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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 BRUSSELS 000211 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR IO, EEB, S/CT, S/P, EUR, L, INL 
TREASURY FOR TFI, IA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2020 
TAGS: BEXP EAID EAIR EFIN ETRD ETTC EUN EWWT KHLS
KJUS, KNNP, KTFN, PARM, PINR, PTER, ZI, UNSC 
SUBJECT: THE EU AND SANCTIONS (INTRODUCING THE EU, PART 
VIII) 
 
REF: A. 2008 BRUSSELS 1790 
     ¶B. 2008 BRUSSELS 1825 
     ¶C. 2008 BRUSSELS 1880 
     ¶D. 2009 BRUSSELS 108 
     ¶E. 2009 BRUSSELS 276 
     ¶F. 2009 BRUSSELS 391 
     ¶G. 2009 BRUSSELS 622 
     ¶H. 2009 BRUSSELS 101 
     ¶I. 2009 BRUSSELS 1021 
     ¶J. 2009 BRUSSELS 616 
 
BRUSSELS 00000211  001.2 OF 007 
 
 
Classified By: USEU EconMinCouns Peter Chase for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
------------------------ 
INTRODUCTION AND COMMENT 
------------------------ 
 
¶1.  (C) This cable describes political and procedural 
dynamics associated with the creation and maintenance of 
EU-wide sanctions programs.  Effective USG influence over 
specific EU sanctions policies generally requires early, 
sustained, and strategic outreach to Member State capitals, 
Member State embassies in countries of concern and missions 
in Brussels, and the EU institutions.  The EU uses its Common 
Foreign and Security Policy ("CFSP") procedures to implement 
as a regional bloc (1) sanctions imposed by the UN Security 
Council, (2) EU programs that go beyond Member States' 
obligations under the UN Charter, and (3) programs involving 
no UN obligations.  Under CFSP rules, EU-level sanctions 
programs require the unanimous support of all 27 Member 
States.  Cumbersome procedures, inadequate resources, 
incoherent organization, and legal, political, and economic 
considerations are leading to "sanctions fatigue." 
Nonetheless, the EU's Lisbon Treaty strengthens CFSP 
significantly, creating new opportunities for U.S. foreign 
policy.  The final section of this cable outlines the 
categories of existing sanctions measures that fall within 
the CFSP framework. 
 
¶2.  (C) COMMENT: The USG should take advantage of the unique 
"post-Lisbon" transitional period to (1) stress that 
sanctions are an important tool of foreign policy, (2) 
encourage greater EU strategic planning, including by 
strengthening its implementation, enforcement, analytic, and 
intelligence-sharing capabilities, and (3) press the EU to 
create a sanctions unit within the nascent European 
diplomatic service.  We should continue to share technical 
and political analysis of specific sanctions measures where 
we assess that EU action could reinforce priority U.S. 
foreign policy and national security interests.  END COMMENT. 
 
------------------------ 
OVERALL SANCTIONS POLICY 
------------------------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) The European Union has long applied foreign policy- 
and security-based sanctions, reflecting the EU Member 
States' understanding that sanctions imposed collectively 
will be more effective.  Sanctions measures are adopted by 
Member State foreign ministers under the EU's Common Foreign 
and Security Policy ("CFSP"), where decisions are taken by 
consensus.  Applying such tools is a politically sensitive 
issue in all Member States.  The need for unanimity makes it 
relatively difficult for the EU to enact sanctions measures 
unless they have already been enacted by the UN.  But the EU 
does autonomously adopt sanctions that go beyond UN 
requirements.  And in some cases it will act absent UN 
measures. 
 
¶4.  (C) The EU and United States generally have common 
strategic objectives where sanctions have been imposed. 
Shared sanctions measures, even when largely symbolic, 
demonstrate transatlantic political unity.  Similarly, as the 
world's largest economy, the EU remains the most important 
 
