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S E C R E T CD GENEVA 000075 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/15 
TAGS: PARM KACT MARR PREL RS US
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP, 
FEBRUARY 8, 2010 
 
REF: 10 MOSCOW 225 (SFO-MOS-007) 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Rose E. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department 
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-025. 
 
 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  February 8, 2010 
 
           Time:  3:30 P.M. - 6:00 P.M. 
 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
------- 
 
SUMMARY 
 
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¶3.  (S) At the Inspection Protocol Working Group (IPWG) meeting 
co-chaired by Dr. Warner and Colonel Ilin, the sides discussed the 
proposed approaches for Type-2 inspections of converted or 
eliminated strategic offensive arms (SOA).  At the heart of the 
matter was the percentage of eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and 
SLBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs that would be subject to 
inspection.  The U.S. side proposed that each year 100 percent of 
such eliminated SOA be subject to selection for inspection via 
quarterly accumulations or "batches" and the U.S. side would have 
the right to inspect each conversion or elimination facility, where 
these batches of eliminated items would be displayed in the open, a 
maximum of twice each year.  The Russian side proposed a 
twice-yearly accumulation, with each batch containing 25 percent of 
the annual elimination plan, and both batches being subject to 
on-site inspection, thus making it possible for Russia to control 
which 50 percent of SOA eliminated each year would be subject to 
inspection.  In both methods, a total of 50 percent of the 
eliminated solid fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile launchers of 
ICBMs would be subject to on-site inspection, with the rest being 
viewed by national technical means (NTM) while displayed in the 
open. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (S) The U.S.-proposed text also contained a broadened 
formulation that provided Type-2 inspection procedures for 
inspecting converted heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments 
into conventional-only heavy bombers, converted SLBM launchers, and 
eliminated silo ICBM launchers.  The Russian side noted that it 
disagreed with various aspects of these approaches but said it 
would study the U.S. proposal.  End summary. 
 
 
 
¶5.  (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY:  Summary of U.S.-Proposed Changes to 
Sections V and VII; Main Issue:  "Squaring the Circle" on Batched 
Eliminations; and UIDs Still in Brackets. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
SUMMARY OF U.S.-PROPOSED CHANGES TO SECTIONS V AND VII 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
 
 
¶6.  (S) Warner gave the Russian side updated versions of the 
U.S.-proposed joint draft text (JDT) of Sections V and VII of Part 
Five of the Protocol.  These sections included both the Russian and 
U.S. concepts for monitoring the results of conversion or 
elimination (C or E) as Type-2 inspections.  Warner summarized 
 
