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Viewing cable 10CDGENEVA89, SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
10CDGENEVA89 2010-02-16 19:33 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET US Mission CD Geneva
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0089/01 0471937
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 161933Z FEB 10
FM USMISSION CD GENEVA
TO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0243
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0171
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION CD GENEVA
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0171
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0171
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0171
S E C R E T CD GENEVA 000089 
 
SIPDIS 
DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JSCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/16 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) TELEMETRY WORKING GROUP MEETING, FEBRUARY 
15, 2010 
 
REF: STATE 13111 (SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 005) 
10 CD GENEVA 07 (SFO-GVA-VIII-006) 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-050. 
 
 
 
2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 15, 2010 
 
           Time:  3:30 P.M. - 5:00 P.M. 
 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
------- 
 
SUMMARY 
 
------- 
 
 
 
3.  (S) At the Telemetry Working Group meeting co-chaired by Mr. 
Siemon and General Poznikhir, the U.S. side discussed initial 
written guidance from Washington that identified several 
problematic issues.  The Russian side claimed the United States was 
proposing to change dramatically the decisions agreed in Moscow and 
emphasized that its position on the issue of telemetry exchange had 
not and would not change.  End summary. 
 
 
 
4.  (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY:  Guidance From Washington; Problematic 
Issues; Russia's Position Would Not Change; Encryption and 
Exchange; and SCDM Telemetry. 
 
 
 
------------------------ 
 
Guidance From Washington 
 
------------------------ 
 
 
 
5.  (S) Mr. Siemon stated the U.S. delegation had received initial 
written guidance from Washington (Ref A) that identified several 
problematic issues, although it had not yet received a proposal for 
Protocol or Annex text.  Siemon anticipated receiving text from 
Washington before the week was over and hoped to provide a U.S. 
proposal by the end of the week.  He indicated the U.S. proposal 
would be along the lines of the paragraph order of the Russian 
proposal, but would not include bracketed Russian-proposed Protocol 
text. 
 
 
 
------------------ 
 
PROBLEMATIC ISSUES 
 
------------------ 
 
 
6.  (S) Siemon indicated the problematic issues identified by 
Washington involved areas that had been discussed in previous 
working group meetings.  The main areas of concern related to how 
the exchange of telemetric data actually took place.  The exchange 
process was a subject for these negotiations and should continue to 
be a subject for discussion during the annual telemetry reviews. 
The United States believed the sides could discuss concerns and 
make proposals for changes during annual telemetry reviews; but 
until there was agreement by the sides on changes, the existing 
telemetry exchange procedures would continue.  The United States 
also believed launches on which telemetry was exchanged should be 
the subject for discussion during the annual reviews. 
 
 
 
7.  (S) It was the U.S. position that the sides would discuss how 
to implement the concept for an exchange on a parity basis.  Siemon 
believed parity in this process would come into play several times 
in the U.S. proposal.  The concept for parity in the exchange of 
telemetry involved an opportunity for the receiving Party to 
indicate those flight tests where it would like to receive 
telemetry with a right of refusal provision for the testing Party. 
In the U.S. concept the receiving Party would indicate the launches 
of the other Party for which it wanted telemetric data exchanged. 
The testing Party would then have the right to deny the exchange 
for an agreed number of the requested flight tests.  In this way 
the testing Party would have the ultimate determination on which 
flights telemetric data would be exchanged.  This right to refuse 
exchange on a certain number of launches would permit the testing 
Party the capability to protect information it believed sensitive 
and allows the testing Party to determine those flight tests where 
an exchange would take place. 
 
 
 
8.  (S) Siemon stated that it would be preferable to discuss the 
exchange at the beginning of the year when the flight tests would 
take place, but the United States could be flexible and hold these 
discussions at the annual review immediately following the year in 
question.  In addition, the United States believed the exchange of 
telemetry should include telemetry on the self-contained dispensing 
mechanism (SCDM) and interpretive data on acceleration and 
separation times. 
 
