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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 000084 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2020 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MARR KG
SUBJECT: KYRGYZSTAN SEEKS SIGNS FROM THE U.S. OF LONG-TERM 
COMMITMENT TO THE RELATIONSHIP 
 
REF: BISHKEK 51 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller, for Reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Action request para. 8. 
 
¶2.  (C) Summary:  The Government of the Kyrgyz Republic is 
actively reviewing the state of its relationships with the 
U.S., Russia, and China, seeking a balance which would best 
serve its interests.  A key concern of our interlocutors is 
what role the U.S. intends to play in Kyrgyzstan in the 
medium and long-term.  Signals, intentional or otherwise, 
which we give over the coming weeks may significantly affect 
Kyrgyz attitudes, and could affect our ability to use the 
Manas Transit Center and other valuable Kyrgyz transit 
routes.  End Summary. 
 
Trial Period 
------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) Numerous meetings with Foreign Minister Kadyrbek 
Sarbayev, Director of the Central Agency for Development (and 
son of the President of Kyrgyzstan) Maxim Bakiyev, and other 
officials of the Kyrgyz Republic over the past weeks have 
left us with the strong impression that we are in a "trial 
period" in Kyrgyzstan.  The Kyrgyz took an important step 
away from their closest international partner, Russia, and 
toward us in agreeing to host the Transit Center last year. 
They are running the balance on that decision right now. 
 
¶4.  (C) We are confident that that balance is now positive. 
Efforts to speed up the payment process for the second 
quarter of Manas Transit Center operations, the beginning of 
preliminary construction on the airport ramp project, the 
progress in disbursement and deliveries under our 
counternarcotics and counterterrorism programs, the upcoming 
visit by DOD to review the progress of the air traffic 
control upgrade program, efforts by the Transit Center to 
contract with Kyrgyz providers of goods, numerous 
humanitarian projects by the Transit Center, and a good deal 
of effective public diplomacy work have kept this ledger in 
the black. 
 
Long vs. Short Term Interest? 
----------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) However, the Kyrgyz remain very queasy about our 
long-term intentions.  Although we have been able to assuage 
early concerns that the U.S. policy in Afghanistan meant we 
would be out of that country by 2011, our interlocutors 
remain concerned that, over the next few years, our need for 
the Transit Center will evaporate and we will disappear.  We 
believe that the Russians, burned last year, are pressing a 
new set of talking points intent on convincing the Kyrgyz 
that the U.S. will turn out to be an unreliable partner and 
will soon leave.  Russia is pressing its desire to have a new 
base in southern Kyrgyzstan, and Kyrgyz opposition to that 
idea seems to be waning. 
 
Potential Regional Jealousies 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) The U.S. discussions with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
on access to other transportation facilities, and especially 
air transport facilities, also play into Kyrgyz concerns.  It 
will be crucial as we move forward on any of these options to 
ensure that the Kyrgyz do not get the impression that we are 
attempting to somehow "replace" the capabilities we have in 
Manas. 
 
Minimizing Risk of Renegotiation 
-------------------------------- 
 
BISHKEK 00000084  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Our concern is that while a long time frame and an 
assumption that the U.S. will be in Manas for many years 
makes the Kyrgyz easier to work with and more acquiescent to 
our needs, the growing belief that the U.S. is in the last 
year(s) of its tenure at Manas might well lead the Kyrgyz to 
become more demanding.  At its most problematic, it could 
lead to a decision on their part that they should reopen the 
Manas negotiations with an eye toward maximizing short-term 
benefits while we remain highly dependent on the Transit 
Center for our operations in Afghanistan.  At this point, we 
do not expect that to happen.  We do believe that it is 
crucial that the USG take steps to minimize such a 
possibility. 
 
¶8.  (C) Action Request:  In that regard, we request that the 
Department consider the following issues: 
 
--  We believe that it would be best to request renewal of 
the Transit Center Agreement as soon as possible.  The longer 
we wait, the more time the Kyrgyz have to speculate about our 
intentions. 
 
--  In requesting renewal of the Transit Center Agreement, we 
recommend using language suggesting that the USG would like 
to begin discussions of our long-term relationship and 
possible long-term access to facilities at Manas.  This issue 
should also be broached at the Annual Bilateral 
Consultations. 
 
--  Keeping-up contacts with Kyrgyzstan.  Where high level 
contacts are made with Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan, parallel 
contacts with Kyrgyzstan would make sense.  A Cabinet level 
visit to the Transit Center would pay huge dividends.  A high 
level meeting for the Kyrgyz Annual Bilateral Consultations 
delegation, to be headed by Maxim Bakiyev and FM Sarbayev, 
would also make a real difference. 
 
--  If we move forward with new air transit capabilities in 
another Central Asian country, it would help for us to 
provide the Kyrgyz Government with a heads-up, emphasizing 
that the capabilities we have at Manas are not being 
replaced. 
 
--  Maintaining assistance levels.  The Kyrgyz will be very 
sensitive to any changes in our level of support and 
engagement. 
GFOELLER