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INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
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RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUMIESS/SOUTHCOM IESS MIAMI FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 000333 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/24 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PTER KJUS KCRM CO
SUBJECT: Specter of "Parapolitics" Hangs Over March Congressional 
Election 
 
REF: 09 BOGOTA 3347 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Mark Wells, Political Counselor; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
Summary 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶1. (C) The "parapolitica" scandal severely damaged the 2006-10 
Colombian Congress' legitimacy and ability to stand as an 
independent and productive branch of government (90 members were 
implicated for collaboration with paramilitaries).  The Supreme 
Court is investigating these cases and has recently handed down 
some welcome rulings.  Congress passed a constitutional political 
reform last year designed to strengthen political parties against 
illicit influence and punish those who allow ineligible persons to 
run for offices.  However, due to a lack of implementing 
regulations, the reform is only partially in effect.  Still, a 
strengthened National Electoral Council (CNE) has been active early 
in the campaign season, suspending controversial political party 
National Democratic Alliance (ADN) for the participation of jailed 
politicians and annulling 200,000 fraudulent voter registrations. 
The ADN and the new National Integration Party (PIN) were 
reincarnations of two scandal-ridden parties, rebranded in an 
attempt to occult their histories.  Ineligible individuals are 
attempting to continue influencing the political system by 
recruiting surrogates to run for office.  NGOs, the media, and 
civic organizations have been active in identifying these 
potentially problematic candidates, but they are still likely to 
win seats given robust financing and the local power of political 
bosses and family dynasties.  The responsibility to screen 
candidates is squarely in the hands of political parties, each of 
which has demonstrated a different capacity and will to do so. 
Overall, the 2010-14 Congress will likely see some continued 
controversy, but regulatory measures and attention from civil 
society and the international community may mitigate the matter. 
End Summary. 
 
 
 
Parapolitica Scandal Hit 2006-10 Congress Hard 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) The March 14, 2010, congressional election will be the 
first since the "parapolitica" scandal rocked the 2006-2010 
Congress -- as of January 31, 90 of 268 senators and 
representatives were implicated for collaboration with 
paramilitaries.  Of the 90, 31 remain in jail (7 found guilty and 
24 awaiting legal resolution), 33 are free but under continued 
investigation, 18 were acquitted, and 8 were given parole. 
Overall, the scandal severely damaged Congress' credibility and 
legitimacy.  The investigations cut across both governing coalition 
and opposition parties, though as a percentage, the pro-Uribe 
parties were hardest hit. 
 
 
 
Supreme Court Rules 
 
------------------- 
 
 
 
¶3. (U) The Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to try sitting 
members of Congress and is investigating the parapolitica cases. 
In welcome news, the Court recently condemned former Senator Alvaro 
Garcia to 40 years in prison for collaboration with paramilitaries 
and his role in the October 2000, Macayepo massacre in Montes de 
Maria, in which 15 rural farmers were killed.  The Court kept the 
case even after Garcia resigned from the 2006-10 Congress, ruling 
that they had jurisdiction for crimes committed by active or former 
members of Congress in relation with their legislative duties 
(Note:  Resignation was a legal tactic for implicated politicians 
to try and avoid the Supreme Court and be tried in regular courts, 
where appeals were available.  The Court's ruling effectively 
 
 
eliminated that option for the defendants.  End Note).  Also, the 
Court just denied a defense petition to release Luis Humberto 
Gomez, former President of Congress, during his investigation for 
links to Tolima paramilitaries and extradited drug trafficker 
Eduardo Victoria.  The Court re-asserted jurisdiction over Gomez 
and ordered his re-capture after initially transferring it to the 
Prosecutor General's office (Fiscalia), which released him for lack 
of evidence. 
 
 
 
Half-Way to Political Reform 
 
---------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶4. (U) In an effort to diminish the influence of illegal armed 
groups, the Congress approved a July 14, 2009, constitutional 
reform with new rules and sanctions designed to strengthen 
political parties and punish those who fail to fulfill their 
responsibilities (reftel).  The reform laid out guiding principles 
but left many details to a second implementing law.  Congress 
failed to pass that second law after it became politicized and 
debate mired in minutiae (like whether public transportation would 
be free on Election Day).  NGOs and analysts lamented that many key 
sanctions and campaign finance provisions would not be in force for 
the 2010 elections. 
 
 
 
Electoral Council Flexes Its Muscles 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶5. (C) Despite these setbacks, one bright spot has been the active 
CNE.  Alejandra Barrios, Director of the NGO Electoral Observation 
Mission (MOE), told us that CNE President Mario Emilio Hincapie's 
rare election to a second term was a factor, pointing to Hincapie's 
transparency, seriousness, and experience.  The CNE gave one 
crucial sanction teeth on January 27 when it suspended the small 
political party National Democratic Alliance (ADN) for violating 
rules banning individuals who are convicted of crimes related to 
illegal armed groups, narcotrafficking, or crimes against democracy 
or humanity from political participation. 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) The suspension effectively killed the ADN.  CNE Secretary 
General Benjamin Ortiz told poloffs that ADN will not be able to 
access the media, receive state funding, or, most importantly, 
field candidates in the upcoming congressional election.  The CNE 
ruled that ADN violated the Constitution since two former senators 
in jail for parapolitica, Vicente Blel (convicted and sentenced to 
seven years) and Jorge Castro (pending trial), had been 
participating in the party's operations and planning -- brazenly 
being named party directors.  The CNE also found that the party 
held fake assemblies to change the party name, slogan, and 
statutes.  The ADN does not deny the charges and admits that the 
two participated in party functions by videoconference from their 
prison cells, but claims the party had authorization. 
 
