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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000197 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR IO, EEB, S/CT, EUR/ERA, AF, EAP, L 
TREASURY FOR TFI, IA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020 
TAGS: ETTC KTFN BEXP KJUS EWWT EAIR PTER EFIN EUN
PINR, ZI 
SUBJECT: EU REVISES ZIMBABWE SANCTIONS 
 
Classified By: USEU EconMinCouns Peter Chase for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C//NF) SUMMARY.  The EU formally agreed on February 15 
to extend its sanctions against Zimbabwe by twelve months. 
Changes include the de-listing of six individuals and nine 
entities; the EU otherwise rolled over all existing program 
measures.  Preambulatory paragraphs within the Council 
Decision helpfully note that sanctions remain appropriate and 
should be extended, due to the lack of progress in 
implementation of Zimbabwe's Global Political Agreement.  But 
these also state that "there are no longer grounds" for 
maintaining certain listings, which may prove detrimental to 
U.S. designations of the relevant individuals and entities or 
to transatlantic political messaging concerning Zimbabwe. 
Brussels-based contacts say that the action came after 
intense debate and compromise; some Member States (notably 
Belgium, see below) pushed strongly for a more limited 
six-month rollover.  Concerning de-listings, contacts are 
adamant that signs of dynamism in the EU program will 
encourage and empower the MDC.  USG officials cautioned in 
advance of the EU decision that the de-listings could 
undermine our common political front and diminish EU leverage 
vis-a-vis Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwean regime (SEPTEL). 
Separately, the EU extended for another year its suspension 
of budgetary support to the GoZ under Article 96 of the 
Cotonou Agreement.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) During the February 15 Education, Youth and Culture 
Council formation meeting, the European Union formally agreed 
to extend its sanctions against Zimbabwe by twelve (12) 
months.  Revisions to the EU program, which were adopted 
without debate, may be found in Council Decision 
2010/92/CFSP.  The EU de-listed six (6) individuals and nine 
(9) entities, but otherwise rolled over all existing program 
measures.  The individuals include one (1) who has left the 
GoZ, four (4) who are now deceased, and one (1), Thamer Al 
Shanfari, whom the EU assesses no longer meets designation 
criteria.  Eight (8) of the entities are Zimbabwean 
parastatals that were designated by the EU on January 27, 
2009, but which have been judged, based on reporting from EU 
Member State missions in Harare, to be under control of the 
Zimbabwean finance ministry and thus de-linked from ZANU-PF. 
 
¶3.  (C//NF) Brussels-based contacts (UK, Spain as current EU 
Presidency, EU Council Secretariat) say that the action came 
after intense debate and compromise.  Our interlocutors were 
unwilling to revisit de-listing decisions once the necessary 
compromises were struck within the Council's COAFR regional 
working group (late January).  They were also adamant that 
select de-listings were appropriate and that signs of 
dynamism in the EU program would encourage and empower the 
MDC.  A U.S. delegation visiting Brussels to discuss 
sanctions issues (SEPTEL) informed EU institutional and 
Member State contacts that parastatal designations were 
assessed by the USG to be a significant leverage point 
vis-a-vis Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF, and cautioned that the 
de-listing of these entities would most likely diminish EU 
leverage with respect to the Zimbabwean regime. 
 
¶4.  (C//NF) Some Member States pushed strongly for a more 
limited six-month rollover.  The UK and Council Secretariat 
seem especially content that EU measures will be extended by 
a full year.  USEU notes that a six-month rollover would have 
placed Zimbabwe sanctions on the Council's agenda during 
Belgium's stewardship of the rotating EU Presidency.  The 
Belgian External Relations ("RELEX") sanctions 
representative, who will presumably chair the RELEX sanctions 
working group during his country's July-December 2010 EU 
Presidency, reportedly frequently complicates life for the 
UK, in particular on Zimbabwe issues, even using a technical 
pretext to delay this specific rollover for as long as 
possible.  Contacts note that this individual has behaved in 
a rogue manner at times in EU working group meetings, 
sometimes contradicting his explicit instructions from the 
Belgian Foreign Ministry. 
 
¶5.  (C//NF) The visiting U.S. delegation raised the 
 
BRUSSELS 00000197  002 OF 002 
 
 
importance of messaging with the UK, Spain, and Council 
 Secretariat.  U.S. officials indicated that the USG would not 
be easing our Zimbabwe sanctions and shared our desire to 
maintain a common transatlantic political front.  The Spanish 
Presidency and the Council Secretariat reviewed draft text 
for the conclusions that now accompany the new Common 
Position.  U.S. officials noted several points of concern, 
and our contacts agreed to remove language that would 
undermine USG political messaging.  Their finalized 
conclusions are largely neutral, stating simply that 
sanctions were extended before listing measures that the 
program currently includes. 
 
¶6.  (C) However, there are two preambulatory paragraphs with 
political implications within the body of Council Decision 
2010/92/CFSP.  The first helpfully notes the lack of progress 
in implementation of the Global Political Agreement.  The 
second treats de-listings as a group and in generic terms, 
stating that "there are no longer grounds" for maintaining 
certain listings.  (COMMENT: This may prove detrimental to 
U.S. designations of the relevant individuals and entities. 
END COMMENT.) 
 
¶7.  (C//NF) During a February 2 bilateral meeting with the UK 
(SEPTEL), the U.S. delegation also asked if the EU would 
consider creating a system of temporary licensing of 
transactions with designated entities as an alternative to 
the relatively permanent de-listing action.  The UK said that 
there was no appetite within the EU for a licensing regime, 
which finance ministries find overly burdensome. 
 
¶8.  (U) Separately, the EU Council also extended for another 
year measures first taken in 2002 against the Government of 
Zimbabwe under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement.  These 
measures include the suspension of budgetary support and 
projects, but do not affect humanitarian and social 
operations, or projects benefiting the implementation of the 
GPA.  The EU considers that these measures can only be fully 
revoked once the GPA is effectively put into practice by the 
Zimbabwean authorities. 
 
MURRAY