicted on a simplified site 
diagram. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (S) Petrov said the Russian proposal had a new section to 
address all other facilities beyond ICBM, submarine and air 
bases.  This was generally reflected in paragraph 3 of the U.S. 
proposal.  Trout said the U.S. side would review the 
Russian-proposed text and would soon be prepared to discuss it. 
 
 
 
------------------- 
 
MOSTLY IN AGREEMENT 
 
------------------- 
 
 
 
¶10.  (S) Petrov then turned to the first part of the U.S.-proposed 
text, related to establishing requirements for site diagrams.  He 
said the two sides were in general agreement for most of the 
section, but minor differences remained in subparagraphs (h) and 
(j).  They would not be hard to resolve, however, as the definition 
of an item of inspection had been conformed and the two sides 
would soon discuss the U.S.-proposed wording regarding depiction of 
large structures on the site diagram.  Petrov also said that the 
Russian side mostly agreed with the U.S.-proposed paragraph 4 
 
 
(newly declared facilities). 
 
 
 
--------------------- 
 
THE MOST PAINFUL PART 
 
--------------------- 
 
 
 
¶11.  (S) Orlov said the sides had now arrived at what would be the 
most painful, but the most interesting part of the meeting, the 
discussion of changes to site diagrams.  Petrov talked about not 
violating the rights of inspectors to access everything within site 
boundaries during an inspection.  The concern was with changes to 
the boundaries prior to an inspection.  Trout reminded the Russian 
side of START procedures that had worked for many years and noted 
that the U.S. would likely be agreeable to a similar proposal. 
There was general agreement that if there were changes to 
structures at facilities within boundaries, the revised site 
diagram would be provided to the inspectors at the Pre-Inspection 
Review.  If either side wanted to exclude a structure within the 
boundary, that issue would be handled within the framework of the 
Bilateral Consultative Commission.  If the boundary of a facility 
were to increase in size, a notice would have to be sent to the 
other Party within a set timeframe which would be determined by the 
Notifications Working Group. 
 
 
 
¶12. (S) Trout indicated that the Russian proposal for a 30-day 
period before such diagrams would have to be provided could become 
a problem.  National Technical Means (NTM) might see items of 
inspection in the expanded area and then the observing Party would 
raise a complaint with the other Party.  He noted that a 
notification only 72 hours after the change in the site boundary 
would decrease the chances of this occurring.  He also indicated 
that this shorter timeframe would help inspection teams prepare 
with the most accurate information available. 
 
 
 
------------------------- 
 
QUESTIONS ON OTHER ISSUES 
 
------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶13.  (S) Trout noted that the two sides were conceptually close on 
site diagrams, and it made sense to reorder the document as 
suggested by the Russian side.  He stated the U.S. side would study 
the Russian-proposed text and create a JDT over the next few days. 
¶14.  (S) Trout questioned the inclusion of ICBM loading facilities 
as a category of data in Part Two and noted that they were deleted 
from the database categories in the Fall, but the Russian side 
subsequently asked for them to be added back in.  Trout said the 
U.S. side started to look at the issue in Article IV of where 
deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs could be located and that it 
appeared they could only be located at ICBM bases.  The moment an 
ICBM was loaded onto a previously non-deployed mobile launcher of 
ICBMs, which in the Russian model could occur at an ICBM loading 
 
 
facility, it became deployed.  Orlov noted the concern and said the 
Russian side needed to look further at the issue.  Petrov talked 
through the situation where a submarine with non-deployed SLBM 
launchers arrived at a loading facility at the same time 
non-deployed SLBMs arrived for loading, and how notifications would 
be handled for the non-deployed SLBMs, non-deployed SLBM launchers, 
and the newly deployed SLBM launchers and SLBMs.  This was a 
regular, well-understood occurrence that was accommodated by the 
treaty.  He indicated that a similar arrangement needed to be 
worked out for mobile launchers of ICBMs to facilitate allowed 
operations. 
 