BRUSSELS 00000211  002 OF 007 
 
 
U.S. counterpart in terms of economic sanctions 
implementation.  Joint U.S.-EU targeted financial sanctions 
are particularly powerful, since blocking access to the 
dollar, euro, pound, and other European currencies greatly 
limits targets' access to the world's formal financial and 
trade system.  The euro's increasing role as a reserve 
currency represents both a potential weakness and a crucial 
leverage point for U.S. economic sanctions programs in the 
future. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
DECISION-MAKING: LEGAL AND POLITICAL PROCESS 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Like the United States, the EU prefers a 
multilateral approach to sanctions, ideally under 
international legal obligations and political cover of UN 
Security Council resolutions.  Failing UN sanctions on 
important cases, Member States pursue unified EU measures 
instead of independent action along national lines.  EU-wide 
sanctions programs are usually initiated through a two-stage 
process:  establishing a common policy, and implementing 
through Commission or other mechanisms. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) First, to set sanctions policy, Member States must 
reach unanimous agreement.  Depending on the case, the 
consensus-making process can be simultaeously "top-down" and 
"bottom-up," with greatinterplay among Ambassadors in the 
country of concern, technical experts, and political leaders. 
 Council working groups responsible for the relevant 
geographical or functional issues are crucial venues in which 
negotiation and compromise occur.  (NOTE: Once consensus is 
reached within these groups, a window effectively closes on 
USG influence over EU policy.  However, many EU sanctions 
programs must be renewed every six to twelve months.  The USG 
can therefore also influence modifications to those programs 
during the renewal process, which mirrors the initial 
decision process.  END NOTE.)  In rare cases where agreement 
is stalled at the working group level, Political and Security 
Committee ("PSC") Ambassadors may continue discussions. 
Council Secretariat permanent staff produce draft policy 
documents using guidance from the appropriate working groups. 
 Their drafts are given to the External Relations ("RELEX") 
Counselors working group, which examines legal and technical 
issues associated with implementing sanctions programs. 
RELEX finalizes the legal texts and transmits documents for 
formal, usually pro forma, approval in the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives ("COREPER II Ambassadors") and 
adoption at subsequent EU Council of Ministers meetings.  The 
end results are "Council Decisions" (FKA Common Positions) 
laying out the broad scope of measures to be taken toward 
shared foreign policy objectives.  Individual Member States 
must pass national legislation or otherwise implement those 
measures for which they retain exclusive competence (e.g., 
travel bans and arms embargoes). 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Second, on the basis of mandates taken from Council 
Decisions, the Commission must propose for Council approval 
(after seeking the non-binding opinion of the European 
Parliament) Regulations prescribing in detail those sanctions 
implementing measures of EU-level competence.  Implementing 
Regulations most often involve trade or financial 
restrictions, such as asset freezes.  Regulations are 
directly applicable law across the European Union.  They 
enter into force upon publication in the EU's Official 
Journal. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Political will for autonomous sanctions can be 
inversely related to European economic interests.  Action has 
been swiftest and strongest in areas, such as Guinea, where 
EU economic sacrifices were relatively insignificant.  In 
contrast, Member State economic interests have prevailed over 
their political statements in key strategic contexts, such as 
Iran; collectively, the EU remains Iran's single largest 
trading partner.  As a general rule, EU sanctions are 
 
BRUSSELS 00000211  003.4 OF 007 
 
 
designed to target as closely as possible the individuals and 
entities responsible for undesirable policies and actions. 
This is partly a moral and legal question of proportionality 
and partly a practical consideration for a 27-member common 
market built on free movement of capital and trade 
liberalization.  The EU strongly resists economic sanctions 
against sovereign States per se, but is willing to designate 
individual regime members or parastatal enterprises where 
appropriate. 
 
¶9.  (C//NF) Although some Member States are either hawkish 
(e.g., UK and France) or largely indifferent toward sanctions 
issues, USEU encounters a general skepticism about the 
efficacy and utility of sanctions among the majority of its 
EU interlocutors.  Various factors fuel this skepticism.  The 
Commission is primarily designed to deploy the power of 
attraction (the proverbial carrot) in the EU's regional 
expansion and engagement with other third countries.  Rather 
than responding to problematic situations by restricting 
participation in community life, the EU often prefers to 
offer explicit incentives in exchange for desired behavioral 
change.  EU "sanctions fatigue" also stems from fears of lost 
economic opportunities, a litany of legal challenges to 
targeted sanctions in European courts, objections that 
sanctions are applied subjectively and inconsistently against 
certain countries, and the associated encumbrances for 
over-burdened bureaucracies.  Nonetheless, the EU is capable 
of taking consequential action in pursuit of its interests. 
European leaders are also sensitive to public opinion on 
major foreign policy issues and to the political and 
diplomatic symbolism of sanctions measures. 
 
¶10.  (C) The EU faces challenges to sanctions by terrorist or 
other targets in courts, as well as lobbying or public 
pressure by some business interests, academics, human rights 
advocates, politicians, and civil servants.  Negative 
publicity campaigns, particularly those criticizing the human 
rights implications of intelligence-driven targeted measures, 
have undermined support for sanctions implementation and 
raised political costs for proponents in key EU 
decision-making bodies.  The most comprehensive example is 
probably the public and legal campaign by the MeK, which 
successfully reversed their sanctions designation (REF H). 
 
