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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/15 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE - 3, ELIMINATION 
MONITORING, FEBRUARY 15, 2010 
 
REF: 10 CD GENEVA 49 (SFO-GVA-VIII-004) 
10 CD GENEVA 75 (SFO-GVA-VIII-015); 10 CD GENEVA 73 (SFO-GVA-VIII-025 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-051. 
 
 
 
------------------------------ 
 
SUMMARY AND GUIDANCE REQUESTED 
 
------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶2.   (S) Summary:  The U.S. and Russian sides came away from the 
Mullen-Makarov meeting in Moscow with sharply differing impressions 
of the deal reached on the conduct of inspections to confirm the 
elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs, solid-fueled SLBMs, and mobile 
launchers for ICBMs.  The United States believed that as part of a 
deal involving U.S. acceptance of the annual quotas of ten Type-1 
and eight Type-2 inspections, and the fact that confirmation of 
elimination would fall under Type-2 inspections, the Russians 
agreed that the United States would have the right to directly 
inspect all items eliminated each treaty year by having accumulated 
the entire output of the elimination process over the course of the 
year into large batches at 6-month intervals.  In contrast, the 
Russian delegation in Geneva asserts that the sides agreed to 
create two batches of such eliminated items each year that would be 
subject to Type-2 inspections at the conversion or elimination 
(CorE) facilities for solid-fueled strategic missiles and mobile 
ICBM launchers respectively, but that these batches would include 
only a total of approximately 50 percent of the annual output of 
eliminated items. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (S) In our talks in Geneva, the Russians steadfastly refuse to 
agree to provide us with the opportunity to inspect semi-annual or 
quarterly batches of the eliminated items that encompass the full 
year's output of eliminations.  Given this development, we have 
tentatively explored with the Russians a compromise approach that 
would build upon the Russian proposal to have them accumulate two 
batches per year, each of which contains approximately 25 percent 
of the annual elimination output, by adding the right to conduct 
Type-2 elimination inspections between announced batches when 
portions of the remaining items eliminated each year are on display 
in the open for national technical means (NTM) observation and 
subject to inspection.  The Russians have clearly indicated a 
willingness to agree to such an approach.  Some on the U.S. 
delegation request guidance to drop the U.S. demand that all of the 
eliminated items be available for Type-2 inspections in batches and 
seek to agree instead on this hybrid approach, called Option 1 that 
combines periodic batching with the right to conduct inspections on 
the unbatched output of eliminated items as well. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (S) Others on the U.S. delegation would prefer to stay with 
current guidance for the time being.  However, if Washington 
decides to pursue a new approach, these members recommend dropping 
the batching concept altogether and would rely instead upon the 
right to conduct up to two Type-2 inspections each year to confirm 
 
 
 
 
the data of the items located at both the solid-fueled missile and 
mobile ICBM launcher CorE facilities, to include those items 
undergoing elimination.  In both options, the sides have agreed 
that the eliminated items would be displayed in the open for an 
agreed period to facilitate NTM observation of the eliminated 
items. 
 
 
 
¶5.   (S) The delegation requests Washington either reconfirm 
current guidance, or examine Options 1 and 2 and provide new 
guidance based on one of the approaches.  Background and analysis 
are in paragraphs 6-15.  The guidance request is in paragraph 
16-17.  End summary. 
 
 
 
----------------------- 
 
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 
 
----------------------- 
 
 
 
¶6.  (S) Background:  Throughout the START Follow-on (SFO) 
negotiations, the U.S. and Russian sides have disagreed on the 
modalities of inspection activity to be used to confirm the results 
of the CorE of strategic offensive arms and other declared data at 
CorE facilities.  During the Mullen-Makarov meeting in Moscow in 
January, the sides agreed that conversion or elimination 
inspections would be conducted as Type-2 inspections within an 
annual quota of eight such inspections, and appeared to agree on 
the availability for inspection of 100 percent of the annual output 
of eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile ICBM 
launchers.  Unfortunately, no session was held at the end of the 
day of negotiations to sum up and record the results of the 
bargaining on the conduct of elimination inspections. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (S) The U.S. side left Moscow with the belief that the Russians 
had agreed to accumulate or "batch" half of their annual output of 
eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs twice each year at the 
Votkinsk CorE facility, for a total availability of 100 percent of 
the output of the elimination process.  In the view of the U.S. 
side, the Russians would openly display the batch of eliminated 
first stage motor casings for 60 days for observation by NTM and 
provide a 30-day window within which the United States would have 
the right to conduct a Type-2 inspection with a team of up to five 
inspectors.  A similar process was to be applied to the inspection 
of eliminated mobile ICBM launchers at the Piban'shur CorE 
facility.  The U.S. delegation came to Geneva under instructions to 
incorporate this agreed approach into the Inspection Activities 
portion of the Protocol. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S) The Russian delegation claims to have come away from the 
Mullen-Makarov talks with a very different understanding of what 
was agreed.  They too assert that the sides agreed on periodic 
accumulation or batching of the eliminated solid-fueled ICBM and 
SLBM first stages at Votkinsk, but, in their view, this would apply 
to only a total of 50 percent, as opposed to 100 percent, of the 
 
