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RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #0237/01 0431731
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 121730Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2784
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS BOGOTA 000237 
 
SIPDIS 
USTR FOR EISSENSTAT AND HARMAN 
DOL FOR ZOLLNER AND QUINTANA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ELAB EAID ETRD PGOV PHUM PREL USTR LAB CO
SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON CHILD LABOR AND FORCED LABOR FOR DOL 
CONGRESSIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
 
REF: STATE 131995; 10 BOGOTA 111 
 
¶1. Per reftel a, post submits the following information for the 
U.S. Department of Labor's (DOL) Congressional Reporting 
Requirements related to forced and child labor. 
 
 
 
¶2. The following is new information relevant to tasking 1: The 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) of 2005, 
Section 105(b) and Executive Order 13126 of 1999, keyed to the 
request in reftel a for new information on the use of exploitive 
child labor in the production of goods.  We will follow up where 
information was "unavailable." 
 
 
 
The Colombian Sugar Cane Producers Association (ASOCANA) objected 
to the inclusion of sugar cane on the DOL List of Goods Produced by 
Child Labor in an October 2009 letter to Ambassador Brownfield. 
ASOCANA said its producers were committed to corporate social 
responsibility and have promoted the importance of child education 
among their employees.  In 2008, the sugar sector invested almost 
$2 million in public and private schools and $500,000 in 
scholarships.  ASOCANA also noted that it continues to support a 
program in conjunction with the International Labor Office (ILO) 
that promotes ILO Conventions 138 and 182 among its sugarcane 
suppliers. 
 
 
 
ASOCANA provided the Embassy with documentation, claiming that DOL 
Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) based its findings on 
labor practices on the part of the sugarcane sector that does not 
produce sugar or ethanol.  In 2008, 205,000 out of the 450,000 
hectares cultivated with sugarcane were dedicated to sugar and 
ethanol.  As such, the inclusion of sugarcane on the DOL list, 
ASOCANA argues, represents an undeserved and poorly documented 
penalty on Colombian sugar and ethanol producers.  ASOCANA requests 
that ILAB take sugarcane off its list, or contextualize its reports 
to reflect that child labor is not used in the production of sugar 
and ethanol in Colombia. 
 
 
 
¶3. The following are answers in response to tasking 2: Trade and 
Development Act (TDA) of 2000, keyed to questions in reftel a. 
 
 
 
2A) PREVALENCE AND SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF EXPLOITIVE CHILD LABOR 
 
 
 
1-2. In what sectors (not related to the production of goods) were 
children involved in exploitive labor?  Posts are requested to 
determine if the government collected or published data on 
exploitive child labor during the 
 
period, and if so, whether the government would provide the data 
set to DOL for further analysis. 
 
 
 
There was evidence that children were involved in exploitive labor 
in the domestic services and child pornography industries. 
According to the  National Administrative Department of Statistics 
(DANE), of the 11.5 million children between the ages of five and 
17 in Colombia, 267,343 worked in service industries, including 
28,356 in domestic services (a further breakdown was unavailable). 
Additionally, the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF) 
received 551 complaints of commercial sexual exploitation of 
 
 
children in 2009, including 53 related to child pornography. 
 
 
 
2B) LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
 
 
 
1-2. What new laws or regulations were enacted in regard to 
exploitive child labor over the past year? If applicable, were the 
changes improvements in the legal and regulatory framework?  Was 
the country/territory's legal and regulatory framework adequate for 
addressing exploitive child labor? 
 
 
 
First, the GOC promulgated Law 1336 of 2009 to expand and 
strengthen Law 679 of 2001, designed to prevent and counter sexual 
exploitation of children, with particular reference to pornography 
and sex tourism.  Specifically, it codified a process for 
dispossession of property -- hotels, pensions, residences, income - 
of entities and individuals involved in the sexual exploitation of 
minors.  Second, Law 1329 of 2009 similarly modified the penal code 
(Law 599 of 2000).  It stipulated a prison term of 14 to 25 years 
per instance of commercial sexual exploitation of a minor, and 10 
to 14 years for advertising such services.  The GOC also issued 
Circular 60 of 2009, which clarified the process for authorizing 
children to work and investigating non-compliance with child labor 
laws.  Finally, the GOC implemented a "Regional Action Plan" for 
the prevention of sexual exploitation of children in the tourism 
sector in conjunction with neighboring countries. 
 
