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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/18 
TAGS: ENRG ECON EINV CO VE
SUBJECT: Venezuela: The GBRV's Political Response to Colombian Offer 
ofAssistance

REF: 10 CARACAS 35; 10 CARACAS 139; 10 CARACAS 173 

CLASSIFIED BY: DarnallSteuart, Economic Counselor, DOS, Econ; 
REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 

¶1. (SBU) In response to press reports of Colombian Minister of 
Mines and Energy HernC!nMartC-nez' offer to help Venezuela through 
its current electricity crisis, Venezuela's Executive Vice 
President ElC-as Jaua rejected the Colombian offer on Tuesday, 
February 16.  On Wednesday, February 17, Venezuelan Minister for 
Electricity AlC- RodrC-guez clarified the GBRV's position, stating 
that it would analyze any Colombian offer, just as it had done with 
Brazil's offer of assistance.

¶2. (SBU) Venezuelan press reports on February 18 quote RodrC-guez as 
modifying the GBRV's position even further, expressing skepticism 
about Colombia's intentions and noting, "The most that Colombia has 
supplied Venezuela is 140 MW and the consumption here is 17,000 MW. 
If the Colombian offer is serious, it could contribute to resolving 
part of the problem, but only a small part."  Press reports, 
however, state 140 MW represents 70% of the GBRV's goal in its 
electricity reduction program for Caracas (200 MW) and that 140 MW 
could supply the electricity needs of an entire city, such as 
Puerto La Cruz.

¶3. (SBU) According to statements published in the Venezuelan press 
on February 11, Colombian Foreign Minister Jaime BermC:dez said that 
the GOC had not ceased dialogue with Venezuela despite bilateral 
tensions.  This was followed up on February 12 with Colombian 
Defense Minister Gabriel Silva's statement saying the GOC was 
expecting "a signal of the GBRV's willingness to settle differences 
and fight regional enemies..."  He added that if the bilateral 
relations between the two states "limped back together," Colombia 
could help Venezuela on security issues.  According to press 
reports, the GBRV expected to receive a formal Colombian offer on 
Thursday, February 18. 

¶4. (C) COMMENT: After months of the GBRV demonizing Colombia and 
politicizing the bilateral relationship, Colombia's offer caught 
the GBRV unprepared.  Newly named Vice President Jaua was quick to 
reject a potential offer of assistance, RodrC-guez walked back 
Jaua's comments, and then added his own political spin to 
Colombia's offer.  For its part, the GBRV has (1) created a 
ministry to confront the issue, (2) appointed, fired, and appointed 
a new electricity minister, (3) enacted unpopular electricity 
rationing measures across the country, (4) accepted assistance from 
Brazil, Argentina, and Cuba, (5) declared an electricity state of 
emergency and (6) appointed an "Electricity General Staff" to 
handle the crisis.  The GBRV would be hard pressed to explain how a 
Colombian offer is "political" when most of its own responses to 
the crisis could also be construed as "political" and 
"bureaucratic."  Given the Venezuelan public's frustration with the 
GBRV's own efforts to date, it appears that Minister RodrC-guez
understood better than the new Vice President that for both 
political and practical reasons a more open response to Colombia 
constituted the wiser course.  END COMMENT. 
DUDDY