VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0157/01 0571642
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 261642Z FEB 10
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0429
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0232
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0302
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0306
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0302

S E C R E T GENEVA 000157 
 
SIPDIS 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) NOTIFICATIONS WORKING GROUP MEETING, 
FEBRUARY 17, 2010 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-060. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 17, 2010 
 
           Time:  3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M. 
 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
------- 
 
SUMMARY 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶3.  (S) At the Notifications Working Group meeting chaired by Mr. 
Siemon and Mr. Smirnov, the Russian side provided an unofficial 
translation of the Russian-proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT) Version 
1.8, Part Four of the Protocol to the Treaty on Notifications, 
dated February 17, 2010.  The Russian side provided clarification 
of its proposed changes and the U.S. side provided counter 
proposals.  The two sides discussed in detail the notifications 
that describe the transfer of SLBMs under the U.S.-United Kingdom 
(UK) existing pattern of cooperation and "notification of the 
development of a new kind of strategic offensive arm (SOA)."  The 
two sides briefly discussed the time and date for the provision of 
a notification, notification of the visit of a deployed heavy 
bomber beyond 24 hours, a notification that provides the planned 
schedule for conversions and eliminations during the calendar year, 
and a notification concerning the list of inspectors and aircrew 
members.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY:  Section I:  General Provisions; Section 
II:  Notifications Concerning the Database; Section III: 
Notifications Concerning the Movement of Strategic Offensive Arms; 
Section V:  Notifications Concerning Conversion or Elimination; and 
Section VI:  Notifications Concerning Inspections and Exhibitions. 
 
 
 
------------------------------ 
 
Section I:  General Provisions 
 
------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶5.  (S) Mr. Smirnov provided Mr. Siemon with two copies of the 
unofficial translation of the Russian-proposed JDT Part Four of the 
Protocol to the Treaty, dated February 17, 2010.  Smirnov had made 
additional changes to the text since a pre-conforming meeting held 
the previous day.  He suggested the group use the Russian version 
for discussion.  Siemon reminded Smirnov the sides should provide 
text for discussion factoring in sufficient time for the other side 
to review.  Siemon added the Russian text should include not only 
the recommended changes but also the text that had been changed. 
In this way, discussion could be more productive.  Although the 
 
 
Russian side had not, in this instance, operated per normal 
procedures in delivering the text, Siemon agreed to continue 
discussion so the group could move forward. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (S) Smirnov recommended the sides delete paragraph 2, which 
related to the database, since Article VIII had for the most part 
been agreed.  Siemon agreed.  Smirnov also recommended the sides 
modify the START language in the paragraph related to using 
Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) for the time and date of a notification. 
The current language had confused individuals in the Russian 
Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC).  First, simply changing the 
date of the notification to the date the respective NRRC received 
the notification corrected one problem.  He also proposed to 
specify all times and dates in the notifications be given in GMT. 
After consulting with Mr. Stickney from the U.S. NRRC, Siemon 
agreed to Smirnov's approach on GMT time; however, he questioned 
the proposal for the date of the notification.  Several of the 
proposed notifications signaled the commencement of monitoring or 
inspection activities using the date provided in the notification. 
Using the date of receipt for the date of provision of the 
notification confused this concept.  Smirnov offered a remark 
within the notification could specify that the commencement of the 
event was based on the receipt of the notification.  Siemon agreed 
to take the proposal back for study. 
 
 
 
-------------------------- 
 
Section II:  Notifications 
 
Concerning the database 
 
-------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶7.  (S) Siemon noted that both sides in the Definitions Working 
Group had agreed on the definition of variant; therefore, the U.S. 
side could accept the Russian-bracketed term "variants" in 
paragraph 3(b), and paragraph 3.  The agreed text of paragraph 3(b) 
was as follows: 
 
 
 
Begin text. 
 
 
 
(b) New facilities, new types, variants of ICBMs and SLBMs and new 
versions of mobile launchers of ICBMs. 
 
 
 
End text. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S) The Russian side believed the U.S. term "items" was too 
broad for use in paragraph 4 and recommended using the formulation 
"ICBMs and SLBMs."  Smirnov further noted this notification was not 
needed since existing patterns of cooperation were addressed in the 
treaty.  The Russian side proposed a new formulation of the 
 
