VZCZCXRO5389
PP RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #0176/01 0480806
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 170806Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1259
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0453
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0167
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0256
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0188
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2711

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 000176 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
TREASURY FOR JEFF BAKER, DAVID WRIGHT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN ECON ETRD PHUM IMF TI
SUBJECT: IMF TAKES STAND ON ROGHUN; SOME SAY NOT STRONG ENOUGH 
 
REF: A. 09 DUSHANBE 1443 
     ¶B. DUSHANBE 52 
     ¶C. DUSHANBE 67 
     ¶D. DUSHANBE 103 
     ¶E. DUSHANBE 171 
 
DUSHANBE 00000176  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  An IMF team recently completed a two-week 
visit to Dushanbe to assess economic and government performance 
before releasing further funding under its Extended Credit 
Facility (ECF).  A central issue was the government's campaign 
to fund the Roghun hydroelectric dam.  The IMF outlined three 
main concerns about Roghun: (1) there is no clear plan in place 
to manage and use the funds it has raised -- over $160 million 
so far.  (2) The funds are raised in somoni, but the bulk of the 
spending on Roghun will have to be in foreign exchange.  (3) The 
Roghun campaign is causing a modest but real increase in poverty 
and decline in economic growth.  IMF team leader Axel 
Schimmelpfennig acknowledged concerns that the government 
continues to force its citizens to contribute to Roghun.  He 
said it was not the IMF's role to question Roghun on human 
rights grounds, but he urged the government to halt on economic 
grounds:  Tajikistan already has raised more somoni than it 
needs; the government must now turn its attention to raising 
foreign exchange.  Schimmelpfennig told the government frankly 
that the campaign was burning political capital with donors, all 
to raise money it could not use in the short term.  He 
encouraged donors to press their concerns about Roghun with the 
government directly.  Apart from Roghun, Tajikistan's economic 
performance had been better than expected given the financial 
crisis.  The IMF team will bring a recommendation about future 
assistance to the PRGF to the full IMF Board within the next few 
months.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On February 12, representatives from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) briefed donors on the tentative conclusions 
of its two-week assessment mission to Tajikistan.  The mission's 
specific task was to measure the government's progress on the 
2009 benchmarks set in the Extended Growth Facility (ECF) 
(previously the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility).  Deputy 
Division Chief Axel Schimmelpfennig, who led the mission, 
acknowledged that donors had serious and wide-ranging concerns 
about the government's campaign to raise funds for the Roghun 
hydroelectric dam -- including extortion, the anticipated 
increase in poverty, and the lack of transparency in accounting 
for the funds (see refs A through C).  He said, however, that 
the IMF had to consider Roghun within IMF's mandate -- i.e., by 
examining its effects on macroeconomic stability, fiscal 
operations, and poverty.  From this narrower perspective, he 
identified several concerns. 
 
IMF PUSHES FOR BETTER MANAGEMENT OF ROGHUN FUNDS 
 
¶3. (SBU) Schimmelpfennig said the government did not appear to 
have a clear plan in place to manage and use the funds raised. 
The government has a "pretty good idea" of the total costs of 
Roghun, but did not present the IMF with a realistic timeline. 
The government was officially maintaining that the dam would be 
built by 2012, but no one with any knowledge about the project 
believed it would be completed before 2014.  The IMF was using 
the later date for its calculations.  Another concern was the 
management of the funds raised so far.  The government has 
committed to releasing details of the fundraising campaign every 
ten days.  According to the February 11 update, available on the 
Ministry of Finance website (www.minfin.tj), the government has 
sold 706,002,413 somoni ($162 million) in shares in Roghun. 
(Note: Since shares are sold in 100 somoni increments it is not 
clear why the total is not a round number.  End note.)  The 
money was held in eight banks and the treasury at the Ministry 
of Finance.  Schimmelpfennig said the government had agreed to 
have an external audit of the Roghun joint stock company for 
2008 and 2009.  While the audit would not reveal anything about 
the current fundraising campaign, which began in early January 
2010, it was important to provide a baseline for future 
accounting. 
 
GOVERNMENT RAISES SOMONI BUT MUST SPEND DOLLARS 
 
¶4. (SBU) The IMF's second major concern about Roghun was the 
"foreign exchange gap."  The government was raising funds in 
somoni, but the bulk of the expenditures for construction 
materials will have to be made in foreign currencies. 
Schimmelpfennig said the government had acknowledged its import 
needs for Roghun lay between $500 million and $800 million (he 
said it was not clear whether this was for the first phase alone 
or the entire project).  Using somoni to buy large amounts of 
 
DUSHANBE 00000176  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
dollars could have profound macroeconomic consequences, 
including a plunge in the exchange rate and a skewed balance of 
trade. 
 