 
 
Controversial Parties Rebranded 
 
Just in Time for Elections 
 
------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) The ADN was 64 days old when it was suspended, but in 
reality it was simply the scandal-ridden "Colombia Viva" party 
rebranded.  Parapolitics decimated Colombia Viva both at the 
national and local level.  Nearly all Colombia Viva senators who 
 
 
served in Congress were implicated (the two who were originally 
elected in 2006, and then their first two replacements).  The ADN 
also had roots in other controversial parties as well, including 
"Convergencia Ciudadana."  Convergencia Ciudadana co-founder Luis 
Alberto Gil and former Senator Juan Carlos Martinez (both in jail) 
helped engineer Colombia Viva's metamorphosis. 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) Since the ADN was suspended, many of its candidates have 
landed in the National Integration Party (PIN), or Convergencia 
Ciudadana redux.  The PIN was created at the end of 2009, and 
continues with many controversial figures or close associates of 
implicated politicians.  Many of its candidates, though notorious, 
come from families and syndicates that continue to exert political 
control and influence in regions where the traditional national 
parties are weak.  They are also well financed and observers 
complain that they violate spending limits with impunity. 
Meanwhile, leaders of the opposition Liberal Party and Uribe's U 
Party have complained to poloffs of funding shortages and limited 
ability to support their candidates at the local level. 
 
 
 
Massive Voter Fraud Spotted in Barranquilla 
 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) The CNE also took strong action against voter fraud in the 
port city of Barranquilla by annulling nearly 200,000 new voter 
registrations.  CNE investigators found false identity documents 
and inconsistencies in voters' claimed residencies.  The CNE has 
provided information to the Prosecutor and Inspector Generals' 
offices for investigations into who authored the fraud.  Given that 
only 320,000 voted in the 2006 congressional election in 
Barranquilla, 200,000 falsified voters would have posed a 
significant electoral fraud risk.  A recent Invamer-Gallup poll 
showed that 7% of voters (over 2 million people) acknowledged they 
had been offered goods or money for their votes. 
 
 
 
Parapolitics, a Family Business 
 
------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶10. (U) Unlike in the blatant case of the ADN, other ineligible 
persons are being more subtle by enlisting relatives or associates 
as surrogates.  PIN accounts for much of this phenomenon, including 
PIN Senate candidate Viviana Blel, the aforementioned Vicente 
Blel's cousin.  Another example is PIN Senate candidate Hector 
Julio Alfonso Lopez, who is the son of Enilse Lopez alias "La Gata" 
-- convicted for money laundering and ties to paramilitaries.  NGOs 
and the media have identified numerous other examples of wives, 
sons, cousins, and others replacing implicated politicians from 
various parties, mostly in departments on the coast and along the 
Venezuelan border. 
 
 
 
¶11. (SBU) Antonio Jose Lizarazo, former CNE magistrate, said there 
is no legal impediment for a relative of a convicted politician to 
run for office.  Other observers add that barring family members 
for the sins of their family seems logical but would be 
undemocratic.  Elizabeth Unger, Director of Transparency for 
Colombia, said that only political parties have the power to do 
anything by voluntarily excluding these family members from their 
candidate lists.  However, many NGO officials lament that parties 
seem to be choosing guaranteed seats over moral responsibility. 
According to media reports, the PIN held a three-day conference 
where it deliberated about these candidates but ultimately accepted 
them as long as they signed a statement of ethics and affirmation 
that they had no ties to illegal armed groups (IAGs).  Alvaro 
Caicedo, legal representative of the PIN, announced the party would 
 
 
continue reviewing the controversial candidates but the only way to 
expel them would be if "true proof of ineligibility" existed. 
 
 
 
Candidate Screening Varies Widely 
 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶12. (C) The political reform placed the responsibility for vetting 
candidates squarely in the hands of political parties.  The Liberal 
Party (PL) international affairs officer told poloff that only 
three political parties had the administrative capacity and 
infrastructure to properly vet candidates -- the PL, Conservative 
Party (PC), and the Alternative Democratic Pole (PDA).  He 
described the other parties more as political movements centered on 
personalities and lacking strong party structures.  He cited the 
example of the Radical Change party, who he said had four permanent 
staff members at its national headquarters. 
 
