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TO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
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INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA
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S E C R E T GENEVA 000165 
 
SIPDIS 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP 
MEETING, FEBRUARY 5, 2010 
 
REF: 10 GENEVA 87 (SFO-GVA-VIII-028); 10 GENEVA 97 (SFO-GVA-VIII-021) 
10 GENEVA 135 (SFO-GVA-VIII-027) 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-029. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 9, 2010 
 
                Time:  3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M. 
 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
 
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¶3.  (S) During a meeting of the Memorandum of Understanding Working 
Group (MOUWG) the U.S. and Russian chairs, Mr. Trout and Gen Orlov, 
discussed the outcome of the Expanded Ad Hoc discussion (Ref A) 
earlier that morning regarding non-deployed heavy bombers.  Orlov 
stressed the sensitivity and importance of the relationship between 
missile defense and telemetry.  Turning to database issues, Trout 
and Orlov reviewed details, once again, of the initial data 
exchange for the treaty to ensure each understood the decision made 
during the previous meeting (Ref B).  Bracketed text in Part II was 
reviewed by the sides.  End summary. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY:  Follow Up on Non-Deployed Heavy Bombers; 
Agreed Statements; Unpleasant News on BMD and Telemetry; and 
Database Issues. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
 
FOLLOW UP ON NON-DEPLOYED HEAVY BOMBERS 
 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (S) Orlov asked Trout his general view of the outcome of the 
Expanded Ad Hoc meeting that morning (Ref A).  Trout stated he 
thought little progress was made.  Orlov remarked he thought 
progress was made in understanding each other's positions.  He 
added, however, that he thought having a separate limit for test 
heavy bombers was redundant and not logical since there was an 
overall non-deployed limit.  Trout argued that the test heavy 
bomber sublimit was necessary because test heavy bombers were not 
inspectable, unlike other heavy bombers.  He continued, that, from 
a pure accountability perspective, the United States would probably 
agree that you would not need a separate limit for test heavy 
bombers; the non-inspectability aspect is what created this special 
need for a sublimit. 
 
 
¶6.  (S) Orlov asked whether the United States differentiated 
between long-term maintenance and long-term repair.  Orlov stated 
that for Russia these were two different concepts.  Repair was 
associated with a long-term cycle, perhaps 1-3 years, and was done 
at a production facility.  Maintenance, however, was done at a 
different facility and only involved a short period of time.  Trout 
noted that for the United States short-term maintenance was done at 
the air base while long-term maintenance was done at the production 
or repair facilities.  Orlov asked whether the United States 
intended to define "long-term."  Trout replied that the United 
States had not decided on this issue but perhaps if this definition 
was deemed necessary it could be included, to which Orlov stated 
immediately that he believed this was a bad idea, as it was 
unreasonable to establish timelines for bombers visiting repair and 
maintenance facilities. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (S) Responding to Trout's question regarding when a heavy 
bomber would change categories from "deployed" to "non-deployed," 
Orlov answered that the category would immediately change upon 
arrival at the appropriate facility.  Orlov asked what would happen 
if a deployed heavy bomber flew to another airbase.  Trout replied 
that this was allowed; it was called a visit, and the status of the 
heavy bomber ("deployed") would not change. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S) Continuing on the notification theme, Trout noted that 
notifications would be very simple if a heavy bomber immediately 
changed status when it moved from facility to facility.  Orlov and 
Trout both agreed that Section V, Heavy Bombers, would have to be 
reworked to incorporate non-deployed heavy bombers. 
 
 
 
----------------- 
 
AGREED STATEMENTS 
 
----------------- 
 
 
 