EFFECTS OF ROGHUN CAMPAIGN ON POVERTY 
 
¶5. (SBU) Under the ECF (formerly PRGF), the government of 
Tajikistan has undertaken to maintain certain social sector 
spending minimums.  Donors expressed concern that the 
government's policy of forcing doctors, teachers, and other 
social sector employees to buy shares in Roghun effectively 
undercut these spending floors.  Schimmelpfennig acknowledged 
the concern, but said it has been difficult to determine the 
effects of the Roghun campaign on poverty in Tajikistan.  He 
said the World Bank was working on a report on the social impact 
of Roghun, while the IMF focused on the macroeconomic issues. 
According to very preliminary calculations, the World Bank 
estimated the Roghun campaign would increase poverty between 
0.5% and 6.0%, probably closer to the lower figure.  There were 
two reasons for the relatively modest effect on poverty.  First, 
if one considered the Roghun payments to be a sort of ad hoc 
tax, it appeared relatively progressive.  According to 
discussions with government officials and anecdotal information, 
it seemed the majority of shares have been sold to the better 
off.  Second, the Roghun campaign was a "one-off effect," that 
should not have a lasting impact on poverty. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Donors disputed both claims.  Numerous attendees 
related how even the very poorest segment of the population had 
been forced to contribute.  Schimmelpfennig appeared to 
backtrack somewhat, saying it was true that although the overall 
share of money collected from the poor was small, the campaign's 
"marginal effect" on poverty could be significant among this 
population.  He noted that the poverty line in Tajikistan is 
calculated at 86 somoni ($20) per capita per month, but the 
minimum share purchase is pegged at 100 somoni.  There were 
reports that many Tajiks who cannot afford even the minimum 100 
somoni payment have been "encouraged" to pool their resources to 
purchase shares.  This raised an additional problem, however, 
since the share will be issued in only one person's name, so the 
others will have no equity.  (Comment: This assumes the shares 
have any value at all -- a concern the IMF acknowledged but did 
not elaborate on.  End comment.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) Donors questioned whether the Roghun campaign would 
truly be a "one-off" event.  Certainly the official rhetoric has 
suggested a more permanent campaign.  Further, the very success 
of the campaign -- the IMF said they never would have expected 
the government to be able to raise $160 million in this way -- 
might tempt the government to employ the same tactics for future 
fundraising.  Schimmelpfennig said the IMF could not base its 
analysis on hypothetical events, but encouraged the 
international community to be vigilant and forceful with the 
government to prevent future occurrences.  He said the IMF 
estimated that the Roghun campaign could slow GDP growth by "up 
to 1%" in 2010. 
 
ROGHUN COMPLETION DATE: 2012 or 12TH OF NEVER? 
 
¶8. (SBU) World Bank Country Representative Chiara Bronchi 
reinforced the IMF's assessment that the government was raising 
funds it could not use.  She said the Roghun project did not 
have the capacity to absorb more than $40 or $50 million a year. 
 The only way the government could spend more money would be to 
bring supplies in by plane, a scenario she did not think 
possible.  If true, and assuming stable exchange rates (an 
unlikely assumption), the government had already raised enough 
money to fund Roghun through 2014.  Bronchi agreed with the IMF 
that the government's timeline for completing the first phase of 
Roghun by 2012 was untenable.  Builders still had not repaired 
the damage to Roghun's massive tunnels from severe landslides in 
¶1993.  (Roghun was begun in 1976 by the Soviets, but the project 
was mothballed during the Tajik Civil War in the 1990s.) 
Despite official announcements that builders had fully excavated 
the collapsed tunnels late last year, Bronchi said it would be 
at least another twelve months before this work was done.  The 
World Bank was underwriting two studies on the Roghun project, 
an environmental and social impact assessment and a technical 
feasibility study.  Bronchi said the long-delayed studies will 
likely not be completed for another year. 
 
IMF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT 
 
¶9. (SBU) In his conversations with government officials, 
 
DUSHANBE 00000176  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
Schimmelpfennig said he urged them to declare victory, cease the 
Roghun fundraising campaign, establish a strong and transparent 
governance framework for the Roghun funds, and work with the 
Fund to secure further financing from an international 
consortium that could raise forex.  Schimmelpfennig said this 
was the IMF's best path for convincing the government to stop 
the forced contributions.  He lightly scolded donors for hoping 
the IMF would do their dirty work by criticizing the government 
on issues that lay outside of its mandate.  He said donors must 
take a firm and clear stand with the government about their 
Roghun concerns.  He said he warned officials that the campaign 
was unnecessarily burning political capital with the 
international community.  He acknowledged, however, that the 
message was so far falling on deaf ears: the very day he 
delivered it to President Rahmon, the President issued a renewed 
appeal to the population for Roghun funds. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The IMF urged the government to establish a mechanism 
to redeem shares issued in 1994 for the Sangtuda-1 hydroelectric 
plant, completed just last year with Russian financing.  For 
many Tajiks, the current Roghun campaign is a more aggressive 
replay of the Sangtuda scheme.  Many who were prevailed upon to 
buy the Sangtuda shares had long ago given up hope of redeeming 
them.  Schimmelpfennig asked donors to underscore this issue as 
well.  It would be an important demonstration of principle for 
the government. 
 