 
 
Colombian laws regarding child labor are comprehensive and should 
be adequate to address exploitive child labor.  However, resources 
remained inadequate for effective enforcement.  The Ministry for 
Social Protection's (MSP) 180 labor inspectors nationwide were 
responsible for enforcing child labor laws in the formal sector 
(approximately 40% of the economy) through periodic inspections. 
(Note: The MSP plans to hire 207 additional inspectors by the end 
of 2010. End Note.) 
 
 
 
2C) INSTITUTIONS AND MECHANISMS FOR ENFORCEMENT 
 
 
 
Section I: Hazardous Child Labor 
 
 
 
1-2. What agency or agencies was/were responsible for the 
enforcement of laws relating to hazardous child labor? If multiple 
agencies were responsible for enforcement, were there mechanisms 
for exchanging information? Assess their 
 
effectiveness. 
 
 
 
The MSP had primary responsibility for enforcing child labor laws 
in the formal sector, which covered approximately 20% of the child 
labor force.  Other agencies and institutions with central 
enforcement roles -- in both the formal and informal economies -- 
included the National Police (CNP) at both the national and 
municipal levels; the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) 
in a preventive capacity; the Ministry of Interior and Justice 
(MOIJ); the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) with respect to cross 
border trafficking; and the Ministry of Education (MOE), primarily 
to raise awareness of child labor issues. 
 
 
In accordance with Decree 859 of 1995, the MSP presided over an 
Inter-Institutional Committee for the Eradication of Child Labor 
and the Protection of Child Workers, which included the following 
actors:  the MSP Vice Minister of Health; the MOE Director General 
for Investigation and Pedagogical Development; the Director of the 
National Planning Department (DNP); the Director General of the 
Colombia Family Welfare Institute (ICBF); the Director General of 
the Colombian Institute for Youth and Sports (ICJD); the Director 
General of the National Training Service (SENA); the Presidential 
Advisor for Social Policy; and a representative from the largest 
labor confederation, currently the United Workers' Confederation 
(CUT). 
 
 
 
While institutional coordination led to significant progress, 
resources remained inadequate for effective enforcement.  Periodic 
labor inspections in the formal economy did little to dissuade 
noncompliance in the informal and illicit sectors. 
 
 
 
¶3. Did the country/territory maintain a mechanism for making 
complaints about hazardous child labor violations? If so, how many 
complaints were received in the reporting period? 
 
 
 
The ICBF maintains a free hotline for complaints related to child 
labor.  In 2009, it received 975 complaints of exploitive child 
labor and 551 complaints of commercial sexual exploitation of 
minors. 
 
 
 
¶4. What amount of funding was provided to agencies responsible for 
inspections? 
 
 
 
There was no budget specifically dedicated to child labor 
inspections.  General labor inspections included evaluations of 
compliance with child labor laws; however, they occurred too 
infrequently to constitute an effective deterrent. 
 
 
 
¶5. How many inspectors did the government employ? Was the number of 
inspectors adequate? 
 
 
 
The MSP employed 180 inspectors.  The number of inspectors was 
inadequate. 
 
 
 
¶6. How many inspections involving child labor were carried out? 
 
 
 
MSP inspectors carried out 38,457 general labor inspections in 
2009, all of which included child labor monitoring components. 
Still, lack of resources prevented the MSP from responding directly 
to numerous child labor complaints. 
 
 
 
¶7. How many children were removed/assisted as a result of 
inspections? Were these children actually provided or referred for 
services as a result (as opposed to simply fired)? 
 
 
The MSP identified and assisted 22,752 victims of the worst forms 
of child labor with assistance from Save the Children and Partners 
of the Americas, among other NGOs and private actors.  (Note: Per 
telcon with ILAB, we will clarify how the MSP arrived at this 
figure.  End Note) 
 
 
 
The ICBF assisted 8,084 victims of child labor exploitation, and 
1,806 child victims of child sexual exploitation.  Additionally, it 
placed 3,344 children in preventative programs, and removed 901 
children from exploitation by illegal armed groups. 
 
 
 
¶8. How many child labor cases or "prosecutions" were opened? 
 
 
 
The information was unavailable. 
 
 
 
¶9. How many child labor cases were closed or resolved? 
 
 
 
The information was unavailable. 
 
 
 
¶10. How many violations were found or "convictions" reached? 
 
 
 
The information was unavailable. 
 
 
 
¶11. What is the average length of time it took to resolve child 
labor cases? 
 