¶9.  (S) Orlov changed topics to ask more about the coastlines and 
waters diagram in relation to the discussion that took place in the 
Agreed Statements Working Group earlier that day (Ref C).  Orlov 
expressed his concern that the United States, by using this 
terminology, was trying to further limit the area that was 
inspectable during a Type-1 inspection.  Trout replied that this 
language was consistent with an SSBN Type-1 inspection and was well 
understood by both Parties in START.  Furthermore, Trout added that 
SSGNs, when located at submarine bases, were generally very near 
the piers of SSBNs and would definitely be well within the 5 km arc 
as required in the coastlines and waters diagram.  LT Lobner added 
that in practice, SSGNs are frequently at the same pier as SSBNs if 
moored at a submarine base. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (S) Orlov asked whether the United States had a chance to look 
 
 
at any of the new agreed statements delivered by Russia earlier 
that day.  Trout responded in the negative.  Orlov addressed the 
rapid reload agreed statement, stating that he was constantly 
trying to explain to his colleagues what he believed was the U.S. 
concern on this topic.  He explained, as he understood the U.S. 
concern, the United States thought that Russia was hiding mobile 
missiles in the field, burying them so they could not be seen.  In 
the event that actual use was required, mobile launchers would go 
from "buried spot" to "buried spot" reloading, launching, and then 
moving to the next place.  Orlov personally noted that he thought 
the real rapid reload item was nuclear ALCMs stored on rotary 
launchers at airbases.  But, he continued, this was a personal view 
only. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
UNPLEASANT NEWS ON BMD AND TELEMETRY 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶11.  (S) In a much more somber tone, Orlov explained that he had 
some more unpleasant news.  He commented that the United States has 
repeatedly said that its ballistic missile defense (BMD) 
capabilities were not directed at Russia.  Why then, he continued, 
do you need telemetry?  He lamented that these related issues, BMD 
and telemetry, were going to be addressed in the near future, and 
most likely would result in a more heated debate. 
 
 
 
¶12.  (S) Trout thanked him for his candor and commented that 
telemetry had been an important element for nuclear arms treaties 
for over 15 years.  He pointed out that prior to exchanging 
telemetry each Party was prone to overestimating the other Party's 
missile capabilities which led to each Party building missiles in 
greater numbers, that were of greater capability, and that cost 
significantly more in order to compensate for what was in reality a 
fictitious missile.  Furthermore he continued, while the United 
States understood that Russia would be the only Party developing 
new missiles during the next 10 years, it may not be the case in 
the decade after that when the positions might be reversed and 
Russia would be very interested in telemetry.  Trout argued that if 
telemetry were not exchanged in this treaty it was unlikely there 
would be an exchange of telemetry in a follow-on treaty. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (S) Trout asked how U.S. limited BMD assets would impact 
Russian strategic deterrence.  Orlov conceded that at this moment 
it did not.  However, he continued, what about in 10 years?  He 
argued that it was very likely that U.S. technology, BMD 
capability, and number of assets would grow and improve. 
Oobviously Russia would continue to develop better technology to 
counter BMD capabilities, but once there were significant numbers 
of BMD assets the strategic balance could shift. 
 
 
 
--------------- 
 
 
DATABASE ISSUES 
 
--------------- 
 
 
 
¶14.  (S) Trout and Orlov turned to Section I of the database. 
Orlov delivered new text for paragraphs 2 and 3.  Trout asked to go 
over, in detail, what data would be included in Sections III, IV, 
and V during the initial exchange based upon the agreement made at 
the last meeting (Ref B).  After using various categories in these 
sections as examples, Trout and Orlov confirmed they both had the 
same idea on what specific data would be exchanged.  Regarding the 
new text, Trout stated the United States would analyze it with the 
help of their legal staff. 
 
 
 
¶15.  (S) Moving to Section II, Mr. Pischulov noted that the Russian 
side had accepted placing the third 800 limit in paragraph 1 but 
had bracketed the phrase "equipped for nuclear armaments."  Lobner 
replied that he understood this position as it was discussed in 
both the Expanded Ad Hoc meeting (Ref A) and in the last MOUWG 
meeting (Ref B).  He added that the issue would be resolved once 
both sides had agreed on the definition of non-deployed heavy 
bombers. 
 
 
¶Q.  (S) Continuing in Section II, Pischulov asked that a new 
category, "non-deployed heavy bombers," be added to paragraph 2, 
stating that it was a logical place for this category.  Lobner 
asked why the Russian side considered this logical as the category 
was really contained both as an aggregate in paragraph 1 (the 800 
limit) and as its own category at the beginning of Section V. 
Furthermore, he continued, the categories in paragraph 2 are unique 
to the remainder of the document as they did not appear anywhere 
else as a combined aggregate, with the exception of test heavy 
bombers, as this category had a sublimit.  After further discussion 
it was agreed that paragraph 2 should be deleted. 
 
