VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHCL #0018/01 0361110
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 051110Z FEB 10
FM AMCONSUL CASABLANCA
TO RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8621
INFO RUEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0357
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 1008
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0006

UNCLAS CASABLANCA 000018 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/RA, AND DRL/ILCSR 
STATE PASS USTR FOR CROMERO AND SRANCESKI 
DOL FOR TWEDDING 
 
E.O  12958: N/A 
TAGS: ELAB ECON ETRD PHUM PGOV MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO: LABOR MONITORING AND TRADE 
ENGAGEMENT 
 
REF: A. 09 STATE 131995 
¶B. CASABLANCA 0013 
¶C. 09 CASABLANCA 0074 
¶D. 09 CASABLANCA 0034 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Morocco has engaged in 
significant labor reform, primarily through a 2004 
modernization of its labor code, an effort that 
received added impetus as a result of the 
negotiation of the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade 
Agreement.  While the current law adheres to core 
international labor standards and is a possible 
model for the region, in practice the Government of 
Morocco's (GOM's) implementation and enforcement of 
the labor code is weak.  The funding, training and 
equipping of labor inspectors is inadequate, and 
other factors such as corruption, collusion between 
employers and local officials, and a judicial system 
in need of reform contribute to the problems.  Labor 
unions are weak and plagued by lack of internal 
democracy and transparency, and in some cases by 
subordination to the interests of the ruling 
political parties.  Morocco also continues to 
struggle with a considerable child labor issue; in 
particular there is little regulation of the 
widespread phenomenon of female child domestics. 
The GOM has responded positively to USG urging, 
however.  Tangible progress has been made with USG 
funding for child labor programs and for training on 
the new labor code.  The USG should more actively 
engage the GOM, within the scope of our bilateral 
cooperation, on enforcement of the existing labor 
code, strengthening of the trade federations and 
child labor.  This cable provides an overview of the 
labor issues in Morocco, labor rights and 
recommendations for strategic engagement on labor 
issues (Ref A).  END SUMMARY. 
 
LABOR SITUATION OVERVIEW 
------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (SBU) According to figures provided by the GOM's 
statistical agency, the Haut Commissariat au Plan 
(HCP), in 2007 approximately 660,000 workers, or six 
percent of the workforce, were unionized.  There are 
more than 25 trade unions though only five, and now 
possibly fewer, are considered to be the "most 
representative" and hence eligible to participate in 
the social dialogue with the Government and 
collective bargaining.  The GOM passed a long- 
stalled reform to its labor code in 2003 as a 
result, in part, of its negotiations with the USG 
over the bilteral Free Trade Agreement.  The new 
labor code ncludes provisions guaranteeing core 
international labor standards, including the right 
to organize, the right to strike and a prohibition 
on frced or exploitive labor.  At the end of 2009, 
te GOM submitted two draft laws aimed at regulating 
and controlling labor union organizing and codifing 
the right to strike.  The GOM argued that pasage of 
these laws in ther current form would permit 
Morocco to ratify ILO Convention 87 on the right of 
assembly, and to abrogate an article in the penal 
code that trade unions say has unfairly been used to 
hamper their right to strike. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The GOM's Ministry of Employment and 
Professional Training's (MOEPT's) Office of Labor 
Inspectors is responsible for enforcing the 
regulations in the labor code, mediating between 
workers and employers to avert strikes, and 
organizing and overseeing the election of labor 
representatives.  According to the MOEPT there are 
421 labor inspectors stationed at 45 offices 
throughout the country.  In the first nine months of 
2009, the inspectors performed 8,938 inspections, 
resulting in 441 offenses and 2,303 infractions 
totaling 235 million dirham (USD 29 million) in 
fines.  Trade unions and observers of Morocco's 
 