¶11.  (C) EU courts and the European Parliament have heavily 
scrutinized Commission and Member State implementation of 
individualized/targeted sanctions, incrementally setting 
legal and practical limits to EU sanctions policy.  Legal 
cases in European courts, usually waged on due process 
grounds, have overturned several EU sanctions designations 
and required major reforms of internal implementation 
procedures.  Evolving European jurisprudence has established 
the importance of time limits to EU sanctions.  Autonomous 
programs must be reviewed, generally every six to twelve 
months, in order to be renewed.   A review is also the 
occasion for the EU to assess the political relevance of a 
program, including the appropriateness of each of its 
specific components and individual targets.  Working-level 
officials, often through informal outreach to U.S. 
counterparts, have attempted to mitigate the spillover 
implications that European jurisprudence could have for UN or 
other multilateral sanctions regimes. 
 
¶12.  (C) Indeed, through irrevocable court decisions, the EU 
risks losing the ability to implement targeted sanctions as a 
foreign policy tool.  The combined "Kadi" and "Al-Barakaat" 
case, which should complete its journey through the European 
Court of Justice in 2010, could even strike down the EU's 
ability to implement targeted UN counterterrorism sanctions 
on due process grounds (SEPTEL).  Individual EU and other 
countries could use such an outcome to justify their own 
non-compliance with the UN's Al-Qaeda and Taliban sanctions 
regime.  European leaders and opinion makers do not yet seem 
to be fully aware of the potential implications of a 
restricted "toolkit" for EU foreign policy. 
 
BRUSSELS 00000211  004.4 OF 007 
 
 
 
------------------------------------- 
U.S. INFLUENCE ON EU SANCTIONS POLICY 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C//NF) Effective USG influence over EU sanctions 
policies generally requires sustained, multi-dimensional 
outreach.  First and foremost, U.S. diplomats in target 
countries (e.g., Burma and Zimbabwe) should engage their EU 
counterparts, who are fundamental to EU listing and 
de-listing decisions.  Parallel outreach is also necessary in 
Member State capitals, in particular former colonial powers 
or governments with special relationships to target countries 
(usually the same as those with embassies in the field).  USG 
produced technical non-papers have proven to persuade EU 
analysis over the long term and influence program 
modifications during renewal decisions.  Some other avenues 
for USG outreach have included:  UN Security Council 
sanctions committees; information/intelligence sharing on a 
bilateral or EU-wide basis; weekly State (EUR/ERA) phone 
calls with the rotating EU Presidency; monthly demarches to 
the EU's Foreign Affairs Council (FKA the GAERC); ad hoc 
demarches; U.S.-EU political dialogues (FKA troikas); U.S.-EU 
Summits; technical and legal discussions or workshops with EU 
institutions; and indirect influence through like-minded 
NGOs.  Each priority U.S. sanctions program should be synched 
with the respective (e.g., Africa, Asia, Middle East, Iran, 
United Nations, Eastern Europe, Latin America, 
Non-proliferation, and Terrorist Financing) U.S.-EU "troika" 
political dialogue during each EU Presidency. 
 
¶14.  (C) USEU strives to ensure that U.S. and EU sanctions 
measures broadly correspond whenever possible.  Common 
transatlantic sanctions policies reduce the potential for 
trade disputes and facilitate political unity toward third 
countries or in multilateral venues.  Some U.S. and EU 
programsappropriate help dcentives for these staQfers or 
their superiors to take proactive initiative beyond their 
formal mandates within theEU's intensely legalistic and 
process-oriente structures.  As a result, the EU 
institutQons do not engage in formal or informal outreach to 
quantify Member State implementation and eEU sanctions programs 
are implemented directly by EU institutions.  Member States 
use the CFSP process to harmonize policy on key international 
security issues, but must act upon most aspects of their 
decisions at the national level.  By extension, personnel in 
Member State capitals (e.g., intelligence services, foreign 
and finance ministries) and Brussels-based Permanent 
Representations are leveraged in all CFSP sanctions programs. 
 All Perm Reps include staffers who engage within functional 
and regional EU Council working groups across the full 
 
BRUSSELS 00000211  005.2 OF 007 
 
 
spectrum of CFSP programs.  Capitals-based officials often 
travel to Brussels to participate in sanctions-related 
meetings at various stages of the decision-making process. 
In addition to their administrative responsibilities, 
Commission and Council Secretariat staffers help coordinate 
discussion and consensus among Member States. 
 