 
 
¶17.  (S) Orlov brought up the topic of coordinates for ICBM bases 
for mobile launchers of ICBMs, asking whether the United States had 
changed its position on requiring this data, along with the size of 
the ICBM base and the size of the basing area.  Trout replied that 
the U.S. position had not changed, nor did he have any new guidance 
on this topic.  He repeated the offer made in the last MOUWG 
meeting (Ref B) that if Russia was willing to provide the boundary 
coordinates for the ICBM base, the United States would drop the 
size requirements.  Orlov acknowledged he understood the offer but 
reiterated the Russian response was that it was unacceptable. 
 
 
 
¶18.  (S) Addressing Section III, Trout asked that the word 
"(Returned)" be added for the category of Non-deployed Mobile 
Launchers of ICBMs under the Production Facility for Mobile 
Launchers of ICBMs.  Orlov agreed. 
 
 
 
¶19.  (S) Orlov turned to the category "warheads on deployed ICBMs" 
 
 
that was listed in the basing area.  He argued that this was a 
unique category as it asked Russia to declare the number of 
warheads for each launcher regiment.  He pointed out information of 
this nature would be provided at pre-inspection, as well as the 
individual warhead data by missile.  Trout said he would think 
about this issue. 
 
 
 
¶20.  (S) Pischulov asked if there was any change to bracketed 
language in Section VI regarding the nomenclature for launchers at 
space launch facilities.  Trout replied there was not. 
 
 
 
¶21.  (S) In Section VII, Pischulov engaged Lobner in a discussion 
over the term "version" versus "variant."  Specifically, Pischulov 
argued that "variant" was the correct term when referring to mobile 
launchers because the nomenclature of the "types" declared was the 
same as missiles.  Lobner pointed out that this issue was confusing 
because the Russian side, in practice under START, referred to the 
name of mobile launchers using the same nomenclature as its 
missiles.  However, he continued, in reality they were actually 
referring to an item and any versions of that item.  Trout added 
that for some time there were two versions of the launcher for 
RS-12M, versions A and B, which were different due to the location 
of the cab.  Trout added, however, that he believed one of these 
versions no longer existed. 
 
 
 
¶22.  (S) Lobner pointed out that the definition for "version" had 
been agreed upon at the end of the last session in December, and 
read aloud the agreed definition.  Pischulov and Orlov both stated 
they were unaware that this definition had been agreed, and that 
they would consult their Definitions Working Group members to 
understand this issue. 
 
 
 
¶23.  (S) With respect to Section VIII, Lobner informed Orlov that 
he had spoken with the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) 
about the issue of what technical characteristics should be 
included in the section.  Lobner recommended, based on the 
recommendations of the IPWG, that the discussion on this be put on 
hold until the IPWG was able to discuss the Annex that would deal 
with heavy bomber inspections.  At that time, he continued, both 
sides would have a better understanding of what characteristics 
were required in Section VIII to support inspections.  Orlov 
agreed. 
 
 
 
¶24.  (S) Trout raised the question of bases overlapping since no 
coordinates would be provided and no size requirement would exist. 
Orlov assured Trout bases would not "walk away," and that the 
United States was very aware of where Russia's bases were located 
and their approximate size under START.  Additionally, no bases 
overlapped in START and not that much would change in this treaty, 
he argued.  He added that he viewed this as a U.S. "control issue," 
in that the United States wanted to control the movements of 
Russian mobile launchers by confining them to certain locations. 
 
 
¶25.  (S) Trout and Orlov agreed to discuss the new Russian-proposed 
text for Section I during the next meeting. 
 
 
 
¶26.  (S) Documents provided: 
 
 
 
- Russia: 
 
 
 
     -- Section I, General Provisions, paragraphs 1 through 5. 
 
 
 
¶27.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Mr. Trout 
 
LT Lobner (RO) 
 
Ms. Gesse (Int) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
Gen Orlov 
 
Mr. Pischulov 
 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 
 
 
 
¶28.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
KING