labor scene agreed that the number of inspectors is 
inadequate to enforce the labor code effectively. 
Inspectors lack resources, are susceptible to 
corruption, and in some cases are fearful of 
confronting powerful employers.  In one case 
recounted to PolOff by the trade unions and the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) 
representative, a labor inspector in Meknes in 2007 
levied a fine against a company.  Subsequently the 
employees, at the behest of the employer, lodged a 
complaint in the courts that the labor inspector had 
fabricated the offense.  As a result the labor 
inspector was tried and sentenced to several years 
in prison for his alleged abuse of power.  Our 
interlocutors frequently cited this example to 
illustrate how wealthy employers, local government 
officials and the courts collude to prevent the 
inspectors from doing their job.  An ILO 
representative commented that inspectors are 
reluctant to put themselves at risk and that many 
see their job as largely one of awareness-raising, 
an observation borne out by the 266,080 warnings 
issued by inspectors in 2009. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Child labor remains a significant problem 
in Morocco despite substantial efforts by the GOM to 
address it and the related questions of education 
and poverty alleviation.  Young boys worked 
primarily in construction, car repair, agriculture 
(mainly family farms) and other service sectors. 
Child labor for girls was most prevalent in the form 
of child domestics.  Female child domestics or 
"petites bonnes" face increased risk of physical and 
sexual abuse from their employers.  Further, they 
typically work very long hours for a nominal salary, 
do not attend school, and have high rates of 
illiteracy.  Both the MOEPT and the Ministry of 
Social Development, Family and Solidarity (MOSD) 
have forwarded separate draft legislation to the 
Secretary General of the Government that would 
expand the labor code to protect domestic servants 
and substantially increase penalties for employers 
who use child domestic workers.  (See Ref B for a 
comprehensive assessment of Morocco's child labor 
problem and the GOM's efforts to address the issue). 
 
UNIONS 
------ 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Morocco's trade unions are no longer the 
populist political and social force they once were 
under King Hassan II.  However, they are still 
capable of mobilizing workers and challenging the 
Government, demonstrated most recently by a three- 
day national strike that forced the Government to 
withdraw proposed legislation to reform the traffic 
laws (Ref C).  Many of the trade unions are now 
closely affiliated with political parties, hampered 
by a lack of internal democracy, and perceived as 
corrupt or acquiescent to the interests of the 
ruling parties.  The Moroccan Labor Union (UMT) is 
the largest union and dominates particularly in the 
private sector.  The UMT has been controlled by 
Mahjoub Benseddik, hero of the anti-colonial 
struggle, since 1955 and has not held an internal 
party congress since April 1995.  The Democratic 
Confederation of Labor (CDT) is the next largest 
union and has the greatest number of government 
employees.  Observers of the Moroccan labor scene 
agree that the CDT and UMT are the only two trade 
unions that operate with a degree of independence 
from the Government and political parties. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The third-largest trade union is the 
General Union of Moroccan Workers (UGTM), affiliated 
with the ruling Istiqlal (Independence) party of 
Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi.  Hamid Chabat, the 
head of the UGTM and Mayor of the City of Fes, also 
sits on the executive committee of the Istiqlal 
 
party (Ref D).  The UGTM has supported the policies 
of the Government, often to the chagrin on its 
members, and only in October 2009 participated for 
the first time in a public sector strike.  The 
fourth-largest trade union is the National Labor 
Union of Morocco (UNTM), affiliated with the 
Islamist-oriented Party of Justice and Development 
(PJD).  The PJD's exclusion from Morocco's coalition 
governments has given it more freedom to represent 
the interests of its members.  Finally, the 
Democratic Federation of Labor (FDT), affiliated 
with the Popular Front of Socialist Union party, was 
formed when the CDT split from the party in 2002. 
 
SITUATION REGARDING SPECIFIC LABOR RIGHTS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Paragraphs 8-21 provide details and a 
description of specific labor rights as requested in 
Ref A. 
 
Freedom of Association 
---------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The Moroccan constitution guarantees 
freedom of association, including the right to join 
a union.  Moreover, the Labor Code allows workers to 
freely join and withdraw from a trade union and 
provides regulations for forming and registering a 
union.  In practice, however, this right is not 
always respected.  Trade union leaders told PolOff 
that attempts to organize workers, in particular in 
under-represented areas such as the export-oriented 
intensive agriculture in Agadir, frequently resulted 
in the dismissal and harassment of workers engaged 
in unionizing activities.  In addition, trade unions 
cited other incidents of harassment, including the 
transfer or demotion of six employees who led the 
effort to form an air traffic controllers union in 
February of 2008.  The unions also cited the high 
number of labor representatives elected without a 
union affiliation as proof of employers' exercise of 
undue influence to prevent effective union 
representation. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) From May 19 to 29, 2009, the GOM held 
elections for labor representatives for the first 
time since 2003.  The election of labor 
representatives, required for all businesses with 
ten or more salaried employees every six years, is 
significant, since it is the duty of the labor 
representative to submit individual complaints about 
working conditions to the employer and to refer 
unresolved complaints to the labor inspector. 
Moreover, the elections designate which trade unions 
are the "most representative" and hence eligible to 
participate in collective bargaining by enterprise 
as well as participate in the social dialogue with 
the government to determine labor policy.  "Most 
representative," for the purpose of collective 
bargaining by enterprise, requires a trade union to 
have at least 35 percent of the total number of 
labor representatives in an enterprise.  To 
participate in the social dialogue, a union must 
have a minimum of 6 percent of the total number of 
labor representatives. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) The 2009 election, the first under the 
new labor code, included for the first time, the 
election of labor representatives from the 
agriculture and handicrafts sectors (although 
turnout in these areas was low).  According to 
statistics provided by the Ministry of Employment 
and Professional Training (MOEPT), 8,487 of the 
13,578 registered businesses, or 62.5 percent, 
participated in the elections.  Of the 615,550 
registered workers, 81 percent, or 498,468, 
participated.  The overwhelming majority of labor 
representative seats, 11,608 out of a total of 
 