 
annual output of eliminated missiles and mobile ICBM launchers. 
Consequently, they have developed draft language for the Inspection 
Activities Protocol that reflects the more limited approach to the 
Type-2 inspections used for confirmation of eliminations of 
solid-fueled missiles and mobile ICBM launchers. 
 
 
 
¶9.   (S) During our current round in Geneva, the starkly differing 
perceptions of the two sides very quickly became apparent. 
Following our guidance, the U.S. side initially argued for 
implementation of the semi-annual batching of 50 percent of the 
eliminated items and having the right to conduct a Type-2 
inspection of the facility for each batch, or 100 percent of the 
annual output, by using up to two inspections at each CorE 
facility.  The Russians, in contrast, said they were prepared to 
pull together two batches each year, for both the eliminated 
solid-fueled missiles and eliminated mobile ICBM launchers, but 
each batch would contain only 25 percent of the annual output of 
eliminated items.  The United States would have the right to expend 
a Type-2 inspection for each of these batches.  The remaining 50 
percent of the Russian missiles and mobile ICBM launchers 
eliminated annually would be displayed in the open for NTM 
observation at the CorE facilities as they emerged incrementally 
from the elimination process, but would not be subject to on-site 
inspection.  Thus, the United States would have the right to 
inspect up to 50 percent of the items eliminated each year, but 
Russia, not the United States, would select which 50 percent of the 
missiles and mobile ICBM launchers were available for on-site 
confirmation of elimination. 
 
 
 
¶10.   (S) The U.S. Inspection Protocol Working Group, in the course 
of discussions with its Russian counterparts, has explored some 
informal ideas to resolve this issue.  These discussions are 
described below.  At this point, these explorations have produced a 
significant amount of agreement between the sides on an approach 
labeled Option 1.  In addition, an alternative view has been 
developed more recently within the U.S. delegation.  It is 
described below as Option 2. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (S) The initial U.S. delegation response to the Russian 
post-Moscow position was to discuss the possibility that the 
Russians would accumulate their annual solid-fueled missile and 
mobile launcher eliminations into four roughly equal batches, 
noting that this method was more in keeping with Russian historical 
practice and still consistent with the agreement reached in Moscow. 
Under this approach, the United States would have the right to 
inspect each of the four batches, but with the already agreed limit 
of no more than two Type-2 inspections at the same facility in a 
given year, would be limited to inspecting no more than two of 
these 25 percent batches or 50 percent of the annual eliminations. 
The Russian delegation refused to consider this approach. 
 
 
 
¶12.  (S) In our internal discussions and exchanges with the Russian 
delegation over the past week, we have mutually explored an 
alternative approach, Option 1, that builds off of and expands the 
Russian proposal.  It falls well short of guaranteeing the right to 
directly inspect 100 percent of the annual output of eliminated 
 
 
items. Under this alternative, each year the Russians would create 
two batches of eliminated items for possible Type-2 inspection by 
the United States at the solid-fueled missile and mobile ICBM 
launcher CorE facilities, with each batch containing approximately 
25 percent of the year's output of eliminated items.  If the United 
States elects not to inspect either (or both) of these 25 percent 
batches, the eliminated items would still be displayed in the open 
for 60 days for NTM viewing (the Russians propose this display 
period should be only 30 days) and then be shredded. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (S) In addition, if the United States chose not to conduct one 
of the announced "batch" inspections under this alternative the 
U.S. would have the right to conduct full Type-2 elimination 
inspections during the periods of the treaty year when portions of 
the remaining 50 percent of the solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs as 
well as mobile ICBM launchers were incrementally being eliminated, 
notified as available for inspection, and displayed in the open in 
small groups.  During this period of incremental elimination, a 
certain amount of "unplanned" batching would likely occur.  That 
is, there would likely be overlaps among small groups of 2-4 
eliminated items during the course of the 30-day periods when each 
increment is subject to inspection.  Given the U.S. offer to limit 
the inspection team to five members, this approach would restrict 
the flexibility for the United States to conduct sequential 
inspections.  A Type-2 elimination inspection at the CorE facility 
would have to be the second of the two sequential inspections and 
an agreement would have to be reached to accommodate the additional 
five members of a normal Type-2 inspection that could not be part 
of the Type-2 elimination inspection. 
 
