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S E C R E T GENEVA 000169 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/27 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) AGREED STATEMENTS, FEBRUARY 22, 2010 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-071. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 22, 2010 
 
                Time:  3:30 P.M. - 5:00 P.M. 
 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
 
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¶3.  (S) Mr. Elliott and Col Ilin chaired a meeting to discuss 
proposed Agreed Statements on February 22.  Elliott provided copies 
of U.S.-proposed joint draft texts (JDT) on the First (Converted 
B1-B Heavy Bombers), Second (U.S. Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs) 
Converted from SSBNs), and Third (Joint Basing of Heavy Bombers 
Equipped for Nuclear Armaments and Heavy Bombers Equipped for 
Non-Nuclear Armaments) Agreed Statements.  Following a quick review 
of remaining issues in the three statements, there was a discussion 
of the differences in heavy bomber counting rules between the 
sides.  The U.S. response to Russian questions on SLBM launcher 
conversion or elimination procedures was also provided to the 
Russian side but discussion was deferred to a future meeting.  End 
summary. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (U) Subject Summary:  Second and Third Agreed Statements; 
Counting Converted or Eliminated Heavy Bombers; Answers to Russian 
Questions on SLBM Launcher CorE Procedures. 
 
 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
SECOND AND THIRD AGREED STATEMENTS 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (S) Elliott gave the Russian side a consolidated U.S.-proposed 
JDT of the First(Converted B1-B Heavy Bombers), Second  (U.S. 
Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs) Converted from SSBNs), and Third 
(Joint Basing of Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments and 
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments), Agreed 
Statements. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (S) On the third Agreed Statement (Joint Basing of Heavy 
Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments and Heavy Bombers Equipped 
for Non-Nuclear Armaments), Ilin agreed to delete the 
Russian-proposed paragraph 2 on the Bilateral Consultative 
Commission (BCC).  He stated the only outstanding issue was the 
number of heavy bombers inspected.  Elliott concurred and stated 
 
that there was no change in the U.S. position on the number of 
bombers to be inspected. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (S) On the second Agreed Statement (U.S. Guided Missile 
Submarines (SSGNs) Converted from SSBNs), Ilin offered to delete 
the Russian-proposed "of SLCM" in subparagraph 1(b).  He also 
accepted the U.S.-proposed language "either side" vice "the United 
States of America" in paragraph 2, acknowledging that if either 
side converted an SSBN into an SSGN the provisions of the agreed 
statement would apply.  Again, Ilin concluded that the only 
remaining issue was the number of launchers to be inspected. 
Elliott concurred and stated there was no change in the U.S. 
position on the number of launchers to be inspected. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
COunting converted or eliminated heavy bombers 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S) With regard to the first Agreed Statement (Converted B1-B 
Heavy Bombers), Ilin agreed that the terms "use" and "apply" were 
equivalent in the two languages and agreed that the English text 
should read "use" vice "apply," with any further discussion of the 
wording taking place during the conforming process.  In 
subparagraph 2(c), as in the second Agreed Statement, Ilin agreed 
to use "either Party" vice "the United States of America" in 
paragraph 4, acknowledging that if either side converted all heavy 
bombers equipped for nuclear armaments of a type into heavy bombers 
equipped for non-nuclear armaments, the provisions of the agreed 
statement wwould apply.  The only remaining bracket in the JDT was 
Russian-proposed text in subparagraph 1(a) on the procedures for an 
exhibition "to confirm the conversion of a heavy bomber."  Ilin 
stated that this idea needed to remain, although the language could 
perhaps be reworked. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (S) Elliott explained the difference between the purpose of an 
exhibition, which would demonstrate the distinguishing features, 
and an inspection of the results of conversion, which would remove 
a heavy bomber from accountability under Part II of the Protocol to 
the treaty.  Elliott stated he believed the two sides understood 
one another on this issue, but perhaps the text could be clearer. 
He agreed to rework this paragraph for the next meeting.  Dr. 
Warner and Ilin discussed the difficulties in referencing the Annex 
on Inspection Activities in this paragraph, as none of the 
procedures to conduct the heavy bomber exhibition had been written. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (S) The discussion of heavy bombers led to Russian comments on 
the fourth Agreed Statement (Basing of Deployed Heavy Bombers at 
the Conversion or Elimination Facility Located at Davis-Monthan Air 
Force Base, Arizona).  Adm (ret) Kuznetsov stated that Russia saw 
two differing interpretations of the last sentence in this agreed 
statement:  "Such heavy bombers shall be considered deployed heavy 
bombers until such time as they are converted into heavy bombers 
equipped for non-nuclear armaments or are eliminated."  The Russian 
 
