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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CARACAS 000197 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/02/12 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE PREL
SUBJECT: Expections for Chavez' Electoral Strategy 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Robin D. Meyer, Political Counselor, DOS, POL; REASON: 
1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  Based on Chavez' past practices, most observers 
expect him to employ the following electoral strategies in the 
September 26 elections for National Assembly (AN) Deputies in order 
to achieve his goal of retaining at least a two thirds majority: 
using his political machine to get out the vote, making the 
elections about him rather than the candidates, intimidating 
friends and adversaries, diverting attention away from problematic 
issues, and using state resources to fund the campaign and win 
voter support.  Political leaders from both sides see the AN 
elections as crucial for Chavez' ability to advance his 
"Bolivarian" project unimpeded by legislative or judicial 
constraints.   If Chavez assesses that he will not be able to 
retain his super majority in the AN, many political leaders and 
observers believe he might either try to derail the elections or to 
undercut the AN's authority.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
----------------------------- 
 
GEAR UP THE MACHINE 
 
----------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶2.  (C)  In past elections, Chavez has won or lost based on his 
ability to get out his supporters and avoid abstentionism. 
Pollsters have told Poloffs that disaffected Chavistas and 
independent voters are more likely to stay home than cast a ballot 
in favor of an opposition candidate, particularly given widespread 
concerns about the secrecy of the vote.  For example, many 
Venezuelans are reportedly fearful that the use of fingerprint 
machines to confirm voter identity can be tied to their actual 
vote.  Since approximately 2.3 million Venezuelans are employed by 
the public sector, these voters and their family members may feel 
vulnerable to job-related retaliation. 
 
 
 
¶3.  (C)  The PSUV  began revving up its electoral machinery in 
October 2009 with the announcement of a PSUV party congress and the 
use of "socialist patrols" - a grassroots effort that tasks each 
member with "delivering" a certain number of people to the polls - 
during the November 15 election for party congress delegates. 
Despite this effort, however, the  abstention rate in that election 
was reported to be high, suggesting that Chavez may need to do more 
to mobilize his base. 
 
 
 
------------------------ 
 
MAKE IT PERSONAL 
 
------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶4.  (C)  Chavez has already begun to try to recast the legislative 
elections as a plebiscite about him.  Although his polling numbers 
dropped towards the end of 2009, he retains a high level of 
personal support.  Chavez' use of rumors of enemy plots at home and 
abroad - ranging from coup rumors to allegations of possible U.S. 
and Dutch attacks against Venezuela -may be intended to suggest a 
threat to his personal survival.  AN President Cilia Flores 
commented on January 5 that "the Venezuelan opposition is planning 
a coup attempt from the Assembly, just like what happened in 
Honduras six months ago."  At the January 23 kick-off of the PSUV 
electoral campaign, Chavez told his followers that "I demand 
absolute loyalty to my leadership because I am not me, I am the 
people." 
 
 
 
¶5.  (C)  Chavez will also try to use his high personal approval 
 
CARACAS 00000197  002 OF 004 
 
 
ratings to win support for PSUV candidates for the National 
Assembly who are likely to be relatively unknown and to lack their 
own political base.  His personal selection of the candidates and 
his personal appearances with them on the campaign trail will 
likely be used to show that these candidates represent Chavismo, 
rather than simply themselves.  Whether this strategy can work for 
Chavez during this electoral season will depend largely on his own 
poll numbers. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------- 
 
INTIMIDATE BOTH FRIEND AND FOE 
 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C)  Political observers believe that Chavez will likely 
continue to use selective, targeted attacks to intimidate potential 
threats within Chavismo and the opposition.  Intolerant of dissent 
within the PSUV or its allied parties, Chavez routinely "punishes" 
or threatens those who fail to toe the line.  For example, Deputy 
Oscar Figuera (Communist Party of Venezuela) was not reelected as 
head of the AN's Social Development Committee allegedly because of 
his too-vocal protest over Chavez' draft labor law.  In the case of 
independently popular PSUV Governor Henri Falcon, Chavez publicly 
warned him about getting too close to the opposition.  Falcon's 
assistant privately told Poloff on January 28 that Falcon would not 
meet with Ambassador Duddy out of concern that Chavez would expel 
him from the PSUV if he did. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C)  Many observers also expect that Chavez will also probably 
continue his selective attacks against high-ranking members of 
opposition as well as PSUV-allied parties .  In the past year, the 
Venezuelan government (GBRV) has issued arrest warrants or jailed 
leaders from "A New Time" (UNT), "Homeland for All" (PPT), "Brave 
People's Alliance" (ABP), and "We Can" ("Podemos").  Student 
activists have been detained on a number of occasions.  In late 
December 2009, Comptroller General Clodosvaldo Russian announced a 
new list of 150 officials disqualified from running for public 
office based simply on allegations of malfeasance or criminal 
conduct.  Russian pledged on January 18 that political 
disqualifications ("inhabilitaciones") would continue to be issued 
against unspecified officials; these administrative sanctions bar 
public officials from running for office for a specified period 
without any prior judicial process or ruling.  Since, as pollsters 
observe, there is minimal public interest in these 
"disqualifications," they remain an effective and relatively 
cost-free tool for Chavez to use against political opponents. 
 
 
 
¶8.  (C)  Chavez could also try to create a generalized sense of 
threat to discourage political activism. For example, Chavez has 
tried to paint student protesters as radicals trying to "turn 
cities into chaos." Pollster Joe Saade (protect) noted that 
targeted, individual killings, such as the killing of student 
protesters in Merida, was a way of stoking fear, although with a 
potentially high political cost. 
 
