VZCZCXRO2200
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHDBU #0172/01 0431010
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 121010Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1246
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0246
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0443
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0178
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2698

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 DUSHANBE 000172 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR S/RAP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/12/2020 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM EAID ECON EINV TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF SRAP HOLBROOKE 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Necia Quast, Charge d' Affaires, EXEC, DoS. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
¶1. (C) Summary: U.S. interests in Tajikistan are a stable state 
on Afghanistan's northern border, support for our military 
efforts in Afghanistan, and for Tajikistan to be a stabilizing 
influence and contributor to economic development in the region. 
 Tajikistan gives unrestricted over flight rights, and quickly 
agreed to NDN ground transit.  In the medium term, it could play 
a more active role in regional development, because of its huge 
hydropower potential, relative (to Afghanistan) stability, and 
religiously moderate population.  But to do so Tajikistan must 
overcome multiple political and economic problems which stymie 
its own development: poverty, bad relations with Uzbekistan, 
intense corruption, Soviet-era economic structures and planning, 
an undemocratic political system, chronic food insecurity, and 
dependence on migrant labor in Russia. 
 
 
 
¶2. (C) U.S. assistance has shown mixed results in the 
development sphere.  Recent steps to improve the business 
climate have been offset by the government's campaign to force 
its citizens to contribute to the construction of the Roghun 
hydroelectric dam.  The government is not willing to reform its 
political process.  Our security cooperation shows some promise. 
 Regardless of our efforts, there is a limit to what Tajikistan 
can offer: it produces very little, is poor, and its government 
has minimal capacity.  The Tajiks have some unrealistic ideas 
about what we can offer them -- mainly large infrastructure 
projects including questionable power plants, tunnels to 
Pakistan, and bridges to nowhere.  There is some truth to the 
quip that Tajikistan's real contribution to our efforts in 
Afghanistan is to be stable, and to allow unfettered over flight 
and transit to our forces - which the Tajiks have done 
unfailingly.  We try to promote Tajik polices which will ensure 
continued stability.  End summary. 
 
 
 
A DIFFICULT NEIGHBORHOOD 
 
 
 
¶3. (C) Some of Tajikistan's difficulties are geographic. 
Chronic problems with Uzbekistan, fueled by personal animosity 
between the presidents of each country, has stymied Tajikistan's 
trade, energy self-sufficiency, and economic development. 
Afghan instability is a malign influence: traffic in drugs 
undermines rule of law in Tajikistan, Tajiks fear the spread of 
extremist ideas from Afghanistan, and militants in Afghanistan 
can threaten Tajik security across the long, porous border. 
Russian interference looms large in the Tajik consciousness. 
The Russians control one major hydropower dam in Tajikistan, a 
source of disagreements between the two countries.  The Tajiks 
seek alternative partners, including the United States, China, 
and Iran, to balance Russian influence.  China is a major 
infrastructure donor, with over $1 billion in low-interest loans 
to Tajikistan to build roads and power line projects.  Iran 
funds tunnel and hydropower projects, but displays of Persian 
solidarity do not mask deep suspicions between the 
hard-drinking, Soviet-reared, Sunni elite in Dushanbe and 
religiously conservative Shiites in Tehran. 
 
 
 
¶4. (C) The Tajik government presses us for greater benefits in 
return for support on Afghanistan.  The Tajiks think Uzbekistan 
is keeping all NDN-related business for itself; they want more 
traffic to transit Tajikistan, more infrastructure to support 
that traffic, and the United States to purchase Tajik goods for 
forces in Afghanistan.  We currently purchase small amounts of 
Tajik bottled water for ISAF.  They have indicated they would be 
happy for the U.S. establish an air base in Tajikistan.  They 
see U.S. involvement in the region as a bulwark against Afghan 
instability, and as a cash cow they want a piece of. 
 