 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
Russia's Position Would Not Change 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
 
9.  (S) Siemon noted there were significant differences in the 
approaches of the two sides.  Once he had the opportunity to review 
the language Washington provided he would know how significant the 
differences were.  Siemon intended to provide the Russian side 
language for both a U.S.-proposed Protocol and Annex.  He indicated 
the U.S. side would be flexible about which formulations would be 
included in the Protocol and Annex, also which formulations needed 
to be discussed in the annual review and within the Bilateral 
Consultative Commission. 
 
 
10.  (S) Poznikhir stated that after listening to these points he 
believed the United States wanted to retain START's telemetry 
regime; if not in its entirety then the majority of its provisions. 
Moreover, he believed the United States wanted to control the 
exchange of telemetric information; to tell Russia on which flights 
telemetry would be exchanged. 
 
 
 
11.  (S) Poznikhir reminded the U.S. side that the Russian 
Federation had shown flexibility and reflected a compromise toward 
the U.S. position.  When negotiations began the U.S. side only 
wanted a reference made to telemetry in the Articles.  Now the 
United States wanted telemetry in its entirety.  However, Russia 
would not allow this to happen.  Russia's fundamental position was 
that the side that conducted the launch had the exclusive right to 
determine those launches where telemetric data would be exchanged. 
Given this position, he could not understand how the receiving 
Party could have a part in this determination. 
 
 
 
12.  (S) Siemon clarified the U.S. concept.  After a Party 
conducted a launch the other Party would indicate that it wanted 
the telemetry from the launch.  This would happen on no more than 
five launches per year.  The Party that conducted the launch would 
then have the right to deny the request and there would be a quota 
for the number of such denials. 
 
 
 
13.  (S) Poznikhir concluded that the United States proposed to 
change the decisions that had been made during the January Admiral 
Mullen-General Makarov meetings in Moscow.  According to the 
arrangements decided in Moscow, the launches for which telemetric 
information would be provided would be determined solely by the 
conducting Party.  So now the Russian side had to report back to 
Moscow that the U.S. side had dramatically changed the position 
that had been agreed during the Mullen-Makarov meetings. 
 
 
 
14.  (S) Siemon disagreed.  He noted that the sides had agreed to 
include three paragraphs in the draft Protocol on the Exchange of 
Telemetry.  Siemon read the text for the three paragraphs. 
 
 
 
Begin text: 
 
 
 
From the entry into force of the treaty, the Parties shall exchange 
telemetric information, on a parity basis, on no more than five 
launches per year of ICBMs and SLBMs. 
 
 
 
The exchange of telemetric information shall be carried out for an 
equal number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs conducted by both 
sides, and in an agreed amount. 
 
 
On an annual basis, the sides shall review the conditions and 
method of further telemetric information exchange on launches of 
ICBMs and SLBMs within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative 
Commission.  Additional details on the telemetry exchange are 
contained in the Annex on Telemetry Exchange Procedures. 
 
 
 
End text. 
 
 
 
15.  (S) Siemon noted that in the small group discussions held in 
Moscow, the Russian side agreed to the three paragraphs and 
indicated it intended to table additional language in Geneva on how 
the exchange would occur in practice.  The sides also discussed ten 
elements from a Russian working draft of the Protocol.  The U.S. 
side had understood that these points would be provided in Geneva 
and also understood they could be changed as a result of a Russian 
interagency review by the time the sides reconvened in Geneva.  The 
summary prepared by the U.S. delegation at the conclusion of the 
Mullen-Makarov Moscow meetings describing the ten elements of the 
initial Russian draft follows: 
 
 
 
Begin text: 
 
 
 
The Russian side indicated it intends to table additional Telemetry 
Protocol language in Geneva, and discussed the following elements 
from their current working draft. 
 
 
 
- The side conducting the test launch would determine the five 
telemetric exchanges on a parity basis. 
 
 
 
- Each Party would have the right to raise concerns about the 
exchanged telemetric information. 
 
 
 
- The exchange would be for an equal number of test launches with 
an agreed volume of information.  Both the volume and type of 
exchanged information would be agreed in the Bilateral Consultative 
Commission (BCC). 
 
