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DE RUEHBR #0061/01 0502328
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R 192328Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0521
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
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RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
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RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA 0004

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 000061 
 
SIPDIS 
DEPARTMENT FOR P, WHA 
NSC FOR RESTREPO 
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/19 
TAGS: PREL XM BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: AMBASSADOR'S MEETINGS WITH SENIOR PRESIDENTIAL 
ADVISORS 
 
REF: BRASILIA 45 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Thomas A. Shannon, Ambassador, State, Embassy 
Brasilia; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  During separate meetings at the Presidential 
Palace, Foreign Policy Advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia and 
Presidential Chief of Staff Gilberto Carvalho discussed with 
Ambassador Shannon their interest in working together on a range of 
regional and global issues, including Honduras, Venezuela, Haiti, 
and non-proliferation issues.  Garcia and Carvalho were impressed 
with the wide range of high-level USG visits to Brazil over the 
next month, and were eager at the prospect of increased dialogue 
with the USG on critical issues.  Garcia was interested in finding 
a strategy to rehabilitate former Honduran President Manuel Zelaya; 
he also reacted favorably to suggestions that the United States is 
open to discussion with the Government of Venezuela if the right 
interlocutors could be found.  Carvalho was particularly interested 
in discussing long-range cooperation in Haiti.  End summary. 
 
Honduras 
 
¶2.  (C) Marco Aurelio Garcia, Lula's highly influential Foreign 
Policy Advisor, steered the conversation in his February 8 meeting 
toward Latin America, his primary focus.  He opened with the need 
for a "certain rehabilitation" of former President Manuel Zelaya, 
which he did not define in detail but characterized as "a little 
more than amnesty."  Garcia recognized that Zelaya is essentially 
conservative but argued that, as a catalyst of a popular movement 
in Honduras, resentment regarding his dismissal will continue and 
can potentially destabilize Honduras long-term if it is not 
addressed.  In response to comments by the Ambassador that 
President Lobo is open to re-establishing normal diplomatic 
channels with Brazil, Garcia took on a conciliatory tone and 
acknowledged that some degree of communication with Lobo - "an 
exchange of notes" - has already taken place. 
 
Venezuela 
 
¶3.  (C) Garcia characterized Venezuela as having deep domestic 
economic problems, particularly with regard to energy supply.  He 
believed that President Chavez would be forced to step back 
substantially from the "foreign policy of oil" in order to attend 
to domestic concerns.  He emphasized that Lula tells Chavez 
regularly that Venezuela "needs to escape from oil."  Brazil is 
willing to help, Garcia said, by providing agricultural assistance 
to the GOV and support in building Venezuela's hydroelectric 
capacity, among other areas. 
 
¶4.  (C) Ambassador Shannon said that Venezuela's problems were 
increasingly intractable, and that the internal domestic problems 
they were generating were pushing Chavez toward more 
authoritarianism and repression.  He noted that our efforts at 
outreach had all been rebuffed by Chavez, and that the lack of any 
reliable interlocutors made dialogue with Venezuela almost 
impossible.  Garcia asked if the United States was still interested 
in dialogue.  The Ambassador said yes.  Garcia was visibly 
intrigued by this, indicating that Brazil could be of assistance in 
this area. 
 
Bolivia, Colombia, Chile 
 
¶5.  (C) Garcia spoke favorably about Bolivia's economy and 
government, and made the case that President Morales is more 
moderate than his words or image indicate.  He downplayed any 
current tension between Bolivia and Brazil on hydrocarbons or other 
issues and suggested that Bolivia under Morales should not be 
viewed as a concern for either the U.S. or Brazil.  The Ambassador 
noted that the United States and Bolivia had negotiated a draft 
bilateral framework agreement, but that the Morales government was 
unprepared to move forward on the agreement at this time.  On 
Chile, Garcia opined that the victory of Sebastian Pinera opens the 
door for the right to take power, and that he foresees serious 
problems between Chile and Bolivia.  He conceded that Colombian 
President Uribe will win again if he runs for re-election and that 
former Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos will probably win if 
Uribe doesn't run. 
 
Haiti 
 
 
¶6.  (C) Haiti featured prominently in the Ambassador's meeting 
February 9 with Lula's personal Chief of Staff, Gilberto Carvalho. 
(Note: Carvalho, who has been Lula's Chief of Staff ever since 
entering the Presidency in 2003, normally focuses largely on Lula's 
schedule and on domestic political concerns.  End note.)  Speaking 
in terms that much resembled an earlier meeting between Ambassador 
Shannon and MRE Secretary General Patriota (reftel), Carvalho and 
the Ambassador talked about Haiti as an opportunity to provide a 
template for future joint U.S.-Brazil assistance efforts in the 
region, and also as a model for future UN post-disaster efforts. 
Carvalho agreed with the need for the United States and Brazil to 
prioritize plans for sustainable reconstruction strategy in the 
next stage of Haiti's recovery, and on the need to use security 
efforts to advance the development strategy in Haiti. 
 
Visits and Coordination 
 
¶7.   (C) Carvalho and Garcia both spoke briefly about President 
Lula's upcoming international travel, including: 
 
- Feb 22-25 (Cuba, Mexico-for the Summit of Latin American and 
Caribbean nations-El Salvador, Haiti) 
 
- Mar 13-15 (Israel, Palestine, Jordan) 
 
- Apr 13-14 (United States-for the Global Nuclear Security Summit) 
 
- Mid-May (tentatively Iran, Russia, Spain) 
 
Each responded favorably to suggestions of increased communication 
between the U.S. and Brazil at the executive level - including 
communication between President Lula and President Obama - both 
before and after official trips.   Both were also impressed at the 
broad range of high-level USG visitors to Brazil planned for the 
next month. 
SHANNON