 
 
FEAR OF INTERNAL RIVALS, MILITANTS, AND RUSSIA 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) The Tajik civil war ended in 1997 with a power sharing 
arrangement between President Rahmon's government and the 
leaders of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO).  Since the end of 
the war, Rahmon gradually has reneged on this deal and forced 
 
DUSHANBE 00000172  002 OF 005 
 
 
nearly all oppositionists out of government -- some are in 
prison, some left the country, and others died mysteriously.  In 
May 2009 an armed group led by a former UTO figure, Mullah 
Abdullo Rahimov, returned to Tajikistan from Afghanistan, 
reportedly with several foreign fighters.  Tajik security forces 
neutralized this group without outside assistance.  They have 
told us U.S. training enabled their security forces to win, and 
they are eager for more training. 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) Russian-Tajik relations have deteriorated.  Tajik 
officials believe the Russians supported Mullah Abdullo's group, 
to signal Tajikistan that they need Russian protection.  The two 
governments could not agree on the terms of Russian involvement 
in the Roghun Dam, and they have other differences.  In October 
2009 the President downgraded the formal status of the Russian 
language in Tajikistan.  His government broached charging Russia 
rent for its military bases in Tajikistan.  In 2009 the 
Russian-controlled Sangtuda-1 hydroelectric plant cut production 
when the government of Tajikistan's failed to pay its bills on 
time. 
 
 
 
ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) Tajikistan is the poorest of the former Soviet republics. 
 It is more mountainous than Afghanistan, with earthquakes, 
floods, droughts, locusts and extreme weather.  Parts of the 
country are often cut off by snow and avalanches.  External 
links pass through obstructive Uzbekistan, unstable Afghanistan, 
or over the rough, remote Pamir passes to western China.  Its 
only industrial products are aluminum and hydroelectricity.  The 
Tajik Aluminum Company (Talco) accounts for most of Tajikistan's 
exports.  Though it is technically state-owned, most of its 
revenues end up in a secretive offshore company controlled by 
the President, and the state budget sees little of the income. 
Talco consumes up to half of Tajikistan's electricity, 
contributing to major seasonal shortages and suffering. 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) President Rahmon's response to Tajikistan's chronic 
energy insecurity was in late 2009 to launch a massive campaign 
to fund and build the Roghun Hydroelectric Plant.  Roghun would 
be the highest dam in the world, and double Tajikistan's 
electricity generation capacity.  The government's fundraising 
efforts, however, have drawn serious concern from international 
donors.  Individuals and organizations across all walks of life 
have been coerced into buying shares in the project.  Many 
people have been told they will lose their jobs unless they 
contribute an amount equal to many months' salary.  While the 
government claims all share sales are voluntary, there is ample 
evidence that officials are forcing the population to cough up 
funds.  Apart from the human rights question, donors are 
concerned that the nearly $200 million in funds raised so far 
will not be accounted for and spent transparently.  Considering 
Talco's share of electricity consumption, the Roghun campaign 
looks like a means to ensure Talco's continued profitability. 
 
 
 
¶9. (C) Tajikistan's economy suffers from the global recession 
through major drops in exports, imports, and remittances from a 
million Tajiks working in Russia.  The money they sent home was 
equal to over 50% of GDP in 2008, and literally keeps rural 
communities alive.  Remittances dropped 34% in 2009.  The 
greatest obstacle to improving the economy is resistance to 
reform.  From the President down to the policeman on the street, 
government is characterized by cronyism and corruption.  Rahmon 
and his family control the country's major businesses, including 
the largest bank, and they play hardball to protect their 
business interests, no matter the cost to the economy writ 
large.  As one foreign ambassador summed up, President Rahmon 
prefers to control 90% of a ten-dollar pie rather than 30% of a 
hundred-dollar pie. 
 
 
 
ELECTIONS ARE COMING, BUT DEMOCRACY ISN'T 
 
 
DUSHANBE 00000172  003 OF 005 
 
 
 
 
¶10. (C) The government has limited opposition party operations 
and rejected electoral law reforms for the February 28, 2010 
parliamentary elections.  The Embassy does not expect the 
elections to be free and fair.  There has been almost no 
coverage of opposition political parties by state media, and 
most of the population is unaware of the purpose of the 
elections.  Parliamentary opposition is weak -- only 15 of the 
62 members are not in the ruling party, and some of these are 
independent in name only.  The most prominent opposition party, 
the Islamic Renewal Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), has two seats in 
the outgoing parliament.  IRPT leadership has supported the 
government on most issues and downplays the importance of Islam 
in the party's platform.  Parliament acts as a rubber stamp. 
 
 
 
¶11. (SBU) In 2009 Parliament passed a restrictive new law on 
religion, curbing the activities of religious groups, Islamic or 
otherwise.  Our advice that this could radicalize many believers 
has fallen on deaf ears.  Last year, the government arrested 
dozens of individuals, accusing them of membership in the banned 
"Salafiya" movement, but it has no evidence that there is an 
organized Salafiya movement.  It also arrested 92 members of the 
Muslim fundamentalist missionary group, Jamaati Tabligh.  Most 
mainstream Muslim religious leaders view the Tabligh members as 
harmless missionaries and have called for their release. 
 