 
paragraph to describe a notification to be used for the movement of 
an ICBM to the territory of a third State and its subsequent launch 
or return from the territory of a third State.  Siemon noted 
paragraph 4 was intended to notify Russia of the transfer of SLBMs 
to the UK pursuant to the U.S.-UK pattern of cooperation (POC). 
Siemon further noted, as in START, the U.S. could also include a 
statement that addressed the U.S.-UK POC.  The U.S.-bracketed text 
"in accordance with an established pattern of cooperation" exactly 
described this POC.  Smirnov noted the Russian-proposed text was 
intended to describe Russia's technical cooperation with Kazakhstan 
and specifically the movement of ICBMs to the Leninsk Test Range. 
Siemon reminded Smirnov while the notification itself might be 
acceptable as written, the bigger issue of how the Leninsk Test 
Range would be covered under the treaty had yet to be decided. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (S) Mr. Dean added that the U.S. transfer of SLBMs to the UK 
and the movement of Russian ICBMs to Leninsk were two distinct and 
different actions, with different legal ramifications under the 
treaty.  In the case of the transfers of Trident II SLBMs, the 
legal framework for such transfers was provided in Article XV of 
the treaty.  However, when Russia moved an ICBM to Kazakhstan for a 
test launch, Russia still retained possession of the ICBM. 
Accordingly, the transfer ban in Article XV (as well as the 
language dealing with "patterns of cooperation") did not apply. 
After a lengthy discussion on the subtleties of the words 
"movement" and "transfer," Smirnov recommended using two 
paragraphs.  The first would relate to the transfers under the 
U.S.-UK pattern of cooperation.  The second would relate to a 
situation in which Russia moved an ICBM to Kazakhstan for testing 
at the Leninsk Test Range.  Siemon acknowledged the need for two 
paragraphs, for which he would present proposed text at the next 
meeting. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (S) Smirnov stated there was a fundamental difference in the 
approaches of the two sides for notifying the emergence of a new 
kind of SOA.  The Russian side believed a Party could request 
discussion of the development of a new kind of SOA in the Bilateral 
Consultative Commission (BCC).  This discussion would be triggered 
by a notification.  The Parties would decide within the BCC if the 
new kind of offensive arm was a "strategic offensive arm."  If the 
Parties determined it was indeed a SOA to which the treaty applied, 
the Parties also decided within the BCC, either then or in a future 
meeting of the BCC, which, if any, provisions of the treaty applied 
to this new kind of SOA.  Therefore, the U.S.-proposed notification 
would not be needed since the official BCC record would serve as 
such.  The Parties could also decide in the BCC if the new kind of 
offensive arm was not an SOA and therefore not subject to the 
treaty.  The fundamental difference of the U.S. position from the 
RF position was that the Parties together decided if the offensive 
arm was a SOA; the Party which developed the item did not decide 
this alone.  The Parties together made this decision prior to 
deploying the item. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (S) Siemon believed the sides could draft two notifications to 
assuage Russian concerns; one to notify the other Party of the 
development of a new kind of SOA that triggered discussion in the 
BCC if either Party had concerns about a potential new kind of SOA, 
and a second notification to signal the deployment of a new kind of 
SOA.  Smirnov believed paragraph 2 of Article V supported the 
 
 
Russian-proposed notification process:  1) One Party noticed the 
other Party developing a new kind of SOA; 2) this Party then sent a 
notification to the other party requesting discussion within the 
BCC; the BCC decided what provisions of the Treaty, if any, applied 
to the new kind. 
 
 
 
¶12.  (S) Dean said the U.S. concept included three steps.  The 
first step, per Article V, entailed a discussion in the BCC if a 
Party believed that a new kind of strategic offensive arm was 
emerging.  There would be a notification to request such BCC 
discussions.  The second step required the developing Party to 
submit a notification that acknowledged the development of a new 
kind of SOA.  The third step, as provided for within Article XIV, 
subparagraph (c), was that the BCC may then resolve questions 
concerning the applicability of provisions of the treaty to the new 
kind. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (S) Siemon reiterated the U.S. position that Article V could 
be used by either Party to trigger discussions within the BCC.  The 
Party with concerns could use the Article V provisions or the Party 
that developed the new kind of SOA could use Article V to trigger 
BCC discussions in order to alleviate a concern of the other Party. 
Siemon believed the Russian-proposed notification only solved half 
the problem.  He offered to draft two notifications for discussion 
at the next meeting; one for step one and the other for step two. 
Siemon reemphasized only the Party that developed the item could 
determine if it was a new kind of SOA.  Smirnov disagreed.  Smirnov 
also disagreed with the U.S.-proposed notification related to new 
SOA including language specifying a "flight test."  He opined some 
new SOA might not be flight tested. 
"Some new SOA might not fly but crawl," he said.  The text remained 
bracketed. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------- 
 
Section III:  Notifications Concerning 
 
Movement of Strategic offensive arms 
 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶14.  (S) The sides agreed to defer discussion of time periods 
captured in this section to the next meeting.  Siemon noted since 
the definition of a non-deployed heavy bomber had not been fully 
resolved, the bracketed text in paragraphs 3 and 4 should remain. 
With respect to text for providing the location in the notification 
of a visiting bomber, Siemon indicated with regard to heavy bomber 
movements outside U.S. national territory, the notification would 
only provide the general geographical area of the visit as was done 
in START.  This was done to protect information related to 
operational missions.  Smirnov recommended replacing the 
Russian-bracketed text "the location during" with "area."  Siemon 
agreed to take this back for discussion.  Text in Section III 
remained bracketed. 
 