 
 
------------------------------- 
 
DISTRACT AND CONQUER 
 
------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶9.  (C)  According to opposition political party leaders, Chavez 
may also try to divert the opposition's focus on the elections and 
 
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on the social and economic issues of concern to most voters.  In 
mid-January, for example, Chavez repeatedly challenged the 
opposition to collect signatures to hold a recall referendum 
("revocatorio").  AN President Cilia Flores, a close Chavez ally, 
said January 27 that "opposition, it is your moment.  If it is 
true, as you say, that Chavez is in his worst moment and has lost 
the support of the majority, well, convoke a recall referendum and 
so, one by one, we will see who has the majority."  Similarly, in 
mid-December, Chavez floated the idea of convoking a constituent 
assembly to redraft the Constitution - an initiative he did not 
pursue but that kept the opposition in discussions for weeks. 
Opposition party leaders Julio Borges ("Primero Justicia") and 
Henri Ramos Allup ("Accion Democratica") suggested that Chavez' 
decision to close RCTV was intended in part to distract attention 
away from the controversial currency devaluation and electrical 
rationing plan to "political" issues purportedly of less interest 
to poorer voters.  Datanalisis pollster Luis Vicente Leon (protect) 
suggested that Chavez could use the threat of an armed conflict 
with Colombia to stoke Venezuelan nationalism, hoping for a "rally 
around the flag" effect. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------------ 
 
USING STATE RESOURCES FOR PSUV CAMPAIGNING 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------------ 
 
 
 
¶10.  (C)  Notwithstanding statutes that supposedly limit or ban the 
use of state funds in election campaigns, Chavez has repeatedly 
made use of state money for partisan campaigning with minimal 
consequences.  Government agencies have been visibly involved in 
distributing PSUV campaign materials - even displaying party 
propaganda on the front steps of government offices in downtown 
Caracas.  The National Electoral Council (CNE) and the Public 
Ministry are legally required to prohibit and punish such abuses. 
However, Chavez controls the CNE, which has wide discretion in 
establishing the electoral timetable and election-related 
regulations.  While Vicente Diaz, the sole independent CNE rector, 
remains in charge of the CNE committee that regulates campaign 
financing, CNE administrator Aime Nogat told Poloffs January 19 
that Diaz's role will probably be nominal at best since the CNE 
leadership selected in December 2009 has reduced what little space 
had existed for "respectful dialogue" and what little authority 
Diaz had.  As a result, Diaz will be even less able challenge PSUV 
campaign abuses. 
 
 
 
¶11.  (C)  As he has in the past, Chavez is expected to dedicate 
substantial resources to the social missions, particularly those in 
health and education, that benefit his political base.  The January 
8 currency devaluation was seen by many as principally a way to 
fill government coffers in order to support this pre-election 
spending spree. 
 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
AND IF FACED WITH A LOSS? 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶12.  (C)  Without exception, political observers have predicted 
that Chavez will not tolerate losing his super majority control in 
the AN.  While elections expert Eugenio Martinez told Poloffs on 
January 13 that Chavez accepted electoral defeat before in the 
December 2007 referendum, and is capable of doing so again, he 
could create a work-around in the event he lost his two thirds 
majority.  During the three-month lame duck session after the 
 
CARACAS 00000197  004 OF 004 
 
 
elections, Martinez speculated that Chavez could seek legislation 
that would give him indefinite decree powers ("ley habilitante") or 
that would drastically decrease the legal powers of the legislative 
branch. 
 
 
 
¶13.  (C)  However, others doubt Chavez would allow elections to be 
held if he assessed the PSUV would lose its two thirds majority. 
Some legal experts said that Chavez could try to cancel or suspend 
the elections by having the Supreme Court rule the new electoral 
law (LOPE) unconstitutional and require that the AN pass new 
legislation; the constitution does not permit elections to be held 
until at least six months after new electoral legislation is 
passed.  However, cancelling elections would have high political 
costs, especially since national elections have apparently only 
been suspended twice in Venezuelan history.  Moreover, Chavez has 
used elections to give domestic and international legitimacy to his 
"Bolivarian project."  Some observers suggest that, if faced with a 
truly desperate situation, Chavez could declare a state of 
emergency that would allow him to dissolve the government, although 
most consider it unlikely unless there were unprecedented, violent 
social unrest and/or mass infrastructure failure. 
 
 
 
------------- 
 
COMMENT 
 
------------- 
 
 
 
¶14.  (C)  Venezuela has not held "normal" AN elections since 2000 
(due to the opposition's boycott of the 2005 election), making the 
September elections unpredictable.  Most observers still estimate 
that Chavez will easily retain his two thirds majority, although a 
significant number of opposition deputies will make the National 
Assembly much less compliant than it is now.  Chavez' electoral 
strategy and campaigning skill will be tested if electricity 
rationing, water shortages, and inflation become crises this spring 
and summer.  Chavez' habit of publicly blaming officials within his 
own government for these and other problems, often during his 
televised Sunday "Alo Presidente" show, has deprived officials of 
credibility and cast doubt on whether anyone in the GBRV other than 
Chavez can be trusted by the public to resolve these problems.  His 
challenge, therefore, will be to make the election about him, while 
also instilling public confidence in the PSUV candidates. 
DUDDY