VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBS #0174/01 0431316
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 121316Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0014
INFO RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC 0006

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 000174 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/WE AND S/GCI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PTER BE
SUBJECT: S/GC SPECIAL ENVOY FRIED SEEKS WAY FORWARD ON 
TUNISIAN DETAINEES WITH BELGIUM 
 
Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Richard Eason, reason 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Daniel Fried, U.S. Special Envoy for 
Guantanamo Closure, met on January 27 with Stefaan De Clerck, 
Minister of Justice of Belgium and (separately) with Dirk 
Wouters, Chief of Staff to Minister of Foreign Affairs Steven 
Vanackere.  S/E Fried was joined by Matt Olsen, the Director 
of the Guantanamo Detainee Review Task Force.  Deputy Chief 
of Staff Marc Van Den Reeck attended the Wouters meeting on 
the Belgian side.  In both meetings, Fried briefed on his 
latest discussions with European Union (EU) counterparts 
regarding Guantanamo.  Fried also sought to identify 
acceptable ways for the Belgian government to receive two 
Tunisian detainees who were convicted in 2004 (in absentia) 
by Belgian courts of terrorism-related crimes.  In the 
primary meeting on this issue, De Clerck protested that his 
ministry could not request the extradition of those two 
detainees given the responsibility it would impose on him for 
any national security threat posed by those individuals.  In 
the same line of reasoning, De Clerck allowed that if the two 
Tunisians were present in Belgium by some other means, the 
Ministry of Justice would seek their arrest and prosecution 
in accordance with its duty to address the prior conviction. 
S/E Fried accepted this as a way forward and offered that he 
understood from the defense counsel for both individuals that 
each would agree to the imposition of various security 
measures if allowed to arrive in Belgium.  In the later 
meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Van Den Reeck 
complained that the two posed a high security threat but that 
their transfer to Belgium would result in a re-trial and 
likely acquittal.  Further to that reasoning, Van Den Reeck 
contended that Belgium would have no legal basis under the 
criminal justice system to monitor or control the Tunisians 
if they were released immediately or after serving a 
sentence, despite any voluntary security measures.  At one 
point, Van Den Reeck suggested the two simply be "sent to 
Thomson" for indefinite detention.  End Summary. 
 
EU DISCUSSIONS 
-------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) S/E Fried reported on his other meetings in Brussels 
with EU Parliamentarians and officials to update them on the 
progress the United States has had in closing Guantanamo. 
Fried specifically noted that he had thanked Belgium among 
those governments which had resettled detainees (Belgium 
resettled a Syrian detainee in October 2009).  Fried informed 
of his request to the EU and its Members for renewed 
assistance to close Guantanamo, including for countries that 
have not taken any detainees to do so while also asking 
countries that have already taken detainees to consider 
one-two more.  Additionally, Fried and Olsen said that the 
review of the 240 Guantanamo detainees (now at 192 remaining) 
has been completed.  There are still difficulties ahead, 
especially in addressing the large Yemeni population 
remaining at Guantanamo, but that there is still progress, 
not least of which includes the help shown by European 
governments to resettle detainees.  (The list of European 
countries that have resettled detainees 
is currently at seven:  France, Portugal, Ireland, Belgium, 
Hungary, Slovakia, and Switzerland; Italy also received two 
detainees, but for prosecution on criminal charges in Italian 
courts.  Spain, Bulgaria and Latvia have (or, in the case of 
Latvia, will shortly) publicly announced their intention to 
resettle detainees in the near term.) 
 
BELGIUM,S RESETTLED DETAINEE 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) De Clerck appreciated Fried,s public thanks for 
Belgium,s reception of a Guantanamo detainee, noting 
(accurately) that it was more than what some others in Europe 
had done.  De Clerck called the resettlement of the 
individual difficult, but manageable.  In the later meeting 
at the MFA, Van den Reeck stated that he coordinates an 
interagency monitoring group that addresses the former 
detainee,s progress, especially in regard to security 
measures in place to prevent the individual,s re-engagement. 
 Van den Reeck said that this is primarily done as a 
contingency because the individual,s resettlement is 
progressing well and without security concern. 
 
NO OPTION BUT BELGIUM FOR THE TUNISIANS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Fried explained to De Clerck that in the cases of Adel 
Hakeemy and Hisham Sliti, two Tunisians whose cases had been 
TUNISIAN DETAINEES WITH BELGIUM 
 
discussed with the Belgians, their convictions in absentia by 
Belgium make it impossible to resettle them in any other 
country.  Additionally, repatriation to Tunisia is not 
possible at this time as it is more likely than not that they 
would be mistreated if returned there.  Fried eminded De 
Clerck of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that had been 
provided to the MOJ as an alternative to a formal extradition 
request by Belgium.  He noted that this type of arrangement 
was done in the case of the two Tunisians transferred to 
Italy for prosecution.  Fried also conveyed a new offer 
extended by the defense counsel for both Tunisians, that 
those individuals would be willing to face trial in Belgium 
and would additionally accede to voluntary and extended 
security measures in order to facilitate their transfer. 
 