GOVERNMENT HAS MET MOST IMF OBLIGATIONS... 
 
¶11. (SBU) Schimmelpfennig said Tajikistan's overall 
macroeconomic performance in 2009 had been satisfactory.  (Since 
Roghun share sales began on January 6, 2010, the fundraising 
campaign had minimal impact on the 2009 IMF benchmarks.) 
Tajikistan has weathered the global financial crisis better than 
expected.  GDP grew 3.4%, driven by non-cotton agriculture, 
which expanded as a result of reforms in the sector.  The 
depreciation of somoni (from about 3.3 to 4.3 to the dollar) 
contributed, encouraging expenditure on domestic products 
instead of more expensive imports.  According to preliminary 
data, Tajikistan met all of its quantitative targets under the 
ECF.  Minimum social sector expenditures were met for 2009, and 
the government agreed to increase social spending by 1% of GDP 
in 2010.  Structural reforms have been slower than anticipated, 
but not enough to cause concern.  Annual audits of the National 
Bank for fiscal years ending April 2008 and April 2009 have been 
delayed, but are finally moving forward.  These audits must be 
completed before further funding can be released under the ECF. 
 
...BUT STILL NO AUDITS 
 
¶12. (SBU) Audits of Barqi Tojik and the state-owned Talco 
aluminum company have been mostly completed, but have not yet 
been released to the public.  These are not formal requirements 
under the ECF, but the IMF has nevertheless been pressing the 
government for their release.  The Barqi Tojik audit, which was 
supposed to have been published on the company's website by 
December, has reportedly been delayed because some financial 
figures must be recalculated.  The fieldwork for the Talco audit 
has been completed.  In addition, the government has agreed to 
an audit of Talco Management, the offshore entity based in the 
British Virgin Islands that controls the real profits from 
Talco, to be tendered by the end of June.  The audit would cover 
2008 and 2009. 
 
DONORS DISMAYED BY IMF REACTION 
 
¶13. (SBU) At the briefing and afterward, a number of donors 
expressed their dissatisfaction with an IMF approach they 
considered too weak.  Some were particularly upset by a 
subsequent press release from the IMF praising government 
reforms while making scant mention of Roghun's negatives, noting 
merely that it "...may temporarily dampen growth in 2010 by up 
to one percentage point, with households reducing consumption 
and corporates investment in order to purchase Roghun shares." 
At the same time, the IMF tacitly endorsed Roghun itself by 
calling it "...an important element of the government's energy 
strategy."  Donors noted as well that the IMF was actually 
proposing to increase the ECF from its original $116 million to 
$156 million, "in line with the new norms for similar 
countries."  Summing up the feelings of several donors, the head 
of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation questioned 
the rationale for continuing to provide multi-million dollars of 
assistance to Tajikistan when the government has shown it is 
capable of raising that money on its own -- and, worse, taking 
 
DUSHANBE 00000176  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
for granted that foreign donors will step in to alleviate the 
social sector problems that the government is exacerbating. 
 
NEXT STEPS 
 
¶14. (SBU) The IMF team will present its findings to management 
in Washington, which will try to work out a package for delivery 
of the next tranche of $42 million under the ECF.  If things go 
smoothly, management should take a request for approval to the 
IMF Executive Board by the end of April.  If the Board has not 
approved the funding by the end of June, the ECF is officially 
considered off-track. 
 
COMMENT: WHEN TO SAY WHEN? 
 
¶15. (SBU) Donor frustrations with the IMF are understandable: As 
an IMF insider recently said, the Fund's natural priority is to 
try to remain engaged where it is working.  On the other hand, 
Schimmelpfennig was right to be exasperated with those who 
expected the IMF to carry all of their water on Roghun.  Our 
approach has been, and should continue to be, to pursue this 
issue along two fronts:  by putting pressure on lending 
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank to carefully 
review their programs, but also by raising our concerns that 
fall outside of these institutions' purview directly with the 
government (ref D).  On the first front, we and several other 
donors are asking our representatives on the IMF Executive Board 
to think carefully before approving additional funding under the 
so-called "Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility" for a 
government whose policies are in fact increasing poverty and 
reducing growth.  On the second, we are coordinating with other 
donors to address the broader concerns of coercion and damage to 
the investment climate (ref E).  Should these concerns fall on 
deaf ears, we may wish to review some bilateral programs.  End 
Comment. 
QUAST