three issues that arose as the United States developed the draft 
text.  First, the U.S. view included a broadened formulation to 
include provisions for inspection of the conversion of heavy 
bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, the conversion of SLBM 
launchers, and the elimination of ICBM silo launchers.  The 
Russian-proposed concept had concentrated mainly on solid-fueled 
ICBMs and SLBMs and on mobile launchers of ICBMs.  Second, Warner 
highlighted that previously agreed text had already provided for 
full Type-2 inspections of the C or E facilities at the facility 
used to eliminate mobile ICBM launchers and the C or E facility at 
Votkinsk, where solid-fueled ICBMs are eliminated.  Therefore, 
under both sides' new proposals for Type-2 batched elimination 
inspections, both the entire facility as depicted on the site 
diagram, and the batch of eliminated items, would be inspectable. 
Third, Warner noted that the U.S. side did not accept the Russian 
proposal to limit the number of inspectors to a maximum of five or 
the provision to reduce the duration of the C or E inspection to 12 
hours.  A reduction in the number of inspectors would make the 
inspection team "tip its hand" concerning the inspection site to be 
designated when it provided initial notice that an inspection team 
would be arriving at the point of entry and make sequential 
inspections, which would typically require a full 10-man inspection 
team, infeasible.  The shorter duration also was not consistent 
with the agreed concept for Type-2 inspections. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (S) Ilin responded negatively to Warner's summary.  Ilin 
maintained that disassembled missiles would not be inspectable at 
the Votkinsk C or E facility during Type-2 inspections.  Mr. 
Smirnov said there would never be disassembled missiles at the 
Votkinsk C or E facility, but only at the adjacent Votkinsk 
production facility, which would not be subject to inspection. 
Ilin stated that for Type-2 inspections at C or E facilities, the 
only inspection rights would be to confirm the number and type of 
items that had been eliminated, and to read and record the unique 
identifiers (UIDs) for these eliminated items.  He asserted that 
the concept of inspecting for first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs at the 
Votkinsk C or E facility was something new from the U.S. side. 
Ilin turned to the Inspection Activities Article of the treaty and 
stated that nothing was written there to allow inspection of 
missiles awaiting elimination.  Warner reiterated that the right to 
inspect the entire facility had long been agreed.  The C or E 
facilities were included on the list of Type-2 inspectable 
facilities as locations where non-deployed SOA could be located and 
inspected and these facilities were included in the database.  In 
the end, Ilin agreed to study the U.S. proposal and to respond at 
the next meeting of the IPWG after consultations with the 
delegation and with Moscow. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (S) Warner reviewed the U.S. version of the JDT for Section V 
of Part Five of the Protocol.  Ilin inquired as to whether the 
U.S.-proposed text contained any other "original ideas"; Warner 
said that it did not.  Both sides repeated and expanded upon 
earlier arguments.  The United States did not accept 
Russian-proposed provisions to limit the number of inspectors and 
reduce the duration for Type-2 C or E inspections.  Ilin stated 
that five inspectors were sufficient to view the burned-out first 
stage motor cases of ICBMs and SLBMs, and that reading UIDs also 
was not difficult.  Concerning sequential inspections, he reminded 
Warner that the Russian side had not been keen on them in the first 
place, and he considered it a concession from the Russian side to 
agree on inclusion of such procedures.  Warner pointed out that 
transportation within an ICBM base to inspect an eliminated silo 
could take up to 12 hours by itself if weather conditions were 
poor, so it would be practical to keep the duration of the C or E 
inspection at 24 hours and allow for the standard 8-hour extension 
of the inspection period, by mutual agreement.  Warner noted such 
disagreements over durations of inspections had occurred earlier in 
the negotiations, but eventually a compromise was found.  Ilin said 
the Russian side would study the U.S. proposals, but noted that the 
U.S. side had bracketed all of Russia's new proposals for this 
section. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
MAIN ISSUE:  "SQUARING THE CIRCLE" ON BATCHED ELIMINATIONS 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
 
 
¶9.  (S) Warner stated that the heart of the matter was to try to 
"square the circle" regarding the sides' differing perceptions of 
the results of the meeting between CJCS Adm Mullen and CHOD Gen 
Makarov in Moscow on January 22, with regard to the monitoring of 
elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile ICBM 
launchers (Reftel).  The two sides agreed to accumulate or "batch" 
eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile ICBM launchers 
for viewing by NTM and for on-site C or E inspections.  Warner 
reviewed the U.S. version of the JDT for Section VII of Part Five 
of the Protocol, which contained both sides' proposals for batching 
such eliminated SOA and provisions for openly displaying and 
inspecting them.  The U.S. proposal would require quarterly 
batching of such eliminated items, with each side having the right 
to inspect up to two such batches each year.  Every year 100 
percent of the eliminated missiles and mobile launchers of ICBMs 
would be subject to inspection.  The United States could inspect up 
to 50 percent of these eliminated missiles and mobile ICBM 
launchers during up to two inspections at each facility. 
 
 
 
¶10.  (S) The Russian proposal, in contrast, was to require batched 
eliminations in a manner so that two batches containing 50 percent 
of the yearly amount of eliminated missiles and mobile launchers of 
ICBMs would be made available annually for inspection.  Only that 
50 percent of the items eliminated in a given year would be subject 
to on-site inspection and Russia would select which eliminated 
missiles and mobile launchers of ICBMs fell into this group.  The 
remaining 50 percent of the eliminated items each year would be 
displayed in the open for viewing by NTM, but would not be subject 
to on-site inspection. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (S) Ilin said he believed there might be a more effective 
approach for elimination inspections based on a 2-year cycle, but 
he was unable to succinctly describe his new idea.  Ilin said he 
would continue to think through this approach and possibly discuss 
it at the next IPWG meeting.  He explained that he thought it would 
be easier to batch missiles over a 2-year period and the United 
States would be able to inspect a larger percentage of the 
missiles.  Warner said he was willing to explore the idea but 
admitted it was not clear at this point how it would work. 
 