¶5. (C) De Clerck opened by adamantly stating extradition was 
not an option for Belgium.  He explained that in balancing an 
extradition request, he had to consider not only the rights 
of the convicted individuals to an in-person trial (they were 
convicted in absentia), but also the national security of 
Belgium.  Accordingly, given the profile of the two 
Tunisians, his answer would have to be "no" to requesting an 
extradition.  Further, in addressing S/E Fried,s suggested 
MOU arrangement, De Clerck dismissed it as a "fake" 
extradition and not an acceptable basis for moving forward. 
In both cases, De Clerck said, he would be responsible for 
any bad act taken by those two individuals after their 
transfer and eventual release into Belgium.  Elaborating, De 
Clerck assessed that although each had been sentenced to 
three to four years of prison in 2004, when transferred and 
re-tried -- as would be their right -- both would "be on the 
street" again soon after their transfer.  He mentioned that 
the Belgian appellate court addressing their original 
conviction will hold a hearing sometime in February, though 
it may be postponed and was already postponed twice before. 
The attorneys in Belgium for the two Tunisians are likewise 
heavily pressuring the MOJ to extradite the individuals to 
Belgium to appear at that hearing.  If the two were present 
in Belgium by some means other than an extradition, then of 
course the MOJ would do its duty and provide them their right 
to an in-person trial.  S/E Fried said that the United States 
could be flexible in how it might arrange the transfer of the 
two Tunisians, but that the Belgian government would have to 
allow for the transfer.  The U.S. would not simply put them 
on a commercial flight to Brussels. 
 
¶6. (C) De Clerck repeated that even if they are convicted and 
serve time, the Tunisians would eventually have to be 
released.  It is not good news to the Belgian public that the 
GOB is "importing" such prisoners.  De Clerck then introduced 
that both Tunisians were formerly resident in Italy and asked 
why the United States was not approaching Italy to take them. 
 Fried responded that the Italians have not expressed an 
interest in either detainee and more to the point, Belgium 
had convicted them and must therefore take responsibility. 
In the later meeting at the MFA, Van den Reeck informed that 
both Tunisians were also convicted in Italy, but that they 
had been "graced".  Throwing this out as another obstacle to 
Belgium receiving them, Van den Reeck claimed that while 
Belgium could not "grace" the men, it would have to clear up 
with the Itthere was a 
prosecut or whether their formerQan issue for their transQ Embassy Rome informs eneral 
amnesty in Ityears sentences for 
Qs.) 
 
¶7. (C) De Clerck Qmeeting by 
highlighting: 1) working with the 
detainees, lawyers to remove the extradition rQquest and 
propose voluntary security measuresrequired for any 
transfer; and 2) resolving a.y complications associated with 
the former resdency of both individuals in Italy. 
Fundamentally, De Clerck reiterated, Belgium does not ant to 
be seen as officially saying that it wQnts the Tunisians. 
Fried stressed that the USG cannot send them to Belgium 
without some arragement, but that the exact shape this takes 
iQ open for discussion. 
 
STRONG PUSH-BACK FRM THE MFA 
------------------------------ 
 
8 (C) In his meeting with Wouters and Van Den Reeck, S/E 
Fried repeated the substance of his dicussion with De 
Clerck, about which both had Qlready apparently been briefed. 
 Van Den RQeck was quick to take control of the conversation 
from Wouters and to list why the transfer of the Tunisians to 
Belgium is not a viable option.  First, he claimed that 
 
because both individuals had been sentenced in Belgium to 
less time than they have already served in Guantanamo, he 
feared a Belgian court would release them immediately, either 
upon arrival or even if convicted in a new trial.  On the 
proposed solution of voluntary security measures, Van den 
Reeck claimed that a Belgian court would not honor them and 
that once released by the court, the two could simply ignore 
or dissolve the agreement.  Embassy Brussels A/PolCouns Kiene 
suggested in response that the issue not be handled as a 
criminal matter, but as an immigration matter, thereby 
allowing for the imposition of voluntary measures.  While Van 
den Reeck conceded that this might be possible, he viewed 
this as an unsatisfactory solution due to the fact that 
Belgian security services consider these two a high security 
risk and likewise there would not be the option of residency 
in Belgium, only prolonged immigration detention.  He 
questioned aloud whether a removal proceeding would be 
initiated to return them to Tunisia after being placed in 
immigration detention and stated that even Amnesty 
International had determined there is no path to integration 
for these individuals in Belgium. 
 
¶9. (C) Further speaking to the second prong of his opposition 
to the transfer, Van den Reeck claimed that Belgian services 
had determined both men are highly dangerous and connected to 
terrorist networks.  Likewise, Belgium could not treat them 
as they did with the previously resettled Syrian detainee. 
He wondered whether it might be better for them at Thomson 
(the proposed U.S. detention facility), "where they belong." 
Finally, Wouters added that the already resettled Syrian 
detainee had specifically mentioned these two Tunisians as a 
threat to his own personal security.  S/E Fried noted that 
the U.S. assessment of both Tunisians was that their threat 
could be mitigated with appropriate security measures and 
emphasized that there was no other resettlement possibility 
for them given the Belgian conviction. 
 
COMMENT 
-------- 
 
¶10. (C) The Belgians are clearly digging in to resist the 
transfer of the Tunisians to Belgium.  Despite the 2004 
convictions, De Clerck will not accede to an extradition or 
quasi-extradition proceeding as it would make him the 
responsible party for their transfer to Belgium at a time 
when he,s already facing public pressure to make Belgium 
safer.  In the MFA, there is clear hostility to the idea of 
either Tunisian resettling in Belgium outside of a prison. 
In short, even with an agreement by the Tunisians to a list 
of security measures, it will be difficult to implement an 
arrangement to transfer the men, as neither the MOJ or MFA 
will take responsibility for doing so. 
 
¶11. (U) S/GC Special Envoy Fried has cleared this telegram. 
 
GUTMAN 
.