 
 
Article 99 of Law 1098 requires child labor cases to be processed 
within four months of opening an investigation.  The MSP must also 
respond to child labor complaints within one day of receipt. 
Information on compliance with these regulations was unavailable. 
 
 
 
¶12. In cases in which violations were found, were penalties 
actually applied, either through fines paid or jail sentence 
served? Did such sentences meet penalties established in the law? 
 
 
 
The information was unavailable. 
 
 
 
¶13. Did the experience regarding questions 7 through 10 above 
reflect a commitment to combat exploitive child labor? 
 
 
 
The GOC appears committed to combating exploitive child labor.  For 
example, it has allocated funds to hire and train an additional 207 
labor inspectors in 2010. 
 
 
¶14. Did government offer any training for investigators or others 
responsible for enforcement? If so, what (if any) impact have these 
trainings had? 
 
 
 
The MSP held numerous workshops and training seminars for 
inspectors and law enforcement personnel in conjunction with Save 
the Children and Partners of the Americas.  The success of these 
training programs were partially responsible for convincing the GOC 
to more than double the number of MSP labor inspectors by the end 
of 2010. 
 
 
 
Section II: Forced Child Labor 
 
 
 
Please see responses to Section I: Hazardous Child Labor above. 
The same Colombian institutions that were responsible for hazardous 
child labor were also responsible for forced child labor. 
 
 
 
2D) INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT -- child 
trafficking, commercial sexual exploitation of children, use of 
children in illicit activities: 
 
 
 
¶1. Did the country/territory have agencies or personnel dedicated 
to enforcement of child trafficking/CSEC/use of children in illicit 
activities?  How many investigators/social workers/dedicated police 
officers did the government employ to conduct investigations?  If 
there were no dedicated agencies or personnel, provide an estimate 
of the number of people who were responsible for such 
investigations. Was the number of investigators adequate? 
 
 
 
The GOC has six entities that work to combat trafficking and 
monitor prosecution, prevention, and victim protection: the MOIJ, 
which presides over the Interagency Committee for the Fight against 
Trafficking in Persons (ICFTP); DAS, which houses the offices that 
monitor migration and coordinate with INTERPOL; the Unit to Combat 
Trafficking in Persons, Sexual Violence and Child Victims at the 
Prosecutor General's Office (Fiscalia); the "Grupo Humanitas" 
inside the Judicial Police section of the CNP; the Family Welfare 
Institute (ICBF); and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). 
Fourteen agencies are members of the ICFTP, which was established 
informally in 2003 and formally launched in 2005:  MOIJ, MFA, MSP, 
MOE, DAS, the CNP, the Fiscalia, the Inspector General's Office 
(Procuraduria), the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman 
(Defensoria), Interpol, ICBF, the Presidential Advisor for Equality 
of Women, The Ministry of Defense organization FONDELIBERTAD, and 
the Special Administrative Unit for Information and Financial 
Analysis (UIAF).  In 2009, the ICFTP prepared public awareness 
campaigns, promoted information exchange among government agencies, 
and initiated use of a database to monitor trafficking cases. 
Moreover, 15 departments established inter-agency committees to 
combat trafficking in persons locally, and the GOC hosted a 
bilateral anti-trafficking conference for counterparts in Panama in 
August.  (NOTE: Colombia has been a Tier I country since the 
inception of the Trafficking in Persons Report.  End Note.) 
 
 
 
¶2. How much funding was provided to agencies responsible for 
investigating child trafficking/CSEC/use of children in illicit 
activities? Was this amount adequate? Did investigators have 
 
 
sufficient office facilities, transportation, fuel, and other 
necessities to carry out investigations? 
 
 
 
Information on total funding was not available. 
 
 
 
¶3. Did the country/territory maintain a hotline or other mechanism 
for reporting child trafficking/CSEC/use of children in illicit 
activities violations? If so, how many complaints were received in 
the reporting period? 
 
 
 
The government maintained a free, national hot line to prevent 
trafficking and report violators.  During the year the national 
trafficking prevention hot line received 2,097 calls, 39 (1.86 
percent) directly related 
 
to trafficking. 
 
 
 
¶4. How many investigations were opened in regard to child 
trafficking/CSEC/use of children in illicit activities? Was the 
 
number of investigations adequate? 
 
 
 
The Prosecutor General's Office opened 134 trafficking in persons 
cases in 2009.  Information on the number pertaining to trafficked 
children was unavailable. 
 
 
 
¶5. How many children were rescued as a result? 
 