 
 
- A schedule of projected yearly test launches would be exchanged 
within the first 65 days of each calendar year. 
 
 
 
- The sides would meet in the BCC on an annual basis to review the 
conditions for the exchange of telemetric information. 
 
 
- A BCC agreement would be required to modify the telemetric 
information exchange agreement. 
 
 
 
- The exchange of telemetric information would include all 
information broadcast during flight tests and from encapsulated 
information.  Data denial techniques would be banned.  Recording 
and broadcasting data on the functioning of the stages and self 
contained dispensing mechanism from a reentry vehicle would also be 
banned. 
 
 
 
- Interpretative data would be provided by the testing Party and 
would include the type of ICBM or SLBM, the identification number, 
the date of launch, recording frequencies, and modulation methods. 
 
 
 
- The Party conducting the test launch would determine the method 
for recording telemetric information. 
 
 
 
- Each Party would provide the means to acquire playback equipment 
to reproduce telemetric information from recorded media. 
 
 
 
End text. 
 
 
 
16.  (S) Poznikhir remarked that Siemon failed to include in the 
agreed paragraphs the paragraph that specified the exclusive right 
of the Party conducting the launches to determine on which launches 
telemetric data would be exchanged.  He produced a paper that was 
provided to the Russian side on January 23, 2010, after the Moscow 
meetings with the text reported above indicating the sides had 
agreed to this paragraph and therefore could not agree that the 
U.S. side did not understand Russia's position on the exchange of 
telemetry. 
 
 
 
17.  (S) Siemon noted that the ten elements that were shown at the 
end of the paper were not agreed points but were a summary of the 
points that Russia had described as drafts that might be included 
in a draft proposal for exchange in Geneva. 
 
 
 
18.  (S) Poznikhir stated that the exclusive right paragraph was 
the fundamental position of the Russian Federation, the position 
had not changed and he had been consistent in presenting this 
position to the U.S. side.  Siemon believed the difference in 
understanding was based on differing perceptions on what had been 
agreed to during the Moscow meetings.  Poznikhir disagreed and 
reiterated that he believed the U.S. side was changing what had 
already been decided in Moscow and had been reported to the 
respective Presidents.  He emphatically stated that the Russian 
side would not discuss any changes to its position.  The U.S. side 
had to either agree to the current Russian proposal or Russia would 
be required to change its approach to telemetry. 
 
 
 
19.  (S) Siemon stated that he believed neither side had been 
intentionally deceitful during the Moscow meetings.  The sides had 
a different belief on what they thought had been agreed and what 
they expected to see in the other side's proposal once it arrived 
in Geneva.  Both sides had redlines.  For the Russian side it was 
the exclusive right to determine flights for which telemetry would 
be exchanged.  For the U.S. side, it was the idea that the 
receiving Party should also have a part in this determination.  The 
U.S. side had to justify the telemetry exchange in the ratification 
process and if the exchange was one-sided then it could not be 
justified as a meaningful exchange.  Both sides were required to 
compromise during negotiations.  The U.S. side had started the 
negotiations with positions it did not believe it would change, yet 
it did change positions to move toward a compromise.  The Russian 
side had also made changes to move toward a compromise. 
 
 
 
20.  (S) Poznikhir stated that the original position of the Russian 
side was that there would be no telemetry exchange in the new 
treaty and it had moved from this position as a compromise. 
 
 
 
----------------------- 
 
Encryption and Exchange 
 
----------------------- 
 
 
 
21.  (S) Mr. Shevchenko indicated he could not understand how 
encryption was possible if a situation existed in which the 
receiving Party had a part in determining the launches on which to 
exchange telemetry.  The Russian side had stated that it intended 
to encrypt telemetry on every launch other than the five to be 
exchanged.  This could not be possible if the receiving Party had a 
part in the determination.  Siemon stated that the sides had not 
agreed that all launches other than the five to be exchanged would 
be encrypted.  What had been agreed was the right of the Party to 
encrypt as it so wished.  Shevchenko reiterated the Russian 
position that there would not be encryption on any of the five 
launches on which data would be exchanged; however, the Russian 
side planned to encrypt all other launches. 
 
