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S E C R E T GENEVA 000153 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/26 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP, 
FEBRUARY 10, 2010 
 
REF: 10 GENEVA 85 (SFO-GVA-VIII-025) 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-034. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 10, 2010 
 
           Time:  3:00 P.M. - 5:00 P.M. 
 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
------- 
 
SUMMARY 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶3.  (S) At the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meeting 
chaired by Dr. Warner and Col Ilin, the sides discussed the 
proposed approaches for Type-2 inspections of converted or 
eliminated strategic offensive arms (SOA), located either at 
operational bases or at CorE facilities.  The U.S.-proposed text 
contained uniform Type-2 inspection parameters for confirming 
converted heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, converted 
SLBM launchers, eliminated silo ICBM launchers, eliminated 
solid-fuel ICBMs and SLBMs, and eliminated mobile ICBM launchers. 
The Russian side disagreed with this approach, but said it would 
study the U.S. proposal.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY:  Parity for All; The Haymaker Right:  SSBN 
Launcher Conversion; The Golden Middle:  and Solid-Fueled ICBM 
Elimination Inspections. 
 
 
 
-------------- 
 
PARITY FOR ALL 
 
-------------- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (S) Warner requested the Russian response to the U.S. 
counter-proposals in Sections V and VII of Part Five of the 
Protocol, provided at the previous meeting (Reftel). Ilin, clearly 
pressed for time, given the Russian mission's pending "Day of the 
Diplomat" reception that evening, expressed hesitation with the 
U.S. approach of handling all conversion or elimination inspections 
as consistently as possible with other Type-2 inspections.  Under 
the U.S. approach, inspection procedures, duration, and team 
composition provisions would be broadly applied to all Type-2 
conversion or elimination inspections, save for a limited scope of 
verification of eliminated silo launchers of ICBMs or converted 
SLBM launchers located at operational bases. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (S) Ilin noted that separate language may be required for each 
specific kind of conversion or elimination inspection, vice the 
one-size-fits-all proposals the United States had tabled.  Ilin 
even opened the possibility that silo eliminations and SLBM 
launcher conversions could be handled as a piggyback to a Type-1 
inspection at these types of operational bases; Warner pointed out 
that this was the original U.S. proposal for confirming silo 
elimination and SLBM launcher conversion, which the Russian side 
had rejected. 
 
 
¶7.   (S) After a lengthy discussion on the conversion of a very 
small number of launchers on SSBNs, Ilin returned to the general 
theory of conversion or elimination inspections, stating that 
Russia was still holding to limits of only five inspectors, a 
12-hour duration, and no time extensions for solid-fueled ICBM or 
SLBM missile or mobile ICBM launcher elimination inspections. 
Furthermore, he said sequential inspections should not be conducted 
in association with conversion or elimination inspections, refuting 
U.S. arguments that these limits would interfere with the conduct 
of sequential inspections, either before or after the conversion or 
elimination inspection.  Warner offered several options that would 
employ subgroups of a 10-inspector team, providing flexibility to 
the inspecting party, but it was clear the Russian side had no 
desire to seek solutions that would facilitate sequential 
inspections associated with solid-fueled missile elimination 
inspections. 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
THE HAYMAKER RIGHT:  SLBM LAUNCHER CONVERSION 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S) During the discussion on conversion or elimination 
inspections, Warner reminded Ilin that all rights afforded to U.S. 
teams during solid-fueled ICBM or SLBM elimination inspections 
would be afforded to Russian teams during silo elimination and SLBM 
launcher conversion inspections at U.S. operational bases.  Ilin 
and Petrov attempted to correct Warner, saying that SLBM launchers 
could not be converted unless all were converted and the submarine 
subsequently became an SSGN, for which there were already specific 
and agreed procedures in an agreed statement.  Warner explained 
that the Treaty and Protocol language provided for the conversion 
of individual launchers onboard an SSBN to non-SLBM-capable status, 
a process the United States fully intended to utilize in order to 
meet both the 700 strategic deployed delivery vehicle and 800 
aggregate deployed and non-deployed "launcher" limits. 
 
 
 
¶9.   (S) The entire Russian contingent was visibly stunned 
regarding the U.S. assertion that procedures for the conversion of 
individual SLBM launchers were already agreed.  This included Mr. 
Smirnov, a regular participant in discussions on this issue which 
occurred between Mr. Elliott and Col Ryzhkov in the Conversion or 
Elimination Working Group.  Warner reminded the Russian side of the 
extensive discussions which occurred on this matter between those 
two principals.  He made clear that such launch tubes would be 
rendered incapable of launching an SLBM and therefore would no 
longer be accountable as SLBM launchers.  The Russian side would be 
allowed to confirm this in a Type-2 inspection. Ilin argued that 
they should also be inspectable during Type-1 inspections as 
launchers not containing an SLBM as a means to ensure these 
launchers were not reconverted into launchers capable of launching 
an SLBM.  Petrov argued that the launchers must be eliminated in 
order to remove them from accountability, but Warner corrected him 
that conversion was also a means of removal from accountability. 
Ilin concluded that this was a serious change, which the Russian 
side must consider carefully. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
THE GOLDEN MIDDLE:  SOLID-FUELED ICBM ELIMINATION INSPECTIONS 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
 