interpretation was that all of a particular type of heavy bomber 
would count under the treaty's central limits as heavy bombers 
equipped with nuclear armaments until the last of the type was 
eliminated or converted.  At that time, all bombers of that type 
would be removed from accountability under the central limits.  The 
U.S. side disagreed with this interpretation, asserting that each 
individual heavy bomber would be removed from accountability as it 
was individually converted or eliminated, in accordance with Part 
III of the Protocol. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (S) Elliott pointed to agreed text in Part III: Conversion or 
Elimination Procedures, Section I, paragraph 3, which used the 
article "an" before ICBM launcher, SLBM launcher, or heavy bomber. 
Elliott said this text clearly showed the intention to address the 
bombers one at a time but noted that there was no indefinite 
article in the Russian text that would equate to "a" or "an." 
Warner commented that the sides obviously had a different import of 
the wording, and there would need to be substantive discussion on 
the issue.  Kuznetsov stated that the issue of heavy bombers in 
Article III, subparagraph 6(c) would be discussed at the Expanded 
Ad Hoc meeting the next day. 
 
 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
ANSWERS TO RUSSIAN QUESTIONS 
 
ON SLBM LAUNCHER C OR E PROCEDURES 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶12.  (S) Elliott gave the Russian side the U.S. response to Russian 
questions on SLBM launcher conversion or elimination procedures 
which was also given to the Russian side by A/S Gottemoeller at a 
Heads of Delegation meeting on February 20. 
 
 
 
Begin text: 
 
 
 
SFO-VIII 
 
     Paper of the U.S. Side 
 
February 22, 2010 
 
 
 
Response to Russian Delegation Questions 
 
On 
 
U.S. Plans to Convert Certain Launchers of Trident II SLBMs 
 
 
 
The following responses to questions of the Russian Delegation are 
provided to provide clarity for further discussions: 
 
Q1:  The purpose of conversion of individual launchers of Trident 
II SLBM launchers. 
 
A1:  In order to comply with the central limits of 700 deployed 
ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers and 800 deployed and non-deployed 
ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, the United States will be required 
to convert or eliminate approximately 80 deployed ICBM or SLBM 
launchers, and heavy bombers.  Should the United States elect to 
convert a limited number of SLBM launchers on its existing Trident 
II SSBNs, the tubes will most likely be configured to carry ballast 
or be used for storage of miscellaneous equipment. 
 
 
 
Q2:  Total number of launchers scheduled for conversion. 
 
A2:  There are no plans to convert SLBM launchers.  However, should 
the United States elect to convert SLBM launchers, the number of 
converted launchers could range from 2 to 4 SLBM launchers on each 
of 14 Trident II SSBNs. 
 
 
 
Q3:  Time frame for conversion activities (beginning and end of the 
activities). 
 
A3: Given the United States has made no decision to convert SLBM 
launchers, no reasonable estimate of the length of time required to 
convert these launchers is possible.   Several factors will 
influence the duration of the conversion process, including the 
intended use of such a launcher, the method of conversion, and 
other major overhaul or refit activities planned for the Trident II 
SSBNs. 
 
 
 
Q4:  Technological conversion characteristics, differences between 
the conducted conversion of SSBNs into SSGNs and the forthcoming 
conversions. 
 
