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S E C R E T GENEVA 000159 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: ARTICLE VIII MEETING, FEBRUARY 16, 2010 
 
REF: 10 GENEVA 139 (SFO-GVA-VIII-048) 
10 GENEVA 97 (SFO-GVA-VIII-021) 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-052. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 16, 2010 
 
                Time:  10:00 A.M. - 12:45 P.M. 
 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
¶3.  (S) Amb Ries led a working group discussion of Article VIII to 
try to resolve the issue of releasability of the initial exchange 
of data.  The U.S. side proposed compromise language in response to 
Russia's proposed changes to previously agreed and conformed 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of the text.  Agreement was reached at the table 
on language for paragraphs 1 and 2 and several brackets were 
removed from the rest of the text.  The Russian side remained 
steadfast in its insistence that only aggregate data for deployed 
ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers; as well as 
aggregate data for deployed and non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, 
deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs, and 
deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers would be released publicly. 
End summary. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY: A Database Must be Established; What to 
Call the Database; and Right to Release Information. 
 
 
 
------------------------------ 
 
A DATABASE MUST BE ESTABLISHED 
 
------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶5.  (S) Ries opened the meeting by saying that the United States 
was pleased with the discussions the previous day (Reftel A).  The 
United States understood the Russian position that, at the time of 
signature of the treaty, the database would not contain any data. 
The database would be created based on the categories and the rules 
laid out in the Protocol.  With this understanding, the United 
States had reviewed the Russian paper passed during the previous 
meeting and, therefore, proposed a change to the language in 
paragraph 1 and 2 of Article VIII; the United States felt this 
change would not compromise either position.  Ries read the 
following proposal for paragraph 1:  A database pertaining to the 
obligations under this Treaty is provided for in Part Two and Four 
of the Protocol to this Treaty. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (S) General Poznikhir reacted by saying that the United States 
had said it understood the Russian position and now appeared to be 
walking back the agreement.  There was no database; yet the United 
States was insisting there was one. 
 
¶7.  (S) Ries stated the United States did understand and wanted to 
convey clearly in the Treaty Article that a database would exist 
under this treaty.  Poznikhir stated emphatically that there would 
be no database at signature, only categories, and asked for a 
written copy of the U.S. proposal.  Poznikhir went on to say that 
there was a Protocol on Notifications and the Parties would be 
obliged every 6 months to exchange data.  Mr. Lobach interjected 
that, if the United States wanted to ensure that a database would 
be established in the future, the U.S. delegation should write the 
text as such.  Poznikhir offered that if the United States 
insisted, a sentence could be added saying, "The database shall be 
established in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol to the 
Treaty."  Ries said that would be a good idea, as Part Two provided 
the rules and Part Four provided the template for the 
notifications.  The sides agreed verbally to the following 
language: 
 
 
 
Begin text: 
 
 
 
¶1.  A database pertaining to the obligations under the Treaty shall 
be established in accordance with Parts II and IV of the Protocol 
to this Treaty.  The categories of the database are set forth in 
Part II of the Protocol to the Treaty. 
 
 
 
¶2.  Each Party shall notify the other Party of changes in such data 
and shall provide other notifications provided for in Part IV of 
the Protocol to the Treaty. 
 
 
 
End text. 
 
 
 
------------------------- 
 
WHAT TO CALL THE DATABASE 
 
------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S) The discussion next turned to the name of the database in 
Part Two of the Protocol.  General Orlov proposed that the Parties 
agree to identify the database as "Database on Strategic Offensive 
Arms."  This title was the same as the one being used in the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group to identify Part 
Two.  Ries offered that since Orlov and Mr. Trout would be chairing 
a meeting that afternoon, this issue could be raised and agreed at 
that time.  The Parties agreed that there were no further changes 
to paragraph 4 and 5 of Article VIII. 
 