 
 
22.  (S) Poznikhir noted that what the sides had agreed was that on 
the launches on which telemetry would be exchanged the Parties 
would not impede getting access to the data; in other words, no 
encryption, encapsulation, jamming or use of narrow directional 
beaming.  Russia would have the right to encrypt all other 
launches. 
 
 
 
-------------- 
 
SCDM TELEMETRY 
 
-------------- 
 
 
23.  (S) Referencing the exchange of telemetry from the SCDM, 
Poznikhir reminded the U.S. side that even Russian Prime Minister 
Putin had expressed his ideas on this exchange.  He stated clearly 
that the Russian side would not exchange SCDM telemetry.  Russia 
would not exchange information the U.S side could use to build its 
missile defense system when Russia was not building a missile 
defense system of its own and therefore could not benefit from the 
exchange.  Poznikhir noted that the Russian side had proposed an 
Agreed Statement that would resolve this issue.  The Agreed 
Statement included text in which the sides agreed that telemetric 
information about ICBM and SLBM launches of the other Party, 
received independently or within the framework of a bilateral 
exchange, would not be used for purposes related to the 
development, increase in capability, or modernization of missile 
defense systems.  The text of the Russian Agreed Statement proposal 
on the use of telemetry for missile defense purposes follows: 
 
 
 
Begin text: 
 
 
 
Document of the Russian side 
 
 
 
February 9, 2010 
 
 
 
Agreed Statement 
 
On the Use of Telemetric Information 
 
 
 
          Considering that the exchange of telemetric information 
on missile launches of the Parties is a sensitive transparency 
measure, which, under specific circumstances, is capable of 
inflicting harm on the national security of a Party, the United 
States of America and the Russian Federation agree that telemetric 
information about ICBM and SLBM launches of the other Party, 
received independently or within the framework of a bilateral 
exchange, shall not be used for purposes related to the 
development, increase in capability, or modernization of missile 
defense systems. 
 
 
 
End text. 
 
 
 
24.  (S) Additionally, President Medvedev offered to provide SCDM 
telemetry if the United States would provide telemetry on the 
homing guidance system of its ground-base interceptor (GBI) 
launches; this would ensure parity.  Poznikhir stated that the 
Russian side was ready to discuss the exchange of SCDM telemetry if 
the United States was willing to agree to exchange GBI telemetry. 
Siemon did not believe the concept of exchanging SCDM telemetry for 
homing guidance was in the current Russian proposal, to which 
 
 
Poznikhir stated that the position on not exchanging SCDM telemetry 
was the Russian position, the rest of the position was his personal 
view.  Siemon said he would report this back to Washington and 
carefully indicate that this was Poznikhir's personal view and not 
the position of the Russian side. 
 
 
 
25.  (S) Poznikhir asked Siemon to also report back to Washington 
the Russian position on the exclusive right of the Party conducting 
the launches to determine on which launches telemetric data would 
be exchanged, that no SCDM or re-entry vehicle telemetry would be 
exchanged and that no stage separation or acceleration data would 
be exchanged.  He again emphasized the U.S. proposal was not 
acceptable to Russia.  Shevchenko summarized Poznikhir's position: 
Russia's position on telemetry had not changed and was not going to 
change. 
 
 
 
26.  (U) Documents provided:  None. 
 
 
 
27.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Mr. Siemon 
 
Mr. Dean 
 
Lt Col Goodman 
 
Mr. Hanchett (RO) 
 
Ms. Pura 
 
Dr. Ringenberg 
 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
Gen Poznikhir 
 
Ms. Fuzhenkova 
 
Lt Col Lyzsovskiy 
 
Col Kamenskiy 
 
Mr. Shevchenko 
 
Mr. Voloskov 
 
Col Zaistev 
 
 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
 
 
28.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
LARSON