--------------------- 
LISBON TREATY OUTLOOK 
--------------------- 
 
¶17.  (C//NF) While it is too soon to determine the impact of 
the Lisbon Treaty on EU sanctions programs, Lisbon will 
consolidate certain Commission and Council Secretariat 
responsibilities.  Our contacts expect the two rival 
institutions to work more closely on sanctions issues.  A 
future EU diplomatic corps, the European External Action 
Service ("EEAS"), should theoretically centralize points of 
contact, creating a "single EU phone number" on many key 
foreign policy issues, specific sanctions policies included. 
The EU's Joint Situation Center ("SitCen"), an analytical 
unit that has historically been staffed by seconded analysts 
from Member State intelligence services, will support the 
EEAS.  SitCen has helped the EU develop policy, including 
terrorism finance and sanctions policy, by forging 
consolidated, EU-wide analyses and "getting the non-UNSC 
member states caught up" so they "can't say they don't 
understand," as its Director told us (REF I, PARA 26).  Our 
contacts expect SitCen to grow significantly in size and 
prestige thanks to its association with the EEAS; some have 
indicated their intention to leave national services in favor 
of permanent positions there. 
 
------------------------------ 
EU SANCTIONS MEASURES, BY TYPE 
------------------------------ 
 
¶18.  (U) Active EU sanctions measures falling under the 
Common and Foreign Security Policy ("CFSP") framework are 
listed below by type.  Member States use the CFSP framework 
to implement measures taken by the UN Security Council under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, along with "autonomous" EU 
measures involving no Chapter VII obligations.  CFSP 
sanctions cannot be imposed against individuals or entities 
where there is no foreign policy dimension.  This list does 
not include EU restrictive measures (e.g. safety-related 
flight bans, export controls on dual-use items) agreed and 
administered through other procedures.  Updated information 
on CFSP programs is currently available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/external relations/cfsp/sanctions/ 
docs/measures en.pdf. 
 
Counterterrorism Sanctions 
-------------------------- 
¶19.  (C) Targeted counterterrorism measures are the only CFSP 
sanctions that are primarily functional in scope; all other 
CFSP programs are designed along regional lines.  The EU uses 
the CFSP framework to apply UN (Al-Qaeda and Taliban/UNSCR 
1267) counterterrorism measures, which include an arms 
embargo, travel ban, asset freeze, and prohibition on 
economic transactions with listed parties.  Beyond this, 
Member States have made a political decision in support of 
applying autonomous EU counterterrorism (UNSCR 1373) measures 
to designated groups and individuals.  However, Member States 
currently refuse to include on their autonomous list anyone 
who could potentially be designated by the UN under UNSCR 
1267 authorities (REF J, PARAS 5-7).  Autonomous EU (UNSCR 
1373) restrictions include an asset freeze and prohibition on 
economic transactions, with exemptions for humanitarian 
purposes.  Member States have also committed to affording 
each other police and judicial cooperation in cases involving 
these autonomous authorities. 
 
Travel Ban/Diplomatic Isolation 
------------------------------- 
 
BRUSSELS 00000211  006.2 OF 007 
 
 
¶20.  (U) EU sanctions frequently target political elites, 
leaders of rebel groups, or other individuals associated with 
country-specific activities of concern.  Diplomatic isolation 
could potentially take a variety of forms (e.g. reducing 
cultural exchanges or diplomatic representation), but 
CFSP-based measures generally include travel bans against 
listed individuals.  In the case of Burma, the EU has also 
agreed to suspend all high-level bilateral engagement, with 
limited exceptions, and banned the attachment of military 
personnel to Burmese diplomatic representations in EU Member 
States.  Travel bans currently apply to regime members, rebel 
leaders, or other problematic figures linked to the Balkans, 
Burma, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo 
("DRC"), Guinea, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon/Syria (pending UNSCR 
1636-related designations concerning the Rafiq Hariri 
assassination), Moldova (Transnistria-related), North Korea, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia (pending UNSCR 1844-related 
designations), Sudan, and Zimbabwe. 
 
Arms Embargo/Suspension of Military Cooperation 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶21.  (U) CFSP-based arms embargoes generally consist of (1) a 
prohibition on the sale, supply, or transfer of arms and 
related materials of all types, military vehicles and 
equipment, and spare parts; and (2) a prohibition on the 
provision of financing, technical assistance, or other 
services related to military activities.  Embargoed goods 
include, at a minimum, the items found in the EU's "Common 
Military List."  Exemptions can apply for (1) UN, EU, or 
other governmental peacekeeping or capacity-building 
operations; and (2) for protective gear used by humanitarian, 
development, or media representatives.  EU arms embargoes 
currently apply to Burma, Cote d'Ivoire, China, DRC, Guinea, 
Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, North Korea, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
Sudan, and Zimbabwe. 
 