 
 
---------------------------- 
 
RIGHT TO RELEASE INFORMATION 
 
---------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) The discussion next turned to the right of a Party to 
release information received in the initial exchange of data.  Ries 
stated that the intention was to release information using the 
rules in Section II of Part Two.  There was no data contained in 
Section II, therefore the phrase "and contained in Section II" was 
not needed.  Moreover, the United States believed the phrase, 
"except as provided for in this Article" was not needed as 
paragraph 2, Section I of Part Two had been crafted to specifically 
exclude any sensitive information.  Paragraph 2 now listed only 
what would be exchanged during the initial exchange of data. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (S) Poznikhir questioned the reference to Paragraph 2.  Mr. 
Lobner recounted the agreement which had been reached by the Heads 
of Delegations (HOD) during a MOU Working Group meeting on February 
5 (Reftel B).  Lobner stated that the HODs had agreed that 
aggregate numbers for Section II would be provided in the initial 
exchange, but that no warhead data would be exchanged at that time. 
In addition, the aggregate numbers for Sections III, IV, and V 
would be exchanged, but no data by base would be provided.  The 
technical characteristics in Sections VII, VIII, and IX would also 
be exchanged.  Poznikhir confirmed that this was the agreement of 
what would be exchanged in the initial exchange; however, the 
Parties were discussing what would be released.  Lobach stated the 
Russian position was that the only numbers to be released from the 
initial exchange would be two of the three numbers from Section II: 
the aggregate for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy 
bombers, and the aggregate for deployed and non-deployed ICBM and 
SLBM launchers and heavy bombers. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (S) Ries explained that the United States had agreed to make a 
special case of the first exchange of data by using the July 2009 
START Data to populate the database.  This data was already in the 
public domain and should not present a problem for releasability. 
Poznikhir retorted that the Parties were working on a new treaty 
and should forget about everything in START.  Only the aggregate 
numbers would be released.  The sides agreed that each Party had 
the right to release its own data, but the Russian side was against 
publishing Russia's data. 
 
 
 
¶12.  (S) Ries went on to explain that the United States was 
entering into a new treaty, which would require the support of the 
U.S. Senate and the U.S. Government also wanted the support of the 
public; the U.S. public had a right to know the basis upon which 
the government was entering into this treaty.  As a matter of fact, 
Ries stated, there was a great deal of public discussion about 
START Follow-On. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (S) Mr. Koshelev interjected an example from implementation of 
the Biological Weapons Convention, recalling under that Treaty the 
Parties were obliged to transfer certain information.  However, 
after the anthrax poisonings, all the information available on the 
internet was removed from the public domain.  This was only prudent 
and reflected Russia's concern for strategic information in the 
public domain. 
 
¶14.  (S) Ries said that the United States understood what was on 
the table and that the Russian delegation had explained it clearly. 
The proposal to release only some of the aggregate numbers was very 
different from the U.S. approach.  This approach was a completely 
different concept.  Poznikhir countered that the approach depicted 
in paragraph 8 matched the U.S. approach.  The Parties have the 
right to release the aggregate numbers.  Ries reiterated the U.S. 
view was that everything in the initial exchange of data could be 
released except geographic coordinates, site diagrams, coastlines 
and waters diagrams and unique identifiers, as specified in 
paragraph 2, Section I, of Part Two of the Protocol.  The aggregate 
numbers would always be released. 
 
 
 
¶15.  (S) Lobach then interjected that during a conforming meeting, 
the U.S. lawyer, Mr. Brown, had confirmed that the phrase "equipped 
for nuclear armaments" had been removed from all places in the text 
since the term "deployed heavy bomber" was an agreed term.  In such 
a case, the use of the defined term was paramount.  Ries stated 
that the term "non-deployed heavy bomber" had not yet been agreed 
and therefore the phrase must be included until the term was 
agreed. 
 
 
 
¶16.  (S) Orlov returned to the initial data exchange saying that 
the July 2009 START data would not exactly fit the categories of 
the new treaty and therefore the data in the initial exchange would 
be slightly different than the July 2009 START MOU update. 
 
 
 
¶17.  (U) Documents provided: 
 
 
 
- Russia: 
 
 
 
     -- Revised Article VIII text dated February 16, 2010. 
 
 
 
¶18.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Amb Ries 
 
Lt Col Comeau 
 
Mr. Dean 
 
Dr. Fraley 
 
Lt. Lobner 
 
Mr. Taylor (RO) 
 
Mrs. Zdravecky 
 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
Gen. Poznikhir 
 
Mr. Koshelev 
 
Mr. Lobach 
 
Ms. Melikbekian 
 
Gen. Orlov 
 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 
 
 
 
¶19.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
KING