A4:  Conversion of SLBM launchers would be accomplished in 
accordance with Section I, paragraphs 3-6 and Section IV, 
paragraphs 6 and 7 of Part Three of the Protocol.   The principal 
criterion shall be that the launcher is no longer capable of 
employing an SLBM.  Since the United States Government has not made 
a decision to convert SLBM launchers, neither has the potential use 
for such a converted launcher nor the method of conversion has been 
determined.  For this reason, no effective comparison to the past 
conversion of the Trident I SSBNs can be made, other than to 
confirm that the procedures selected would be consistent with the 
criteria established in Part Three of the Protocol. 
 
 
 
Q5:  Functional differences and observable distinguishing features 
of converted or non-converted launchers. 
 
A5:  Functionally, any converted SLBM launcher will no longer be 
capable of employing an SLBM.  Because no decision has been made to 
convert SLBM launchers, no new function can be expressed with 
certainty at this time.  However, the most likely function would be 
to carry ballast containers.  Observation of the functional 
 
differences and observable distinguishing features of the first 
item of a type converted would be made during an exhibition as 
specified in Section 1, paragraph 5 of Part Three of the Protocol. 
 
 
 
Q6:  Bases for SSBNs with converted launchers, broadening of the 
functions of SSBNs. 
 
A6:  SSBNs with converted launchers formerly capable of employing 
SLBMs will be based at the existing submarine bases located at 
Silverdale, Washington and Kings Bay, Georgia.  The U.S. side notes 
that this question suggests the functions of SSBNs will be 
broadened.  The U.S. has no plans o broaden the function of its 
SSBNs. 
 
 
 
Q7:  Counting procedures for converted launchers with the framework 
of the Treaty: 
 
A7:  When an SLBM launcher is converted by rendering it incapable 
of employing an SLBM in a manner that the other Party can confirm 
the results of the conversion, such a converted strategic offensive 
arm shall cease to be subject to the aggregate numbers provided for 
in Article II of the Treaty and may be used for purposes not 
inconsistent with the Treaty (see Section I, paragraph 3 of Part 
Three of the Protocol). 
 
 
 
Q8:  Conversion verification measures. 
 
A8:  The results of conversion of strategic offensive arms subject 
to the Treaty may be confirmed by inspection in accordance with 
Articles [XI]1[X]2 and [XII]1[XI]2 of the Treaty (see Section I, 
paragraph 6 of Part Three of the Protocol). 
 
 
 
Q9:  Inspection regime with regard to converted launchers after the 
completion of the conversion process. 
 
A9:  The results of conversion of strategic offensive arms subject 
to the Treaty may be confirmed in accordance with Articles 
[XI]1[X]2 and [XII]1[XI]2 of the Treaty (see Section I, paragraph 6 
of Part Three of the Protocol). 
 
 
 
End text. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (S) The response was not discussed further but rather was 
taken by the Russian side to study for future discussion. 
 
 
 
¶14.  (U) Documents provided: 
 
 
 
- United States: 
 
-- U.S.- Proposed Joint Draft Text, First Agreed Statement: 
Converted Heavy B1-B Heavy Bombers, dated February 22, 2010; 
 
 
 
     -- U.S. Proposed Joint Draft Text, Second Agreed Statement: 
U.S. Guided Missile Submarines (SSGNs) Converted from SSBNs, dated 
February 22, 2010; 
 
 
 
     -- U.S. Proposed Joint Draft Text, Third Agreed Statement: 
Joint Basing of Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments and 
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments, dated February 
22, 2010; and 
 
 
 
     -- U.S. Written Response to Russia's Questions on SLBM 
Launcher Conversion and Elimination Procedures, dated February 22, 
¶2010. 
 
 
 
¶15.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Mr. Elliott 
 
Mr. Albertson (RO) 
 
Lt Col Goodman 
 
Mr. Highsmith 
 
LTC Litterini 
 
Amb Ries 
 
Mr. Trout 
 
Dr. Warner 
 
Mr. French (Interpreter) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
Col Ilin 
 
Mr. Koshelev 
 
Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov 
 
Mr. Zaitsev 
 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Interpreter) 
 
 
 
¶16.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
KING