Trade Restrictions 
------------------ 
¶22.  (SBU) Despite its preference for targeted sanctions, the 
EU has imposed sectoral trade restrictions in several 
contexts.  Trade restrictions have primarily involved natural 
resources whose exploitation has fueled violent conflict or 
sustained undemocratic political regimes.  The EU generally 
undertakes them under UN obligations or in concert with 
like-minded countries.  There are currently prohibitions on 
imports of certain diamonds (Cote d'Ivoire), cultural 
artifacts (Iraq), and timber/metal ores/semi-precious stones 
(Burma).  The EU also bans the export of listed luxury goods 
(North Korea) and the provision of certain export credits 
(North Korea, Iran, and Burma). 
 
Asset Freeze/Prohibition against Economic Transactions 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
¶23.  (U) Targeted EU financial measures generally entail (1) 
a freeze of assets held by listed individuals and entities 
within EU jurisdiction; and (2) a prohibition on economic 
relationships with affected parties (with exemptions for 
humanitarian purposes).  These frequently, but not always, 
accompany EU travel bans against sanctioned individuals. 
Targeted financial measures remain in force against 
individuals, groups, and entities (including parastatal 
enterprises) with links to the Balkans, Burma, Cote d'Ivoire, 
DRC, Guinea, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon/Syria (similarly depending 
on investigation of the Hariri assassination), North Korea, 
Somalia (similarly pending UNSCR 1844 designations), Sudan, 
and Zimbabwe. 
 
"Enhanced Vigilance" for the Financial Sector 
------------------------------------------- 
¶24.  (U) Enhanced vigilance for the financial sector is a 
relatively recent innovation in the EU sanctions domain. 
Credit and financial institutions under EU and Member State 
jurisdiction are expected to incorporate a robust set of 
anti-money laundering controls to help stem Iranian and North 
Korean proliferation-related activities.  These controls 
 
BRUSSELS 00000211  007.2 OF 007 
 
 
implement non-binding components of UNSCRs 1803 and 1874 and 
reflect guidance issued by the Financial Action Task Force 
("FATF").  They include continuous vigilance/enhanced 
customer due diligence; requirements for complete payment 
instructions in all wire transfers; maintenance of 
transaction records for five years; and suspicious 
transaction reporting to Member State financial intelligence 
units. 
 
Cargo Inspections 
----------------- 
¶25.  (U) Cargo inspections in the aviation and maritime 
sectors also constitute a new approach to CFSP sanctions 
policy.  These inspections are also limited to the Iran and 
North Korea contexts and similarly implement non-binding 
UNSCR provisions.  The EU requires relevant aircraft and 
vessels to submit pre-departure/pre-arrival information to 
Member State customs authorities for all goods brought out 
of/into the EU.  Those aircraft and vessels must also declare 
whether they are shipping goods covered by associated EU 
sanctions and, if so, specify all particulars of the relevant 
export license.  The EU/DPRK program prohibits bunkering, 
supply, or other services to vessels that are reasonably 
suspected of carrying sanctioned goods. 
 
Reduction of Technical Cooperation 
---------------------------------- 
¶26.  (U) Several CFSP programs reduce or eliminate EU 
technical cooperation with countries of concern.  A ban on 
training in disciplines related to nuclear technology 
currently applies to nationals of Iran and North Korea.  EU 
sanctions against Burma prohibit direct participation in 
certain non-humanitarian aid and development projects. 
Suspension of EU-wide aid monies, however, is a Commission 
competence.  Despite its aversion to economic sanctions 
against sovereigns, the EU currently restricts provision of 
loans/financial assistance (e.g., through international 
financial institutions) to the Governments of Iran and North 
Korea. 
 
Protections against Extra-Territorial Applications of Law 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
¶27.  (SBU) Contacts occasionally remind us that the EU 
maintains a standing legal framework that allows for 
retaliatory sanctions against the United States.  The 
program, adopted in response to the Iran & Libya Sanctions 
and Helms-Burton Acts of 1996, requires Member States to 
protect themselves against the extra-territorial application 
of third country legislation in violation of international 
law.  In practice, Member State and EU institutional 
interlocutors more frequently threaten World Trade 
Organization dispute resolution when they are unhappy about 
the potential impact of U.S. economic sanctions on EU 
companies. 
 
 
KENNARD