18,063, or 64 percent, were won by representatives 
without any trade union affiliation, known by the 
French acronym as SAS (Sans Appertenance Syndicale). 
Trade union leaders argued that the high number of 
SAS representatives was due to poorly regulated 
elections which allowed employers to either pressure 
their workers into electing an SAS representative 
sympathetic to the employer or to rig the election 
outright and name an SAS representative.  The 
confederation of private enterprises (CGEM) and the 
Government countered that workers are alienated and 
distrustful of the highly politicized trade unions, 
which lack transparency and internal democracy and 
have failed to represent adequately the interests of 
workers. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The rest of the labor representatives 
were elected as follows: 
 
UMT:  2,481 or 13.74 percent 
CDT:  1,393 or  7.71 percent 
UGTM: 1,045 or  5.79 percent 
UNTM:   683 or  3.79 percent 
FDT:    520 or  2.88 percent 
Others: 333 or  1.84 percent 
 
The remaining 333 representatives were divided among 
15 other trade unions.  According to Moroccan law, 
failure to meet a six-percent threshold means that, 
in theory, the UNTM and the FDT will not be allowed 
to participate in the social dialogue with the 
Government. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Despite commitments from GOM officials at 
the time of the U.S.-Morocco FTA negotiations, 
Morocco has still not ratified ILO Convention 87 
covering freedom of association and the right to 
organize.  In November 2009, the MOEPT submitted to 
the trade unions two draft laws, the first of which 
reforms to the right to strike law (and is covered 
in the next section).  The second draft law aims to 
unify legislation concerning the formation and 
management of trade unions.  The legislation would 
mandate greater transparency and democracy in the 
unions by requiring a union to hold an internal 
congress every four years.  In addition, it would 
require unions to open their books to government 
inspectors and account for the use of government- 
provided subsidies and member dues.  The Minister of 
Employment Jamal Rhmani argued that passage of this 
law would permit Morocco to ratify Convention 87 and 
be compliant with its conditions.  While the trade 
unions have not yet officially responded, we expect 
they will vociferously resist its passage. 
 
Collective Bargaining and the Right to Strike 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Unions have the right to bargain 
collectively, but in practice, this right is 
infrequently used.  The GOM held numerous meetings 
with trade union representatives throughout 2009 
under the rubric of the "social dialogue."  However, 
talks mainly focused on wage and benefit issues 
related to civil servants and an increase in the 
minimum wage, rather than labor policy.  No 
agreement has been reached on these issues, and 
civil servants, especially from the Ministries of 
Health, Justice, and National Education, went on 
strike repeatedly in late 2009.  Trade unions told 
PolOff that employers are reluctant to engage in 
tripartite talks and instead negotiations are 
frequently held with the Government representing the 
interests of the enterprises. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Workers have the right to strike but are 
required by law to give ten days notice, unless the 
issue concerns the non-payment of salaries or 
threatens the health or life of workers, in which 
 
