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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/16 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP 
MEETING, FEBRUARY 1, 2010 
 
REF: 10 CD GENEVA 83 (SFO-GVA-VIII-009) 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-011. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 3, 2010 
 
                Time:  10:00 A.M. - 12:45 P.M. 
 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
 
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¶3.  (S) The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group (WG) 
met on February 3 and discussed Sections I and II of Part Two, the 
initial data exchange, heavy bomber categories, and the Leninsk 
Test Range.  During the meeting, the Russian side clarified that it 
did not intend to provide any base-by-base data in the initial data 
exchange, a position which came as a surprise to the U.S. side. 
The sides also engaged in a lengthy discussion about Russia's use 
of the Leninsk Test Range in Kazakhstan.  End summary. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (S) SUBJECT SUMMARY:  Missile Defense the Major Remaining 
Issue; Surprising Russian Position on Initial Data Exchange; 
Working Through the MOU Once More; Leninsk; and Site Diagrams. 
 
 
 
----------------------------------------- 
 
MISSILE DEFENSE THE MAJOR REMAINING ISSUE 
 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (S) General Orlov noted most issues had been agreed and the 
Russian side had several proposals for resolving the remaining 
issues.  Mr. Trout agreed with his assessment.  Orlov commented 
that the dynamic in the MOU WG differed from the discussions at the 
Heads of Delegation level, where Ambassador Antonov had "very 
complicated" discussions with Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller. 
Orlov revealed that Antonov was "worked up" after his last meeting 
with Gottemoeller due to unresolved issues.  He remarked that the 
major remaining issue in the treaty negotiations was the 
interrelationship between strategic offensive arms (SOA) and 
strategic defense.  He stated that progress on issues in Moscow had 
been clearly linked to the missile defense question.  Trout 
acknowledged the Russian concern with the issue. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (S) Trout handed over the U.S.-revised Part Two, Section I, 
 
 
Paragraph 2, noting that it incorporated Russian positions and 
asked that it be discussed during the meeting. 
 
 
 
Begin text: 
 
 
 
¶2.  The Parties shall exchange the data according to the categories 
of data contained in this Part no later than 45 days after 
signature of the Treaty, based upon the data exchanged on July 1, 
2009, under the START Treaty.  For this initial exchange, the 
Parties shall not provide any data related to: 
 
 
 
(a)  Geographic coordinates; 
 
 
 
(b)  Unique Identifiers; 
 
 
 
(c)  Warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, as well as nuclear 
warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers; and 
 
 
 
[(d) Aggregate data on the number of deployed ICBMs, deployed 
SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers]2 
 
 
 
End text. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
SURPRISING RUSSIAN POSITION ON INITIAL DATA EXCHANGE 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
 
 
¶7.  (S) Colonel Pischulov began the Russian agenda with discussion 
of Section I, Paragraph 3.  He proposed a number of wording 
changes, including the addition of the word "facilities" after 
references to "site diagrams," acceptance of the U.S.-proposed "as 
applicable" terminology, and removal of the Russian brackets around 
the word "declared" with respect to new facilities.  The sides 
discussed moving elements of Paragraph 3, specifically 
subparagraphs (b) and (c), to the Annex, arguing that these two 
subparagraphs addressed situations that could come about after 
entry-into-force (EIF) but were not pertinent to establishing the 
requirements for exchanges prior to EIF.  After a short discussion, 
Trout stated that the proposal sounded reasonable and he would take 
the matter under consideration. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S) Regarding paragraph 4, Pischulov proposed a compromise of 
 
 
45 days after EIF for exchange of photographs based on the 
recommendation of their inspectors.  Trout agreed. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (S) Trout raised the new text provided on the U.S.-proposed 
Paragraph 2 and along with LT Lobner pressed for clarification 
regarding which information would be exempted from the initial 
exchange of data.  The Russian side emphasized they would provide 
aggregate data on total forces but would not provide any 
base-by-base information.  Orlov summarized the Russian position as 
that the Parties would be required to provide only Part Two, 
Section II data in the initial exchange; in other words, the 
central and supplementary limits.  Trout noted the United States 
had misunderstood the Russian position and asked for confirmation 
that the Russian position was that the Parties would provide only 
Section II data in the initial exchange of data 45 days after 
signature.  Orlov confirmed that this assessment was correct. 
Pischulov clarified that Russia would also provide data on Sections 
VII through IX (technical data), but not Sections III through V. 
(Begin comment:  The old Section IX was deleted in the previous 
meeting.  End comment.) 
 