 
 
¶12. (SBU) Independent media is reeling after government 
officials recently filed lawsuits against five newspapers for 
reporting on public government reports and statements in open 
court which were critical of judges and government ministries. 
The newspapers will be forced to close if the lawsuits succeed. 
We and European partners have protested the lawsuits. 
 
 
 
DIFFICULT RELATIONS WITH DONORS 
 
 
 
¶13. (SBU) In 2007 Tajikistan's National Bank admitted it had 
hidden a billion dollars in loans and guarantees to 
politically-connected cotton investors (of which $600 million 
was never repaid), violating its IMF program.  The IMF demanded 
early repayment of some debt, an audit of the National Bank, and 
other reforms before renewing assistance.  In May 2009 the IMF 
voted to lend a further $116 million to Tajikistan to help it 
through the next three years; the U.S. was the only IMF member 
to vote against this, which infuriated the Tajik government. 
The IMF has so far disbursed $40 million.  A team from 
Washington was recently in Dushanbe to assess government 
progress, establish new benchmarks for the next tranche of 
funds, and assess the impact of Roghun fundraising.  The team's 
assessment should be available soon.  Donors are concerned that 
the campaign to finance Roghun is exacerbating severe poverty, 
and violates the terms of the IMF's assistance.  It raises 
questions about the government's frequent appeals to donors for 
financial aid and its willingness to enact economic reforms as a 
condition of that aid.  Donors have expressed their concerns 
formally to the government and await a response.  Donors are 
pushing regional energy market integration and the construction 
of power lines that will allow Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to sell 
surplus summer electricity output to Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
A 220 kW line from Tajikistan to Afghanistan is under 
construction with Asian Development Bank financing, and will be 
finished in late 2010.  The larger CASA-1000 power line project 
to link to Afghanistan and Pakistan has been delayed by 
financing problems. 
 
 
 
U.S. ASSISTANCE 
 
 
 
¶14. (U) U.S. assistance to Tajikistan will grow significantly to 
$45.3 million in FY 2010, from $27.8 million in FY 2009.  The 
new money will go to agriculture, trade, and private sector 
initiatives to compensate for the loss of the much-needed food 
security programs.  Until FY 2008 Tajikistan had a multi-year 
 
DUSHANBE 00000172  004 OF 005 
 
 
food aid program that had significant results reducing food 
insecurity in some of Tajikistan's most at-risk regions, 
followed by similar single-year programs in FY 2009 and 2010.  A 
new Food Security Initiative is in development, but it remains 
unclear whether Tajikistan will receive any of those funds.  New 
programs also will address chronic energy shortages by building 
a regional energy market and helping the Central Asian states 
address water and power issues.  Tajikistan was awarded $9.9 
million in FY 2008 1207 funds to address stability issues.  The 
major threats to stability arise from the Tajikistan's poverty 
-- the World Bank estimates over 60% of the population lives 
below the poverty line -- and the government's demonstrated 
inability to respond to emergencies.  The 1207 project works in 
50 isolated communities in the Rasht and Fergana valleys, and 
along the Afghan frontier.  Health and education deficiencies 
are so acute they imperil our progress in other areas.  Our 
programs work to improve health policies, systems and services, 
teacher training, education finance, national curriculum, 
student assessment, and school governance. 
 
 
 
SECURITY COOPERATION 
 
 
 
¶15. (C) Security Cooperation remains a strong point in our 
relationship with Tajikistan.  The Ministry of Defense 
volunteered last year for the first time to host CENTCOM's 
Exercise Regional Cooperation, including Afghanistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, which concluded August 10.  CENTCOM 
and the Tajik Armed Forces held Consultative Staff Talks in May 
and established the FY 2010 Security Cooperation Plan, which 
reflects Tajikistan's increased interest in demining and 
participation in the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). 
The U.S. Army Humanitarian Demining Research and Development 
Office will provide Tajikistan a mechanical demining machine for 
field evaluation in FY 2010 with a planned FMF purchase in FY 
¶2011.  Tajikistan reconfirmed its commitment to deploy a 
company-sized peacekeeping unit in 2011.  Training begins this 
month with a National Policy White Paper Workshop that will help 
shape development in the Ministry of Defense and their Mobile 
Forces.  A General Staff level workshop and actual unit training 
will take place next year. 
 
