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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/16 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) AGREED STATEMENTS AND TREATY ARTICLE VIII 
MEETING, FEBRUARY 2, 2010 
 
REF: 10 STATE 9670 (SFO-VIII GUIDANCE 003) 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-009 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 02, 2010 
 
                Time:  3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M. 
 
               Place:  U. S. Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
 
¶3.  (S) The first meeting on agreed statements of the eighth round 
of the START Follow-on negotiations was held on February 2.  At the 
request of the Russian delegation the meeting began with discussion 
of provisions in Article VIII of the treaty on public release of 
data.  The sides discussed the proposed agreed statements on rapid 
reload, Trident I SLBMs, movements of ICBMs to and from the Leninsk 
Test Range, Republic of Kazakhstan, basing of deployed heavy 
bombers at the conversion or elimination (CorE) facility located at 
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base (AFB), Arizona, joint basing of heavy 
bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped 
for non-nuclear armaments, converted B-1B heavy bombers, and U.S. 
guided missile submarines (SSGNs) converted from SSBNs (Reftel). 
The Russian side agreed to continue discussion on all agreed 
statements with the exception of rapid reload which it felt was 
unnecessary because neither side possessed this capability.  They 
expressed doubts about the need for the agreed statement on the 
Leninsk Test Range in Kazakhstan.  End summary. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY:  To Release Data or Not to Release Data; 
Basing of Deployed Heavy Bombers at the CorE Facility Located at 
Davis-Monthan AFB; SSGNs Converted from SSBNs; Joint Basing; 
Converted B-1B Heavy Bombers; Trident I SLBMs; Rapid Reload; 
Leninsk Test Range; and Missile Defense. 
 
 
 
---------------------------- 
To Release or Not To Release 
---------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5.  (S) Mr. Elliot opened discussion on joint draft treaty text 
Article VIII regarding public release of data.  Col Ilin said the 
working group should focus on paragraphs 5 and 7 and noted the 
primary difference between the sides was whether a Party needed 
permission of the other Party in order to release data. Ilin 
mentioned that the Russian side was preparing an alternate version 
 
 
of Article VIII but needed some clarification on the U.S. version. 
Ambassador Ries clarified that the first exchange of data would 
occur 45 days after treaty signature.  The exchange would include 
the same data exchanged under START on July 1, 2009, with the 
addition of non-deployed launchers, and would be releasable with 
the exception of the classified annexes and site diagrams or 
geographic coordinates.  Ries added this was no different than what 
was done under START. 
 
 
 
¶6.  (S) General Poznikhir said the Russian position was that each 
Party should have the right to determine whether the other Party 
should be allowed to release the data in the initial exchange 
(e.g., the data provided within 45 days of treaty entry into 
force), including aggregate numbers for deployed launchers, 
non-deployed launchers and warheads.  All other data, he said, 
should be released if agreed in the Bilateral Consultative 
Commission (BCC).  Poznikhir said Russia was limited in its ability 
to release data because of Russian legislation and that releasing 
this data had the potential to provide terrorists with information 
on each nation's nuclear assets. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (S) Dr. Warner said releasing exchanged Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) data was a precedent set in START and since 
this data was already published, what was the harm of publishing 
the same data under START Follow-on (SFO)?  Poznikhir said he was 
unaware that START data had been released.  Ries confirmed that 
certain START MOU data was published on the Department of State 
website.  Ries provided additional detail on the U.S. proposal that 
aggregate data on strategic delivery vehicles (SDVs) and warheads 
be published on a continuing basis, not just following the initial 
exchange of data.  She reassured the Russian side that more 
sensitive data, such as geographic coordinates, unique identifiers, 
site diagrams, and other classified information would not be 
released.  Ilin commented that he, too, was not aware that 
publication of MOU data was allowed under START. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S) Mr. Koshelev stated that Moscow Treaty data was not 
published and while it was acceptable for the United States to 
disclose its own data, Russian law had changed to prevent them from 
releasing their data.  He proposed that since SFO was a hybrid of 
START and the Moscow Treaty, best practices from both treaties 
should be drawn from and in this case the Moscow Treaty methodology 
of not releasing the other side's data should be adopted. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (S) Poznikhir said Russia agreed with release of aggregate 
numbers of deployed and non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMS, and heavy 
bombers and release of aggregate numbers of deployed warheads on 
deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers following the initial 
exchange of data.  Subsequent data exchanges, however, should only 
be released with the other Party's consent.  Warner stated that 
paragraph 7 proposed the release of aggregate data on a continuing 
basis.  Ries explained the proposal was to disclose all data, 
except sensitive or classified data, following the initial release 
and to subsequently disclose aggregate data, from both Parties, on 
a continuing basis.  Ries emphasized that to not release this data, 
which was released under START, would be seen as a step backwards 
 
 
in terms of transparency and would not be understood by the U.S. 
public. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (S) Poznikhir said the Russian side would provide a draft 
proposal for review and Mr. Taylor agreed to provide a link to the 
Department of State's website where the START data could be found. 
It was agreed to continue to discuss this matter at future 
meetings. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------- 
 
