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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000177 
 
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AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA 
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PASS TO AMCONSUL QUEBEC 
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF 
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG 
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PASS TO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2035/02/12 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: Opposition Committed to Elections Despite Challenges 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Robin D. Meyer, Political Counselor, State, POL; 
REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.       (C)  Summary.  Despite continuing internal rivalries, 
opposition political party leaders are united on the need to resist 
Chavez' "provocations" and remain focused on the September 
legislative elections, where they expect to present a unified 
candidate slate and to win at least 40 seats in the National 
Assembly.  Several expect Chavez to try to derail the elections if 
he thinks he will lose his "rubber stamp" two thirds majority. 
Some Chavistas are concerned about the upcoming elections given 
looming inflation and electricity rationing and divisions within 
Chavismo.  End Summary. 
 
 
 
Legislative Elections - The End of the Rubber Stamp Congress? 
 
 
 
¶2.      (C)  Following a week of coup rumors and anti-government 
student protests sparked by the closing of RCTV, Ambassador and 
Polcouns met with a variety of anti- and pro-government politicians 
during the week of February 1 to discuss each sides' assessment of 
their political prospects in this election year.  All characterized 
the September 26 legislative elections as decisive for Chavez' 
ability to advance his Bolivarian project.  Both anti- and 
pro-government politicians concurred that Chavez was not eager for 
the legislative elections to take place. 
 
 
 
¶3.      (C)  Political party leaders speculated about ways that 
Chavez could try to "provoke" a situation that would allow him to 
cancel the elections if he thought the ruling United Socialist 
Party of Venezuela (PSUV) would not win a two thirds majority. 
National Assembly Second Vice President Jose Albornoz ("Patria para 
Todos") (PPT), who is allied with the PSUV, told Polcouns on 
February 4 that the opposition had not "taken the bait" of calling 
for a recall referendum ("revocatorio"), as Chavez had been 
taunting them to do, which would have diverted the opposition's 
time, attention, and resources away from the legislative elections. 
Opposition legislator Juan Jose Molina ("Podemos") told Polcouns on 
February 5 that Chavez' agenda was "radicalization and violence" in 
order to provoke a situation in which Chavez could declare a "state 
of emergency" or otherwise suspend or cancel the elections.  As for 
the political cost from cancelling the elections, Luis Carlos 
Solorzano (COPEI) recalled Chavez' February 7 televised walk 
through downtown Caracas,  when he pointed to certain historic 
buildings and ordered the mayor to "expropriate them," and 
concluded that Chavez was increasingly less concerned about 
maintaining his democratic faC'ade; "his democratic halo is 
evaporating."  Diego Arria, a former mayor of Caracas, political 
ally of former President Carlos Andres Perez and former Venezuelan 
Ambassador at the UN, told the Ambassador on February 1 that Chavez 
could also use pro-government militant groups, such as "La 
Piedrita," the "Tupamaro," and the "Lina Ron Brigade," to instigate 
violence. 
 
 
 
Elections - Opposition Cautiously Optimistic 
 
 
 
¶4.      (C)  Most opposition political party leaders agreed on the 
need for the opposition to remain focused on the legislative 
elections.  Julio Borges ("Primero Justicia") cautioned against 
"shortcuts," referring to the opposition's strategy in 2001-2002 of 
provoking civil disturbances and a coup, which he insisted only 
made the establishment of legitimate democratic institutions harder 
in the long run.  He even expressed concern about the January 31 
call for Chavez' resignation by a group of former Chavista military 
and government officials, which Borges feared could contribute to 
coup rumors and divert attention from the electoral process. 
 
 
 
¶5.      (C)  However, none of the opposition leaders was able to 
enunciate a campaign theme or message.  Solorzano blamed the 
opposition leadership's lack of political will or interest in 
defining a message, claiming that, despite the extensive work of 
 
CARACAS 00000177  002 OF 003 
 
 
the "unity table" subcommittee on "program," the leadership only 
dedicated 15 minutes a week to the issue.  However, Solorzano, 
Borges, and Ramos Allup ("Accion Democratica") all talked of the 
need for the opposition to address the social and economic problems 
of concern to all voters.  Solorzano said the sub-committee had 
focused on social security, health, education, personal and legal 
security, and balance of powers ("reinstitutionalization").  Ramos 
Allup said the opposition had to focus on insecurity, 
water/electricity, and the cost of living.  Solorzano said the 
themes of the still inchoate "message" would probably be peace (in 
contrast to Chavez' calls for war), inclusion (as opposed to 
Chavez' rhetoric of exclusion), and equilibrium (rather than 
Chavez' goal of dominance).  Borges and Allup said the opposition 
had to refrain from allowing Chavez to divert the opposition's 
attention away from economic/social issues. 
 