 
 
¶10.  (S) Trout responded that the U.S. side expected to exchange 
all information, including Sections III through V, except for data 
on warheads, unique identifiers (UIDs) and coordinates.  Orlov said 
the Russians would consider providing the aggregate data listed at 
the beginning of Sections III through V, but not the base-by-base 
data.  Trout asked whether this would be data current as of 
signature or current as of July 2009 START MOU data.  Orlov 
confirmed that it would be July 2009 MOU data, as agreed to in 
December. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (S) Trout explained that the U.S. view was to exchange as much 
data as possible, including base-by-base data, at an early stage. 
This would allow the Parties to flush out differences in 
interpretations of their obligations.  Orlov countered that the 
Russian side did not see utility in discussing this data after the 
initial exchange because the Parties would be unable to modify the 
document substantially at that stage. 
 
 
 
¶12.  (S) Pischulov asked the U.S. side to clarify its position. 
Lobner confirmed that the U.S. proposal was to exchange all data 
for all sections, except data related to coordinates, UIDs and 
warheads.  Orlov emphasized that the Russians had clearly stated 
their position in their proposed Section I, Paragraph 2(b).  Trout 
commented that this was clearly a misunderstanding.  Orlov remarked 
that the U.S. side was continually relating the initial data 
exchange to Senate ratification, but pointed out that the United 
States would have site diagrams and aggregate data to show the 
Senate.  Furthermore, the Parties would exchange the full required 
data within 30 days after EIF, which was the most important 
information in any case.  Orlov also restated that the Russian side 
could consider providing aggregate data for Sections III through V. 
Trout replied that he would report the Russian position back to the 
U.S. Head of Delegation.  Orlov confessed that he doubted he would 
succeed in convincing his colleagues to agree to the U.S. proposal, 
and would even have great difficulty convincing them to provide 
 
 
aggregate data for Sections III through V.  Trout pointed out that 
when it came to providing aggregate warhead data, U.S. law mandated 
that the treaty EIF before certain warhead data could be released. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
WORKING THROUGH THE MOU ONCE MORE 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶13.  (S) Turning to Section II, Trout asked where Orlov would like 
to place the 800 limit on deployed and non-deployed launchers and 
heavy bombers ("the third limit").  Pischulov spoke about the 
similarities between some of the existing categories in paragraph 2 
and the third limit, stating that perhaps some categories could be 
deleted or merged.  He asked Trout where he would like to place the 
third limit.  Trout referred back to the previous meeting and 
suggested matching the location of the third limit in the database 
to the location of the actual limit in the treaty text.  In 
addition to making this suggestion, he noted he would continue to 
think about the issue. 
 
 
 
¶14.  (S) Orlov asked about the U.S. view on counting rules for 
heavy bombers, specifically the question of deployed and 
non-deployed status.  Trout replied that the United States would 
come to a decision on the question soon.  He said it was possible 
that the non-deployed category would include test heavy bombers, 
heavy bombers in long-term maintenance, and heavy bombers awaiting 
elimination.  He noted that this was the Russian position 3 months 
previously, which Orlov confirmed.  Trout told the Russians that 
the position was not yet official, and that he expected Secretary 
of Defense Representative Dr. Warner to deliver a full presentation 
on the issue the following week. 
 
 
 
¶15.  (S) Pischulov noted there were ambiguities in the draft 
Protocol on UIDs, specifically with respect to the UID category 
listed for missiles in test launchers.  Trout replied that the 
category was necessary, but often no UID would be listed because no 
missile would be deployed in a test launcher.  However, if a 
missile happened to be in the launcher at the time of the update, 
then a UID would be required.  Pischulov asked whether the United 
States demanded UIDs for training facilities.  Trout replied in the 
negative, stating the United States only wanted coordinates. 
(Begin comment:  This was an error in the Russian text.  End 
comment.) 
 
 
 
¶16.  (S) Pischulov asked whether the U.S. wanted warhead 
information for basing areas, and Trout replied that it did.  Orlov 
asked whether warhead data for individual missiles would be 
required.  Trout answered the United States proposed to exchange 
warhead data for the base and basing area but not for individual 
missiles.  Orlov commented that the Russians would probably agree 
to give aggregate warhead data for each basing area but that he 
would consult with his delegation and respond formally at the next 
 
 
session. 
 