 
 
¶13. (C) Without the clarity of an implementing law, parties have 
gone to varying lengths to fulfill their constitutional 
responsibility: 
 
 
 
-- PDA:  Potential candidates had to sign a document committing to 
disclose campaign finances, comply with electoral rules, submit 
clearance certificates from various government authorities, and 
affirm that they have no pending investigations against them.  In 
contrast to other parties, vetting was delegated to regional 
coordinators (rather than a central authority) who would monitor 
candidates' compliance. 
 
 
 
-- "Compromiso Ciudadano Por Colombia":  Independent candidate 
Sergio Fajardo's campaign, when forming its congressional candidate 
list, checked with government authorities and the USG OFAC list of 
designated persons as an initial filter.  Each candidate then had a 
personal interview with Fajardo. 
 
 
 
-- PC:  Candidates were required to present certificates from 
government authorities (Prosecutor General, etc.) and party 
officials said they also ensured that candidates understood they 
could be expelled for not applying in good faith.  The officials 
worried that certificates were not backed by rigorous 
investigations and prospective candidates could easily lie. 
 
 
 
-- Green Party:  The Greens relied on the public to screen its 
candidates by posting their names on the website 
www.confianzaelectoral.com.  Also, each candidate had to sign a 
declaration of eligibility and pay a deposit to the party in case 
the party was later fined for that person's participation. 
 
 
 
-- PL:  The PL actively investigated candidates through government 
authorities (Prosecutor General, etc.) and also had a network of 
900 watchdogs that would monitor candidates during the campaign. 
 
 
 
-- Independent Movement of Absolute Renovation (MIRA):  MIRA only 
accepted candidates who had been known by existing members at least 
five months prior to elections.  The list was then reviewed by any 
willing party members (5,000 participated).  The party also 
conducted a background investigation by visiting the candidates' 
home localities and interviewing family members, associates, and 
neighbors. 
 
 
-- National Integration Party (PIN):  The PIN does not have a clear 
process for vetting candidates but has talked about financial 
disclosure and working with government authorities. 
 
 
 
-- Radical Change (CR):  Antonio Alvarez, Secretary General, called 
the party's efforts a strict system to avoid a situation like that 
of the last four years, where many CR members were involved in 
parapolitica.  The party only accepted candidates who were 
sponsored by an existing member of the party (both had to sign a 
statement that the person has no ties to IAGs and that their 
campaigns would be financed licitly).  Candidates also needed to 
present clearance certificates from government authorities. 
 
 
 
-- U Party:  The party's departmental committees initially vetted 
candidates, including requiring clearance certificates from 
government authorities.  Candidates were then reviewed by the 
national ethics committee (who used the OFAC list) and party 
leadership.  Finally, the candidate had to sign a statement that 
they did not have ties to IAGs.  Party Secretary General Solano 
told poloff on March 12 that he was still reviewing a few 
candidates that may be expelled. 
 
 
 
Next Evolution of Parapolitica 
 
------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶14. (SBU) Political scientist Juan Felipe Cardona Cardenas stated 
that narco-groups' attempts to co-opt the state have evolved over 
time.  In the Pablo Escobar era, drug lords ran for office 
themselves but ended up being too exposed.  Next, criminal groups 
indiscriminately financed campaigns to buy loyalty, resulting in 
the "8000 Process" that plagued the administration of Ernesto 
Samper (1994-1998).  Parapolitica was a third attempt to co-opt the 
system by focusing on certain regions and "friends."  German 
Medina, Sergio Fajardo's political strategist, said the next 
evolution in co-option will be even more subtle.  Medina argues the 
political uncertainty gripping Colombia because of the Uribe 
reelection question has paralyzed candidates and blocked the 
citizenry from seriously considering congressional elections, 
opening space for illicit funds and fraud. 
 
 
 
Lack of National Structure Limits Nefarious Influence 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
 
 
¶15. (C) On the other hand, the Directors of Medellin's American 
Chamber of Commerce told poloff that illicit funds and IAGs would 
have negligible influence over upcoming elections and parapolitica 
was unlikely to repeat.  They said that after the paramilitary 
demobilization, criminal groups no longer had a national structure 
or political impetus to control and infiltrate the political 
system.  Groups were more interested in reducing exposure and 
focusing on drug trafficking. 
 
 
 
Comment 
 
------- 
 
 
 
¶16. (C) The CNE appears to be taking its mandate seriously this 
 
 
election cycle by giving some major sanctions teeth, though further 
progress depends on how it enforces campaign finance regulations. 
Also, NGOs, the media, and civil society have been exemplary 
watchdogs, exposing problematic candidates and their links to 
implicated politicians and criminal figures.  Even so, local 
electorates are unlikely to punish candidates despite knowledge of 
their problematic relationships due to the continued power of 
dubious local political dynasties and bosses.  Little has changed 
locally since the 2007 sub-national elections, when controversial 
parties were not punished at the ballot box in the face of 
parapolitica.  Reforms yet to come into effect concerning party 
strengthening, internal democracy, and finance would improve 
parties' capacity to diminish the influence of illicit funds and 
IAGs and the CNE's ability to enforce regulations.  The influence 
of illicit financing and support remains the biggest threat to the 
March legislative elections. 
NICHOLS