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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000105 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: FONSEKA DETAINED, GOVERNMENT PLANS 
COURT MARTIAL 
 
COLOMBO 00000105  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES VALERIE C. FOWLER.  REASONS: 1.4 (B, D 
) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On February 8, former opposition presidential 
candidate Fonseka was taken into custody by military police. 
Several key joint opposition leaders were at the office when 
the detention occurred and said the military personnel had 
man-handled Fonseka and dragged him across the floor as they 
took him out to waiting vehicles.  The Defense Ministry 
website said the military police had arrested Fonseka because 
he had violated military regulations, although official 
statements on February 9 still lacked clarity.  Mrs. Fonseka 
said that after repeated calls, including to the ICRC, for 
assistance, government officials said she would be allowed to 
visit her husband, who was being held at Navy headquarters, 
and bring him his medications.  At a February 9 meeting with 
diplomatic heads of missions, opposition coalition leaders 
described the detention of Fonseka as an "abduction" and 
warned that the country was moving toward "fascism."  They 
claimed the crisis had "galvanized our solidarity" going into 
parliamentary elections, which may be called later today, and 
said a demonstration would take place in front of the Supreme 
Court on February 10 as a symbolic gesture against the "law 
of the jungle" that was spreading throughout the country 
under the Rajapaksas.  Under the "threat to national 
security" clause of military regulations, Fonseka could be 
held in custody throughout the entire court martial 
proceedings.  Fonseka would have no access to independent 
media, and his statements would be released through the Army 
Spokesman.  Members of the court martial tribunal would 
include tri-service commanders and senior military officers. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
FONSEKA'S DETENTION 
------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) On February 8, retired General Sarath Fonseka was 
taken into custody by military police around 9:30 PM local 
time at his office.  This came less than two weeks after his 
defeat in Sri Lanka's first post-war presidential election, 
and while the victor in that election, President Rajapaksa, 
was still on an official visit to Russia.  Several key joint 
opposition leaders were at the office when the detention 
occurred, including Mano Ganesan of the DPF, Rauff Hakeem of 
the SLMC, and Somawansa Amarasinghe of the JVP party. 
Fifteen to twenty military officials reportedly entered the 
office, while another 100 waited outside.  Mangala 
Samaraweera of the SLFP(M) immediately phoned PolCouns with 
the news, and Ravi Karunanayake of the UNP called Charge, 
both saying the military personnel had roughed up Fonseka and 
dragged him across the floor as they took him out to waiting 
vehicles.  Fonseka's media secretary also was detained at the 
office and reportedly beaten, although it was unclear if he 
was taken into separate custody by civilian authorities or by 
the same military personnel. 
 
¶3. (C) The Defense Ministry website said the military police 
had arrested Fonseka because he had violated military 
regulations, although official statements on February 9 still 
lacked clarity.  Post contacts in the military said that 
according to Army Act 57, all military personnel were 
automatically considered to be in the reserves for three 
years following retirement and, therefore, were still subject 
to military law.  While this military code would prohibit 
political activity by any former military personnel 
throughout this three-year period, the rules were said to be 
particularly strict for the first six months after 
retirement. (NOTE: Fonseka retired from his position as Chief 
of Defense on November 12, 2009.  END NOTE)  Lakshman 
Hulugalla, Director General of the Defense Ministry's Media 
 
COLOMBO 00000105  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Centre for National Security was quoted on the Defense 
Ministry's website as saying Fonseka had been arrested "in 
connection with condemnation acts and other military offences 
committed by him."  One contact told Post that all previous 
cases of conspiracy charges pursued by the government were 
carried out in the civil justice system, even when the 
accused were military personnel. 
 
¶4. (C) By mid-afternoon on February 9, Fonseka's wife 
released a statement to the press repeating the accusation 
that Fonseka was beaten by the military police as they 
arrested him and that she had not been told where he was 
being held despite several requests.  There were also reports 
that he was being denied medicine he required several times 
daily ever since an LTTE suicide attack left him severely 
injured.  Later in the day, Mrs Fonseka said that after many 
calls, including to the ICRC, for assistance, government 
officials contacted her and said she would be allowed to 
visit her husband, who was being held at Navy headquarters, 
and to bring him his medication. 
 
