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RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 5234
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0883
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0836
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S E C R E T DAMASCUS 000158 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, DRL/NESCA, S/CT 
NSC FOR SHAPIRO/MCDERMOTT 
LONDON FOR MILLER 
PARIS FOR NOBLES 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2020 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV PINR PINS PTER KISL KTSD MASS
MOPS, IZ, LE, SY 
SUBJECT: WHEN CHICKENS COME HOME TO ROOST: SYRIA'S PROXY 
WAR IN IRAQ AT HEART OF 2008-09 SEIDNAYA PRISON RIOTS 
 
REF: A. 08 DAMASCUS 00482 
     ¶B. 08 DAMASCUS 00517 
     ¶C. 08 DAMASCUS 00814 
     ¶D. 08 DAMASCUS 00885 
     ¶E. 09 DAMASCUS 00006 
 
Classified By: CDA Charles Hunter for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Lawyer and Syrian Human Rights 
Organization-SWASIAH activist Catherine al-Tali (strictly 
protect) updated us on SWASIAH's ongoing investigation into 
what happened during the Seidnaya prison riots in July and 
December 2008, and January 2009 (refs A, B, D and E). 
SWASIAH's investigation, al-Tali confided at a February 11 
meeting, had culminated in a series of taped interviews on 
the riots with three military personnel, one Seidnaya prison 
guard, and one former Seidnaya inmate.  According to these 
sources, the Islamists in Seidnaya responsible for the riots 
were part of a cadre of inmates sent to Iraq sometime after 
2003 to fight with the insurgency.  Upon their return to 
Syria, they were re-arrested and returned to Seidnaya prison. 
 Feeling that their service warranted better treatment from 
the SARG, the prisoners staged two riots that led to the 
death of many military personnel, nearly 100 prisoners, and 
untold injuries. End Summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
From Prisoner to Foreign Fighter 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S/NF) Lawyer and Syrian Human Rights Organization-SWASIAH 
activist Catherine al-Tali told us that over the last four 
months she had taped interviews with three military 
personnel, one prison guard, and one former Seidnaya inmate, 
all of whom reportedly had first-hand knowledge of the 
Seidnaya prison riots.  Tali said she was in the process of 
compiling a written report that she would pass to us.  When 
asked for copies of the taped interviews, Tali hesitated and 
said she would try. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) According to Tali's contacts, after the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq, the SARG offered Seidnaya inmates the 
opportunity to receive military training in Syria and then 
travel to Iraq and fight coalition forces, a claim we had 
heard in early January 2009 from imprisoned SWASIAH leader 
Muhanad al-Hasani (ref E).  Tali had no additional 
information on how many inmates joined or at what times they 
were sent to Iraq.  She did report, however, that of those 
who returned from Iraq to Syria, some remained at large (but 
in contact with the regime), others were sent to Lebanon, and 
a third group were re-arrested and remanded to Seidnaya 
prison.  The group in Seidnaya were, Tali claimed, 
"Islamists."  (Comment: Tali was unable to identify the 
specific government/security entity responsible for routing 
prisoners in and out of the country; nor did she know how 
many of those former inmates still at large or presently in 
Lebanon were also Islamists. End Comment.) 
 
------------- 
Planned Riots 
------------- 
 
¶4. (S/NF) The group of returned foreign fighters in Seidnaya 
felt the SARG, by sending them back to prison, had cheated 
them, Tali explained.  The inmates had expected better 
treatment, perhaps even freedom, and were upset over prison 
conditions.  These factors led to the planning of the July 5, 
2008 riot (refs A & B), she said.  Her sources claimed the 
inmates fashioned swords from iron bed supports.  Once they 
had accumulated a sufficient supply of arms, they staged a 
riotous protest over prison conditions. 
 
¶5. (S/NF) The SARG reportedly responded by surrounding the 
prison with elements of the Fourth Armored Brigade and 
sending a group of military cadets, armed only with batons, 
 
to quell the uprising.  According to Tali's sources, the 
armed inmates quickly captured the cadets, stripped them of 
their uniforms, forced them to don prison garb, and then 
marched them at sword-point onto the roof of the prison. 
When the cadets emerged onto the roof, the military (assuming 
them to be prisoners) opened fire, killing an unknown number 
before realizing their error.  Once it became clear what had 
happened, Tali said, the Fourth Armored Brigade entered the 
prison, killing between 50-60 inmates. 
 
¶6. (S/NF) Tali's sources claimed the SARG military were only 
partially successful in quelling the riot.  The Islamist 
faction reportedly maintained control over part of the prison 
and held a large enough number of hostages that from July 
through October they were able to trade hostages for food. 
During that time, Tali contended, the prisoners regrouped and 
planned the riots that took place in December 2008 (ref D & 
E), which resulted in an additional 35-50 inmate deaths. 
Tali's sources believed that the prisoners' organized 
violence and ability to hold on for as long as they did was 
largely due to the military training they had received prior 
to being sent to Iraq. 
 
¶7. (S/NF) Comment: Still a sensitive subject and a black mark 
for military and security services who for months failed to 
subdue the riots, the Seidnaya troubles seem to have subsided 
and the SARG has begun to allow families limited access to 
imprisoned relatives, though we have heard there are still 
prisoners whom nobody has been able to visit since the riots 
began.  Tali's reporting adds to the mounting evidence that 
the SARG allowed Seidnaya prisoners to train in Syria for 
combat operations in Iraq.  According to Hasani and other 
diplomatic contacts, the SARG coordinated with Damascus-based 
Fatah al-Islam elements (ref C & E) to train the prisoners 
and transport them across the Iraqi-Syrian border.  The 
SARG's roundup and return to Seidnaya of prisoner-combatants 
might have provided a revenge motive, as diplomatic sources 
suspected, for Fatah al-Islam's alleged bombing of a Syrian 
Military Intelligence site on September 27, 2008 (ref C). End 
Comment. 
HUNTER