Basing of Deployed Heavy Bombers at 
 
the c or e Facility Located at Davis- 
 
Monthan AFB, Arizona 
 
------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶11.  (S) Elliott said the intent of the proposed agreed statement 
on basing of deployed heavy bombers at the CorE Facility located at 
Davis-Monthan AFB, was to capture heavy bombers while they were at 
the facility and declare their status as deployed heavy bombers 
until they were converted to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear 
armaments or eliminated.  Ilin said the Russian side noticed 
several differences from the last paper provided.  He said they 
were still reviewing the paper and did not have final approval from 
Moscow to further discuss this paper.  The sides agreed to cover 
this agreed statement at a future meeting. 
 
 
 
-------------------------- 
 
SSGNs Converted from SSBNs 
 
-------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶12.  (S) Elliott said the changes to the U.S. SSGN converted from 
SSBNs agreed statement were an attempt to draft acceptable wording 
for both sides and that the remaining brackets were solely related 
to the number of launchers to be viewed.  Ilin agreed there were 
still differences on the number of launchers to be viewed.  He said 
his staff was completing translation of the text and it could be 
reviewed at a later meeting. 
 
 
 
------------ 
 
Joint Basing 
 
------------ 
 
 
¶13.  (S) Elliott explained that in the proposed joint basing agreed 
statement the U.S. side sought the right to carry out joint basing 
of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers 
of the same type that had been converted for non-nuclear armaments, 
since this situation was not allowed in the treaty.  He stated the 
primary changes to this paper were editorial.  The most significant 
comment from the U.S. side would be a recommendation to remove the 
last bracket on paragraph (c) since this agreed statement would be 
approved upon signature of the treaty and required no referral to 
the BCC.  Admiral Kuznetzov stated the Russian view remained the 
same as the last round of negotiations; that only separate basing 
was allowed in the treaty and this position was approved by their 
President.  The Russian side would continue to review the paper and 
both sides agreed to continue the discussion at a future meeting. 
 
 
 
---------------------------- 
 
Converted B-1B Heavy Bombers 
 
---------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶14.  (S) Ilin explained that he did not intend to comment on the 
editorial changes to the proposed agreed statement on converted 
B-1B heavy bombers, but the Russian side noted that the number of 
inspections per year had changed to "no more than one inspection 
per year" compared to the previous Russian version "no more than 
one such inspection on each base per year."   Elliott affirmed that 
it was one inspection per year.  Ilin agreed to continue to review 
the proposed changes and both sides agreed to discuss this agreed 
statement at a later meeting. 
 
 
 
--------------- 
 
TRIDENT I SLBMs 
 
--------------- 
 
 
 
¶15.  (S) Elliott explained that the original paper on Trident I 
SLBMs was crafted as a unilateral statement and that this version 
of the Trident I SLBM agreed statement was an attempt to alter the 
paper to create an agreed statement.  Kuznetzov replied that this 
statement needed to provide clarity on the intended use of the 
remaining Trident I missiles that had yet to be destroyed.  Warner 
stated that the real question was what were the pros and cons of an 
agreed statement versus a unilateral statement.  Elliott stated 
that these missiles are used for testing and other purposes and we 
should continue to work to provide a statement that was agreeable 
to both Parties.  Ilin stated that the Russian position was that 
the paper should be a unilateral statement since Trident I was a 
U.S. asset.  He added that since unilateral statements were a part 
of the treaty, this would be their tacit consent to the statement. 
 
