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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 000227 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2020 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO GM AF
SUBJECT: GERMAN GOVERNMENT SUCCEEDS IN WINNING LARGE 
MAJORITY IN FAVOR OF NEW ISAF MANDATE 
 
REF: 09 BERLIN 1554 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR GEORGE GLASS. REASONS: 1.4 
(B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  An overwhelming majority of opposition 
Social Democrats (SPD) joined the government parties on 
February 26 in supporting a new one-year mandate for the 
Bundeswehr in Afghanistan, which increases the authorized 
troop ceiling by 850 (including a 350-soldier reserve).  SPD 
Caucus Leader Steinmeier emphasized, however, that the SPD 
support was not based on confidence in the new government 
(which he said "it had not earned"), but rather on the clear 
"withdrawal perspective" contained in the mandate.  While the 
mandate does not include a fixed date for withdrawal, it does 
specify that the handover of security responsibility of 
certain provinces in the north will begin in 2011.  Even with 
the modest troop increase, the Bundeswehr is planning to 
implement an ambitious form of "partnering" with the Afghan 
National Army (ANA) in the north, based on the creation of 
two new "training and protection battalions."  While the 
broad support for the new mandate is clearly a political 
victory for the government, the process of deciding on the 
appropriate level of the troop increase has revealed that in 
the months ahead, FM Westerwelle's Free Democrats could end 
up being as much of a challenge on the military engagement as 
the SPD.  END SUMMARY. 
 
BROAD MAJORITY IN FAVOR OF MANDATE 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Bundestag vote was 429 in favor of the new 
mandate, 111 against, with 46 abstentions.  The level of 
support, therefore, was only slightly less than what the 
government obtained for a simple technical roll-over of the 
mandate in December (446-105-43).  While some opposition 
Social Democratic Party (SPD) leaders -- most notably 
Chairman Sigmar Gabriel -- had threatened in recent weeks to 
oppose any proposed increase in troops, the overwhelming 
majority of SPD parliamentarians in the end joined the two 
government parties -- Chancellor Merkel's Christian 
Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and FM 
Westerwelle's Free Democratic Party (FDP) -- in supporting 
the new mandate (113-16-8).  As usual, the entire Left Party 
caucus of 71 parliamentarians voted in block against the 
mandate, while the Greens split (8-21-35) as they have since 
Tornado reconnaissance aircraft were added to the ISAF 
mandate in 2007. 
 
MODEST TROOP INCREASE 
 
¶3. (C) As proposed by the government, the mandate increases 
the troop ceiling from the current 4,500 to 5,350.  However, 
only 500 of the 850 additional troops are authorized for 
full-time deployment; the other 350 are considered a 
"flexible reserve" which can only be deployed for "temporary 
periods" in reaction to "special situations" like providing 
security for the upcoming Afghan parliamentary elections. 
The mandate requires the government to brief the Bundestag 
Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees on any proposed 
deployment of the reserve.  While the mandate does not 
require the committees to give their permission, some MOD 
officials fear that it could be politically impossible to 
deploy the reserve without the broad support of the 
committees.  The mandate expressly allows the Bundeswehr to 
temporarily exceed the troop ceiling during changes in 
contingents, so the 350-troop reserve will not have to be 
used for this purpose. 
 
HIGH-WATER MARK FOR THE MILITARY ENGAGEMENT 
 
¶4. (C) This mandate, which runs for one year, expiring March 
1, 2011, is almost certainly the high-water mark for the 
German military engagement in Afghanistan.  The expectation 
is the government will come under great pressure to reduce 
the troop ceiling by at least some nominal amount when the 
mandate comes up for renewal next year, although much depends 
on the developments in Afghanistan over the next several 
months.  Neither the mandate nor the accompanying 
justification includes a fixed date for complete withdrawal. 
However, it does include the goal to begin the handover of 
security responsibility of certain provinces in the north to 
the Afghans beginning in 2011 and expressly endorses 
President Karzai's goal to have the Afghan national security 
forces (ANSF) take over full responsibility for the country's 
 
BERLIN 00000227  002 OF 002 
 
 
security within five years (i.e., by the end of 2014).  SPD 
Caucus Chair Steinmeier said in his Bundestag speech before 
the vote that the SPD would "follow very closely" whether the 
government "fulfilled its commitments" and "set the path for 
a step-by-step, successful withdrawal beginning in 2011."  He 
emphasized that this "withdrawal perspective" had been 
decisive in the SPD's decision to support the new mandate. 
 