 
 
¶16. (C) The Nizhny Pyanj Bridge and Point of Entry facilities 
have improved the links between Tajikistan and Afghanistan 
significantly.  Though the bridge is not being used to its 
fullest capacity, traffic is much heavier than the old ferry 
system, and continues to grow.  Counts vary between 40 and 200 
containers and transport trucks per day.  CENTCOM 2010funding at 
this facility will improve lighting, fences, and cameras, and 
parking areas.  Tajikistan is eager to see us make greater use 
of our agreement on transit of non-lethal goods to Afghanistan 
through the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), and hopes for 
economic benefits to Tajikistan from this agreement.  So far we 
have low rate truck traffic from Manas through Tajikistan to 
Bagram.  Defense Logistics Agency is arranging to buy bottled 
water from a Tajik producer for forces in Afghanistan.  The 
Tajiks are looking for any way to circumvent Uzbekistan's 
stranglehold on their trade. 
 
 
 
US SOF ENGAGEMENT 
 
 
 
¶17. (S) The U.S. Embassy plans to continue to build the capacity 
and capability of select Tajikistan security forces, in support 
of CENTCOM Joint Interagency Coordination Group for Counter 
Narcotics (JIACG-CN), and U.S. government strategic themes, 
goals and objectives for Tajikistan.  Once SOCCENT forces have 
done an assessment and started organizing these groups into 
special units, the main goal is to sustain an increase in 
capabilities by U.S. Special Forces Joint Combined Exercise and 
Training (JCET) and Counter-narcotic training (CNT) missions. 
 
 
 
NARCOTICS 
 
 
DUSHANBE 00000172  005 OF 005 
 
 
 
 
¶18. (C) Tajikistan is a major transit route for Afghan heroin 
going to Russia and Europe.  According to UN Office of Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) estimates, 40 tons of Afghan opiates enter Russia 
each year via Tajikistan.  Less than 5% is seized before 
reaching Russia.  Capabilities of Tajik law enforcement agencies 
are severely limited.  Corruption is a major problem.  Law 
enforcement agencies are reluctant to target well-connected 
traffickers,  but are effective against low- and mid-level 
traffickers. The Drug Control Agency (DCA) is a ten-year-old, 
400-officer agency developed through a UNODC project.  Many 
countries are donors, but an INL-funded salary supplement 
program provides the primary funding.  DCA's liaison officers in 
Taloquan in northern Afghanistan were key to seizures totaling 
over 100 kilos of heroin in the last four months.  U.S Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents work with DCA to deepen 
operations. 
 
 
 
¶19. (SBU) Until 2005, the Russians guarded the Tajik/Afghan 
border; after the Russians departed, the outposts were broken 
down lean-tos, unfit for human habitation.  The Tajik Border 
Guard force is staffed largely by conscripts who are poorly 
trained, poorly paid, underequipped and often under-fed.  INL 
rebuilt border posts, giving the Border Guards suitable and safe 
places to live, creating conditions for successful border patrol 
operations.  Each new outpost costs about $500,000 and houses 
more than 100 guards.  The outposts use low-maintenance 
energy-efficient prefab construction and alternative energy, 
including solar, wind and micro-hydro power.  We are planning a 
pilot project of joint Tajik/Afghan border guard training in 
Khorog.  If successful, it will be part of the regular training 
of guards assigned to the Afghan/Tajik border.  We are exploring 
offering a popular Emergency First Responder course to a joint 
class of Tajik and Afghan border guards.  INL has rebuilt the 
Tajik Border Guard academy.  A U.S. Border Patrol team plans to 
visit to discuss and demonstrate patrolling techniques at the 
Academy and in the field; this might lead to an exchange of 
instructors. 
 
 
 
 
 
¶20. (C) CENTCOM's Counter Narcotics program is making strong 
contributions to Tajikistan's security.  This year, $16.9 
million in funding, recently approved in the Supplemental Bill, 
will support construction of an interagency National Training 
Center, infrastructure at the Nizhny Pyanj Point of Entry, and 
communications equipment.  The Training Center will be a 
multi-use facility for all ministries and serve as a venue for 
SOCCENT's bi-annual Counter Narco-Terrorism training.  A recent 
end-use monitoring visit demonstrated the Tajiks are using 
previously provided communications equipment and maintaining the 
equipment.  This year, we will begin establishing an interagency 
communications architecture at Nizhny Pyanj and the adjoining 
district.  This will allow five government agencies to 
communicate using a compatible system. 
QUAST