 
 
 
------------ 
 
 
Rapid Reload 
 
------------ 
 
 
 
¶16.   (S) Poznikhir asked where the idea for the rapid reload 
agreed statement came from.  He said the Russian side felt that 
rapid reload was not a credible scenario and that the agreed 
statement was unnecessary.  Ries explained that A/S Gottemoeller 
presented this proposed agreed statement to Amb Antonov at a 
previous meeting.  Ilin explained the Russian position that the 
U.S. SLBMs in loading tubes could be considered the only rapid 
reload capability that existed since the missiles were stored with 
the front sections attached.  Elliott asked whether they wanted to 
include SLBMs in the agreed statement.  Some discussion occurred on 
where the concept of rapid reload was developed.  The Russian side 
asserted the concept had been the product of the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty when both sides had possessed the ability to 
quickly reload and redeploy their Intermediate Range Ballistic 
Missiles following their launch.  Warner concurred and added that 
this capability only made logical sense for mobile ICBMs. Elliott 
explained that while both sides knew that it was currently not 
operationally feasible to conduct rapid reload on any units it 
would be considered a serious step back by the world's arms control 
community if this statement were not included.  Ilin agreed to 
consider whether this agreed statement was needed. 
 
 
 
------------------ 
 
Leninsk Test Range 
 
------------------ 
 
 
 
¶17.  (S) Elliott opened the discussion on the Leninsk Test Range 
agreed statement and said this statement was created to address the 
unusual circumstance involving taking missiles to a test range 
outside of national territory.  This circumstance is not otherwise 
covered in the treaty, he said.  Ilin replied that the Russian side 
had read the agreed statement and was concerned that mentioning 
Kazakhstan in the treaty in any way, and especially the transfer of 
items to Kazakhstan, was not appropriate.  Ilin referred to the 
U.S. "special relationship" with the United Kingdom and how there 
were no limitations on transit time for the transfer of missiles to 
the United Kingdom. 
 
 
 
¶18.  (S) Ilin explained that Russia did not own the facility in 
Leninsk and therefore it could not be declared in the treaty MOU. 
Koshelev added that Russia had persuaded Kazakhstan not to 
participate in these negotiations on the basis that Kazakhstan 
would not be mentioned in the treaty.  Koshelev reiterated that 
under no circumstance was Kazakhstan to be mentioned in this 
treaty.  Warner stated that the comparison to the U.S. pattern of 
cooperation with the United Kingdom was a mischaracterization but 
the point was not lost on the U.S. side.  Elliott explained that 
while there was no intention to bring Kazakhstan into the treaty, 
the United States understood that Russia expected to continue to 
 
 
use this facility, and therefore it created a situation that was 
not covered by the treaty.  The U.S. side was merely attempting to 
address this reality, he said.  Elliott also pointed out that 
Russia did not identify this as a long standing "pattern of 
cooperation" and without this agreed statement it would be 
impossible to issue the required test launch and elimination 
notifications for both the missile and the launch canister.  Elliot 
reiterated that the United States was attempting to accommodate an 
operational practice not impose additional limits.  Ilin concluded 
that this was an issue of notification and should be discussed by 
the Notifications Working Group.  He said the Russian side did not 
agree with this agreed statement.  Warner asked whether the 
sensitivity was based solely on the inclusion of Kazakhstan and 
whether it would be possible to change the wording of the agreed 
statement to remove specific reference to Kazakhstan or Leninsk. 
(Begin comment:  Koshelev and General Orlov appeared mildly 
interested in this idea.  End comment.)  Ilin said they would think 
about it.  Elliott requested the Russian side draft proposed 
changes to the statement to be reviewed at the next meeting. 
 
 
 
--------------- 
 
Missile Defense 
 
--------------- 
 
 
 
¶19.   (S) At the end of the meeting Warner asked whether there were 
any additional agreed statements that the Russian side felt would 
be necessary and Ilin replied that the Russian side felt it would 
be necessary to create an agreed statement on missile defense. 
 
 
 
 
 
¶20.  (U) Documents provided: 
 
 
 
- UNITED STATES: 
 
 
 
     -- U.S. Proposed Part Three of the Protocol, dated February 2, 
¶2010. 
 
 
 
¶21.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Mr. Elliott 
 
Mr. Ahlm (RO) 
 
 
Mr. Connell 
 
Mr. Dean 
 
Dr. Dreicer 
 
Lt Col Goodman 
 
Amb Ries 
 
Mr. Taylor 
 
Dr. Warner 
 
Mrs. Zdravecky 
 
Ms. Gesse (Int) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
Col Ilin 
 
Mr. Koshelev 
 
Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov 
 
Mr. Luchaninov 
 
Gen Orlov 
 
Gen Poznikhir 
 
Gen Venevtsev 
 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Interpreter) 
 
 
 
¶22.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
LARSON