¶10.  (S) Ilin reiterated the Russian position that only 50 percent 
of the annual eliminated total would be batched and that no more 
than two inspections per year could be conducted at each CorE 
facility.  Warner pointed out the inconsistencies in the Russian 
arguments requiring steady-state inflows and outflows of ICBMS for 
elimination, and also cited safety concerns, which limited the 
number of ICBMS simultaneously permitted within the Votkinsk Final 
Assembly Facility, as Mr. Smirnov had briefed previously.  If the 
process flow was, in fact, the way Smirnov had briefed, Warner 
pointed out, then the U.S. batching proposal (100 percent) and 
frequency of inspections (four times annually) was not a difficult 
proposition, particularly given the requirement for a 60-day 
display of eliminated first stages for national technical means 
(NTM) viewing. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (S) Smirnov sought to refute Warner's argument by saying the 
Russian side had not agreed to a 60-day NTM display window for 
eliminated first stages of solid-fueled ICBMs, but was proposing 30 
days.  Warner countered with the fact that the 60-day NTM window 
had been agreed by the Russian side in December 2009 in Part Three 
of the Protocol, but the Russian side was now again bracketing that 
text in an effort to secure a smaller 30-day NTM window.  The 
60-day NTM window requirement lowered the amount of additional 
dwell time eliminated first stages would remain on display at 
Votkinsk as part of the batching process, and would still ensure 
the same sustained rate of outflows to downstream disposition of 
eliminated first stages of solid-fueled ICBMs or SLBMs. 
 
 
 
¶12.  (S) Warner suggested the sides consider a combined inspection 
alternative: that Russia would batch solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs 
and mobile ICBM launchers twice annually, with each batch equaling 
25 percent of the annual elimination output.  What would be new was 
that the United States would also have the right to conduct Type-2 
inspections at the solid-fueled missile and mobile ICBM launcher 
CorE facilities during the time periods between the two batched 
accumulations.  Furthermore, the U.S. inspection team could inspect 
all items of inspection within the CorE facility, not only those 
eliminated items that were displayed in the open.  Under this 
arrangement, while the Russian side would only need to batch 50 
percent of the annual eliminated items, 100 percent of the 
eliminated items would be potentially subject to inspection each 
year.  The United States would have the right to inspect not only 
the 50 percent of items that were batched, but could inspect as 
well, portions of the remaining 50 percent of eliminated items not 
subject to batching. The Votkinsk and Piban'shur CorE facilities 
would each be subject to up to two Type-2 inspections each year. 
Warner underscored that this was not an official proposal, but 
rather a concept for discussion by the sides. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (S) Ilin appeared interested in the prospect of such a 
compromise solution.  He reiterated that batching no more than 50 
percent of the eliminated items was a red line for the Russian 
side, and that another major concern was maintaining an 
uninterrupted, steady-state downstream flow of eliminated ICBM 
motor casings.  With Ilin, Zaitsev, S. Shevchenko, Smirnov, and 
Petrov all nodding in unison, the Russian contingent did not seem 
at all alarmed at the prospect of being subject to short-notice 
Type-2 inspections during the non-batching periods of the 
elimination year.  Ilin promised that the Russian side would begin 
discussing this concept internally.  He reiterated, however, that 
the Russian side did not see a "great future" for sequential 
inspections in conjunction with conversion or elimination 
inspections. 
 
 
 
¶14.  Ilin proposed removing several minor brackets in Section VIII 
of Part Five which deals with the conduct of exhibitions.  The 
 
 
sides proved unable to clear the brackets on the exhibitions of new 
conversion or elimination processes that have been applied for the 
first time.  Following the discussion on exhibitions, Warner 
proposed beginning work on the selected portions of the Annex to 
Part Five of the Protocol as soon as possible during upcoming IPWG 
sessions.  Ilin cautioned that the Russian side was convinced that 
the sides needed to complete work on "more global" issues of the 
Protocol before turning to the Annex. 
 
 
 
¶15.  (U) Documents provided: 
 
 
 
None. 
 
 
 
¶16.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Dr. Warner 
 
Mr. Ahlm 
 
Mr. Buttrick 
 
Mr. Elliott 
 
Lt Col Goodman 
 
MAJ Johnson 
 
LTC Litterini (RO) 
 
Mr. McConnell 
 
Ms. Purcell 
 
Mr. Rust 
 
Mr. Smith 
 
Ms. Gesse (Int) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
Col Ilin 
 
Col Petrov 
 
Mr. S. Shevchenko 
 
Mr. Smirnov 
 
Ms. Vodopolova 
 
Col Zaitsev 
 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 
 
 
 
¶17.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
KING