 
 
¶6.      (C)  The opposition parties appeared to take as given that 
they would announce a unified slate of candidates for the September 
elections by the April 30 deadline.  Borges estimated that most of 
the candidates would be chosen through a "consensus" process 
organized by the opposition "unity table," but that about 30 would 
have to be selected through primary elections.  They acknowledged 
the potential for division and "personalism" when the decisions 
were actually made in March and April.  Already, opposition figures 
have begun announcing their candidacies even before the "unity 
table" selection process has been completed. 
 
 
 
¶7.      (C)  While hurt by the new electoral law and redistricting, 
the opposition leaders all calculated the opposition could win at 
least 40 seats.  Solorzano and Borges were the most optimistic, 
with Solorzano predicting an opposition win of 50 seats and Borges 
even seeing the possibility of winning a blocking one third.  Even 
Chavez ally Jose Albornoz claimed the opposition would win about 40 
seats, which, he lamented, while less than a blocking one third, 
would still create "problems" in the National Assembly.  According 
to Solorzano, even if the opposition wins less than a blocking one 
third, Chavez will face a different game if the National Assembly 
has a significant opposition presence. 
 
 
 
¶8.      (C)  In contrast to this focus on elections, former Caracas 
mayor and former UN Ambassador Arria advocated building a legal 
case against Chavez, whom he characterized as a "walking rap 
sheet." Arrias referred to the January 31 announcement of the 
former Chavista military officers (see para 5 above) as a positive 
step that contributed to the de-legitimization of Chavez in the 
international community. 
 
 
 
Elections - Chavismo Divided and Worried 
 
 
 
¶9.       (C) Government ally Albornoz claimed that Chavez was 
concerned about the elections given the looming inflation and 
electrical crisis.  He said many PSUV Deputies who did not expect 
to be selected as candidates wanted to talk to him about joining 
the PPT.  Albornoz claimed that even Lara Governor Henri Falcon had 
approached him about possibly joining the PPT.  (Note:  Falcon is a 
popular PSUV governor with crossover appeal to many in the 
opposition.  Chavez has publicly challenged him to join the 
opposition.  Falcon recently defied Chavez' call for a crackdown on 
student protesters by calling for dialogue rather than repression. 
End Note.)  (Comment:  While disgruntled, most Chavista Deputies 
lack the stature or the political base that would enable them to 
prosper outside of Chavez' patronage.  End Comment.)  Albornoz said 
the PPT was considering forming an electoral alliance with several 
small leftist parties, including the Communist Party (PCV), which 
is unhappy with Chavez' decisions to not support their draft 
workers law and to replace the PCV Chair of the National Assembly's 
Social Development Committee. 
 
CARACAS 00000177  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶10.   (C)  While PSUV Deputies Saul Ortega, Calixto Ortega, 
Francisco Torrealba, and Hiroshima Bravo asserted to Polcouns that 
the PSUV would win between 127- 140 of the 165 seats in the 
National Assembly, they expressed concern about the government's 
communication efforts, alleging that widespread public doubts about 
Chavez' programs were due to the GBRV's own ineffective 
communication.  In contrast to Albornoz, Saul Ortega stressed the 
PSUV's internal party discipline, which would ensure that, whatever 
the process for candidate selection, all PSUV members would support 
the candidates selected.  (Note:  Saul Ortega himself had recently 
been replaced as the National Assembly's First Vice  President. 
End Note.)  (Note and Comment:  Despite the assertions by Saul and 
Calixto Ortega, Chavez may in fact be concerned about party 
discipline.  In his February 7 "Alo Presidente" talk show, Chavez 
called on the National Assembly leadership to consider approving a 
law that would punish Deputies elected on the PSUV ticket from 
changing parties after their election.  End Note.) 
 
 
 
Appealing to the "Ni-Ni" Voters 
 
 
 
¶11.   (C)  Both the PPT and the opposition parties expressed 
interest in the growing percentage of voters identifying themselves 
as "ni-nis," neither with the government nor with the opposition. 
Albornoz considered the "ni ni" voters as potential supporters of a 
non-Chavez leftist alliance, while Solorzano stressed the need for 
"new opposition faces" to appeal to the "ni nis." However, Ramos 
Allup concluded that the "ni-nis" really do not exist as an 
independent voting bloc since polls show that, on the issues, there 
are no separate "ni-ni" positions:  overwhelming majorities support 
private property, reject the Cuban model, reject Chavez' reelection 
after 2012, etc. 
 
 
 
Comment 
 
 
 
¶12.   (C)  Chavez could face a difficult spring if projected 
electrical and water crises materialize.  The opposition is 
counting on this discontent to help them in the September 
elections. Chavez' recent actions, especially his summary 
expropriations, show his increasing willingness to dispense with 
the illusion of needing to consult with the legislature or 
judiciary before taking major decisions.  Despite the preference of 
some in the opposition to hope for "shortcuts," opposition 
political parties appear committed to the democratic and electoral 
process, despite its difficulties.  They believe that, even without 
a blocking one third, it will be a different game for Chavez after 
September. 
DUDDY