case only 24 hours notice is required.  Workers who 
wish to engage in a strike are required to submit to 
mediation by a labor inspector.  In practice, 
workers frequently went on strike without notifying 
the Government in advance.  According to the MOEPT, 
in the first nine months of 2009, there were 168 
strikes resulting in the loss of 242,247 days of 
work.  The MOEPT also reported that labor inspectors 
assisted negotiations that avoided 537 planned 
strikes.  Observers agree, however, that this number 
does not accurately represent the true state of 
labor relations and is likely a tally of the 
"official strikes" referred to labor inspectors. 
Finally, the courts have the power to reinstate 
workers who are unfairly dismissed.  The MOEPT 
reported that in the first nine months of 2009, 
5,713 workers were reinstated. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Trade unions complained that the GOM 
continues to use Penal Code Article 288 to prosecute 
workers who participate in a strike.  Article 288 
prescribes a sentence of one month to two years' 
imprisonment for any individual using force, threat 
or fraudulent activities to cause a coordinated 
stoppage of work in order to force a change in wages 
or that jeopardizes the free exercise of work. 
Unions alleged that the GOM frequently used this law 
to prosecute workers, citing the example of strikes 
in January 2009 at the SOPROFEL packaging plant in 
Biourga, Agadir, where a number of workers were 
injured by strikebreakers and then prosecuted and 
sentenced under Article 288. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Minister of Employment and Professional 
Training has tabled a draft law on the right to 
strike.  The new legislation would require that 35 
percent of workers, through the labor 
representatives, agree to a strike, and give ten 
days notice.  The bill would require mediation 
before a labor commission, rather than by the labor 
inspectors, and would include prohibitions on 
strikebreaking and sit-ins.  Minister Rhmani 
announced that the passage of this law would allow 
the GOM to abrogate Article 288 and bring the 
Government in compliance with its ILO obligations. 
 
Elimination of Forced Labor and Child Labor 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶17.  (SBU) Despite substantial steps to address the 
issue, Morocco continues to have a significant 
problem with the use of child labor in multiple 
sectors.  Young girls trafficked from the 
countryside to work as domestic servants or "petites 
bonnes" are especially vulnerable to physical and 
sexual abuse and forced labor.  The GOM has proposed 
a law that would extend the labor code to include 
domestic workers and increase penalties for those 
who employ minors.  A comprehensive assessment of 
the problem of child labor and the GOM's efforts to 
address the issue is available in mission reporting 
on child labor for TVPR and TDA (Ref B). 
 
Elimination of Employment Discrimination 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶18.  (SBU) Women are the primary victims of wage, 
employment and workplace discrimination.  Morocco's 
most prominent non-governmental organizations for 
women's rights reported that women are the frequent 
victims of sexual harassment and discrimination in 
the workplace.  Sexual harassment is a crime under 
the penal code, but only when committed by a 
superior, and is classified as an abuse of 
authority.  The law was not adequately enforced by 
the Government.  Women were generally reluctant to 
sue their employers for fear of losing their jobs, 
anticipated difficulties in proving their case and 
conservative social mores that would harm their 
 
reputation. 
 
Acceptable Condition of Work 
---------------------------- 
 
¶19.  (SBU) The national minimum wage for non- 
agricultural work is 1,873 Dirham per month (USD 
230) based on a 44-hour work week.  Agricultural 
workers earn 55.12 dirham per day or 1,203 dirham a 
month (USD 137) based on a 48-hour work week.  The 
minimum wage does not provide an adequate standard 
of living for a worker and his family.  Trade unions 
reported that many employers do not respect the 
minimum wage, do not pay overtime as required by the 
law and do not accurately report workers' earnings 
to the national social security system.  The MOEPT, 
through its labor inspectors, reported that among 
the offenses failure to pay the minimum wage was the 
number one issue, accounting for 34 percent of all 
fines.  Failure to pay a worker's social security 
obligations accounted for another 20 percent. 
 
¶20.  (SBU) The law specifies a number of health and 
safety standards for workers, but in practice these 
are rarely enforced.  There are less than a dozen 
labor inspectors who specialize in health and safety 
issues, and their numbers are inadequate to enforce 
the standards properly as set by the law.  The 
MOEPT, in discussions with PolOff, has requested 
funding for the training of health and safety 
inspectors, which representatives admitted were too 
few in number. 
 
Strategic Recommendations 
------------------------- 
 
¶21.  (SBU) The Mission recommends a sustained and 
focused engagement with GOM on priority labor 
issues, specifically targeting areas where the GOM 
is able to make tangible improvements, such as in 
fighting child labor, training and resources for the 
labor inspectors, and more robust enforcement of the 
existing labor code.  Washington agencies, including 
the Office of the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR), should continue to emphasize the importance 
of enforcing current labor regulations in their 
bilateral discussions with the GOM.  The 
consultation and assistance provisions on labor and 
environment of the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement 
provide a vehicle both for highlighting problems 
with compliance, and for helping with solutions.  It 
might be possible to augment our technical 
assistance, provided under the FTA, through MEPI or 
other funding, to emphasize the importance of the 
labor and environmental chapters.  The USG should, 
for example, stress to the GOM the need to assure 
adequate enforcement of minimum core labor standards 
in the export-oriented value-added agriculture 
sector, where Moroccan and U.S. labor groups have 
recently noted deficiencies.  Past and current DOL 
programs have been well received and produced 
measurable results.  In particular, the Department 
of Labor's program "Strengthening Industrial 
Relations" to achieve higher levels of compliance 
with the new labor code through the training of 
labor inspectors and union representatives, 
implemented by the ILO, was a positive first step to 
increase enforcement.  The Mission supports the ILO 
follow-on proposal to continue the training program 
-- in our view, a much-needed next step.  Any 
follow-on proposal should have clearly defined 
indicators to measure the progress of the GOM's 
enforcement of the labor code. 
 