 
 
¶14.  (S) The most critical point under this option is that the 
United States would have the right and the opportunity to exercise 
that right at a time of its choosing to inspect all of the annual 
output of eliminated items.  If the United States were to withhold 
one of its two annual inspections at the relevant CorE facility 
until the very end of the treaty year, the Russian side would be 
vulnerable to a U.S. Type-2 elimination inspection of the entire 
output of eliminated items during the course of the year, or until 
the U.S. side had expended the two inspections at each of the CorE 
facilities.  As a practical matter, the United States could, at 
most, actually inspect no more than 50 percent of the annual 
eliminated output were it to choose to inspect the two planned 
batches.  If the United States were to choose to combine the 
inspection of one announced batch with one "unbatched" inspection, 
we would likely see no more than 35-40 percent of the annual 
elimination total.  In the case of both the two 25 percent batches 
as well as the incremental elimination of the remainder of the 
yearly output of eliminated missiles and mobile ICBM launchers, all 
of these items would be displayed in the open for an agreed period 
for viewing by NTM or until they were inspected.  That, combined 
with the total vulnerability of the Russian side to inspection 
throughout the year, will create a powerful deterrent to cheating 
in the elimination process. 
 
 
 
¶15.   (S) Other delegation members propose to develop and negotiate 
a different approach to inspecting eliminations, Option 2, which 
drops the batching concept.  This option would call for the conduct 
of Type-2 inspections, with full Type-2 inspection rights to 
 
 
inspect the entire CorE facilities, at both the Votkinsk and 
Piban'shur up to two times each year, at times chosen by the 
inspecting Party.  This approach is predicated on Russia providing 
site diagrams for the Votkinsk and Piban'shur facilities that were 
the same as those provided under the START Treaty and on their 
willingness to make available all items subject to inspection 
within the inspectable area during such an inspection.  This 
proposal would allow the United States to confirm the accuracy of 
all the data declared for the facilities and to confirm the 
elimination of all items being displayed in the open in accordance 
with a 60-day display window using a team of up to 10 inspectors. 
The benefit of this approach would be to permit the United States 
randomly to sample all missiles and launchers undergoing 
elimination.  It would also retain the flexibility for the United 
States to conduct sequential inspections as needed.  Consequently, 
two such inspections at one of the two CorE facilities in a given 
year would likely inspect at most 20-30 percent of the year's 
output of eliminated items.   It should be noted that this option 
also provides total vulnerability of the Russian side to inspection 
throughout the year, thus creating a powerful deterrent to cheating 
in the elimination process. 
 
 
 
------------------ 
 
GUIDANCE REQUESTED 
 
------------------ 
 
 
 
¶16.  (S) The record of the delegation's exchanges with the Russian 
side during round VIII to date, on the percentage of items to be 
inspected during a Type-2 inspection of eliminated solid-fueled 
ICBMs and their launchers (Reftels), clearly indicates differing 
U.S. and Russian views of the outcome on this issue during the 
January 22 Mullen-Makarov meeting in Moscow.  In this context, 
delegation requests that Washington either reconfirm existing 
guidance, or authorize deployment of an alternative approach. 
(Begin comment:  HOD notes that the majority of agencies 
represented on the delegation support deploying an alternative 
approach at this time.  One agency supports a reconfirmation of 
existing guidance for the time being.  End comment.) 
 
 
 
¶17.  (S) If the decision is made to proceed with an alternative 
approach at this time, then delegation requests that Washington 
examine Option 1 and Option 2 and provide guidance based on one of 
the two.  It should be noted that informal discussions with the 
Russian side have indicated that Option 1 would be readily 
negotiable.  The negotiability of Option 2 is unknown, but it falls 
within the concept of a normal Type-2 inspection.  If that approach 
is chosen, the biggest issues to resolve are likely to be the 
location of the inspections for the eliminated solid-fueled 
missiles (the two burn-out facilities at Krasnoarmeisk and Perm vs. 
the CorE facility at Votkinsk) and the size of the inspection 
teams, as noted above. 
 
 
 
¶18.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
LARSON