 
 
¶15.  (S) Petrov started to ask about size criteria for facilities, 
and LT Lobner addressed the issue of reference cylinders.  These 
issues had been discussed briefly in the MOU Working Group in 
November, 2009 but it was decided that they would be addressed by 
the Inspection Protocol Working Group.  Once inspection criteria 
were agreed, the appropriate text would be placed in Part Two of 
the Protocol (Database). 
 
 
 
¶16.  (S) Trout raised the issue of three engineering ICBM silos at 
Hill Air Force Base and plans to maintain a training ICBM silo at 
each U.S. ICBM base.  Petrov acknowledged the plan to count them as 
training silos, just like in START.  Petrov noted that the silos 
would be on site diagrams but would not be inspectable. 
 
 
 
¶17.  (S) Petrov asked about new treaty requirements for exchange of 
photographs, expressing that the Russian side wanted to establish 
the requirement as soon as possible so it could plan ahead for the 
right equipment.  Trout said the U.S. side understood the concern 
and would review the equipment and procedures for acquiring 
photographs.  He said that subject could be discussed after 
completing the issue of site diagrams. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
JUST WHEN WE THOUGHT WE WERE DONE 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶18.  (S) Mr. Pischulov read through the U.S-proposed JDT of Part 
Two of the Protocol (Database) during the meeting, and he brought 
an issue to Orlovs attention.  Pischulov noted that when he met 
with Lobner on February 17, he thought there was agreement on the 
use of unique identifiers (UIDs) on heavy bombers equipped for 
non-nuclear armaments.  In reading the U.S. proposal, he did not 
find a requirement for UIDs for heavy bombers equipped for 
non-nuclear armaments, similar to the requirement for UIDs for 
heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.  Trout said the U.S. 
side was still considering its position on the issue.  He proceeded 
to explain that upon entry into force, all but one B-1B bomber 
would likely have been converted so that the heavy bombers would be 
incapable of employing nuclear armaments.  The sole remaining B-1B 
capable of employing nuclear armaments would have been kept in that 
condition solely for the purpose of a distinguishing features 
 
 
exhibition.  Once all the B-1Bs were converted, they would no 
longer be subject to the treaty, and the associated data would not 
have to be recorded in the database.  Pischulov said the Russian 
side was trying to look ahead for the duration of the treaty, and 
he asked if the U.S. might consider converting some B-52Hs. 
 
 
 
¶19.  (S) Orlov said that until the B-1B distinguishing features 
exhibition occurred, of course all the B-1Bs would have to be 
recorded in the database as heavy bombers equipped for nuclear 
armaments, regardless of their true status.  Trout asked Orlov to 
clarify what he meant, and Orlov reiterated the Russian position. 
Trout asked if the United States conducted an exhibition prior to 
entry into force, would the heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear 
armaments be removed from the treaty provisions.  Orlov said they 
could be removed, but that position could change.  Orlov reiterated 
the Russian position that all heavy bombers should have UIDs. 
 
 
 
¶20.  (S) Documents provided: 
 
 
 
- UNITED STATES: 
 
 
 
-- U.S. proposal for Joint Draft Text of Part Two of the Protocol 
(Database), dated February 18, 2010 
 
 
 
- RUSSIA: 
 
 
 
-- Russian proposal for Annex on Inspection Activities (Part Four, 
Procedures for Site Diagrams), dated February 18, 2010 
 
 
 
-- Russian proposal for Joint Draft Text of Part Two of the 
Protocol (Database), dated February 18, 2010 
 
 
 
¶21.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Mr. Trout 
 
Mr. Brown 
 
Mr. Evans (RO) 
 
LT Lobner 
 
LT Sicks 
 
 
Mr. French (Int) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
Gen. Orlov 
 
Mr. Ivanov 
 
COL Petrov 
 
Mr. Pischulov 
 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 
 
 
 
¶22.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
KING