 
------------------------------------- 
 
Section V:  Notifications 
 
Concerning Conversion or Elimination 
 
------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶15.  (S) Smirnov indicated the title of the section "Notifications 
Concerning Conversion or Elimination" showed agreement that 
resulted from the previous pre-conforming meeting.  Both sides 
agreed to delete "of ((Items and Facilities Subject to the 
Treaty))1 ((Strategic Offensive Arms))2".  He noted the text 
included two variants of the paragraph which addressed conversion 
or elimination schedules.  The Russian-proposed text provided only 
calendar-year scheduled eliminations.  The Russian side could not 
provide a calendar-year plan for scheduled conversions since they 
did not draft these schedules.  Smirnov stated the schedule was not 
needed since a Party was required to notify the other Party 30 days 
in advance of the intent to initiate a conversion or elimination. 
Siemon recommended adding the number and types of SOA to the 
Russian-proposed text and indicated he would discuss the text of 
the notification with Mr. Elliott, the Chair of the Conversion or 
Elimination Working Group. 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Section VI:  Notifications 
 
Concerning inspections and exhibitions 
 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶16.  (S) Smirnov reiterated the Russian side had accepted the 
U.S.-proposed 45-day period for the notification of amendments to 
the list of inspectors and aircrew members.  Siemon asked how the 
Russians proposed to handle notifications when a Party wanted to 
immediately remove an individual from either list because of 
criminal behavior.  Smirnov acknowledged the Russian-proposed 
notifications did not capture this situation. 
 
 
 
¶17.  (S) Siemon asked Smirnov to clarify the purpose of the 
proposed notification containing the agreed list of inspectors and 
aircrew members.  Smirnov told Siemon, in the Russian view, the 
agreed list would be shared one time shortly after entry into force 
of the treaty.  Siemon opined this process was confusing as it did 
not take into account further updates to the agreed list over the 
life of the treaty.  Siemon ultimately agreed to consider Smirnov's 
proposal. 
 
 
 
¶18.  (S) Each side reiterated its position with respect to the 
timing for notification of the intent to conduct an inspection. 
Smirnov stated the 72-hour time period was needed so the Russian 
NRRC could arrange logistics for the arrival of the inspection 
team.  Siemon indicated the notification should reflect the time 
 
 
period agreed upon by the Inspection Protocol Working Group. 
(Begin comment:  The United States has proposed 16 hours for this 
activity in the Inspection Protocol Working Group. End comment.) 
Both sides agreed to keep the proposed time periods bracketed. 
 
 
 
¶19.  (S) Smirnov indicated the Russian side had refined the 
language that referenced the exchange of geographic coordinates to 
focus on those geographic coordinates related to reference points. 
This was required since the Treaty included several situations 
where coordinates were exchanged; the Russian side simply wanted to 
refer to the coordinates of a reference point in this notification. 
Siemon noted the difficulty of using the text provided by Smirnov 
at the beginning of the meeting since it did not indicate what text 
had been changed or deleted.  He reiterated that in the future, the 
Russian side should provide its proposed JDT well in advance of a 
meeting so that an effective discussion could take place. 
 
 
 
¶20.  (S) Before concluding the meeting, Smirnov wished to discuss 
the time period related to a change in site diagrams.  He 
reiterated that no time period for transmitting a notification with 
the changes was necessary since he believed the changes would be 
documented in the BCC.  The documentation would reference the date 
of change.  The sides agreed to continue this discussion at the 
next meeting. 
 
 
 
¶21.  (U) Documents provided: 
 
 
 
- Russia: 
 
 
 
-- Unofficial English translation and Russian language of Russian 
Proposed JDT Rev 1.8, Part Four of the Protocol to the 
Treaty-Notifications, dated February 17, 2010. 
 
 
 
¶22.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Mr. Siemon 
 
Mr. Albertson 
 
Lt Col Comeau 
 
Mr. Dean 
 
Mr. Dwyer 
 
Dr. Fraley 
 
 
Mr. Hanchett (RO) 
 
LT Sicks 
 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
Mr. Smirnov 
 
Mr. Ivanov 
 
Mr. Voloskov 
 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
 
 
¶23.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
KING