VZCZCXRO3258
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRY #0077/01 0321651
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011651Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4439
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CONAKRY 000077 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2010 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC GV
SUBJECT: FRANCOIS FALL SKEPTICAL OF DORE'S INTENTIONS 
 
REF: A. CONAKRY 00072 
     ¶B. CONAKRY 00049 
     ¶C. CONAKRY 00046 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Patricia Moller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) On February 1, Ambassador Moller met with former PM, 
and newly appointed spokesperson for the Forces Vives (reftel 
A), Francois Lonceny Fall. Fall told the Ambassador that 
Guinea, for the first time, has a window of opportunity for 
democracy. However, he noted that there are problems within 
the military and among the Forces Vives that could derail 
political progress. According to Fall, neither the Forces 
Vives, nor the Guinean public, trust Jean Marie Dore to 
relinquish power. Fall and a small group of political leaders 
plan to pressure Dore to rule out his candidacy in 2010 
immediately or step down from the PM office. He also 
expressed concern about the role that Claude Pivi could play 
in the transition government. END SUMMARY. 
 
 
--------------- 
THE DORE FACTOR 
--------------- 
 
 
¶2. (C) In a candid and frank discussion with the Ambassador, 
Fall expressed both his optimism about the transition and his 
fear that power hungry individuals could subvert the process. 
Focusing primarily on Jean Marie Dore's refusal to rule out 
his candidacy in upcoming elections, Fall said that 
international and internal pressure needs to be focused on 
keeping Dore on track to prepare for democratic elections, in 
which no one from the CNDD, CNT, or the transition government 
could run, in six months. 
 
 
¶3. (C) According to Fall, Dore has mentioned privately that 
he would like to run for President. Though Fall doesn't think 
that Dore has sufficient popular support to win a general 
election, his candidacy would violate the Ouagadougou 
Declaration and set a bad precedent for the CNDD and the rest 
of the transition government. It would also portray the 
Forces Vives as weak in their opposition to the PM office. 
Fall intends to lead a delegation to Dore's residence 
tomorrow morning to pressure Dore to renounce his possible 
candidacy. If he continues to be noncommittal on the issue, 
the Forces Vives will apparently ask him to step down 
immediately. Pointing out Dore's political past, he noted 
that "Dore hasn't worked in nearly 30 years, how could he 
really think he could be PM or President?" 
 
 
¶4. (C) Calling Dore the "military choice" for PM, Fall noted 
that he is having the same conversations about candidacy with 
Dore as he was with Dadis Camara this time last year. 
However, he said, Dore is not Dadis - he will give in to 
pressure. As such, he suggested that the members of the 
International Contact Group meet with Dore at least once a 
week to pressure him to move in the right direction. He 
suggested that he and the Forces Vives would also meet with 
him often and apply direct pressure. If, at any point, it 
seems that he will try to run for President, the group will 
demand his resignation. 
 
 
---------------------- 
THE "RABIATOU PROBLEM" 
---------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Fall noted that union leader Rabiatou Diallo is 
increasingly becoming a problem within the Forces Vives. 
According to Fall, Diallo is demanding inclusion in the 
cabinet as either the Minister of Territorial Administration 
or head of the CNT (reftel B). Fall argued that it would be 
impossible to have Rabiatou, a Peuhl (Fulani), as the 
Minister of Territorial Administration in the current 
ethnically-charged political climate. Even though she does 
not have the education necessary to lead the CNT, the Forces 
Vives may be willing to concede Rabiatou the position of CNT 
chairperson in the interest of consensus. "What is most 
important is not who is in the cabinet," Fall said, "but that 
work on the transition starts shortly." 
 
------------------ 
THE MILITARY ISSUE 
------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) Fall noted that the weight of the transition lies 
 
CONAKRY 00000077  002 OF 002 
 
 
primarily on Konate's shoulders, and that he is possibly the 
only hope for the transition. Singling out Pivi, Fall said 
that many of Dadis, cronies are not likely to leave power 
quietly. While he believes that Moussa Tiegboro Camara is 
fairly neutralized for the time being (reftel C), Pivi still 
presents a risk to stability and has no place in the 
transition government. The Forces Vives will oppose the 
appointment of any individual named by the UN Commission of 
Inquiry as carrying out the September 28 massacre. In this 
context, Pivi has been circulating as a possible nomination 
for Presidential Security and Political Secretary for 
Political leaders. Fall noted that Pivi had no place in the 
government, nor did he belong in Conakry's barracks. He 
expressed concern that Pivi's inclusion in the government 
could be a sticking point between the Forces Vies and the 
CNDD. 
 
------------------------ 
BALANCING THE TRANSITION 
------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) In regards to the CNT, Fall noted that there is 
considerable debate about appointing a religious head to the 
group. He argued that the Peuhl will not accept more 
Christians into the government. Fall noted that while 
Monsignor Gomez, a well respected Anglican clergyman, has 
been mentioned for the job, the Peuhl opposition to his 
appointment could be formidable. Fall said that there is an 
ethnic problem in Guinea, but not yet a religious problem. 
With a heavily Christian government, the Peuhl may believe 
that the Christians are dominating politics, creating 
resentment within the community. 
 
¶8. (C) In an aside, Fall shared his thoughts on young 
political leader and President of the New Democratic Force 
party Mouctar Diallo. Fall argued that Mouctar has been 
recently excluded from decision making in the Forces Vives 
due to his affiliation with Compaore and Dadis during the 
Ouagadougou negotiations. According to Fall, Blaise Compaore, 
who was firmly in support of Dadis during the negotiations, 
was searching for a weak member of the opposition who he 
could convince to act as Dadis' Prime Minister. Fall said 
that Compaore convinced Mouctar, who had little money and 
sparse political experience, to work with Dadis. Mouctar then 
apparently linked with the Forces Nouvelles in Cote D'Ivoire 
on behalf of Compaore, presumably to facilitate weapons 
transfers. Fall said that despite his past mistakes, Mouctar 
still has a promising future in Guinean politics, and will 
likely be part of the transition cabinet. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) Fall seems to believe that Dore can be convinced to 
lead Guinea to elections in six months if the international 
community and the Forces Vives apply constant pressure on him 
to do so. Fall's conviction that the Forces Vives will ask 
Dore to step down if he does not renounce his possible 
candidacy is a strong one and, if true, will show that the 
group has learned from mistakes made with the CNDD. 
 
¶9. (C) As the new spokesperson for the Forces Vives, Fall 
will have significant influence over the group's actions in 
the coming months. If they remain firm on the issue of Dore's 
candidacy and the six month time frame, the possibility of 
Guinea having democratic elections will be much greater. If, 
however, they acquiesce to Dore's candidacy and allow 
referendums and delays, the transition period could be drawn 
out. The Forces Vives has a past of political divisions and 
splintering opinions, but they must remain united around a 
common message toward elections if the country is to move 
toward democracy. 
Moller