 
 
A total of 10 trafficked children were recovered in 2009, including 
nine girls trafficked for sexual exploitation: two in Trinidad and 
Tobago, four in Ecuador, one in Panama, and two in Venezuela.  One 
male victim of labor trafficking was recovered from Ecuador. 
 
 
 
¶6. How many arrests were made or other kinds of prosecutions 
carried out? 
 
 
 
The information was unavailable. 
 
 
 
¶7. How many cases were closed or resolved? 
 
 
 
The information was unavailable. 
 
 
 
¶8. How many convictions? 
 
 
 
The Prosecutor General's Office opened 134 cases for trafficking in 
persons (pertaining to adults and minors) in 2009; 21 individuals 
were placed in preventive detention; 27 individuals were convicted 
 
 
and sentenced. 
 
 
 
¶9. Did sentences imposed meet standards established in the legal 
framework? 
 
 
 
The law provided for prison sentences between 13 and 23 years and 
fines up to 1,000 times the monthly minimum wage ($252) for 
trafficking offenses.  These penalties may be increased by up to 
one-half if there are aggravating circumstances, such as 
trafficking of children younger than 12.  Additional charges of 
illegal detention, violation of the right to work in dignified 
conditions, and violation of personal freedom also may be brought 
against traffickers.  In general, sentences imposed met these 
standards. 
 
 
 
¶10. Were sentences imposed actually served? 
 
 
 
See response to 2D question 8. 
 
 
 
¶11. What is the average length of time it takes to resolve cases of 
child trafficking/CSEC/use of children in illicit activities? 
 
 
 
This information was unavailable. 
 
 
 
¶12. Did the government offer any training for investigators or 
others responsible for enforcement of child trafficking/CSEC/use of 
children in illicit activities? If so, what was the impact (if any) 
of these trainings? 
 
 
 
The GOC worked with the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) to strengthen government institutions involved in 
anti-trafficking efforts and assist trafficking victims.  The IOM 
and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime trained officials 
on specific trafficking issues and provided sensitization training 
to NGO groups. 
 
 
 
¶13. If the country/territory experienced armed conflict during the 
reporting period or in the recent past involving the use of child 
soldiers, what actions were taken to penalize those responsible? 
Were these actions adequate or meaningful given the situation? 
 
 
 
Guerillas and illegal armed groups used children as soldiers.  The 
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and ICBF estimated the 
number of children participating in illegal armed groups ranged 
from 10,000 to 13,000.  The penalty for leaders of armed groups who 
use child soldiers is life imprisonment.  The government, in 
conjunction with USAID, IOM, and UNICEF, provided services to 
former child soldiers and carried out public awareness campaigns to 
prevent the recruitment of children by armed groups. 
 
 
 
2E) GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON CHILD LABOR: 
 
 
¶1. Did the government have a policy or plan that specifically 
addresses exploitive child labor? Please describe. 
 
 
 
The GOC ratified ILO Convention 182 (Prohibition and Immediate 
Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor) in 
¶1999.  Subsequently, the GOC promulgated the Code of Childhood and 
Adolescence in 2006 (Law 1098).  In 2008, the MSP issued Resolution 
677 further delineating those activities considered to be the worst 
forms of child labor.  The GOC also has a National Strategy for 
Preventing and Eliminating the Worst forms of Child Labor and 
Protecting Child Workers (2008-2015), and a National Action Plan 
for Preventing and Eliminating Commercial Sexual Exploitation of 
Children and Adolescents (2006-2011). 
 
 
 
¶2. Did the country/territory incorporate exploitive child labor 
specifically as an issue to be addressed in poverty reduction, 
development, educational or other social policies, such as Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers, etc? Please describe. 
 
 
 
Strategies and policies addressing exploitive child labor formed 
part of the National Development Plan (2006-2010) and Millennium 
Development Goals. 
 
 
 
¶3. Did the government provide funding to the plans described above? 
Please describe the amount and whether it was sufficient to carry 
out the planned activities. 
 
 
 
The MSP budget for child labor administrative responsibilities was 
approximately USD$600,000.  The ICBF received about USD$6 billion, 
which was disbursed for the following program categories:  $3.4 
billion for removing children from the armed conflict; $2 billion 
for assisting children in circumstances of sexual exploitation; and 
$600,000 for attending to children dangerous and prohibited 
employment. 
 
 
 
¶4. Did the government provide non-monetary support to child labor 
plans?  Please describe. 
 