 
 
¶12.  (S) Ilin noted that with either the U.S. or Russian proposals, 
there would be little parity in elimination inspection 
opportunities made available to the Parties, as the United States 
exploded its SLBM first stages in order to eliminate them and 
conducted static test firings with its MMIII first stages, neither 
of which readily provided opportunities to inspect the results of 
elimination.  Ilin inquired about the possibility of inspecting the 
results of the static test firings; Warner said the U.S. side would 
examine the possibility. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (S) Warner and Ilin agreed that provisions for the batched 
elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs needed to be described 
in detail, but for mobile launchers of ICBMs the simple sentence 
"the same quantitative parameters and procedures shall apply," 
might be sufficient.  Mr. Brown stated that from a legal 
standpoint, it would be better to use the same structure and full 
 
 
descriptive language to outline the provisions for inspecting the 
results of elimination of mobile ICBM launchers. Warner agreed the 
U.S. side would adopt that approach. 
 
 
 
---------------------- 
 
UIDS STILL IN BRACKETS 
 
---------------------- 
 
 
 
¶14.  (S) Ilin noted some issues with the broadened formulation that 
the U.S. proposed.  In paragraph 9 of Section VII, Ilin noted that 
the Russian-proposed text allowed for recording of UIDs only on 
eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs; the U.S.-proposed text 
broadened that to allow for recording of UIDs during all Type-2 
inspections.  Ilin opined that such broadening of the concept 
undercut the logic behind the Russian approach that justified 
shortening the duration of the inspection and reducing the number 
of inspectors.  While Ilin agreed conceptually with the right to 
read UIDs, the methods to apply and read them had not yet been 
agreed, therefore the Russian side would leave all references to 
UIDs in brackets.  Furthermore, Ilin said he would have to check 
with Amb Antonov on the results of the Heads of Delegation (HODs) 
meeting which addressed this issue, as he did not want the IPWG to 
get ahead of the work of the HODs. 
 
 
 
¶15.  (S) In closing, Warner emphasized that only three or four 
major substantive issues remained to be resolved before the treaty 
could be completed; batched inspections of eliminated solid-fueled 
ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs was one of these 
major issues and the only one within the purview of the IPWG.  Ilin 
noted that other such major differences had been overcome in the 
past, and said he was confident that this issue, too, could be 
resolved once the issue of how to treat missile defense issues in 
the treaty was resolved.  Warner noted that matters regarding the 
treatment of missile defense issues in the treaty were being 
addressed by the HODs. 
 
 
 
¶16.  (U) Documents provided: 
 
 
 
- United States: 
 
 
 
     --  Section V of Part Five of the Protocol, U.S.-Proposed JDT, 
dated February 5, 2010 
 
 
 
     --  Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol, U.S.-Proposed 
JDT, dated February 5, 2010 
 
 
 
¶17.  (U) Participants: 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
 
 
Dr. Warner 
 
Mr. Albertson 
 
 
Mr. Ahlm 
 
Mr. Brown 
 
Mr. Buttrick 
 
MAJ Johnson 
 
LTC Leyde (RO) 
 
LTC Litterini 
 
Mr. McConnell 
 
Ms. Pura 
 
Ms. Purcell 
 
Mr. Rust 
 
LT Sicks 
 
Mr. Smith 
 
Ms. Gesse (Int) 
 
 
 
RUSSIA 
 
 
 
Col Ilin 
 
Col Petrov 
 
Mr. G. Shevchenko 
 
Mr. Smirnov 
 
Ms. Vodolopova 
 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 
 
 
 
¶18.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
LARSON