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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1369
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000143 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE
SUBJECT: COLOMBO CHIEFS OF MISSION RECOMMEND WAYS FORWARD 
 
REF: SECSTATE 16163 
 
COLOMBO 00000143  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA A. BUTENIS.  REASONS: 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting called by Ambassador to discuss 
reftel demarche to capitals, chiefs of missions (COMs) in 
Colombo agreed with the U.S. assessment that the political 
situation in Sri Lanka had deteriorated after the 
presidential elections in terms of the Fonseka arrest, 
intimidation of the media, purges in the military and police, 
and renewal of Emergency Regulations.  They also noted new 
threats to NGOs and INGOs, particularly Transparency 
International.  COMs were unsure whether the recent political 
crackdown was temporary or indicated a new style of 
leadership by the Rajapaksa regime, though it appeared the 
Rajapaksas were set on a more authoritarian course.  COMs 
made several recommendations for the way ahead including: 
 
-- Refrain from active public engagement -- especially in the 
press -- with the government of Sri Lanka (GSL) until after 
parliamentary elections April 8. 
 
-- At the same time, we should be prepared to hit the GSL 
hard privately or publicly if it moved forward with 
persecution of NGOs and INGOs. 
 
-- After the parliamentary elections, we immediately and 
forcefully should re-engage to hold President Rajapaksa to 
his promises on reconciliation, the 13th Amendment, and 
economic development in the north and east. 
 
-- In capitals, governments should encourage Tamil diasporas 
to renounce separatism and militancy, to find ways to make 
constructive contributions to economic re-development and 
political reconciliation, and to engage as far as possible 
with the GSL. 
 
END SUMMARY. 
 
AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH COLLEAGUES 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) On February 25, Ambassador followed up reftel demarche 
to select capitals with a meeting with COMs of Australia, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, 
Norway, and Switzerland, plus the EU and UN, to discuss the 
current situation in Sri Lanka and gather thoughts on the way 
ahead.  The meeting began with the Australian high 
commissioner and French ambassador recounting recent meetings 
with President Rajapaksa.  High Commissioner Klugman -- who 
accompanied Australian Special Representative for Sri Lanka 
John McCarthy to see the president -- said he appeared 
comfortable, relaxed, and positive, saying "all the right 
things" on such topics as national reconciliation and -- 
unprompted -- the de-centralizing 13th Amendment, though 
emphasizing that these processes could only move forward 
after the April 8 parliamentary elections.  He emphasized 
that economic reconstruction and development would be top 
priorities: "There can be no peace without development," he 
said, "and there can be no development without peace."  Newly 
arrived French Ambassador Robichon recounted similar remarks 
from the president at her recent credentialing ceremony, 
noting that he also had spoken of de-linking the northern and 
eastern provinces. 
 
DEEP CONCERNS ABOUT CURRENT SITUATION 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Despite these relatively positive remarks by the 
president, the COMs were in full agreement with the 
assessment of the U.S. demarche to capitals that the 
 
COLOMBO 00000143  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
political situation in Sri Lanka had deteriorated 
significantly since the presidential election on January 26, 
as exemplified by the arrest and detention without charges of 
former opposition candidate Fonseka, the purge from the 
military of suspected Fonseka supporters, reassignment of 
hundreds of police officers, intimidation of independent 
media, and the continued renewal of the repressive Emergency 
Regulations.  COMs were also deeply concerned about the 
recent announcements by the government that it would be 
investigating NGOs and INGOs for financial malfeasance and 
alleged hostility to the government, particularly 
Transparency International. 
 
WHAT CAN WE EXPECT? 
------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) COMs -- including those such as Norwegian Ambassador 
Hattrem with long experience in Sri Lanka -- were unsure 
whether the recent political crackdown was temporary or 
indicated a new style of leadership by the Rajapaksa regime. 
But it did appear that the Rajapaksas were headed in a more 
authoritarian direction.  "The plane seems to be heading for 
Singapore," EU Ambassador Savage quipped, "but it might land 
in Burma." 
 
¶5. (C) COMs said they already had been making many of the 
same points to the GSL that the U.S. had been making.  The 
question was where to go from here.  Hattrem argued for a 
long-term approach, emphasizing the need to point out to the 
GSL the importance of a liberal political system for economic 
growth and prosperity.  Klugman agreed firmness on core 
values was important but stressed that in the shorter term 
other key topical issues -- such as treatment of IDPs, 
reconciliation, and development in the north and east -- also 
must be emphasized. 
 
¶6. (C) Ambassador Butenis, however, pointed out the 
difficulty in controlling or moderating the message from our 
capitals, given that many actors other than foreign 
ministries were involved.  She passed out to the group copies 
of a recent CSIS report on Sri Lanka advising the West to 
accept new realities and think of new approaches, which had 
been cited in the GSL media and privately to Ambassador by 
GSL spokesman G.L. Peiris as implying less emphasis on human 
rights.  Moreover, there were some developments -- such as 
the imminent release of the annual U.S. Human Rights Report 
-- over which we had no control.  On this score, Ambassador 
also noted that the question of war crimes and accountability 
now overshadowed all of our dealings with the Rajapaksas. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
--------------- 
 
¶7. (C) After further discussion, COMs arrived at consensus on 
a number of steps for the way forward in Colombo and in 
capitals: 
 
-- We should not expect much progress on issues of importance 
to us before the parliamentary elections and should refrain 
from public comment, particularly in the press.  The 
parliamentary election campaign was likely to be more violent 
and contentious than the presidential election.  In this 
environment, the international community should not appear 
too eager to engage the Rajapaksa government, which would be 
taken by the government as countenancing its recent bad 
behavior. 
 
-- At the same time, we should be prepared to hit the GSL 
hard privately and publicly if it moved forward with 
persecution of NGOs and INGOs.  As Hattrem noted, attacking 
Transparency International was tantamount to attacking the 
 
COLOMBO 00000143  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
core democratic values of the West, and it was important to 
point out to the government in the strongest terms the 
problems it created for itself by going after such basic 
institutions.  We must tell them categorically, Hattrem 
summed up COM thinking, "Don't go down that road." 
 
-- After the parliamentary elections on April 8, we 
immediately and forcefully should re-engage to remind the 
president of his promises on reconciliation, the 13th 
Amendment, and re-development in the north and east.  The 
president long has told us to wait until after elections then 
he would undertake these big projects.  We must keep him to 
these promises. 
 
-- In capitals, it was agreed, governments should engage with 
the Tamil diasporas to encourage them to renounce separatism 
and militancy, to find ways to make constructive 
contributions to economic re-development and political 
reconciliation, and to engage as far as possible with the 
GSL.  We should also find ways to enlist garment importers 
and others who do business with Sri Lanka to bring pressure 
on the GSL to improve its governance and meet GSP-plus 
targets. 
BUTENIS