 
 
In the past decade, the GOC has provided institutional, 
informational, and other non-monetary support to a variety of 
international organizations, NGOs, and foreign governments aimed at 
eliminating the worst forms of child labor in Colombia, including 
four USG programs (three by DOL and one by USAID) totaling USD$10 
million.  The GOC has readily adopted best practices stemming from 
these projects and integrated them into its own national strategy 
and programming (reftel b). 
 
 
 
¶5. Provide any additional information about the status and 
effectiveness of the government's policies or plans during the 
reporting period in regard to exploitive child labor. 
 
 
 
The ICBF also identified and assisted 2,137 children working in 
 
 
illegal mining operations in 2009. Estimates of the total number of 
children who worked in illegal (artisanal) mining operations varied 
from 10,000 to 200,000. 
 
 
 
¶6. Did the government participate in any commissions or task forces 
regarding exploitive child labor? Was the commission 
 
active and/or effective? 
 
 
 
See response to 2D question 1.  No additional details were 
available. 
 
 
 
¶7. Did the government sign a bilateral, regional or international 
agreement to combat trafficking? 
 
 
 
On April 27, the ICBF signed a cooperation agreement with the ILO 
to reinforce its efforts to prevent and eliminate exploitive child 
labor.  Additionally, the Department of Cordoba and municipalities 
of Armenia, Cartagena, Cucuta, and Dosquebrades signed a voluntary 
accord on January 21 aimed at combating commercial sexual 
exploitation of children. 
 
 
 
2F) SOCIAL PROGRAMS TO ELIMINATE OR PREVENT CHILD LABOR: 
 
 
 
¶1. Did the government implement any programs specifically to 
address the worst forms of child labor? Please describe. (Please 
note that DOL will not consider anti-poverty, education or other 
general child welfare programs to be addressing exploitive child 
labor unless they have a child labor component.) 
 
 
 
See responses to 2C Section I above.  No additional details were 
available. 
 
 
 
¶2. Did the country/territory incorporate child labor specifically 
as an issue to be addressed in poverty reduction, development, 
educational or other social programs, such as conditional cash 
transfer programs or eligibility for school meals, etc? Please 
describe. 
 
 
 
See response to 2E question 2.  No additional details were 
available. 
 
 
 
¶3. Did the government provide funding to the programs described 
above? Please describe amount and whether it was sufficient to 
carry out the planned activities. 
 
 
 
N/A 
 
 
 
¶4. Did the government provide non-monetary support to child labor 
 
 
programs? Please describe. 
 
 
 
See response to 2E question 4. 
 
 
 
¶5. Provide any additional information about the status and 
effectiveness of the government's activities during the reporting 
period in relation to the programs described above. If the programs 
involved government provision of social services to children at 
risk of or involved in exploitive child labor, please describe and 
assess the effectiveness of these services. 
 
 
 
Colombian laws and strategies regarding exploitive child labor are 
comprehensive and should be adequate to address exploitive child 
labor.  However, resources were inadequate for effective 
enforcement. 
 
 
 
¶6. If the government signed one or more bilateral, regional or 
international agreement/s to combat trafficking, what steps did it 
take to implement such agreement/s? Did the agreement/s result in 
tangible improvements? If so, please describe. 
 
 
 
See response to 2E question 7. 
 
 
 
2G) CONTINUAL PROGRESS: 
 
 
 
¶1. Considering the information provided to the questions above, 
please provide an assessment of whether, overall, the government 
made progress in regard to combating exploitive child labor during 
the reporting period. In making this assessment, please indicate 
whether there has been an increase or decrease from previous years 
in inspections/investigations, prosecutions, and convictions; 
funding for child labor elimination policies and programs; and any 
other relevant indicators of government commitment. 
 
 
 
Despite resource challenges, evidence suggests that the GOC 
continues to invest significantly in preventing and eliminating 
exploitive child labor.  In 2009, the MSP took action in 155 
municipalities in 20 departments, identifying and assisting 22,572 
children in danger of the worst forms of child labor.  It also 
passed new legislation to expand and strengthen existing laws, 
including increasing penalties for cases of child exploitation. 
Moreover, the GOC has committed to doubling the number of official 
labor inspectors by the end of 2010, which should substantially 
improve enforcement.  It also implemented a regional action plan in 
cooperation with neighboring countries, and readily cooperated with 
international organizations such as Save the Children, Partners of 
the Americas, and the ILO. 
BROWNFIELD