 
 
¶17.  (S) For Section VI, Pischulov asked for updates on remaining 
brackets regarding the language for launchers located at space 
launch facilities.  Trout responded that this language was still 
dependent on some other issues, namely soft site launchers, which 
would be discussed in the Definitions Working Group.  Consequently, 
they remain bracketed. 
 
 
 
¶18.  (S) In Section VIII, Pischulov proposed a compromise in which 
the Russian side would delete some recognition features of heavy 
bombers in exchange for U.S. acceptance of the remaining categories 
of recognition features.  The Russians proposed dropping categories 
on the following:  type of nuclear armaments for which a heavy 
bomber is equipped; maximum number of nuclear armaments for which 
any heavy bomber of this type and variant of a type is actually 
equipped; maximum number of nuclear armaments carried on external 
attachment joints; maximum number of nuclear armaments carried in 
internal weapons bays; maximum number of nuclear armaments carried 
on each pylon; distance between joints for attaching nuclear 
armaments to pylon; and maximum number of nuclear armaments for 
which launcher is equipped.  Trout agreed to consider the proposal. 
 
 
 
 
¶19.  (S) In the new Section IX (Formerly Section X, Other Data 
Required by the Treaty), Orlov asked for confirmation that the 
sides would drop the category for nuclear armaments for heavy 
bombers.  Trout replied that the United States would probably agree 
and he would check on the matter. 
 
 
 
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LENINSK 
 
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¶20.  (S) Trout raised the issue of Leninsk and the proposed Agreed 
Statement on the test range (Reftel).  He explained that the United 
States needed to have the substance of the proposed statement 
either in an Agreed Statement or in the Protocol.  It was not 
acceptable for SOA simply to disappear from the database.  The 
sides needed clarity as to what happened with missiles that left 
Russia. 
 
 
 
¶21.  (S) Orlov replied that the Russians had several problems with 
the proposed statement.  First was the issue of singling out 
Kazakhstan, since Kazakhstan had specifically stated that, unless 
they were omitted from the treaty, they would insist on 
participating in its deliberations.  More broadly, Russia did not 
understand the U.S. concern regarding Leninsk.  The United States 
had comparable issues, for instance with the United Kingdom and 
Meck Island, he said.  He added that Russia had not received a 
 
 
clear answer to its questions about the proposed statement during 
the Ad Hoc meeting the day before (Reftel).  He said Russia would 
notify the U.S. regarding the transit and launch of accountable 
missiles and if the missiles had UIDs, then the United States would 
have all the needed information. 
 
 
 
¶22.  (S) Trout responded that the United States would provide 
movement notifications for treaty-accountable missiles with respect 
to Meck Island.  Further, the United States would declare the 
facility if a treaty-accountable missile was taken there.  Trout 
noted that the United States was only launching Trident I C-4 
missiles from Meck Island, and the C-4 would not be accountable 
under this treaty.  Trout said the U.S. relationship with the 
United Kingdom (UK) was different from the Russian relationship 
with Kazakhstan.  In the U.S.-UK instance, the United States would 
sell a missile to the UK, which would then take ownership of it. 
Russia, on the other hand, would never relinquish control of a 
missile to Kazakhstan.  Trout emphasized that the United States was 
not trying to restrict Russia, but was simply seeking to account 
for the unique circumstances presented by Leninsk, and to identify 
appropriate notifications and procedures tailored to the situation. 
Orlov countered that he did not understand the U.S. concerns nor 
did he accept the distinction from the UK case. 
 
 
 
¶23.  (S) Asking to go "off the record," Orlov queried Trout what he 
envisioned for the agreed statement.  Would the facility be subject 
to inspection?  Would there be a 30-day movement restriction? 
Trout replied that the 30-day restriction would apply, just like 
the 30-day movement restriction applied to all missile movements. 
After Orlov pointed to the February 2 U.S.-proposed agreed 
statement, Trout commented there were problems with that version, 
and a final proposed version was not yet complete. 
 
 
 
¶24.  (S) Trout remarked that the issue of space launch facilities 
(SLF) outside national territory had been an issue under START. 
The U.S.-proposed agreed statement on Leninsk was developed to 
account for various scenarios that could arise with missiles 
located outside national territory.  One such scenario addressed 
how to track an expended launch canister if the missile was 
launched at an SLF outside national territory.  According to the 
proposed agreed statement, under this scenario, the canister would 
be eliminated either on-site or after it was returned to Russia. 
Another scenario involved the situation if a problem arose with the 
missile, in which case it would be returned to national territory 
for repair.  Orlov stated that it was impossible to develop 
language that would capture every possible situation. 
 