OPPOSITION: "MOVING TOWARD FASCISM" 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) At a February 9 meeting with diplomatic heads of 
mission, opposition coalition leaders (minus UNP leader Ranil 
Wickremesinghe, who was in India), along with Mrs. Fonseka, 
discussed the general's detention, its implications for 
democracy in Sri Lanka, and what they saw as the way forward. 
 UNP deputy head Karu Jayasuriya refused to characterize the 
detention as a taking into custody, insisting it was an 
"abduction," because Fonseka was a civilian and not subject 
to military justice.  He cited opposition claims of massive 
fraud in the election and saw the detention of Fonseka as a 
continuation of harassment of the opposition in an effort to 
cover up that fraud.   Mangala Samaraweera said the full 
force of the government was now put towards the general 
election, which the president may call later this evening, 
explaining the government hoped media attention would turn to 
the election, pushing Fonseka's arrest from the front pages. 
The opposition leaders said, however, that this crisis was 
"galvanizing our solidarity."  Several described the 
Rajapaksa regime's latest moves against them, the crackdown 
on the press, and the purges in the military as moves toward 
"fascism" and "dictatorship."  In response, the opposition 
would continue with its legal challenges against the election 
results, but they also now planned "direct action" in the 
streets.  They said a demonstration was planned for February 
10 before the Supreme Court building as a symbolic gesture 
against the "law of the jungle" that was spreading under the 
Rajapksas.  For now, such demonstrations would be peaceful 
but "could escalate." 
 
COURT MARTIAL PROCEDURES 
------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) Based on Post discussions with persons in and close to 
the military, a formal summary of evidence must be presented 
to a military legal officer prior to an arrest, unless there 
is a threat to national security.  In the latter case, the 
summary of evidence must take place within 48 hours of a 
person's detention, although some contacts told Post the 
summary can take as long as two months, effectively 
preventing Fonseka from contesting the general elections. 
Fonseka will be allowed a civilian legal counsel or can opt 
for military legal counsel once the Army Commander has 
reviewed the summary and given the convening order for the 
court martial.  The accused is also authorized a "friend of 
the accused," a military person to act on his behalf.  The 
opposition leadership confirmed this afternoon that a lawyer 
 
COLOMBO 00000105  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
representing Fonseka would file an application with the 
Supreme Court on February 9 or 10, alleging a fundamental 
violation of Fonseka's human rights. 
 
¶7. (C) Under the "threat to national security" clause, 
Fonseka could be held in custody throughout the entire court 
martial proceedings.  Fonseka would have no access to 
independent media, and his statements would be released 
through the Army Spokesman.  Members of the court martial 
tribunal would include tri-service commanders and senior 
military officers.  A long-time Post contact with close ties 
to the military thought it likely that Air Force Commander 
Air Chief Marshal Goonalitilake and former Naval Commander 
Karunagoda would be on the panel, along with a third recalled 
commander.  Judge Advocate General Major General Mohanthi 
Peiris will likely preside over the case.  Major General 
Peiris had been serving as the Director General Legal of the 
Army until last week, when she was promoted to this new 
position.  The woman she replaced was actually demoted from 
the Judge Advocate General position Peiris now holds, to take 
Peiris's prior position, and may be tapped to oversee the 
summary of evidence against Fonseka.  One military contact 
reported that the Secretary of Defense had made these 
personnel changes himself last week, and another contact told 
Post the change was made in part because Peiris might have 
been unlikely to allow the case to move forward to a court 
martial. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) In terms of the court martial itself, the cards are 
not in the general's favor.  It will be difficult for him to 
find a serving member of the military willing to act as his 
"friend of the accused" during the proceedings or to make any 
public statements on his behalf, given the current climate of 
fear among any remaining Fonseka supporters in the military. 
Many in the current Army, Air Force, and Navy leadership have 
a disdain for Fonseka.  During his tenure as the Army 
Commander, Fonseka took claim for winning the war against the 
LTTE, giving no credit to the Air Force and the Navy, and 
many senior Army officers felt sidelined by Fonseka and 
harbor a deep resentment for him.  One contact told Post that 
two Brigadier Generals who were known to be avowed enemies of 
Fonseka, Sumith Manawaduge and Jagath Wimalasiri, were sent 
with the military police to arrest him.  SLMC leader Hakeem 
described the arresting commanders as in "an indecent hurry," 
and JVP leader Amarasinghe said the leading general acted "as 
if he had a personal vendetta against the general." 
FOWLER