¶22.  (SBU) Labor Engagement:  The GOM's efforts to 
pass legislation requiring the trade unions to 
become more transparent and democratic are likely to 
meet with stiff resistance.  The problem of union 
independence is intricately tied to weaknesses of 
 
capacity in the political parties, which remain 
largely powerless to initiate and implement reform 
independent of the Palace.  The AFL-CIO's Solidarity 
Center reported that its training and cooperation 
with Moroccan trade unions is limited to work with 
CDT.  According to the Solidarity Center 
representative, the UMT was eager to receive funding 
but declined training and cooperation programs, 
arguing that the UMT had its own internal trainers. 
The representative opined that the real reason for 
their refusal to enter into a partnership was the 
UMT's reluctance to lift the veil on its internal 
workings.  Ultimately, stronger unions are the key 
to bringing pressure to bear on the GOM to 
adequately enforce existing labor legislation.  U.S. 
engagement with the trade unions needs to be open to 
all the unions and would be best achieved through a 
program such as "Strengthening Industrial 
Relations." 
 
¶23.  (SBU) Child Labor:  This is an area that has 
seen real progress but still remains a significant 
problem.  U.S. support for more programming is very 
much needed.  If the GOM is successful in passing 
new legislation to restrict and penalize the use of 
female child domestics, the U.S. should look for 
ways to support the initiative with program funding. 
 
Ongoing Labor Programs 
---------------------- 
 
¶24.  (U) The U.S. Department of Labor's program 
"Combating Child Labor through Education (Dima 
Adros)" is scheduled to last from 2007 until 2010 at 
a cost of USD 3 million.  The program aims to 
prevent exploitive child labor in rural areas 
through school retention.  The program has been 
highly successful and a model for capacity building 
of local NGOs and an effective means of preventing 
child labor. 
 
Labor Contacts 
-------------- 
 
¶25.  (U) Post Labor Reporting Officer is Matthew 
Lehrfeld, e-mail: LehrfeldMW@state.gov, telephone: 
+212522264550 ext.4151, fax number: +212522208096. 
The Senior Foreign Commercial Service Officer is 
Jane Kitson, e-mail: Jane.Kitson@mail.doc.gov, 
telephone: +212522264550 ext.4129, fax: 
+212522220259, the Economic Counselor is Michael 
DeTar, e-mail: DeTarMR@state.gov, telephone: 
+212537668132, fax: +212537765661. 
 
¶26.  (U) The principal interlocutor for labor issues 
at the MOEPT is Abdelaziz Addoum, Director of Labor, 
e-mail: azizaddoum@yahoo.fr, telephone: 
+212537281861, fax: +212537281858. 
 
¶27.  (U) The MOEPT provides office space and hosts a 
local officer from International Labor 
Organization's International Program for the 
Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC) to oversee and 
coordinate programs to reduce child, forced and 
exploitive labor.  Ms. Malak Ben Chekroun is the 
National Program Administrator for ILO-IPEC, e-mail: 
benchekroum@ilo.org, telephone: +212537291881, fax: 
+212537290864. 
 
¶28.  (U) The AFL-CIO Solidarity Center maintains an 
office in Rabat and is active in providing training 
to unions, principally the CDT.  The regional 
officer based in Algiers is Loraine Clewer, e-mail: 
LClewer@solidaritycenter-dz.org, telephone: 
+213770650395, fax: +212537681437.  There is a local 
program officer, Driss Choukri, e-mail: 
dchoukri@solidaritycenter-dz.org, telephone: 
+212537681436, fax: +212537681437. 
 
¶29.  (U) UNICEF is active in promoting studies and 
programs aimed at child protection, in particular 
child labor.  Ms. Malika Elatifi, Specialist in 
Child Protection, e-mail: maltifi@unicef.org, 
telephone: 212537759741, fax: 212537759760. 
 
¶30.  (U) Embassy Rabat cleared this message. 
 
MILLARD