 
 
¶25.  (S) Trout also sought to clarify that the Russian relationship 
with Kazakhstan was not an existing pattern of cooperation, 
specifically, that Russia retains control of its missiles.  Summing 
up, Trout stated that the United States did not propose to inspect 
Leninsk, but sought to ensure that the treaty's provisions would 
apply when items were outside of national territory.  Trout 
emphasized that, in any case, a missile leaving national territory 
would still have to be assigned to some declared facility in 
Russia. 
 
 
¶26.  (S) Orlov countered that unique  identifiers (UIDs) were 
central to this issue, and turned the discussion to the question of 
what would happen to Trident II D-5 SLBMs turned over to the UK. 
Would the United States notify Russia?  Trout responded that the UK 
would not be subject to this treaty but the United States would 
notify Russia when the UK picked up missiles.  Orlov retorted that 
the United States had repeatedly underlined the importance of 
tracking missiles throughout their lifecycle.  In light of this, he 
stated, Russia had accepted UIDs.  In this case, however, Russia 
would only know when the missiles had been sold.  He emphasized the 
deficit in information Russia would receive as opposed to what the 
United States would know about missiles at Leninsk.  Trout asked 
which declared facility a missile would be assigned to when located 
at Leninsk.  Orlov replied that they would be declared at Leninsk, 
but clarified that the Leninsk Test Range itself would not be a 
declared facility. 
 
 
 
¶27.  (S) Trout pointed out that this was precisely why the U.S. was 
seeking an agreement on the topic.  He emphasized that this was 
ultimately an accounting issue, not a test of wills.  Orlov 
explained that some of the leaders in Moscow were more rigid. 
Orlov elaborated that, in explaining the obligations to provide 
notifications and other information under START, officers such as 
himself would routinely be asked why Russia needed to provide such 
exhaustive information and whether Russia really needed such 
information from the U.S. 
 
 
 
¶28.  (S) Trout replied that the nub of the problem was that the 
treaty did not provide for the accountability of non-declared 
facilities outside of national territory.  The issue was 
fundamentally about data.  He further explained that the United 
States was focused on tracking missiles because during the Cold War 
the sides had developed wildly distorted assessments of the other's 
forces and programs.  Since the EIF of START, the Parties had known 
with exactitude the other side's force structure and patterns so 
there was no room for exaggeration.  This information would 
continue to be useful in the future, Trout continued, especially if 
a crisis were to develop.  Orlov acknowledged Trout's arguments, 
and responded that these were the reasons why Russia would provide 
notifications regarding Leninsk.  Trout restated that the substance 
of the agreement did not need to appear in an agreed statement but 
did needed to be somewhere in the treaty or protocol.  Nearing the 
end of this discussion, Orlov admitted that he now understood the 
U.S. concerns in principle, and would think the matter over to find 
a solution. 
 
 
 
------------- 
 
SITE DIAGRAMS 
 
------------- 
 
 
 
¶29.  (S) Trout noted Gottemoeller and Antonov had discussed the 
 
 
 
issue of site diagrams and he proposed that the MOU WG handle the 
issue (formerly Annex J of START's MOU).  Orlov said he had not 
heard of the matter, but would consult with Antonov and his 
delegation. 
 
 
 
¶30.  (S) Pischulov asked about topics for the next meeting.  The 
sides agreed to provide positions or answers, as applicable, to the 
following:  Section I, paragraph 2, regarding initial data exchange 
requirements; Section I, paragraph 3, regarding moving two 
subparagraphs to the Annex; Section II, incorporation of the third 
limit; Section VIII, response to the Russian-proposal of deleting 
some categories of data; and finally Section IX, deletion of types 
of nuclear armaments. 
 
 
 
¶31.  (S) Documents provided: 
 
 
 
- United States: 
 
 
 
     -- U.S.-Proposed Revised Part Two, Section I, Paragraph 2. 
 
 
 
 
¶32.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES: 
 
 
 
Mr. Trout 
 
Mr. Colby (RO) 
 
LT Lobner 
 
Mr. Sobchenko (Int) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA: 
 
 
 
Gen Orlov 
 
Ms. Vodopolova 
 
Mr. Pischulov 
 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 
 
 
 
¶33.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
LARSON