RESTRUCTURING THE FORCE 
 
¶5. (C) While the troop ceiling will only be increased by 500, 
the Bundeswehr plans to increase the number of "trainers" 
deployed in the field working alongside the Afghan National 
Army (ANA) in operations from the current 280 to 1,400.  It 
will do this through restructuring of the current force and 
by creating two "training and protection battalions," one 
based in Mazar-e Sharif and the other in Kunduz.  The new 
battalion in Mazar-e Sharif will be organized around the 
existing quick reaction force, while the battalion in Kunduz 
will be organized around the four existing infantry companies 
there, which currently report to the PRT commander. 
According to the MOD Joint Commitments Staff Afghanistan Team 
Leader COL Harald Gante, most of the 500 additional soldiers 
to be sent to Afghanistan will be the engineers, logistics 
personnel and other support staff necessary to create the new 
battalions.  Only one additional platoon of infantry (30-40 
soldiers) will be deployed.  The new troops will start 
arriving in June and the battalions will be fully operational 
by October. 
 
GERMAN "TRAINERS" TO DO PARTNERING 
 
¶6. (C) Gante emphasized that the German "trainers" will in 
fact be carrying out the German concept of "partnering" with 
the ANA in the north.  The German battalion in Mazar-e Sharif 
will partner with the new 3rd Brigade of the 209th ANA Corps, 
while the Kunduz battalion will be paired with the 2nd 
Brigade.  Gante noted that the 1st ANA Brigade, currently in 
Mazar-e Sharif, will move to Meymaneh, where it is supposed 
to be the responsibility of Norway and the other Nordic 
countries.  Gante said the first mission of the German 
battalion in Mazar-e Sharif will be to deploy to the Baghlan 
Jadid district in Baghlan Province -- one of the eight ISAF 
priority districts in the north -- and conduct 
insurgency-clearing operations with the ANA.  The German 
battalion, in a complete break with past Bundeswehr practice, 
will not return to its home base in Mazar at the end of each 
day, but instead will stay in the district during the entire 
operation, until the clearing is complete and security 
responsibility can be handed off to the ANSF.  Gante said the 
expectation was that such an operation could last several 
weeks.  The German battalion will live and operate from a 
forward operating base (FOB) in the district, established and 
occupied jointly with the ANA.  Gante said that Germany 
essentially wanted to replicate, on a smaller scale, the 
"Moshtarak" operation currently being conducted in Helmand 
Province.  The first mission of the German battalion in 
Kunduz will be to carry out the same kind of operation in the 
Char Dara District of Kunduz Province, another ISAF priority 
district. 
COMMENT 
 
¶7. (C) The single most important consideration for Chancellor 
Merkel in considering a troop increase after the London 
Conference was keeping as many SPD parliamentarians on board 
with the ISAF mandate as possible.  In that sense, the 
government has scored a clear political victory in 
maintaining a broad political consensus on the way forward. 
As it turned out, the internal coalition negotiation on the 
troop increase -- given the rivalry between FM Westerwelle 
and Defense Minister zu Guttenberg -- turned out to be the 
most difficult, with Westerwelle at the last minute vetoing 
the original government proposal to increase the troop 
ceiling by 1000 and insisting on the lower 850 figure.  One 
potential trouble spot on the horizon is the fact that the 
government, in emphasizing the "training" aspect of the 
Bundeswehr mission, may not have adequately prepared the 
German people for the increased casualties that 
implementation of the new partnering concept could very well 
bring. 
Murphy