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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DUSHANBE 000223 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR S/SRAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/26/2020 
TAGS: PREL ENRG ETRD EINV AF PK UZ TI
SUBJECT: SRAP HOLBROOKE'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT RAHMON 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Ambassador, EXEC, DoS. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
¶1. (C) Summary:  In a one hour forty five minute meeting on 
February 20, President Rahmon reiterated his commitment to 
supporting U.S.-led efforts in Afghanistan and complained at 
length about Uzbek efforts to obstruct regional cooperation. 
Ambassador Holbrooke urged Rahmon to work with President Karzai 
to obtain support for regional infrastructure projects and to 
push Pakistan to conclude a transit trade agreement with 
Afghanistan.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassador Holbrooke outlined USG strategy in 
Afghanistan, emphasizing U.S. support for President Karzai, and 
the commitment of civilian expertise in addition to increased 
troop numbers.  Ambassador Holbrooke also explained the U.S. 
decision to cease eradication efforts against opium poppy 
production and to focus on destruction of drug traffickers 
rather than punishment of small scale producers.  He 
acknowledged Tajik and Russian disagreement with this approach, 
saying the USG was convinced this was the best strategy to 
pursue and would increase counternarcotics cooperation with the 
Tajik government.  Ambassador Holbrooke also acknowledge 
concerns about the upcoming "Peace Jirga" President Karzai was 
organizing, saying the United States shared these concerns; but 
since Karzai was determined to press ahead with this Jirga, it 
was important to make sure it was successful and did not 
contribute to ethnic tensions. 
 
 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador Holbrooke said USG assistance goals in 
Afghanistan focused on improving agricultural production and 
urged that Tajikistan do everything possible to increase trade 
with Afghanistan to spur economic development.  He noted Foreign 
Minister Zarifi's proposals for a second U.S.-funded bridge to 
Afghanistan and for road, rail, and gas pipeline connections to 
Turkmenistan, but observed that truck traffic crossing the 
U.S.-funded bridge at Nizhny Pyanj still encountered long delays 
and the bridge needed to be fully utilized. 
 
 
 
A HISTORY OF SUPPORT FOR AFGHANISTAN 
 
 
 
¶4. (C) Rahmon recited the history of Tajik support for 
Afghanistan and for President Karzai, emphasizing Tajik 
opposition to the Taliban.  Rahmon said the United States should 
not repeat the mistake of the USSR of supporting the Afghan 
Tajiks over the Pashtun, but should ensure a government which 
represented the interests of all ethnic groups.  Rahmon also 
made a plea for support for the CASA-1000 project, saying it was 
vital for the region, but that the ADB did not support it.  He 
said that in the past week 35 Afghan police officers had begun 
training on counternarcotics in Tajikistan, and Tajikistan would 
train Afghan border guards, too. 
 
 
 
INFRSTRUCTURE AND UZBEKISTAN 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) Rahmon gave a short talk on the merits of Tajikistan's 
proposals for rail and pipeline connections to Turkmenistan, via 
Afghanistan, and the importance of the Dusti Jum and Roghun dams 
for CASA-1000.  He presented his vision of a region economically 
open and integrated by rail, gas, electricity and road 
connections stretching from Iran through Central Asia.  He then 
turned to the problem of Uzbekistan, giving a lengthy 
description of the hostile actions by the Uzbek government -- 
blocking transit trade to Tajikistan, mining the border, cutting 
electricity connections, and undermining the Roghun project.  He 
said Uzbekistan wanted to "return to 1924" (note:  the Tajik 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic" was established as a part 
of the Uzbek SSR in 1924 and did not become a separate Soviet 
Republic until 1929.)  Rahmon described President Karimov as an 
unreliable partner for the United States and a "Soviet 
politician." 
 
 
 
DUSHANBE 00000223  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
IRAN AND RUSSIA 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) Rahmon expressed support for Pakistani President Zardari 
and for the strategy of reconciling Afghan Taliban.  He said 
reconciliation with rebels had been the solution to the Tajik 
civil war.  Rahmon then urged the United States to begin direct 
negotiations with Iran, asserting that the Iranian government 
was ready for face-to-face talks.  He said that continued enmity 
between the United States and Iran played to Russian interests, 
which were to keep oil prices high, keep the central Asian 
states fearful and dependent on Russia for security, 
anti-Americanism strong among Muslims, and the United States 
dependent on Russia for help in resolving problems with Iran. 
Rahmon warned that if the United States attacked Iran, the 
"gates of Central Asia will close."  He concluded by saying 
Tajikistan is the "strategic partner" of the United States and 
by praising President Obama's policy in Afghanistan." 
 
 
 
CHINA AND RIVERS 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) Ambassador Holbrooke asked what role China played in 
Tajikistan.  Rahmon described China's role as "good and bad. 
For Tajikistan, which has serious problems, it's a good role. 
What other way do we have?"  He did not explain what might be 
bad in this relationship.  Rahmon took the opportunity to go to 
a large map of Tajikistan at the end of the table and point out 
the Chinese-funded power transmission line project between north 
and south Tajikistan and the road projects involving Chinese 
funding or contractors around the country.  He also gave his 
idiosyncratic interpretation of transboundary water sharing 
obligations, asserting that the Vakhsh River, on which the 
Roghun Dam project lies, was not a transboundary river (note: 
it supplies about one third of the flow of the Amu Darya, which 
flows into Uzbekistan).  Rahmon also spoke at length about 
wasteful Uzbek water use, including reservoirs which he said 
were collectively larger than the Aral Sea. 
 
 
 
SHOES AND STEPS 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) Ambassador Holbrooke observed that Tajikistan had huge 
water resources in its Pamir glaciers.  Rahmon agreed with this, 
and laughingly recalled a Russian proverb that he said described 
Tajikistan's situation:  "We are the shoemaker with no shoes." 
Ambassador Holbrooke urged Rahmon to take two steps with regard 
to Afghanistan and Pakistan --first, use whatever influence he 
had with Zardari to push Pakistan to agree on a pending transit 
trade agreement with Afghanistan since this would open up large 
regional trade opportunities for Tajikistan, and second, agree 
with Presidents Karzai and Zardari on transborder infrastructure 
projects, since the United States would likely support such 
projects. 
 
 
 
RAHMON'S POPULIST SCIENCE 
 
 
 
¶9. (C) Comment:  Rahmon clearly appreciated the opportunity to 
talk at length with Ambassador Holbrooke and was friendly and 
open in his assessments of Russian and Uzbek motivations. 
Rahmon gave his usual remarks promoting grandiose infrastructure 
projects and touting Tajikistan as open for business and a 
reliable political partner.  Much of this differs from the 
reality we encounter, but the meeting elicited renewed 
commitment from Rahmon to support us in Afghanistan.  End 
Comment. 
 
 
 
¶10. (U) Ambassador Holbrooke cleared this cable. 
GROSS